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Abstract
This thesis examines the musical cultures associated with extreme-right politics, 
considering not only what this music projects about extreme-right ideology, but also 
the various ways in which music functions as part of a political subculture. This 
analysis extends beyond the stereotypical extreme-right  music associated with the 
skinhead subculture, often referred to as Oi!, to incorporate extreme-right 
engagement with genres such as metal, folk, country  and classical music. The 
chapters explore various aspects of identity—including race, sexuality, gender and 
class—and their significance to and reflection through extreme-right music, as 
manifested in genre choices, lyrics, album artwork and the features of the music 
itself. The thesis also considers the way in which less explicit content is produced 
and the motivation behind this, the importance of myth and fantasy in extreme-right 
music, and the way that the conspiracist mindset—which is prevalent, albeit  not 
homogeneous, in extreme-right culture—is articulated both in extreme-right music 
and in the interpretation of mainstream music as antagonistic to extreme-right goals.
 Music is significant to extreme-right politics for a number of reasons. It is 
generally  understood to be an effective tool in the indoctrination and recruitment of 
individuals into extreme-right ideology  and politics, which is why music is 
sometimes freely  distributed, particularly to youths. The very  existence of this music 
can act  to legitimise extreme-right views through the implication that they are shared 
by its producers and audience. Music also acts as an important  tool for the imagining 
of an extreme-right community through its creation of a space to meet and create 
networks, a function consolidated by the media surrounding music, particularly 
websites, forums and magazines. As well as constructing the spaces for extreme-right 
communities, this music plays an important role in identifying the characteristics of 
those communities, in articulating what it is to be “us” as contrasted to “them.” 
Analysis of this music suggests that it has the ability to resolve the ideological 
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List of Abbreviations
This list  covers those abbreviations used frequently in the text, with geographical 
location included where appropriate:
B&H: Blood & Honour (International and generally  split into national chapters, 
 founded in Great Britain)
BNP: British National Party
EDL: English Defence League
FN: Front National (France)
KKK: Ku Klux Klan
NA: National Alliance (United States)
NF: National Front (Great Britain)
NPD: Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party  of 
 Germany)
RAC: Rock Against Communism (International, founded in Great Britain)
RAR: Rock Against Racism (International, founded in Great Britain)
SD: Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)
ZOG: Zionist Occupation Government—the conspiracist belief that Jews secretly 
 control a country, with the visible government merely a puppet regime. The 
 term seems to have originated in the United States (c.1976) but is a relatively 
 new addition to the canon of anti-Semitic conspiracies, and is in common 
 usage among the extreme right internationally.
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Introduction:
Constructions of Identity Through Music 
in Extreme-Right Subcultures
The attacks of Anders Behring Breivik in Norway on 22nd July 2011—and, to a 
lesser extent, the shootings perpetrated by Wade Michael Page in a Sikh temple in 
Wisconsin on 5th August 2012—are perhaps the most notorious modern examples of 
extreme-right activity, but the present-day  extreme right has not only made its mark 
through terrorist atrocities. Since the September 11th attacks on the World Trade 
Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. in 2001—and in some 
cases for a significant time before—the extreme right has been increasingly visible in 
local, national and international contexts, particularly in its embracing and 
appropriation of Islamophobia. The increasing electoral successes of extreme-right 
parties, and the encroachment of extremist rhetoric and policies into mainstream 
political discourse, have led to an increase in academic attention on the subject.
 A similar flurry of success and attention occurred in the early- to mid-1990s, 
and the academic scrutiny at that time included the musical culture of the extreme 
right. The significance of music to the extreme right in the 21st century has so far 
been relatively neglected, implying that it is less relevant to the current  movement on 
the whole. However, at its peak the extreme-right music scene was said to be a multi-
million dollar industry, and its musicians were able to appeal on an international 
scale. This thesis shows that, in contrast  to the implied insignificance of music in 
contemporary  extreme-right culture through its omission from recent research, music 
still has an important role. Comparisons of the four most significant extreme-right 
music-producing nations and their political context shows that this role is far from 
homogeneous. 
 Existing literature tends to treat the extreme-right music scene as if it is 
historic, or at least static. Focus has been generally on one, albeit highly significant, 
genre, referred to by  a variety  of terms such as “White Power Rock ’n’ Roll,” “Hate 
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Rock,” “Nazi Punk” and “Neo-Nazi Music.”1  This genre, primarily associated with 
the skinhead subculture, is still largely dominant in the United States and Germany, 
while in other countries the tightening of hate-speech laws and the modernisation 
programmes of extreme-right movements have marginalised it. Other genres are 
therefore being recruited into the extreme-right music scene, even in the United 
States, where folk and country music in particular are being exploited.
 There is a particular focus in this thesis on Germany, Great Britain, Sweden 
and the United States. Existing research has mostly concentrated on these countries, 
albeit usually in isolation; international assessments do exist, either in straight 
accounts of extreme-right  music in two countries2  or a more cursory summary  to 
contextualise a domestic situation.3
 There are two main reasons for choosing these four nations. Firstly, this is a 
study of the extreme right in a Western context, where the movement originally was
—and in some cases still is—based around vehement anti-Communism and anti-
Socialism. These subcultures all developed in nations with mainstream political 
opinion opposed to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and in this regard the 
extreme right were broadly aligned with national policy, if not in the intensity and 
form of their opposition. This is of course problematic in the case of Germany given 
its division into West and East during the Cold War, but it is clear that—like the 
dominant role of the capitalist state during reunification—it is the Western culture of 
skinheads and racism that dominates the contemporary  German scene, even if it is 
most prominent in the former Eastern Länder.
2
1 Timothy S. Brown, ‘Subcultures, Pop Music and Politics: Skinheads and “Nazi Rock” in England 
and Germany’, Journal of Social History, Vol.38, No.1, 2004, pp.157-78; Art Jipson, ‘Introduction to 
the Special Issue: Influence of Hate Rock’, Popular Music and Society, Vol.30, No.4, 2007, pp.
449-51; Ugo Corte and Bob Edwards, ‘White Power music and the mobilization of racist social 
movements’, Music and Arts in Action, Vol.1, No.1, 2008, pp.4-20.
2  For example, the summary of Germany and England in Brown, ‘Subcultures, Pop Music and 
Politics’.
3 Such as Corte and Edwards, ‘White Power music’,  which primarily refers to the United States but 
which refers to practices in other countries.
 A strong component within the extreme-right culture of Western Europe is the 
presence of what has variously  been called Nordicism, Germanism and Aryanism: 
the belief that the white peoples of North-West Europe are racially superior to the 
whites of Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as to other ethnicities. This is not a 
uniform belief across the entire Western extreme right; indeed, many  in the 
movement have spoken of the need to cooperate with ideological comrades outside 
the Nordic region in the construction of “Fortress Europe” in order to preserve 
European identity  in the face of immigration, and there has been support even in 
musical form for emergent allies in the former Soviet states and the new Balkan 
nations. However, “Aryan” ideals and lyrics have often permeated much of the music 
of the extreme right, and it is probably  no coincidence that Aryanism and neo-
Nazism have been important aspects of the extreme right in the countries studied.4 It 
is these countries in Western Europe (Germany, Great Britain, Sweden) and the 
United States that have driven the music scene forward, and frequently capitalised on 
its potential.
 Secondly, these four countries are the major producers of extreme-right 
cultural products, primarily music. Simultaneously, they appear to be the largest 
consumers of extreme-right music, though this point is harder to verify  given the 
absence of sales figures and the increase of piracy  and file-sharing over the last 
fifteen years. These nations have also been major touring destinations for bands, with 
a peak in the mid-1990s for festivals and concerts. While a number of factors might 
contribute to the proliferation of concerts, particularly local laws and lack of 
organised opposition to performances, the fact that many bands were able to make 
economically  viable tours of Germany and Sweden for a number of years, 
3
4 For academic work on the extreme right in Eastern Europe,  see Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), The Radical 
Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1999; Cas Mudde (ed.), Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe, London: Routledge, 2004; 
Hilary Pilkington, Al’Bina Garifzianova and Elena Omel’Chenko, Russia’s Skinheads,  London: 
Routledge, 2010. A scholar who frequently includes music in his analysis is Anton Shekhostov; see 
particularly ‘Apoliteic music: Neo-folk, Martial Industrial and “metapolitical fascism”’, Patterns of 
Prejudice,  Vol.43 No.5,  2009, pp.431-457; see also the chapters on White Power music in Hungary, 
Romania and the Czech Republic in Anton Shekhovtsov and Paul Jackson (eds.), White Power Music: 
Scenes of Extreme-Right Cultural Resistance, Ilford: Searchlight and RNM Publications, 2012.
particularly during the 1980s and 1990s—in what is essentially an amateur business 
in which musicians are usually unable to sustain themselves solely  through their 
music—suggests a significant fan-base in these countries. Other factors have since 
shown their importance, however; the outlawing of hate speech and Nazi 
glorification in Germany has diminished its viability  as a touring destination for 
foreign bands, with some prominent German musicians imprisoned for continuing to 
play, while the opposition of anti-Fascist campaigners in Sweden, and laws relating 
to hate speech, have hampered the ability  of the extreme right in their traditional 
practices. It is undoubtedly the trend of legislation that curbs the more graphic and 
confrontational of extreme-right music which has led to the scene slipping from 
academic and journalistic attention. Extreme-right music is still the subject of much 
scrutiny  in the United States, particularly from organisations such as the Anti-
Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center; it is likely that primacy  of 
free speech in the United States, which has prevented legislation which can inhibit 
extreme-right music, has meant that the scene there has been able to continue in 
much the same way as it always has.
 The opening chapter of this thesis considers the political history of the 
extreme right in each of these principal countries, as well as the musical cultures that 
these countries have engendered, and presents some factors which may have 
contributed to their primacy. It begins by  defining the terminology—not only 
“extreme right” but also far right, radical right, neo-Nazi etc.—used to assess the 
political parties and movements in question, and the characteristics which lead to 
their application. A thorough critique of these terms is required not only  to justify the 
terminology  used, but to highlight the common factors which unite these disparate 
movements. However, a comprehensive cross-border comparison of these groups is 
difficult, for though they are part of an international movement which presents itself 
as united, each is situated within and dependent on a specific historical and cultural 
context; while these groups may have enough in common to share campaign 
platforms and even funds—as well as creating alliances in bodies such as the 
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European Parliament—each depends on the particular circumstances of its home 
nation for its existence and support. A similar cultural specificity  is apposite in the 
consideration of the music scenes; put simply, the cultures of each country  have had 
a distinctive influence on the music they produce. 
 To simplify  the complexities, the political context of the extreme right in each 
country  is examined in isolation. This will allow for a deeper understanding of the 
context from which the music scenes emerged. Like most  research in this field,5 this 
analysis places a primacy on the influence of British band Skrewdriver. For this 
reason, due to the particular influence of its music scene on the other countries, 
Britain is examined first, followed by Germany and Sweden. The United States is 
assessed last due to its unique features, such as its long history of multi-racial 
immigration, and its own history of extreme-right music going back to the Ku Klux 
Klan. These countries are then analysed in a more comparative way through an 
analysis of the effects of censorship and hate-speech legislation in each.
 While Chapter One explores the political and historical context in these 
significant nations, Chapter Two is in part an account of why extreme-right music is 
deemed necessary, beyond its financial and recruitment potential. Given that 
extreme-right ideology contains many strands which espouse white supremacism, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that there is a tendency to believe that the extreme right—and 
the white race in general—are victims of conspiracies conducted by nefarious forces 
in order to keep them down. This chapter analyses not only the transmission of 
conspiracy theories through extreme-right music, but also the way that the movement 
views mainstream popular music. The latter has altered from an absolute dismissal of 
the form towards a more focused attack—not on the form itself, but on the way in 
which it is apparently used to promote a conspiratorial multicultural agenda. This ties 
in with the extreme-right tenet that mass culture, and the mass media, are conspiring 
5
5  For example, Helene Lööw, ‘White Noise Music: An International Affair’, Paper presented at 1st 
World Conference on Music and Censorship, Copenhagen 20-22 November 1998.  Available at 
Freemuse: http://www.freemuse.org/sw6649.asp, accessed 11 Sep 2011; Robert Futrell, Pete Simi and 
Simon Gottschalk, ‘Understanding Music in Movements: The White Power Music Scene’, 
Sociological Quarterly, Vol.47, 2006, pp.275-304.
against them. It is therefore seen as essential that  the extreme right establishes its 
own media, of which music is a fundamental component, in order to counteract the 
subversive and conspiratorial intentions of the mainstream.
 Chapter Three begins the detailed examination of the music itself through an 
analysis of genre identification, and its significance for projecting a “white” identity. 
By associating with and using genres which have as little identification with non-
white ethnicities as possible, or by claiming white identity for genres and ignoring 
their multicultural origins, the extreme right convey not  only the cultural styles they 
perceive to be explicitly  “white,” but also what it is they believe it means to be white. 
This chapter notes how this discourse has been changing over the past few years; 
whiteness has been invoked less as a marker of racial superiority, and more as a sign 
of cultural and ethnic distinctiveness. The use of less confrontational genres that 
highlight aspects of tradition, community and heritage—particularly folk music—
represents a major shift from the previous confrontational incitement and 
belligerence. However, the occasional presence of less emphatically “white” genres
—such as electro, pop and rap—speaks to another purpose of generic variation: the 
desire to appeal to youth cultures and the hope that mass cultural products will garner 
mass cultural appeal.
 The notion of mass appeal is also relevant in Chapter Four, which considers 
the significance of populism in extreme-right  rhetoric, particularly in regard to 
constructions of class. Populism is a difficult concept to define: it is variously 
referred to in context as a political ideology, a philosophy, or a style. Academic (and 
common) usage is inconsistent, tending towards political action, although the term is 
frequently used to describe extreme-right  parties, or policies associated with their 
ideology. In music, this is manifested in genres associated with the “ordinary 
people,” such as the punk association with street culture, heavy metal’s association 
with the working class, or folk music’s apparent origin among “the folk” themselves. 
Populism is just as apparent in the lyrics of songs; by adopting populist themes and 
language, political parties such as the BNP hope to extend their appeal beyond their 
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base in the alienated working class to broader society. This chapter considers the 
association of the extreme right with populism, particularly  in the portrayal of the 
working class with notions of decency, virtue and honesty. The chapter’s assessment 
of populism considers it  as a style, which the extreme right have begun to use as a 
means of portraying themselves as representing the decent communities of their 
nation, valuing the community and tradition. At the same time, the extreme right’s 
rhetoric contrasts the “people” with elites and with ethnic minorities (particularly 
Muslims and Jews), solidifying an attitude of “Us and Them” which is frequently 
articulated in the music they release and promote. Through this use of populism, the 
extreme right  is portrayed as a genuine contrast to the “elite” of established political 
parties, while also constructing an ideology  of what class means, and how the 
attributes of class, in varying manifestations, define national identity. In these 
definitions of national identity, immigrants are often cited as lacking the qualities the 
extreme right associate with class.
 One of the ways in which many extreme-right  supporters feel marginalised is 
in the loss of the privileged place of white males. While equal rights legislation is 
intended to promote equality, it is perceived by the extreme right as a tool of 
oppression, purposefully designed to keep  down the white race—which is 
understood primarily in terms of manhood—and providing benefits for women, 
homosexuals and ethnic minorities which their abilities do not merit. This 
interpretation reflects the overwhelming maleness of what might be called the 
mainstream extreme right, most visibly evident in the skinhead subculture and, with 
some exceptions, reflected in contemporary  political parties and the demographics of 
their support. Frequently, the portrayal of masculinity is intimately bound up with 
violence, with songs often valourising real and imagined exploits of warrior 
archetypes. Chapter Five explores the way in which extreme-right masculinity is 
constructed, the significance of violence to this construction, and the associations 
between music and violence. Music is important not only in communicating ideas 
about violence, but also in providing a space or context in which violence can be 
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enacted. The violent rituals integral to extreme-right concerts provide one example of 
this, as do a litany  of violent attacks on perceived enemies in which music has been 
cited as a factor. Music is also an important means of allowing musicians and 
listeners to imagine violence, which is understood as a purging force which will lead 
to a better world.
 The violent masculinity associated with the warrior identity is an important 
facet of the Viking imagery  which is commonly  adopted by  the extreme right, but 
this use also has a religious aspect. Chapter Six examines the lyrical and symbolic 
themes which have arisen to act as a surrogate for religion in Europe, with particular 
attention paid to the pagan revival of Nordic Gods. Religion is another facet used by 
the extreme right as a marker of why immigration is detrimental to the host society,6 
but while extremists have always been able to point to the incompatibility  of other 
religions with European culture, it has been much more difficult for them to claim a 
coherent religious identity for Europe, or even particular regions of it. Certainly, the 
extreme right in Europe have tended towards Protestantism,7  but  shared religion, 
rather than the fear of another, has never been a consistent  or reliable unifier in the 
movement. While these pagan gods originated in a fairly limited geographical space, 
they  have been adopted across Western Europe and the United States, with reports of 
an upswing in conversion to pagan religions. However, not all those who evoke this 
imagery do so for overtly  religious reasons, instead citing it  as a component in a 
broader narrative of myth-telling, attempting to emphasise the traditions that make 
regions and their inhabitants unique. At the same time, there is often an attempt to 
mythologise ideologically suitable events and figures and situate them within the 
8
6  For example,  pointing to the apparent incompatibility of Islam with the host countries’ liberal 
Western principles, and arguing that the maintenance of Western traditions of tolerance requires the 
legislation of intolerance towards Muslims. Such a practice is not necessarily new, being reminiscent 
of the blood libel accusations against Jews (the belief that Jews sacrificed Christian children to use 
their blood in certain religious rituals) which date back at least as far as the 12th century. Israel Yuval, 
Two Nations in Your Womb: Perceptions of Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Middle 
Ages, trans. by Barbara Harshav and Jonathan Chipman, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2006.
7  As seen in the support for Protestant Loyalists in Northern Ireland, or the hostility towards Papal 
Authority and the Catholic Church in general.
mythological canon, so, for example, one comes across songs which present Hitler 
and the Nazis as romanticised founding fathers of the extreme right. This 
preoccupation with myth also finds an outlet in the engagement of the extreme right 
with fantasy, often involving the interpretation of stories such as Tolkien’s Lord of 
the Rings as analogies for the struggle of the extreme right. In particular, fantasy 
depictions of the battle between good and evil are seen as representing the struggle 
between “indigenous” whites and immigrants.
 While extreme-right music has received a certain amount of academic 
attention, the current literature has neglected to acknowledge the diversity of musical 
forms and styles exploited by the extreme right. The musical style of the extreme 
right is generally characterised as having emerged from a deliberately  simplistic form 
of punk known as Oi! in the late 1970s, transforming into a more straightforward 
form of traditional rock in the 1980s. Often, these styles used lyrics with explicit 
National Socialist references, and bands tended to conform to skinhead stereotypes in 
their image. Attention to Oi! and rock certainly reflects the dominant component in 
the scene, but does not begin to cover the huge breadth of genres which have been 
adopted by the extreme right. There are even many in the movement (although they 
were increasingly marginalised during the 1980s and 1990s and are all but gone 
today) who would eschew popular music altogether, in favour of the “high culture” 
eminence of Western classical music. Similar arguments have been used about folk 
music, while a number of other genres—including pop, country and metal—have 
been exploited. This diversity  of genres is a major part of Chapter Seven, which 
explores the “softer” sides of extreme-right  music—particularly in terms of genre, 
lyrics and image—and the ideological justifications behind this usage. While this 
tendency is in part  a reaction to censorship, the chapter shows that these “softer” 
examples are also crucial in retaining a sense of community  and solidarity among 
those who find the prevalent musical styles unappealing.
 The notions of identity running throughout these chapters tie into the 
concluding remarks about the way music functions in extreme-right constructions of 
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identity, considering particularly what music itself contributes to these constructions, 
and why it is so integral to extreme-right subcultures. The contemporary extreme 
right—in line with its ideological predecessor, fascism—is often seen as an ideology 
of negativity: it is only deemed to be able to thrive in a context in which it can point 
to enemies. While this has some truth, the extreme right can only  truly  make inroads 
when it  appears to offer a positive alternative that is worth voting for; this is 
something that  it strives to do, and which many  voters believe it already does. 
Absolutely  central to the musical discourse of the extreme right is a particular notion 
of class, and it offers a romanticised account of class culture in an attempt to appeal 
to those who feel marginalised by the various effects of globalisation. It also offers a 
sense of what it is to be British, Swedish, German, American etc., and, on a broader 
level, what it is to be white. This thesis is intended not only to address the extreme-
right music scene as a modern phenomenon, rather than merely a historic one, but 
also to examine how it constructs its narratives of identity, through its use of 
concepts such as nationalism, class and myth.
 By exploring these different  and diverse aspects of extreme-right culture and 
ideology, this thesis extends scholarly attention beyond the often caricatured 
extreme-right archetypes of skinhead and Ku Klux Klan member—archetypes which 
do not adequately encompass the diversity of ideologies and identities found beneath 
the extreme-right umbrella. Such diversity in the ideology of racism has already been 
recognised by, among others, Étienne Balibar:
Certainly there is not a racist  philosophy, particularly since racist  thinking does 
not always assume a systematic form. Contemporary neo-racism directly 
confronts us today with a variety of historical and national forms: the myth of 
the “racial struggle,” evolutionist anthropology, “differentialist” culturalism, 
sociobiology and so on.8
Each of these aspects is certainly apparent throughout this thesis, but it is important 
to state that any characterisation of extreme-right politics as merely  an ideology  of 
racism is reductive. Not only is racism variously embraced and rejected by  extreme-
10
8  Étienne Balibar,  ‘Racism and Nationalism’, in Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein,  trans. by Chris 
Turner, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, London and New York: Verso, 1991, p.55.
right supporters, it is not the sole pillar of extreme-right ideology, and therefore 
cannot be conceived of as the sole appeal to voters and supporters: extreme-right 
politics also has much to say to its audience on matters such as gender, class and 
morality. This thesis demonstrates how analysis of the music of this political culture 
can reveal much about the multi-faceted nature of the contemporary extreme right, as 
well as showing more generally the fundamental roles that music is playing here in 
constructing and reflecting ideologies and identities.
Terminology
Chapter One includes an analysis of the various terms used to denote the extreme-
right political family, as well my own reasons for preferring the term “extreme right” 
and what I understand that term to encompass. Here I define some of the other 
important terms used in this thesis.
 The literature on extreme-right music is preceded by academic interest in 
skinheads from the perspective of subcultural theory, particularly  the work of John 
Clarke and Dick Hebdige.9 Skinheads have been central to most analyses of extreme-
right music, and the literature follows Clarke’s and Hebdige’s characterisation of 
them as a subculture.10 The characterisation of extreme-right music taking place in 
subcultural sites is evident in work that goes beyond skinheads.11 That said, there are 
numerous examples of other terms used interchangeably  with subculture; indeed, a 
passage in a work produced by the Anti-Defamation League headed “The Skinhead 
Scene” also refers to skinheads as a “movement,” a “phenomenon,” “gangs,” and a 
11
9  John Clarke, ‘The Skinheads & the Magical Recovery of Community’, in Stuart Hall and Tony 
Jefferson (eds.), Resistance Through Rituals: Youth subcultures in post-war Britain, London: 
Hutchinson, 1976, pp.99-105; Dick Hebdige, Subculture: the meaning of style, London: Routledge, 
1979.
10  Cf.  John M. Cotter, ‘Sounds of Hate: White Power Rock and Roll and the Neo-Nazi skinhead 
subculture’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.11, 1999, pp.111-140; Brown, ‘Subcultures,  Pop 
Music and Politics: Skinheads and “Nazi Rock” in England and Germany’.
11  Devin Burghart (ed.), Soundtracks to the White Revolution: White Supremacist Assaults on Youth 
Music Subcultures, Chicago: Center for New Community, 1999.
“way of life.”12  This diversity of terms, alongside the lack of explanation of or 
engagement with what “subculture” means, suggests that the term is employed to 
assert the collective character of skinheads and that there are identifiable features 
which distinguish them as a distinctive group.
 I use the term subculture in a similar way, to distinguish between the various 
groups associated with extreme-right ideology, such as skinheads, neo-Pagans and 
militia members, terms and affiliations which members are likely  to apply to 
themselves. These could be described as sub-groups, but subculture communicates 
the importance of cultural factors to the construction of subcultural identity, with 
music, fashion, and even ideological nuance important to each subculture. I 
emphasise the plurality  of these subcultures to highlight that there is no one unified, 
absolute incarnation of a particular subculture—particularly given the national 
variations outlined in Chapter One—and to emphasise the diversity that  can be 
accommodated under the umbrella term “extreme right.”
 “Scene” is a term which is also regularly applied to extreme-right groupings 
and has no absolute common usage, but it  is generally applied when making 
particular reference to a specific musical culture. Thus, collections published by 
Searchlight specifically  about music cultures are subtitled “Inside the International 
Nazi Skinhead Scene” and “Scenes of Extreme-Right Cultural Resistance.”13 I use to 
term scene to refer to the components of the musical culture of the extreme right, not 
only the music itself, but the infrastructure and media which surrounds it: record 
labels, gigs, music magazines, music websites. Scene is similar to subculture in that 
music is an important aspect of subcultural belonging, but I make a distinction since 
involvement with and liking for certain aspects of a music scene do not necessarily 
entail identification with or membership  of a particular subculture. Although it is 
divisible into “sub-scenes”—such as the skinhead music scene or the heavy metal 
12
12  The Skinhead International: A Worldwide Survey of neo-Nazi Skinheads,  New York: Anti-
Defamation League, 1995, p.5.
13  Nick Lowles and Steve Silver (eds.),  White Noise: Inside the International Nazi Skinhead Scene, 
London: Searchlight, 1998; Shekhovtsov and Jackson, White Power Music.
scene—I generally use “scene” as an umbrella term, to incorporate all of the music 
(and its associated media and infrastructure) associated with the extreme right. 
 In the conclusion I discuss the ways in which music plays a role in 
constituting “community.” Clearly, the processes described also play  a part in 
constituting subcultures and scenes, but I make a distinction because music can play 
a role in engendering a sense of community beyond these groupings. These processes 
need not take place within subcultures, nor can the community  they constitute 
necessarily be regarded as a subculture or scene. Extreme-right music may play an 
important, even distinctive, role specific to subcultures and scenes, but that does not 
mean the same music cannot simultaneously play an important role in the imagining 
of a community beyond that subculture and scene. For example, music associated 
primarily  with the skinhead subculture or the heavy metal scene can also be invoked 
as emblematic of the wider extreme-right community.
 Finally, I use “identity” as something of an umbrella term to capture some of 
the most prominent traits that extreme-right music and ideology  are concerned with, 
particularly in terms of gender, race, class, religion and politics, all significant in the 
construction of a dichotomy  between belonging to “us” and identifying “them.” 
Identity is not fixed, but an ongoing process;14  there is no absolute identity that is 
being uncovered in extreme-right music, rather music is playing an important  role in 
constructing a collective identity for its listeners. Moreover, music plays a significant 
role in exposing what the extreme right sees as the crucial aspects of identity, how 
they  ought to be articulated, and what their political significance is. This is 
particularly evident in the following chapters on race, class and gender, in which 
competing narratives vie for position as the proper articulation of extreme-right 
identity.
13
14  Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex, London: Routledge, 1993; 
Simon Frith, ‘Music and Identity’, in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay, Questions of Cultural Identity, 
London: SAGE Publications, 1996, pp.108-127.
Literature Review
There is an existing body of literature on extreme-right music, albeit small, which 
has been extremely helpful in the course of this work. There are two main reasons 
why this literature is often unsatisfactory, or at  least insufficient. First, much of it 
dates from the 1990s, meaning that although it is helpful in understanding extreme-
right music and its development, it is only characteristic of a particular historical 
moment. Second, much of this literature concentrates solely on the music most often 
associated with the skinhead subculture, that  is, confrontational and explicit material, 
most often in a rock style. This focus, while representative of the dominant strand of 
the extreme-right music scene, is somewhat reductive in its assessment of the genres 
in use and of the tastes of extreme-right supporters.
 Among the most important works in the gestation of this thesis is the edited 
collection White Noise,15 which details the rise of extreme-right music in Britain, and 
its spread to Germany, Sweden, Poland and the USA. The book suffers for each of 
the reasons above, but it is also notable that  it has almost nothing to say about  the 
music itself, instead focusing on the individuals and organisations behind it. Even so, 
the chapters in the collection have been most helpful in providing an overall 
impression of the history  and evolution of the extreme-right  music scene up to the 
point of its publication.
 The Anti-Defamation League, a civil rights group based in the US A , 
produced a survey  of the neo-Nazi skinhead subculture in many countries around the 
world.16  While again out of date, it provides an overview of the global skinhead 
subculture, with nation-specific details. Another edited collection from the United 
14
15  Nick Lowles and Steve Silver (eds.),  White Noise: Inside the International Nazi Skinhead Scene, 
London: Searchlight, 1998.
16  The Skinhead International: A Worldwide Survey of neo-Nazi Skinheads,  New York: Anti-
Defamation League, 1995.
States, Soundtracks to the White Revolution,17  provided useful details and contexts 
on various subjects, particularly in the chapters on metal.
 While these works have been valuable in providing histories and contexts for 
extreme-right music, they are not scholarly  works and as such do not engage with or 
analyse the musical products and culture of the extreme right in any  meaningful way, 
instead providing an overview of the extreme-right scene and the individuals and 
groups behind it. Several academic articles have been published on extreme-right 
music, but they are too short to explore the subject in great depth, and are generally 
restricted to the “White Power” manifestation of the extreme right.
 Among the more recent of these academic works is the analysis by Ugo Corte 
and Bob Edward of how “White Power” music mobilises racist social movements,18 
particularly in cultivating a collective identity, but also in recruiting new followers 
and making financial gain. The article’s focus on youth is particularly distinctive and 
it contains useful interview material with supporters, though its limited length means 
its analysis must be somewhat cursory; it is perhaps for this reason that it is mostly 
restricted to American extreme-right music. However, as a concise introduction to 
extreme-right music it is perhaps unmatched.
 An up-to-date assessment of the extreme-right music scene published during 
my studies, White Power Music,19  contains information on the current scene in 
various European countries, as well as examining aspects such as issues of gender 
and censorship in extreme-right music. This work was particularly  useful in 
providing recent information and context concerning the music scenes in Sweden 
and Germany.
 Other significant work includes Futrell, Simi and Gottschalk’s analysis of 
how music allows extreme-right activists to cultivate a sense of local, translocal and 
15
17  Devin Burghart (ed.), Soundtracks to the White Revolution: White Supremacist Assaults on Youth 
Music Subcultures, Chicago: Center for New Community, 1999.
18 Corte and Edwards, ‘White Power music and the mobilization of racist social movements’.
19 Shekhovtsov and Jackson, White Power Music.
virtual communities,20  although their focus is mainly on how extreme-right 
communities use music and not on how music facilitates such uses; Timothy Brown’s 
in-depth history of skinhead music (or, as he calls it, “Nazi Rock”) in the United 
Kingdom and its adoption in Germany;21  and Roger Sabin’s chapter on punk’s 
ambiguous relationship with racism which, although concerned predominantly with 
“mainstream” punk, has much useful information on racism within punk and why the 
genre had the potential to be appropriated by the extreme right.22
 The relationship between extreme-right music and “whiteness” explored in 
Chapter Three is not unprecedented; Les Back includes a chapter on skinhead music 
in his and Vron Ware’s collection of essays on various aspects of “whiteness” and its 
study.23  However, while the rest of that book seeks to interrogate “whiteness” and 
establish parameters for its study, the chapter on “White Power Music” is more 
focused on the increasing use of the Internet by the extreme right and the possibilities 
that cyberspace has opened up, with whiteness essentially reduced to racism. In 
addition, there are a number of factual errors in Back’s chapter which suggest that 
the engagement with the extreme-right music scene has been superficial at best: the 
more prominent of these are the crediting of Skrewdriver’s ‘The Snow Fell’ to 
RaHoWa (who covered it), even though Skrewdriver are cited in detail as 
fundamental to extreme-right music; while the hoax symphony orchestra of the Ku 
Klux Klan—the work of notorious prankster Alan Abel—is cited as legitimate and 
evidence of elite taste within a certain strand of the extreme right.24 Back does make 
some reference to distinctions made between “white” and “black” music, but he does 
not explore how this distinction is established, what purpose it  serves, and the extent 
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20 Futrell, Simi and Gottschalk, ‘Understanding Music in Movements’.
21 Brown, ‘Subcultures, Pop Music and Politics’.
22 Roger Sabin, ‘“I won’t let that Dago by”: Rethinking punk and racism’, in Sabin (ed.),  Punk Rock: 
So What? The Cultural Legacy of Punk, London: Routledge, 1999, pp.199-218.
23  Vron Ware and Les Back, Out of Whiteness: Color, Politics,  and Culture. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002, pp.94-132.
24 Ibid., fn.62 p.115 & p.114.
to which it is predicated on mainstream tendency to label particular musics as 
“black.”
 Along with the literature primarily concerned with the extreme right, it is 
appropriate to acknowledge Rosenthal and Flacks’s Playing for Change, which 
accounts for extreme-right music in its argument.25  The authors do a fine job of 
analysing the way that  music functions within political movements through a 
combination of case studies, interviews, and song analyses. However, at one point 
they  claim that “Oi! music played a peripheral role in the skinhead movement in 
England where it was created, but a central role in the United States.”26  This 
comment is puzzling since the most popular Oi! bands in Britain sustained their 
careers for many years and, particularly in the case of Skrewdriver, were esteemed as 
musical heroes of the extreme right in general. Such a statement suggests that while 
Rosenthal and Flacks’s analysis of how music functions in the context of political 
movements is highly useful in assessing the music culture of the extreme right, their 
sections on the extreme-right music scene itself are not necessarily the most reliable 
sources.
 Finally, there is much work on the “modernised” extreme right in the realm of 
political theory which has been most useful to my research. This scholarly focus on 
party  political manifestations of the extreme right means it does not concern itself 
with music, but it  has been particularly useful in contextualising the processes and 
purposes of the “new” extreme right. Particularly  valuable literature includes the 
essays on the new extreme right in the Western world,27  Eatwell and Goodwin’s 
collection on the “new extremism” of the BNP (examined alongside the rise of 
17
25  Rob Rosenthal and Richard Flacks, Playing for Change: Music and Musicians in the Service of 
Social Movements, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2011.
26 Ibid., p.200.
27 Roger Eatwell and Cas Mudde (eds.),  Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge, 
London: Routledge, 2004.
Islamic extremism)28 and Jens Rydgren’s work on Sweden.29 The best of this work 
integrates empirical research and voter data with ideological and discourse analysis 
to portray both the “supply” and “demand” aspects of the extreme right, looking at 
how extreme right movements and parties develop, and how their rhetoric finds a 
sympathetic audience.
Methodology
Early on in this research, it became clear that interviews and contact with musicians, 
politicians and supporters of the extreme right would not be feasible. Approaches to 
the British National Party  were rebuffed due to the party’s ban from campuses by the 
National Union of Students, and it was likely  that given extreme-right hostility 
towards academia—perceived as part of the “liberal elite”—this would be a common 
response. Furthermore, the difficulties in communicating with German and Swedish 
activists (languages of which I have limited knowledge), as well as the practical 
challenges in locating activists across a range of countries—particularly  given the 
secrecy with which extreme-right activities are generally carried out—meant that any 
ethnographic ambition would have prolonged this research beyond practicality. 
 Similar considerations precluded the possibility  of attending gigs, perhaps the 
prime means of physical congregation for extreme-right activists. A particular 
obstacle was that in Britain, where I was based for the majority  of this research, live 
concerts seem to have become more infrequent, and those that are staged are often 
restricted to an inside group to minimise the potential for anti-fascist disruption. 
However, it was possible to garner information on extreme-right gigs from both 
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28 Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin (eds.), The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain,  London: 
Routledge, 2010.
29 Jens Rydgren,  ‘Is Extreme Right-wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New 
Party Family’,  European Journal of Political Research Vol.44 No.3, 2005, pp.413-437; ‘Sweden: The 
Scandinavian Exception’, in Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (eds.), Twenty-First Century 
Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008, pp.135-150; ‘Radical Right-wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining 
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primary and secondary  literary  sources, as well as from concert footage and 
recordings.
 While a lack of extreme-right contact was perhaps prudent in the context of 
my personal safety—given the threats against researchers, and the existence of 
websites dedicated to disseminating personal information about the extreme-right’s 
enemies30—I do not believe it detracted meaningfully from the progression of my 
research. This is because the media through which the extreme right communicate 
may be well hidden or marginalised, but they are not exclusive or invisible.
 In my engagement with extreme-right cultures, I made a distinction between 
what might be referred to as “centralised” or official ideology, and devolved ideology 
or the ideology of the audience. In musical terms, this distinction is illustrated by 
musicians, producers and distributors in the former category, and fans in the latter; in 
political terms, political parties, groups, movements and significant individuals make 
up the former category, supporters and voters the latter. Clearly, these ideological 
categories cannot be considered as homogeneous, and it  is often disagreements and 
schisms which reveal most about extreme-right culture, but they do entail different 
methodological processes in acquiring data.
 Before the Internet, centralised ideology  was disseminated mainly through the 
printed word; extreme-right supporters can be separated by large geographical 
distances, as well as being wary of the stigma associated with publicly declaring their 
political allegiance.31 A primary method of connection in the extreme right, as well 
as party-specific propaganda, was through music magazines, which remained 
important for a significant period despite the potential of the Internet. As well as 
including band interviews and music reviews, these magazines often include explicit 
statements on ideological positions, as well as philosophical debates, often related to 
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30  Cf. the website ‘Redwatch’ (www.redwatch.org), which publishes photographs and personal 
information of anti-fascist and “Marxist” individuals; see also Les Back’s comments on receiving hate 
messages after being criticised in the BNP’s Spearhead magazine in Vron Ware and Les Back, Out of 
Whiteness: Color, Politics, and Culture. Chicago: University of Chigaco Press, 2002, pp.33-34.). 
31  Robert Futrell and Pete Simi, ‘Free Spaces, Collective Identity, and the Persistence of U.S. White 
Power Activism’, Social Problems, Vol.51 No.1, Feb 2004, pp.16-42.
music. I have used material from various magazines from each of the main countries 
studied: Blood & Honour magazine of Britain and Germany, Nordland of Sweden, 
and Resistance from the USA. Also useful are the magazines of anti-fascist 
organisations, particularly  Britain’s Searchlight and Sweden’s Expo, which include 
information about and quotes from the extreme right. This information was 
fundamental to constructing an overall perspective of the extreme right.
 The extreme right were early adopters of the Internet, using it for 
messageboards, information pages and forums. This has increased the transmission 
capabilities of centralised ideology  (not only through the written word but also 
through Internet TV and Radio), and has also facilitated the creation of spaces for 
extreme-right supporters to come together and have their voice heard. Undoubtedly 
the most significant of the latter is the website Stormfront, founded by former Ku 
Klux Klan leader Don Black, a forum which, although based in the United States, 
has an international reach and membership. There are alternative forums often 
catering specifically  to certain niches of extreme-right support; among the more 
significant is the Vanguard News Network Forum, which is particularly antagonistic 
towards Stormfront and the latter’s policy of censoring racist language.
 Online forums are perhaps the pre-eminent means of connection and 
communication among extreme-right supporters. As of 21st August 2013, Stormfront 
claims 272,378 members, as well as 49,923 “guest” visitors over the previous 24 
hours (the site states that the highest number of guests online over a 24-hour period 
was 189,334), clearly  a significant  community. However, these statistics ought to be 
treated with caution, considering Stormfront undoubtedly has a substantial number of 
academics (myself included), anti-fascists and trolls amongst its membership,32 while 
the remainder will not necessarily comprise of wholly  indoctrinated supporters or 
regular site visitors. Nevertheless, websites such as this are a significant space for 
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forum/, accessed 21 Aug 2013.
extreme-right supporters to come together, network, socialise, debate and discuss 
topics they consider important.
 I have registered with most of these websites in order to obtain more 
extensive access, but have refrained from posting. At times, particularly during 
extended trawls for data, I have been tempted to introduce topics and questions 
related to my  research. However, I have maintained this silent approach as I have 
tried as far as possible to limit my analysis to subjects supporters feel important 
enough to instigate discussion about themselves.
 The music itself has also been gathered mainly online. Some extreme-right 
music is available through conventional channels such as YouTube, while online 
sellers offer samples, and I have been fortunate enough to access the archives of the 
anti-fascist archive APABIZ. The most pervasive current method of distributing 
music, however, is through the sharing of .zip  and .rar files through file-sharing 
websites. Not only is this method shared by many who listen to extreme-right music, 
it also gives an indication of relative popularity, as downloaders must “thank” posters 
for music, which results in a list  of thankers, and thus an indication of how desirable 
or popular certain music is. This indication is invaluable, particularly  since there are 
no sales figures for extreme-right music in circulation, the closest thing being lists of 
top sellers on merchandisers’ websites. The free availability of extreme-right music 
has been the subject of debate between supporters: since this is primarily a 
“message” music, many advocate its free distribution; others argue that downloading 
is “a form of communism,”33 taking money away  from the extreme-right cause. Even 
so, the Internet has allowed comprehensive access to extreme-right music (including 
scans of album sleeves and the CDs themselves) for those who know where to look.
 Lyrics are undoubtedly  more important in extreme-right music than in many 
other forms of popular music: often, this music is valued for its message first and its 
aesthetic second. While this research shows that aesthetic, particularly  in terms of 
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performance style and genre, carries its own important message, lyrics have been a 
prime resource for my understanding of extreme-right music. The value of lyrics in 
extreme-right music is clearly  recognised; it is rare to find music released without the 
lyrics in an accompanying booklet, and there are a number of websites which 
aggregate them as well. While I have used these booklets and websites in my 
transcription of lyrics, I have always checked texts by listening to the music.
 Clearly, recognition of the particular significance of lyrics to extreme-right 
music does not eradicate the difficulties associated with analysing lyrics. It is of 
course problematic to assume that any form of communication has a single absolute 
meaning, and that this is what listeners will perceive. In addition, even in a scene 
such as this which places such an emphasis on lyrics, it does not follow that all 
listeners will value, or even comprehend, lyrics to the same extent; this is particularly 
true in genres such as National Socialist Black Metal, in which vocal delivery  can 
consist of incomprehensible shouts.
 I agree with Walser when he states that “verbal means are only a fraction of 
whatever it is that  makes musicians and fans respond to and care about popular 
music,”34 and for this reason I devote attention to non-verbal qualities of the music, 
such as timbre, rhythm, harmony, melody, and instrumentation. In particular, I have 
sought to explore the contexts and histories which reveal how aesthetics and genres 
develop and how they come to be seen as in keeping with extreme-right ideology. As 
well as this analysis of musical components and their interpretation, I have included 
analysis of artwork connected to music, both in album artwork and in magazines and 
online. It is interesting to note that album artwork frequently takes the form of 
illustrations rather than photographs, allowing for freer and more idealistic 
representations and reflections of ideology.
 Through these processes, I have sought to investigate the musical products of 
the extreme right, as well as the various discourses surrounding this music. Music is 
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Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1993, p.26.
not only  used to indoctrinate and recruit—although this process, and its importance 
to the extreme right, does arise throughout  the text—but also plays a role in 
constructing and reflecting extreme-right ideology. Through this investigation, it 
becomes clear that  extreme-right music is crucial not only in appealing, even 





What “Extreme Right” Means and Who It Describes:
Context, Definitions and Histories
“In the final days of our story;
Before the night falls for the last time;
We're marching out on the fields of glory;
We have one last chance to let the sun shine.”
Brutal Attack, ‘Fields of Glory’, When Odin Calls, Destiny Records, 1998.
“We are a Sweden-friendly party that seeks a high level of community and 
belonging in society. We wish for a warmer society where people feel safe and 
caring by taking responsibility for each other. The community is a prerequisite for 
jointly-financed welfare policies, low crime and a functioning labour market.”1
Sweden Democrats, ‘Vår politik’ (‘Our Policies’), 
http://sverigedemokraterna.se/var-politik/, accessed 9 Dec 2013.
“We, the Members, in exercise of our inherent freedom of association, freedom of 
thought, freedom of belief, freedom of opinion, freedom of conscience, freedom of 
expression, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom to hold private 
property and freedom of agreement, have come into association….”
Article 2.1 of the BNP constitution (edition 12.3), 2011, p.5.
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1  “Vi är ett Sverigevänligt parti som eftersträvar en hög grad av gemenskap och samhörighet i 
samhället. Vi önskar oss ett varmare samhälle där människor känner trygghet och visar omtanke 
genom att ta ansvar för varandra. En förutsättning för en gemensamt finansierad välfärdspolitik,  låg 
brottslighet och en fungerande arbetsmarknad är den gemenskapen.”
This chapter sets out the contexts in which extreme-right music has developed. Any 
research into the extreme right, particularly with an international scope, has to 
contend with the ambiguity  of what “extreme right” represents. Therefore, before 
setting out the historical context of extreme-right music in the countries under study, 
it is important to outline what I mean by “extreme right,” and to explore other terms 
often applied to extreme-right groups in order to gain a fuller understanding of the 
ideology and origins of the contemporary extreme-right political family. I refer to 
groups which work against the extreme right—such as the British magazine 
Searchlight or Sweden’s Expo, or more generally  to protestors who mobilise against 
the extreme right—as “anti-fascist” as this is how they  generally refer to themselves. 
In addition, when I quote from external sources I do not alter their preferred term, so 
terms such as “radical right” and “fascist” occur in the text.2
 It is essential to adopt  a sufficiently wide definition of extreme-right music in 
order to include all the relevant material. Most extreme-right music has come from 
the skinhead subculture, or from groups with explicitly neo-Nazi ideologies, and this 
is reflected in the existing literature on the topic. However, this narrow focus means 
that certain developments have gone unrecognised, such as the musical activities of 
the BNP since around 2000, or the musical ideology of the Norwegian terrorist 
Anders Behring Breivik. My broader definition of the extreme right allows for these 
musics and ideologies to be considered together, rather than as seemingly disparate 
phenomena.
 The chapter goes on to examine the political and musical contexts of the 
extreme right in Great Britain, Germany, Sweden and the United States. As outlined 
below, these countries have been the most significant producers of extreme-right 
music, but the significant variations between them make it difficult to generalise 
about the extreme right as an international phenomenon. Even so, the extreme-right 
music scene does have international dimensions, but these are modified according to 
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national circumstances; this is demonstrated through a comparison of the effect of 
censorship on extreme-right music and its distribution in each of these countries.
Fascism, Nazism
When George Orwell engaged with the question “What is Fascism?”3 he suggested 
that the “average thinking person” would point to the Italian and German regimes, 
but thought this unsatisfactory due to the differences between them in structure and 
ideology. Orwell’s essay, published in 1944, argued that while Fascism as applied to 
Japan, Germany or Italy was generally understood, it had lost its meaning in 
domestic politics. Orwell showed that the term was readily applied in print to 
Conservatives, Socialists, Communists, Trotskyists, Catholics, war resisters, 
supporters of the war and nationalists, and verbally  to “farmers, shopkeepers, Social 
Credit, corporal punishment, fox-hunting, bull-fighting, the 1922 Committee, the 
1941 Committee, Kipling, Gandhi, Chiang Kai-Shek, homosexuality, Priestley's 
broadcasts, Youth Hostels, astrology, women, dogs and I do not know what else.” 
Despite this ambiguity, Orwell did see three underlying meanings to fascism: a 
difference between fascist and democratic regimes; if taken to mean “in sympathy 
with Hitler” a certain logic to some of its application; and thirdly, an emotional 
significance on the part of the user. This latter meaning feeds into “fascist” as a term 
of abuse; Orwell references it again in a 1946 essay in which he states that fascism is 
meaningless other than to describe “something not desirable.”4
 The use of “fascist” or “Nazi” as terms of abuse is still common, and has 
contributed to making the terms relatively meaningless. Despite the fact that both 
Italian Fascism and German Nazism drew on aspects of left- as well as right-wing 
ideology, they are generally  associated with the right and particularly with 
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authoritarianism and totalitarianism.5 Nevertheless, they have been used in a number 
of contexts to suit a variety of arguments. For example, conservative columnist Jonah 
Goldberg claims in his book Liberal Fascism that fascism is actually a product of the 
left, and that contemporary  liberal politics, and American society, are fascist. 
Goldberg draws comparisons between fascism and identity politics in an attempt to 
prove his point, ignoring inconsistencies and the basis of fascism in ideas of nation 
and race rather than class.
 In contrast to Goldberg’s thesis, fascism is not  a precursor of the modern left 
any more than the mainstream right is fascism’s successor; rather, fascism drew on 
some political and intellectual ideas that would influence the contemporary left, as 
well as some which would form the right. The terms “extreme right” and “far right” 
are therefore somewhat misleading as they  imply the ultimate end on the left-right 
continuum; rather, these ideologies incorporate aspects from both sides of the left-
right divide.
 Goldberg’s work is in part predicated on the “empty signifier” nature of 
fascism. This is reflected in the lack of academic consensus over what “fascism” 
actually describes. Roger Griffin’s definition of fascism as palingenetic 
ultranationalism—predicated on a myth of the coming rebirth of the nation, itself 
based on the land of an ethnic people—has gained some consensus as the “fascist 
minimum.”6 Other commonly cited features of fascism are its nature as a byproduct 
of modernity,7 its view of the world in terms of nations rather than classes, and its 
authoritarian or totalitarian nature. Fascism was also depicted as a crusade rather 
than merely a political ideology, with the goal of perfecting the nation through the 
cleansing of “evil” aspects.8
28
5 Authoritarianism and totalitarianism are concepts that are, of course,  not restricted to the right of the 
political spectrum, but these aspects are considered crucial in differentiating Fascism and Nazism 
from other political ideologies of the right.
6 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1991.
7 Michael Mann, Fascists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.1.
8 Ibid., p.8.
 Fascism arose in Italy; as well as being the home of the first fascist regime, 
the very  word is Italian.9  The differences between the Italian Fascist and German 
Nazi regimes highlight the geographically specific nature of Fascism. This was 
acknowledged by  Oswald Mosley, leader of the British Union of Fascists, which was 
inspired mainly by Mussolini:
Fascism was in essence a national creed, and therefore by definition took an 
entirely different form in different  countries. In origin, it was an explosion 
against intolerable conditions, against  remediable wrongs which the old world 
had failed to remedy. It was a movement to secure national renaissance by 
people who felt themselves threatened with decline into decadence and death 
and were determined to live, and live greatly.10
Fascism depended on there being a strong sense of nationalism in order to present the 
populace with enemies, both within and without, and the idea that the nation could be 
“purified” if cleansed of these enemies. While German fascist ideology was 
concerned with race, and therefore able to make enemies out of “Others” such as the 
Jews, Italian Fascism did not originally attribute much significance to ideas of racial 
purity.
 The Italian model was based around “nation-statism” and “organic” 
nationalism, an ideology which believed in “(1) an enduring national character, soul, 
or spirit, distinguishable from that of other nations, (2) their [nationalists’] right  to a 
state that  would ultimately express this, and (3) their [nationalists’] right to exclude 
minorities with different characters, who would only  weaken the nation.”11 Clearly, 
the latter component could incorporate racism and ethnic discrimination, but in the 
early years of Fascism was more likely  to target communists, socialists and anti-
Fascists. Racism towards “people of colour” was commonplace, but arguably no 
more so than in other European countries, while, in contrast to Nazi Germany, anti-
Semitism was so marginal to Fascism that Jews held prominent positions in the 
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Italian government. Mussolini only adopted racial laws in 1936 (fourteen years after 
coming to power), and more substantially with the “racial laws” of 1938, as a 
reaction to a perceived faltering in the Fascist  revolution and in anticipation of 
colonial projects in Libya and Ethiopia, as well as in deference to the growing 
influence of Nazi Germany over Italian politics.12
 Nazism developed as a variant  of fascism, but it has particular features which 
distinguish it from the Italian model. While Mussolini’s Italy emphasised the state, 
Nazism advocated a particular kind of nationalism, emphasising the importance of 
race and incorporating anti-semitism as a prime component. This difference was 
acknowledged by Mussolini himself, who did not agree with racial distinctions, 
saying: “Race! It is a feeling, not a reality; ninety-five per cent, at  least, is a feeling. 
Nothing will ever make me believe that  biologically pure races can be shown to exist 
today.… National pride has no need of the delirium of race.”13  Such ambiguities 
mean that when extreme-right politics is described in racial terms, it is more sensible 
to speak of it in terms of Nazism than fascism. In addition, the ideology of racial 
cleansing—which has been commonly advocated in certain sections of the extreme 
right throughout the post-war period—clearly has its roots in Nazi genocide.
 Obviously, these ideologies were hugely influential on the modern extreme 
right, and it  is possible to trace the histories of many contemporary parties and 
movements back to fascist or Nazi roots. It is therefore unsurprising that some 
scholars describe contemporary movements and groups as fascist;14  however, it  is 
more often restricted to describing political parties of the inter-war period, no doubt 
because of the problematic definitional complexities of the term. What this makes 
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clear is that—even if Nazism is considered an offshoot of fascism, rather than a 
discrete ideology—fascism itself refers to something more specific and localised, 
both geographically and temporally, than the political family described by the term 
“extreme right.”
Neo-Fascists, Neo-Nazis
Working from their historical predecessors, the extreme right are often described as 
neo-Fascist or neo-Nazi. However, as argued above, Fascism and Nazism are best 
used to describe the regimes of Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany specifically. 
Therefore, these neologisms refer only  to those who admire or seek to emulate the 
ideologies of Mussolini or Hitler. Certainly neo-Fascists and neo-Nazis do exist, but, 
just as their forerunners were not the only political movements of the extreme right, 
they  are merely  a component in a much wider and diverse extreme right today. Neo-
Nazism is a strong and influential ideology within the extreme right, but it is not 
alone and, certainly  in a political sense, it is seen by some on the extreme right as a 
barrier to recruitment and the advancement of their ideas. Therefore, when I refer to 
neo-Nazis I am referring specifically to those who adhere to the ideology of National 
Socialism, often displaying this through reverence for Adolf Hitler and use of Nazi 
symbolism such as the swastika. Neo-Fascists, on the other hand, are not a 
significant component of the modern extreme right in the countries studied and are 
not referred to in the text.
Populism
In their introduction to Twenty-First Century Populism, Daniele Albertazzi and 
Duncan McDonnell argue that Western Europe has been “the main area of sustained 
populist growth and success over the last fifteen years in established democracies.”15 
The ability of populist parties to achieve electoral success is attributed to a number of 
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factors, including “economic and cultural globalization, the speed and direction of 
European integration, immigration, the decline of ideologies and class politics, 
exposure of elite corruption, etc.”16
 The idea of elitism is crucial to populism, a phenomenon which is thought to 
be the result of mass disillusionment with the political process: Albertazzi and 
McDonnell define populism as “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous 
people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as 
depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, 
prosperity, identity and voice.”17  Although this definition is reminiscent of a crucial 
component of traditional extreme-right  ideology, which claims that the interests of a 
nation (Fascist Italy) or race (Nazi Germany) are under threat  from elites and Others, 
Albertazzi and McDonnell note that populism need not always equate with the right, 
let alone the extreme right, of the political spectrum. Sabrina Ramet asserts that 
extreme-right politics is fundamentally  populist in character,18  but even if this is 
accepted it does not mean that the converse is true, that populism is inherently 
extreme-rightist.
 Contemporary populism can appear to have originated with the successes of 
individuals such as Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and Jörg Haider in Austria, and 
therefore to be tied to the extreme right. However, not only is populism best 
described as a style rather than an ideology, it is available to all members of the 
political spectrum. The use of “populism” as a pejorative term between mainstream 
parties indicates that it is a tactic used, or perceived to be used, by non-extremist 
parties. Populism as ideology is generally  applied to describe parties that use it 
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rare to find it in isolation, and it is usually qualified, such as in describing 
Scandinavian parties as “radical-right populist.” 
 Given the nature of populism as presenting itself as “authentic,” and in 
defining the political establishment as elite and out of touch, populists cast 
themselves as voices of the ordinary folk. Musical manifestations of this are 
considered in Chapter Four.
Extreme Right
As I have made clear, I prefer the term “extreme right.” Before considering the 
benefits and drawbacks of the term, it is worth setting out what it means here. I 
define extreme-right ideology  as intrinsically reactionary; it is an ideology which 
points to the perceived degeneration of a society, community or nation, and blames 
this degeneration on contamination by  Others. The form of this contamination can be 
biological (as in white supremacism), social (as in the rejection of multiculturalism) 
or economic (the taking of jobs from the “indigenous” population by cheap 
immigrant labour).
 As these examples imply, the Othering process usually targets immigrants 
who embody a wide range of imagined flaws. However, the success and appeal of 
extreme-right parties is just as dependent on the changes wrought on socioeconomic 
circumstances by globalisation: by identifying itself as the politics of “tradition,” 
extreme-right ideology frequently  presents itself as in opposition to socio-economic 
and socio-structural change. Hans-Georg Betz argues that extreme-right politics 
frequently owes its appeal to “intense economic and financial pressure,” particularly 
when real incomes fall, the gap  between rich and poor widens and unemployment 
increases. Betz asserts that these circumstances engender increased uncertainty, 
anxiety, insecurity  and pessimism, leading to a decline in public faith and trust in 
“the established parties, politicians, and the political process in general.”19  The 
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declining standing of mainstream politicians—their identification as an elite with no 
conception of the day-to-day life of “ordinary” people—is a common theme of 
extreme-right rhetoric, encouraging the view of the political classes as remote and 
out of touch. Other political parties are blamed for allowing, even encouraging, 
immigration, which is felt to make the life of the “ordinary” people even harder.
 What distinguishes the extreme right particularly from the left in this context 
is the theory of Lipset and Raab, summarised here by James Alfred Aho:
The distinguishing mark of right-wing [extremist] movements is their 
preservative backlash character. Right-wingers look nostalgically on the 
(sometimes imaginary) past, whereas left-wing groups look hopefully to an 
often equally fanciful future.20
Arguably, the left is just as likely to use the past as the basis for its imagined future, 
but restorative rhetoric is most associated with the right, particularly the extreme 
right. The desire to return to an idealised past often takes the form of returning to the 
past’s “purer” state; so immigration, the liberalisation of sexuality and the decline of 
religiosity  are all blamed for the degeneration of society. Sabrina Ramet suggests that 
to return to these traditional values, the extreme right wish to impose their will on 
others, where the mainstream right seek to persuade: “Whether they call their values 
‘patriotism’ or ‘family values’ or ‘the Christian way of life,’ right-wing extremists 
believe that they are justified in using any means at their disposal in their quest to 
impose their views on society, including murder, arson, and the corruption of the 
democratic process.”21  For Ramet, compromise is never more than a tactical 
manoeuvre for the extreme right.22
 Other prominent features of extreme-right  ideology are its strong nationalism 
(which can manifest in different ways) and its bitter enmity  towards socialist and 
communist politics. Further features are common, but  not universal. For example, 
extreme-right parties tend to be populist, particularly in contemporary  politics. 
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Extreme-right groups tend to be overwhelmingly  patriarchal and masculine, in group 
hierarchy, membership, and voter support. Anti-Semitism is frequently  equated with 
extreme-right ideology, but this is not necessarily typical, and many extreme-right 
movements emphatically  distance themselves from it. More recently, Islamophobia 
has become a significant component of extreme-right rhetoric, particularly  in Europe, 
though this is relatively recent, based on waves of Islamic immigration and Islamic 
terrorism.
 While there is something of a consensus as to what “extreme right” describes, 
there is some doubt as to whether it is an apt descriptor. It is not a term which parties 
and movements use to describe themselves, preferring terms with more positive and 
unifying connotations, such as “patriotic” and “democratic.”23 The use of “extreme” 
is seen by  some as a herald that the groups must necessarily  engage in violence24 or 
operate outside the democratic process. This is clearly not the case for all those 
described as “extreme”; rather, the term is best understood as a referential marker for 
these movements in the context of “mainstream” politics:
[T]he word “extreme” has two primary meanings: a party can be extreme 
relative to the existing political system or relative to other parties in the same 
party system. Extremism in the former meaning (rejection of the existing 
political system) is hardly applicable here. Very few, if any, contemporary 
parties are in principle opposed to the existing democratic system, and have any 
plans, explicit  or hidden, to fundamentally change it.… Extremism relative to 
other parties, however, is more relevant. Understood this way, extremism means 
that a party is at  or near the end of an ideological dimension, at  a clear distance 
from the other parties.25
“Extreme” here need not only  refer to the distance of political parties from others, 
but also to the “pariah status” conferred upon them by mainstream parties, examples 
35
23 Paul Hainsworth, The Extreme Right in Western Europe. London and New York: Routledge, 2008, 
p.2.
24  Summarised in Roger Eatwell, ‘Introduction: the new extreme right challenge’, Eatwell and Cas 
Mudde (eds.),  Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge, London & New York: 
Routledge, 2004, p.8.
25  Anders Widfeldt,  ‘A fourth phase of the extreme right? Nordic immigration-critical parties in a 
comparative context’, NORDEUROPAforum, 2010, http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/nordeuropaforum/
2010-1/widfeldt-anders-7/XML/.
being the treatment of the Sverigedemokraterna in the Swedish Riksdag or the 
reception of the British National Party.
 The placing of the extreme right on the right of the political spectrum is also 
contested. In economic terms, the extreme right are often overtly hostile to 
established capitalism and, like Fascism and Nazism, draw on some of the same 
ideology as the left. However, this is generally of secondary importance in the 
ideological programme of the extreme right: “an extreme right party is a party which 
prioritises the socio-cultural dimension, is far to the right on that dimension and is 
significantly different from other parties on that dimension.”26  When non-political 
manifestations of the extreme-right engage with economics, it is often in the context 
of other aspects of their ideology, such as highlighting supposed Jewish control of 
world finance, or blaming the political establishment for financial misery. Combined 
with Lipset and Raab’s distinction of the right as nostalgically striving to restore the 
imagined harmony of the past, this situates the extreme right most properly on the 
right.
Far Right, Radical Right
Use and meaning of the term “extreme right” are not universally  accepted, and other 
terms are used to describe the ideology, particularly  “far right” and “radical right.” 
“Far right” is not commonly found in academic literature; it is more likely to be used 
to describe the furthest right in mainstream political parties, such as the Conservative 
Monday Club, and is widely used in the media. “Radical right” is a term especially 
favoured by American academics,27  and is also commonly used in Germany 
following its definition there by  the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 
which has the power to ban parties if they are perceived to be hostile to the State.28 
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However, the use of radical right  to describe what is more commonly known as the 
“New Right,” the politics of Thatcherism and Reaganism, has destroyed the clarity  of 
the term.29 While I find these terms to be less satisfactory than “extreme right,” it is 
important to acknowledge their use by others in this field.
The Big Four
As outlined in the Introduction, the main focus of this study is the use of music by 
the extreme right in Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and the United States, which I 
argue have been the most significant in this field. This is evident in terms of quantity: 
there are a number of sources which attempt to compile extreme-right bands by 
country, and although the results vary, these four countries are usually the top four.30 
These countries have also produced bands that  are the most influential, as those 
described below have achieved canonic status in the extreme right. Labels and 
distributors such as Rock-O-Rama, Nordland, and Resistance Records have had true 
international significance, although British bands have tended to look abroad for 
production and distribution. This hints at the financial importance of each of these 
countries as well.
 The circumstances that have fostered extreme-right music are unique in each 
country, but there is some common ground which might, in part, account for their 
significance. One notable feature of the countries other than Germany is that they did 
not experience Nazi occupation. Such a commonality  is clearly  complex, particularly 
as neutral Sweden had a very  ambiguous role of antagonism and cooperation with 
the Nazi regime,31 and in Britain and the USA national identity has become bound up 
in part with the narrative of overcoming Nazism. But the fact remains, none were 
ever technically  invaded by  Nazi armies, no matter how significant the traumas of 
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war otherwise were for these countries. While the effect of this on national identities 
and ideologies is complex, it did have notable consequences in terms of censorship.
 While the legacy of Nazism in Germany—including post-war denazification 
processes in both East and West—resulted in laws against neo-Nazi parties and the 
use of Nazi symbolism, this was not a priority  in non-occupied countries. Occupied 
states developed laws against Holocaust denial, revisionism and the spread of Nazi 
propaganda, but similar steps were not taken in unoccupied countries.32  It is only 
recently, with the development of hate speech laws, that  a degree of consensus has 
emerged over state reaction to extremism, although the extent and application of 
these laws are not uniform. It  is important to note that the primacy of the First 
Amendment in the United States has placed the preservation of free speech above 
any legislation against  hate speech, and I am not aware of any action being brought 
against extreme-right musicians in the USA on the basis of their music. In Germany, 
there have been many raids against producers and distributors of extreme-right 
music, while some of the most prominent musicians have been imprisoned.
 As the nation-specific histories below demonstrate, there has been little 
political space in these four key  countries for extreme-right parties to operate in. This 
is in stark contrast to much of the Western world, where parties have influenced 
governments as part of formal and informal coalitions—such as the FPÖ in Austria 
under Jörg Haider, or Geert Wilders’ PVV in the Netherlands—or provided 
significant opposition to government—such as the French Front National under Jean-
Marie Le Pen and now his daughter, Marine. The democracies in Britain and Sweden 
have been presented as exceptions to the rise of the extreme right, although this has 
more to do with electoral systems, infighting and incompetence than with a lack of 
extreme-right sympathy in the electorate; indeed, signs are strong in both Britain and 
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Sweden that there is widespread support for the policies of the extreme right, though 
lesser support for the parties themselves.33 
 In Germany, extreme-right parties have found it difficult to function due to 
anti-Nazi and anti-hate-speech laws in force there; some political parties have been 
forced to close down, while the most successful extreme-right party, the NPD, has 
been placed under observation by the German domestic intelligence agency  as it is 
deemed to be “a threat  to the constitutional order.”34 As such, extreme-right political 
parties in Germany have found it difficult to gain much momentum, while the music 
scene, which was particularly neo-Nazi and confrontational, has essentially been 
outlawed, with many musicians in prison and distribution reduced to bootlegs or the 
often illegal importation of albums produced in other countries. 
 In the United States, the two-party  system has effectively precluded the 
possibility of an insurgent party breaking into the American political landscape. This 
has left the American extreme right with a choice between violent extremism and 
attempting to influence the mainstream parties. It has mostly attempted the former, 
with explicitly neo-Nazi or Ku Klux Klan groups advocating racial hatred and 
foretelling racial war; such rhetoric has led to surges in militia group membership, 
occasionally resulting in tragedies such as the Waco Siege. It  should not be forgotten 
that before the September 11th attacks, the greatest terrorist threat  to the United 
States was considered to come from the extreme right, exemplified by the Oklahoma 
Bomber, Timothy McVeigh.
 The terrorist threat  in the United States is very much contemporary, with 
numerous attempts such as the 2011 Spokane bombing incident having explicit  links 
to the extreme right.35  This threat is mirrored in each of the other countries. In 
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Britain, many planned attacks have been foiled, though in 1999 the nail-bomber 
David Copeland succeeded in killing three and injuring 139; in 2011 the German 
parliament passed a motion expressing “deep shame” that a neo-Nazi terror cell was 
able to commit ten murders—known in the media as the “Döner Murders”—and 
fourteen bank robberies over a period of thirteen years;36  while in Sweden, “lone-
wolf” terrorists such as John Ausonius and Peter Mangs have targeted immigrants in 
shootings. The continuing and recurrent threat of terrorism in these countries implies 
that extreme-right movements have mainly seen activism as taking place outside the 
democratic arena, which might in part explain the effort devoted to making and 
producing music in these countries.
 Another significant feature is that to a certain extent  each of these countries 
claims to be—or is seen as—the originator of some particular aspect of extreme-right 
politics. The establishment of the extreme-right musical culture in Britain, and 
particularly the influence of Skrewdriver, means it is often cited as the spiritual home 
of extreme-right music. The Nordic preoccupation of these countries (see below) is 
often exhibited in the proclamation of Sweden, and to a lesser extent Germany, as the 
home of the true white race. Germany  is also hugely  significant in neo-Nazi circles, 
where the history of Hitler and Nazism means that it is seen as the Fatherland. In the 
United States, the long history of racial politics—from slavery through the Ku Klux 
Klan to segregation—has given the country precedence in racialised politics, while it 
is also seen as having the potential to be established as a truly  “white” country. This 
explains in part  the way in which ostensibly  national projects have taken on 
international dimensions.
 Another important  feature of these four countries, but which is not universal 
to all extreme-right groups within them, is a shared sense of Nordic identity, at times 
expressed as Germanic or Anglo-Saxon, but presumed to be held in common across 
this geographical space. Even in America, where white immigration occurred from 
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all over Europe, extreme-right activism has generally  been the preserve of white 
Protestants who identify as primarily Anglo-Saxon.
 This Nordic identity is significant as it can engender a sense of shared 
heritage between extreme-right activists in these countries, particularly evident in the 
revival of Norse Pagan beliefs under the banner of Odinism or Wotanism. There is 
also a lingering sense of superiority, such as manifested in Nazi Aryan ideology. This 
is shown in the belittling of groups which are seen as insufficiently white, 
particularly Slavic and Mediterranean peoples, although they  are easily incorporated 
when it is perceived to be advantageous. “Improperly  white” can also at times be 
linked to religious beliefs, with Protestantism probably the most significant Christian 
denomination associated with the extreme right, although this is not absolute. The 
particular appeal of this Nordic identity is explored in Chapter Six.
Great Britain
In a political context, Britain is claimed as an exception to the appeals of the extreme 
right. Its electoral system prevents insurgent parties from becoming major political 
forces quickly. However, Britain—or, more specifically, England—is the birthplace 
of extreme-right music in its current form. Extreme-right music has existed in other 
historical contexts, notably  Nazi Germany and throughout the history of the United 
States (see below), but  the origin, organisation and style of the current scene stems 
from Britain in the late 1970s. The history  of the extreme right can be traced at least 
as far back as the interwar period, particularly to the leader of the British Union of 
Fascists, Oswald Mosley; but the overt politicisation of the second wave of skinhead 
culture and the concurrent rise of the National Front (NF) as an electoral force is a 
discrete phenomenon quite separate from the “gentlemanly” fascism of Mosley and 
the minorities of neo-Nazis in the immediate postwar period.
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 Skinhead culture originated in working-class districts of London in the mid- 
to late-1960s.37  Skinheads drew on the style and music of Jamaican “rude boys,” 
listening mainly to ska and reggae. The skinheads were characterised not only  by the 
cropped hair which gave them their nickname, but also by  their “uniform” of Doc 
Marten boots, Levi jeans, and Ben Sherman or Fred Perry shirts, clothing brands 
known for their association with the working-class.38 Skinhead culture at this point 
was not exclusively white; there were black skinheads too.39  But while skinheads 
were not racially homogeneous, and as a subculture were appropriating aspects of 
Jamaican culture, they  were notorious for their racist attitudes, particularly  the 
practice of “Paki-bashing”:
Skinheads’ concern with a particular, collective, masculine self conception 
[involved] an identification of masculinity with physical toughness, and an 
unwillingness to back down in the face of “trouble.” Paki-bashing involved the 
ritual and aggressive defence of the social and cultural homogeneity of the 
community against its most obviously scapegoated outsiders—partly because of 
their peculiar visibility within the neighbourhood (in terms of shop ownership 
patterns, etc.) by comparison with West Indians, and also because of their 
different  cultural patterns (especially in terms of their unwillingness to defend 
themselves and so on)—again by comparison with West Indian youth.40
The first wave of skinhead culture had fragmented by the early  1970s.41  With the 
coming of punk, there was a skinhead revival, and the subculture became entangled 
with the punk subgenre known as Oi!. Most famously typified by the band Sham 69, 
Oi! music consisted of loud and simple songs that were easy to sing—or shout—
along with. It celebrated a “peculiarly violent version of male working-class 
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culture,”42 at the same time presenting itself as the authentic sound of working-class 
or “street” culture in contrast to the “artful” style of punk. At this stage skinheads and 
Oi!, although considered unsavoury  by many, did not yet have firm associations with 
extreme-right politics. Indeed, Sham 69 took a stand against racism by performing 
for Rock Against Racism.
 Rock Against Racism (RAR) was launched in 1976 to combat what its 
founders saw as increasing racial tension in Britain. In August of that year, Eric 
Clapton launched into a drunken, on-stage tirade against immigration, which 
included the statement:
We are a white country.… I think Enoch’s [Powell] right … we should send 
them all back. Throw the wogs out! Keep Britain white!43
In the same year David Bowie was quoted in a number of publications saying that 
Britain could benefit from a fascist leader, and that Adolf Hitler was the first rock 
star. The NME also published a photo they claimed showed Bowie giving the Nazi 
salute. With the goal of challenging racist attitudes, RAR served as a symbol for 
decentralised grassroots activism, but was also capable of staging huge concerts 
around the country. While these were cited as the factors that inspired the founders of 
RAR, their primary target was the National Front (NF). 
 The NF was formed in reaction to a perceived liberalisation of the 
Conservative Party, especially on its policy towards immigrants and their integration, 
after the 1966 general election. The NF brought together a number of extreme-right 
groups such as the League of Empire Loyalists, the 1960s incarnation of the British 
National Party (BNP), and a smattering of smaller like-minded groups.
 The NF was built  around a core policy of closing British borders to 
immigration, and the compulsory repatriation of non-European immigrants already in 
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the country. The NF was seemingly condoned by  a speech made in 1968 by a senior 
member of the Conservative Party, Enoch Powell, which would later be known as the 
“Rivers of Blood” speech. In it, Powell said of the current policy on immigration:
We must  be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of 
some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part  the material of the future 
growth of the immigrant-descended population. It  is like watching a nation 
busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre … As I look ahead, I am 
filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see “the River Tiber foaming 
with much blood.”44
The NF offered Powell’s speech, along with the race riots that Britain had 
experienced, as evidence that immigration would inevitably lead to all out race-war.
 The NF gained momentum following the mass immigration of ethnic Asians 
from Uganda, expelled by the dictator Idi Amin in 1972. The subsequent racial 
tension led to some minor electoral success and a conviction within the party  that  the 
NF was on the verge of a major breakthrough. However, despite putting up 303 
candidates for the 1979 general election, the party attracted just  over 1% of the 
vote.45  It is often suggested that the NF became almost redundant following a 
hardening of the Conservative Party’s policy  on immigration under Margaret 
Thatcher, with the pluralist nature of British politics making it quite possible to hold 
opinions compatible with the NF on the right of the Conservative Party. Despite 
attempting to broaden its policies to encompass more than just  immigration,46 the NF 
was unable to regain its earlier momentum and descended into infighting and 
factionalism.47
 Advocates of RAR contend that it was crucial in combating racist tensions 
and attitudes in Britain in the late 1970s, and contributed substantially to the collapse 
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of the National Front.48 It is important to note that non-musical histories of this time 
cite many reasons for the collapse of the National Front, and do not attribute any 
direct significance to RAR. While RAR therefore functioned mainly  as a symbol, 
with many events occurring on the initiative of decentralised activists, it was 
powerful enough to stage huge outdoor events, reportedly attracting 100,000 people 
to a march and music festival in London in 1978, while 25,000 attended a carnival in 
Manchester in the same year. The bands that took part in these events included some 
of the most commercially successful of the time, such as the Clash, the Buzzcocks, 
Stiff Little Fingers, Sham 69, Steel Pulse and Elvis Costello.
 The deliberate decision to use punk and reggae bands ensured that these 
genres came to be associated with left-wing ideology (in part due to RAR’s 
association with the Socialist  Workers Party). RAR also sought to appeal to 
skinheads by  hosting Oi! band Sham 69, which David Renton argues helped grab the 
genre “out of the hands of the white racists.”49 Certainly, Sham 69 were a prominent 
band in RAR, but what Renton omits is that Sham 69 were forced to split up  by the 
racist element of their fan-base, which repeatedly broke up their gigs with eruptions 
of violence.50 The forced break-up of a flagship RAR band by racist elements in its 
fan-base hardly portrays the success of RAR, and also undermines the claim that 
RAR was able to appeal to the skinhead audience through Oi! bands.
 While the experience of Sham 69 demonstrates the racist and violent 
tendencies of most skinheads, it  was the NF that harnessed this into an established 
counterculture. Rock Against Communism (RAC) was the first attempt to bring 
together politically  sympathetic bands, and, as the name suggests, was also intended 
as a riposte to Rock Against Racism. RAC was led by Joe Pearce, a senior figure in 
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the Young National Front (YNF) and editor of its paper, Bulldog, who planned to 
expand RAC to include its own record label and recording studio to help  entice 
bands to the circuit. The first event was held in August 1978, and attracted around 
150 youths. Although they did not all play  at this first  concert, several bands were 
already associated with the scene, including Damaged, Phase One, Beyond the 
Implod, Homicide, The Raw Boys, The Ventz and The Dentists.51  RAC’s early 
success is demonstrated by the then-NF leader John Tyndall claiming that an 
increasingly  high proportion of new recruits were young people, and by a marked 
increase of gig-disruption, particularly of gigs arranged by RAR.52
 It was in 1981 that Skrewdriver—often cited as the founders of right-wing 
rock music53—reunited and aligned themselves explicitly with the NF. Consisting of 
frontman and songwriter Ian Stuart Donaldson (who often went by the name Ian 
Stuart) and an ever-changing assortment of other musicians, Skrewdriver had 
initially tried to break through in the punk scene in 1977, before shaving their heads 
and actively courting a skinhead following. Their original disbandment was a result 
of pressure over apparently unfounded allegations about their political sympathies. In 
1979, Searchlight printed a retraction after reporting Skrewdriver’s involvement with 
RAC, stating that the band had been approached but had turned the NF down,54 
although this was the year that Donaldson joined the NF.55
 In 1981 Skrewdriver reformed, and in 1983 they released the single ‘White 
Power’ (backed by  ‘Smash the IRA’) on the NF’s White Noise label, which was 
hugely  successful and is still one of the anthems of the extreme-right music scene. 
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The record’s success in Europe showed the potential, and Donaldson negotiated to 
release his music on the West-German-based Rock-O-Rama label rather than with 
the NF. A number of British bands followed in Skrewdriver’s footsteps, with some of 
the more popular such as Brutal Attack, Combat 84 and Skullhead also releasing 
through Rock-O-Rama. Many early  releases of extreme-right music on Rock-O-
Rama were in collaboration with the NF’s White Noise, and it is likely that the 
arrangement with Rock-O-Rama was originally intended to exploit the potential of 
extreme-right music on the continent.56 It also became clear that, in contrast to the 
NF, Rock-O-Rama was reliable in paying royalties,57 particularly notable given that 
many extreme-right labels were financially untrustworthy  as well as prone to 
collapse.
 Although this music scene quickly established itself as financially lucrative 
and useful for engendering a sense of community among skinheads, it was not a 
harmonious arrangement; the NF was rapidly declining and the extreme-right music 
scene was its main source of income. The party’s dependence on this income meant 
that little of the money made was seen by musicians.58  The discontent this 
engendered culminated in Donaldson splitting with the NF and, along with 
prominent skinhead Nicky Crane, setting up Blood & Honour (B&H). It  is 
interesting to note that the French label Rebelles Européens, which was devoted to 
extreme-right music, was established in 1987—the same year as Blood & Honour—
and released a number of albums by prominent extreme-right bands, although 
Skrewdriver remained with Rock-O-Rama. 
 Like the Skrewdriver album of 1985, B&H was named after a motto of the 
Hitler-Jugend, becoming commonly referred to by the code “28,” referring to the 
position in the alphabet of its initials. Although ostensibly just a publication, B&H 
united various activists, bands and fans in a common organisation, and avoided the 
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splits that plagued the extreme right by  not explicitly supporting a particular political 
party. The group stated its aim in its manifesto:
BLOOD & HONOUR IS:
1 An independant  [sic] National Socialist movement supporting all active N.S./
Nationalist parties/groups in the White world.
2 A magazine promoting N.S. ideals, N.S. music, be it rock, oi, metal, etc.
3 A cog ina [sic] movement  that has divisions in most  countries including USA, 
Canada, Germany, France, Scandanavea [sic], Russia etc.
4 A no compromising stand against all we consider corrupt.
OUR AIMS:
1 To unite White youth.
2 To promote White Power through positive ideals and a positive message.
3 To create units in every city in every town in every country.
4 To promote our culture, our traditions.
5 To help any worthy political organisation either financially or with manpower 
on the streets.
6 To win our nations back, once and for all.
88/14 59
B&H thus presented itself as the “independent” voice of RAC, and was a success in 
terms of circulation and the number of concerts it arranged. As well as regional 
divisions, groups were set up  in different  countries to the point where B&H could 
legitimately be described as an international nazi-music network.
 Despite Donaldson’s intention to keep it independent, after his death in 1993 
B&H transferred to the control of violent neo-nazi organisation Combat 18 (C18). 
Donaldson’s death in a car crash made him an instant martyr figure (see Chapter 
Six), with ISD Records quickly  set up by C18 to cash in on his name. C18 used ISD 
records and B&H to fund their organisation, cooperating on an international level 
through the pooling of resources and material. However, their control of B&H was 
not to everyone’s satisfaction, and led to a violent feud, with splits among B&H and 
C18.60 The effects of this are still evident, with a number of live websites trading on 
the B&H name denouncing one another as traitors. A number of arrests and splinter 
groups also weakened C18, although they remained in control of ISD records.61
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 Donaldson’s death, and the infighting which followed, effectively crippled 
the British branch of extreme-right music. Attendances at gigs, already relatively  low 
in a European context, were now noteworthy if they  approached 200. While Britain 
was home to the most influential bands, such as Brutal Attack, No Remorse and 
Skullhead, most  were products of the boom in the 1980s and early 1990s. The scene 
still functions, with the British version of Blood & Honour still in production, and 
many of the different factions made public declarations of newfound “unity” through 
the publication.62 However, the British wing of extreme-right music has diminished 
significantly, and is now far less important in an international context than the 
countries explored below.
 The modern version of the British National Party (BNP) was founded in 1982 
essentially  as a variation of the National Front, having been set up by those who had 
lost out in a power struggle in the NF. Although it didn’t have any official links with 
Blood & Honour, the party’s progress was regularly and favourably featured in 
Blood & Honour magazine, while bands played benefit concerts for the BNP. The 
products of skinhead bands were also advertised in the BNP magazine, Spearhead. 
The BNP advocated the NF policies of ending immigration and forcing repatriation 
of foreigners, and used the same tactics of street marches as a show of strength. 
Other than the election of a councillor in the London borough of Tower Hamlets—
following a successful “Rights for Whites” campaign—the early BNP was 
insignificant as an electoral force.
 This changed in 1999 when Nick Griffin took control of the party. Griffin 
engaged in the process of “modernising” the BNP, bringing it into line with 
successful European parties like Le Pen’s Front  National. As well as softening party 
policies and distancing the BNP from violent strategies and tactics, this involved re-
situating music within the party’s cultural policy. The BNP established its own 
festival, in which music played a prominent part, and its own label, Great White 
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Records. Although the label seems to have been financially unsuccessful63  and the 
festival has ceased in the face of local hostility, these endeavours, along with the 
attempt of the BNP to appropriate folk music, show a shift in the tactics of the BNP, 
aiming to distance themselves from the electoral poison of skinhead associations 
towards something more accessible (see Chapter Seven on “softening” in extreme-
right music).
 Politically, Griffin’s leadership brought about a turn in the fortunes of the 
BNP. Party membership  doubled in the two years to 2002, and the party polled 
significantly in some local elections in that year, with a number of councillors 
elected.64 In 2006, the BNP more than doubled its councillors in England—to 46—
and became the second party  in the Barking and Dagenham ward, and in 2008 
Richard Barnbrook was elected to the London Assembly. But it  was when Griffin 
and Andrew Brons were elected to the European Parliament in 2009 that the party 
made its most significant gain, leading to extensive media coverage and a guaranteed 
source of income. 
 This success led to raised hopes for the 2010 general election, despite the 
first-past-the-post voting system which made the BNP extremely unlikely to succeed. 
Putting up a record 338 candidates, the party won no seats and lost most of its sitting 
councillors. Griffin announced he would step down as leader in 201365 but still faced 
three (unsuccessful) leadership challenges following the election, including from 
Barnbrook, who subsequently  left the party. The following year, Griffin was 
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challenged by  Brons, only retaining the leadership  by nine of the 2,305 votes cast.66 
The failure to gain a general election breakthrough and the subsequent infighting—
highly  reminiscent of the NF—means the BNP are currently of little significance, 
with some observers declaring them finished as an electoral force.67  The party lost 
one of its two MEPs when Brons left the party  in October 2012, claiming that  90% 
of members and activists had already done so,68 while Griffin was declared bankrupt 
in early  2014, leading to predictions that Britain would become “BNP-free” after the 
next European elections.69 The BNP have also largely been overshadowed by the rise 
of the UK Independence Party, a Eurosceptic party which has benefited from protest 
voting, in part because it has less stigma attached to it than the BNP.
 The collapse of the BNP gave some momentum to the street movement 
English Defence League (EDL), which had been formed in 2009.70  Evolving 
particularly from anti-Islamic protests and the football “casual” subculture, the EDL 
has denied any links to extreme-right politics and views itself as an anti-Islamic 
movement. The EDL’s ideology is therefore fairly narrow, but it  has demonstrable 
links to the extreme right, notably its agreement of cooperation with the BNP 
offshoot the British Freedom Party.71 While the EDL is still relatively young and it is 
unclear which direction it  will take, it has taken steps to form an international 
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“counter-Jihad” movement72  and looks likely  to be the main outlet for British 
extreme-right sentiment in the near future. Alex and the Bandits have taken on the 
title of “official” EDL band, but the decentralised nature of the EDL means that 
activists tend to share their own musical tastes rather than follow explicitly  extreme-
right bands.73
Germany
After the end of World War II, the Allied occupiers of Germany embarked on 
denazification processes designed to purge German society  and politics of any 
remaining National Socialist  sympathy, including taking German civilians around 
concentration camps, and, most prominently, the Nuremberg Trials. This carried 
through to the constitution of West Germany, which had passages specifically 
designed to combat any return of Nazism, particularly the clause banning non-
democratic parties. East Germany, meanwhile, presented itself as the true antithesis 
to Nazism. These circumstances have made it  nigh-on impossible for the extreme 
right to establish itself politically in Germany, although there have been notable 
attempts. Since Germany is unique among the four countries I focus on, in that it  was 
partitioned at the time extreme-right music came to prominence and has since been 
reunified, it  seems prudent to divide the following discussion into sections on West 
Germany, East Germany, and reunited Germany.
West Germany
In 1951, the West German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)
—the body intended to safeguard the liberal democratic constitution—was 
established.74  One of the roles of this court (which retains its place in reunified 
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Germany) is to act against political parties which are seeking to undermine the free 
democratic institutions of Germany. Only two parties have been dissolved by the 
court: the openly  Nazi—in both ideology and membership—Sozialistische 
Reichspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Reich Party, SRP), founded in 1949 and capable 
of gaining up  to 11% of the vote in regional elections, was banned in 1952, and the 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany) in 1956. The 
perception of the NPD (see below) as a threat to democracy saw the party tried by 
the court in 2003, although the case was dismissed after it was found that  members 
of the party, including at leadership level, were in fact agents of the state.75 While 
banning is evidently uncommon, the potential threat means that extreme-right parties 
in West and reunified Germany were/are less likely to advocate extremist platforms, 
particularly alternatives to democratic processes.
 The SRP was merely one of many nationalist and extreme-right parties that 
fought elections in the immediate postwar period, often with former Nazis featuring 
prominently  in their ranks, although the threat of banning encouraged a more 
moderate approach. As well as regional successes, some of these parties even 
managed to achieve representation in the Bundestag.76 This fringe had collapsed by 
the early  1960s, but in 1964 the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(National Democratic Party of Germany, NPD) was formed from the remnants of 
several of these groups. The party gained much momentum in regional elections 
throughout the 1960s and was by far the largest extreme-right organisation up to this 
point.77 The NPD’s rise led to fears that it would enter parliament in 1969, but it just 
missed the required 5% threshold. This failure led to schisms within the party, and 
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the NPD’s increasing association with violence and shift to a more identifiably Nazi-
influenced ideology meant that it would not be a significant  force until after German 
reunification, at which time its significance would not only be party  political, but 
also musical.
 Gerhard Frey, a publisher who had founded the weekly  newspaper Deutsche 
National-Zeitung in the 1950s, created the Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s 
Union, DVU) in 1971. Frey’s influence through his publication, which in the 1980s 
had a circulation approaching 100,000,78 was initially used in rivalry  with the NPD, 
but in 1987 the parties made an alliance which saw some regional gains. However, 
expectations were not met and the parties separated in 1990, although they were to 
come to another non-competition agreement after the turn of the century.79
 Die Republikaner (The Republicans, REP) was founded in 1983 by defectors 
from the Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) which, along with its 
sister party Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democrat Union), is one of 
the two main conservative parties in Germany. As such, its roots lie more in 
conservative politics than in the extreme right; the REP have rejected attempts by the 
NPD and DVU to join in electoral alliance. Even so, the party  has been described by 
the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution, BfV) as possessing extreme-right tendencies, particularly in its 
emphasis on nationalism and hostility  towards immigrants. The BfV started 
monitoring the REP in 1992, though stopped monitoring it in 2006, apparently as it 
was no longer considered “extreme.” The major successes of the REP were in 1986, 
with the party  achieving some regional representation, but it  has suffered following 
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reunification for a variety of reasons, entering a decline punctuated by occasional 
successes at individual state level.80
 Just as in the other countries analysed in this chapter, then, extreme-right 
political parties in West Germany found it  difficult to establish themselves 
democratically; as in the other countries, music became a more significant locus for 
extreme-right ideology. While the party  political extreme right in West Germany  can 
be traced to Nazism, the skinhead culture which used music to transmit extreme-right 
ideology was, according to Timothy  S. Brown, brought to the country by British 
soldiers during the punk era, establishing itself fully around 1980/1.81 The growing 
significance of skinheads during the 1980s in both Germanys was due to the 
influence of the British NF and as such was heavily  infused with the associated 
musical culture. Before this, extreme-right parties had attempted—with little success
—to engage youth through marching and folk songs in the vein of National 
Socialism, in spite of the huge cultural changes brought about by jazz and rock.82 
Although Michael Weiss states that skinheads already had a right-wing image,83 
Barber-Kersovan argues that, just as in Britain, West German Oi! lacked political 
significance at first, in fact marked by its hatred of any kind of politics.84
 This is evident in the early career of the Frankfurt band Böhse Onkelz (a play  
on Böse Onkels, meaning Wicked Uncles). Formed as a punk band, Böhse Onkelz 
never openly advocated extreme-right politics outside of their music, claiming to be 
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more interested in football than politics.85  But Böhse Onkelz complemented the 
politicisation of Oi! in the subject  matter of their early  work, particularly  the songs 
‘Türken Raus’ (‘Turks out’) and ‘Deutschland den Deutschen’ (‘Germany  for the 
Germans’). These songs were never officially released, rather being spread on 
bootlegged demos, but the band encountered further controversy with the release of 
their debut album, Der nette Mann (The Nice Man) in 1984, which was banned 
outright in 1986 for its “pornographic, nationalistic and violent tendencies.”86
 Although this ban contributed to the band’s reputation, there is some 
ambiguity  as to whether they were part  of the extreme-right ideology. In the song 
‘Deutschland’ (Der nette Mann, Rock-O-Rama, 1984) the band declare “Also twelve 
dark years in your history; Does not void our bond with you,” referring to the years 
of Nazism as “dark” in a way which would not conform to extreme-right ideology.87 
The band explicitly dissociated themselves from extreme-right politics, leaving the 
Rock-O-Rama label which had distributed their early  releases as it gained a 
reputation for extreme-right politics. Despite the suggestive titles of the above 
(unreleased) songs, Böhse Onkelz never associated themselves with extreme-right 
politics and emphatically denied any such association; even so, their influence is 
significant. Timothy S. Brown believes that  Böhse Onkelz “became a point of 
articulation between the concepts ‘skinhead’ and ‘right-wing,’ communicating the 
basic elements of skinhead identity to a wide audience while linking them to a 
nationalist (German) message.”88 The band were, therefore, particularly  significant in 
providing a specifically German model for extreme-right skinhead culture to rally 
round, even if the band disavowed such ideology.
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 Böhse Onkelz’ first  label, Rock-O-Rama, quickly  cornered the market  for 
extreme-right music, not just  in West Germany  but internationally, particularly 
through the release of Skrewdriver albums. Although the label’s founder, Herbert 
Egoldt, was apparently not of extreme-right persuasion, he saw the financial 
potential in this music that no mainstream label would touch.89  Other domestic 
labels, such as Düsseldorf’s Funny Sounds, became significant  along with the 
distributor Creative Zeiten-Vertrieb.90 Given the amount of music produced by  the 
West German industry, as well as the trend of bands such as Skrewdriver touring 
West Germany, then either the anti-Nazi laws which applied to political parties did 
not apply to music, or they were simply not enforced, with police raids likely to be 
motivated by other activity, such as violent crime. It has been difficult to find any 
firm evidence regarding the attitude of the West German state towards this music, but 
it seems that the threat of extreme-right movements was not taken seriously until at 
least a few years after reunification—with government attention directed towards the 
extreme left rather than the extreme right—and little effort was made to censor them.
 The West German movement, and later that of reunified Germany, was better 
organised than many  of its counterparts, and its record labels were amongst the most 
significant in Europe. Because of this, it was capable of producing professional-
quality publications beyond the resources of many other movements, such as the 
glossy  Rock Nord, which also ran as a record label, or the German-language version 
of Blood & Honour which produced magazines far longer than its British 
counterpart. The Blood & Honour division established in West Germany, avoiding 
the schisms which afflicted their British counterpart, effectively marshalled the 
skinhead scene for many years.
 The recruitment of West German skinheads was seen as crucial by the 
existing extremist organisations in Germany. Michael Kühnen, founder of the 
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Aktionsfront Nationaler Sozialisten (National Socialist Action Front) and one of the 
most significant figures of the West German extreme right until his death in 1991, 
was of the opinion that skinheads “could be good soldiers,” but not necessarily 
“useful citizens” (“brauchbaren Menschen”).91 Peter Dehoust, chief editor of the SS-
founded political magazine Nation und Europa, wrote:
We now have a generation whose appearance and behaviour does not fit into the 
image which national Germans have of their offspring … we must accept these 
young Germans who do not conform. Our task is to win them for the entire race 
and to show them the way.92
Skinheads thus came to be of great importance to the extreme-right cause in West 
Germany, establishing a thriving musical culture and becoming energetic activists in 
extreme-right politics.
East Germany
The regime in East Germany pretended that the problem of right-wing extremism 
solely  affected the West, but, although it was not facing an electoral challenge, the 
East German regime had to contend with its own extreme-right problem, most 
notably with the trial of alleged neo-Nazis throughout the 1960s and 1970s, often 
resulting in expulsion to the West. These political groups, with names such as “Nazi 
Punks,” “Nazi Heavys” and “National Resistance” appeared more often towards the 
end of the 1970s,93 and the East German skinhead scene was a popular enough youth 
subculture to be placed under constant observation by the Ministerium für 
Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security).94  The Eastern skinhead scene was in 
communication with its Western counterparts from at least 1988, establishing links 
that were to be fully realised upon reunification.
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 It has been said that  the skinhead cultures in the two Germanys evolved along 
similar lines,95 although the Eastern movement had more at stake in choosing right 
over left:
In the West, being far left  and being far right  was equally dissident. In the East, 
where the establishment itself was far left, youths had to orient themselves 
toward the far right  in order to rebel politically. Moreover, whereas in the West 
flirting with far-right  ideology can be seen as primarily a subcultural pose, 
skinhead slogans like ‘Smash Communism’ had a more explicitly political 
meaning in the East.96
As the above quote suggests, the skinhead subculture in the East was less likely to be 
solely  an aesthetic consideration (even if rebellion was possible, and enacted, 
through embracing variations of left-wing ideology). Violence became an 
increasingly  significant pastime for East German skinheads, rising five-fold between 
1983 and 1988.97
 As suggested by the relative lengths of the sections on East and West 
Germany, the extreme right  in East Germany did not create a culture that would be 
dominant following reunification. Put simply, the lack of political space under the 
Communist regime precluded any  possibility of political parties establishing 
themselves, while state repression and censorship—as well as the difficulty  in 
establishing links with established extreme-right  musical cultures in Western Europe
—made it difficult for a distinctively East German extreme-right music to develop. 
However, one highly significant feature of the East German skinhead subculture was 
the high proportion of adherents. Statistics produced in 1992 by the German 
intelligence services in the wake of reunification placed the militant right-wing 
extremist (predominantly skinhead) population of the Western states at 2,600 
compared to 3,800 in the Eastern states, and 3,000 in the West and 2,600 in the East 
in 1993.98 Given that at the time of reunification the population of West Germany 
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was around four times that of East Germany, these numbers indicate a significant 
new market for the extreme-right political parties and musical culture of the West. 
However, the variation in these statistics over a year implies their unreliability, while 
the freedom of movement between the former states means they cannot easily  be 
applied to the pre-unification states. Even so, they suggest a substantial population of 
extreme-right supporters in East Germany, and given that the statistics are restricted 
to militant activists, it  can be assumed that the potential audience was much larger. 
The growing significance of extreme-right movements following reunification lends 
weight to this interpretation.
Reunited Germany
Upon reunification in 1990, the activities of right-wing extremists increased and 
became a priority for the German state, as Sabrina Ramet explains:
During the entire era of German division, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) was always more concerned about left-wing extremists than about  the 
right—the Baader-Meinhof gang being a case in point. The reunification of 
Germany changed this balance, and 1991 was the first year since World War II 
in which extremists on the right outnumbered those on the left in the FRG. At 
that time, there were an estimated 40,000 right-wing extremists in the country, 
as opposed to only 26,500 left-wing extremists. In 1997, there were about 
45,300 radical right extremists in Germany and about  35,000 left-wing 
extremists, according to official estimates. Skinheads accounted for only about 
4,000 of these (in 1993), although there were also about an equal number of 
left-wing skinheads… As of March 1997, there were about fifty far-right groups 
operating in the Federal Republic.99
The increase in the number of extremists was accompanied by  an increase in racist 
violence, with notable incidents including the “pogroms” in Hoyerswerda in 1991 
and Rostock-Lichtenhagen in 1992, arson attacks in Mölln and Solingen in 1992 and 
1993 respectively, and the Magdeburg riot of 1994. The German government has 
often downplayed the significance of these, claiming them to be the result of 
directionless and disorganised youth; Eike Wunderlich cites the example of a neo-
Nazi attack on a campsite in 1997 reported as the work of “fifty  individual attackers” 
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rather than as a politically  motivated and organised act.100 Die Zeit reported that there 
had been 149 deaths due to racist violence between 1990 and 2010, many more than 
the Federal Government’s statistic of 63.101 Music has been cited as playing a role in 
some of these deaths, as in the case of the attackers of Omar Ben Noui singing 
Landser songs beforehand, or the motivating role of the bands Sturmwehr and 
Kraftschlag during the fatal assault on Mozambican Alberto Adriano.102
 In its 2009 report on Germany, the European Commission against  Racism and 
Intolerance notes “that  music from the extreme right-wing scene continues to act as a 
vector for spreading racist, antisemitic and xenophobic ideas,”103  confirming that 
extreme-right music is at least  as important to German racists now as in the late 
1980s. Many of the most significant extreme-right German bands—such as Noie 
Werte (1987), Störkraft (c.1988), Kraftschlag (1989), Macht und Ehre (1991), 
Oithanasie (1991), Landser (1992), and Sturmwehr (c.1993)104—came from the 
period immediately  before or after reunification. Drawing on a strong network of 
publication, distribution and activist organisation, the German scene established itself 
as a main reference point  in the extreme-right  scene, and the country was a valuable 
touring destination for other bands, such as Skrewdriver, Ultima Thule and Midgårds 
Söner. 
 While the British scene collapsed due to internal conflict and the Swedish 
gradually diminished in importance, the German scene has supported many bands 
over a long period, and has seen vast expansion beyond its skinhead origins. The 
musicians and activists are no longer best  classified solely as skinheads, with other 
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styles emerging—such as the Autonome Nationalisten (Autonomous Nationalists) 
who appropriate the style of the extreme-left Autonomen. The latter movement 
peaked during the 1970s and 1980s in West Germany and is now mainly  associated 
with anti-Fascist activity,105 but is also known for its style (typically black clothing 
and covered faces) and its militant  tactics. By emulating the Autonomen, the 
Autonome Nationalisten present  an alternative extreme-right image to that of the 
skinhead, as well as asserting their independence from extreme-right groups. In part 
because of the Autonome Nationalisten’s development of their own music scenes, 
extreme-right ideology has also expanded into a number of genres, including 
Darkwave, various forms of metal, techno, industrial, hip hop and folk music.106
 The NPD have developed strong links with many musicians; indeed, they  
offer a legitimate avenue for performance, as under German law performances at 
political rallies are not considered as concerts, and otherwise illegal material is 
allowed to be performed. The NPD have resurfaced as the most prominent of the 
German extreme-right parties, gaining representation in the state parliaments of two 
former eastern states, and surviving a banning attempt by  the Federal Government in 
2001. The party  twice nominated a musician, Frank Rennicke, for the office of 
German President, in 2009 and 2010. Rennicke, who styles himself as a “national 
bard,” has a long history in various extreme-right organisations and his music has led 
to his prosecution on two occasions under the “Volksverhetzung” (“incitement of 
popular hatred”) law. Rennicke played a prominent role in Projekt Schulhof (Project 
Schoolyard), the NPD campaign which distributed various compilation albums of 
material by  extreme-right musicians for free to young people, particularly school 
students. The NPD have compiled a number of CDs under the Projekt Schulhof 
banner, and, although the selected songs tend to be less explicit  in their ideology, 
some have been indexed and thus prevented from distribution to minors.
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 The indexing of extreme-right music is one of the most prominent examples 
of state suppression of extreme-right music. In 1993, the Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) launched a 
nationwide operation against the extreme right, which involved searching the homes 
and offices of musicians and bands, as well as the closure of Rock-O-Rama. This 
operation involved the trial for incitement of musicians from Störkraft, Radikahl, 
Tonstörung, Noie Werte, and Kraftschlag; most  received probationary sentences, 
although Jens Arpe of Kraftschlag was sentenced to two years in jail.107 In addition, 
much extreme-right  music was placed on the index of texts which could prove 
harmful to minors; possession of this material did not become illegal, but the sale, 
advertising and distribution of it did. The list expanded from a few entries in the 
1980s to 75 in 1995, to 140 in 1999.108  A relative decline in the number of bands 
after 2006 was reversed in 2010, when 128 concerts were performed with an average 
attendance of around 130.109
 The band Landser, a slang term for a common soldier, has been perhaps the 
most significant in Germany over the past ten years. Led by Michael Regener, also 
known as Lunikoff, it has a sizable back catalogue of albums, with such titles as Das 
Reich kommt wieder (The Reich will rise again), which are almost all banned in 
Germany. Landser’s releases, along with those of its contemporaries, tend to be 
recorded in Germany but manufactured and distributed abroad, mainly in the United 
States, United Kingdom and Eastern Europe. These CDs are freely available in other 
countries, but are obviously intended for a German market; as such, they are 
distributed through underground networks or, more recently, through online file-
sharing. It is this distribution that has been targeted by the authorities, since owning 
the music is not illegal, but selling it is. This business is big, with revenues cited as in 
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the millions;110 in 1997 German police raided 25 locations, arresting 14 figures of the 
extreme-right scene, and seizing 30,000 CDs of illegal material. They also exposed a 
lucrative sideline of the business by  seizing 260,000 counterfeit CDs of mainstream 
music.111 In 2006, Polish customs officials seized 300 illegal CDs being transported 
from the United States to Germany.112 In 2009, German police carried out the largest 
operation against this music scene, an operation two years in the making. Searching 
more than 200 locations, they seized some 45,000 CDs, as well as a substantial 
amount of computers and weapons.113
 Concerts are also legally risky. Landser allegedly played only  once in public, 
and even then in masks, otherwise restricting themselves to private gigs. Despite 
their precautions, the members of Landser were charged with inciting racial hatred 
by a Berlin court in 2003; two members received probationary  sentences due to their 
agreeing to testify  against band leader Michael Regener, who was sentenced to three 
years in prison. Regener’s incarceration, which caused the breakup of Landser, led to 
a protest  in 2006 by 750 neo-Nazis outside the prison, calling for Regener’s 
release.114  Other bands, such as Race War, have since been prosecuted under the 
same laws, tending to receive probationary sentences.115  There has been recent 
discussion around launching a “Nazi Shazam app,” software to identify  the audio 
fingerprint of indexed music, in order to curb the playing of extreme-right music at 
clubs, gatherings and on Internet radio stations.116
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 The actions of the state have hampered the distribution of this material, but it 
is still a crucial component of German extreme-right culture, recruitment and 
income, with one former party member claiming that music is the primary means of 
financing the NPD.117 Michael Regener founded Die Lunikoff Verschwörung (The 
Lunikoff Conspiracy) after his perceived betrayal by his Landser bandmates, and has 
continued to release material and perform since his release from prison. There has 
also been a marked shift into less confrontational genres and forms, which would in 
part seem to be a tactic to avoid further state censorship (see below). Despite the 
attentions of the state, the extreme-right scene in Germany has long since eclipsed 
Britain’s as the most significant in Europe, although the tendency for musicians to 
sing in German has meant it has remained a domestic rather than an international 
phenomenon.
Sweden
Like Britain, Sweden is presented as an exception to the appeal of extreme-right 
politics. Scholars note the sustained successes of parties in other Scandinavian 
countries, such as the Norwegian Fremskrittpartiet  (Progress Party) and the Danish 
Fremskridtpartiet (Progress Party) and Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party), 
which have supported coalition governments, and contrast  this with an almost 
complete lack of similar parties in Sweden.118  It is significant to note that  in the 
literature these parties are referred to as “radical-right populist” rather than extremist; 
they  were founded in order to oppose high taxation and bureaucracy, rather than 
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immigration. Formed in the early 1970s, these parties therefore did not  come from 
any tradition of extremism or xenophobia, only mobilising against immigration in the 
1980s.119
 The portrayal of Sweden as a Scandinavian exception was challenged in 
September 2010 when the extreme-right Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats, 
SD) gained enough votes in the Swedish general election to qualify  for 
representation in the Swedish Riksdag. When compared to its neighbours, Sweden’s 
extreme-right support was still notably low; the SD received 5.7% of the vote, with 
4% required to gain representation. In contrast, the Dansk Folkeparti has averaged 
12–13% in parliamentary elections over the last ten years, while the Norwegian 
Fremskrittpartiet has increased its voter share from 15% in 1997 to 23% in 2009. In 
both cases minority governments have relied on these parties to pass legislation.
 In the wake of SD’s success, Swedish novelist Henning Mankell wrote that 
the party should have been “argued … to oblivion,” claiming that the refusal of the 
Swedish political mainstream to engage with extreme-right parties contributed to 
their success. Mankell also saw the Sweden Democrats as beneficiaries of protest 
voting, reflecting dissatisfaction with established parties, rather than support for 
extreme-right policies.120  These sentiments tie in with the notion of Swedish 
exceptionalism, but scholars have forwarded other factors for the lack of extreme-
right success. 
 Firstly, Sweden had a long period of uninterrupted Socialist Democrat rule, 
which meant that protest voting against it could be directed to other mainstream 
parties, whereas the success of the right as well as the left in Norway and Denmark 
meant that new parties were required to accommodate such protest  voting.121 In the 
late-1960s and early-1970s in Denmark and Norway  non-socialist coalitions were in 
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power at the time of the most expansive period for the welfare state, followed by an 
unprecedented increase in taxes. In Sweden, the Social Democrats were in power, 
meaning the protests against  tax could be directed to the established non-socialist 
parties.122  In addition, although bloc voting dependent on class position was 
declining across Europe during this period, in Sweden it began from a much higher 
level, meaning that significantly high proportions of the working classes were still 
voting for the Social Democrats or Left Party.123 These explanations are lent weight 
by research which has shown that Swedish voter attitudes, particularly  xenophobia, 
do not differ significantly  from their counterparts in other countries.124  Of course, 
xenophobic attitudes alone do not  necessarily produce an extreme-right voter, but 
they are a good indication of similarities in international voter attitudes.
 One of the major obstacles the SD have had to face is their stigmatisation and 
marginalisation by the mainstream parties; Ramalingam argues that the SD partly 
overcame this by renegotiating the established norms of Swedish society, and the 
place of their policies within it.125 Despite this apparent renegotiation, the SD have 
been and are often linked to neo-Nazis, which may in some part account for the 
difficulty they  have had in gaining electoral traction. The party’s origins can be 
traced to the Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish) movement, and the 
party’s early senior members had a history  of involvement with National Socialist 
parties.126 Although the SD itself was never fascist or National Socialist, these links 
would prove a significant obstacle to the party’s attempts to gain mainstream 
acceptance.
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 This struggle for acceptance has continued; following the SD’s modest 
electoral success, the other parties in the Riksdag all declared their unwillingness to 
associate with the party. This has not been due to lack of effort on the part of the SD, 
however. Under the leadership  of Mikael Jansson (1995–2005) and particularly 
Jimmie Åkesson (2005–present), the SD have undergone an extensive process of 
modernisation and moderation. This has included the expulsion of some of the more 
extreme members of the party—during the early 1990s “there was no clear 
distinction between the SD and various skinhead and Nazi organisations”127—which 
in turn has led to the defection of some established politicians from mainstream 
parties to the SD. The process of modernisation included the banning of uniforms 
and an open renunciation of Nazism, as well as the toning down or deletion of some 
of the most contentious or hardline policies in the party’s manifesto.128
 There is evidence to suggest that the SD’s attempt to integrate into 
mainstream political life is popular among voters, if not  with other political parties. 
This is in spite of the scandals which have beset the party, reminiscent of the 
problems many extreme-right parties have experienced upon entry  into democratic 
politics. In November 2012, two of the SD’s MPs, Kent Ekeroth and Erik Almqvist
—who also held positions of party  justice policy  and economic policy spokespersons 
respectively—took a “break” from their roles in the Riksdag after the Expressen 
tabloid released video footage of the men involved in a scuffle with a member of the 
public, with the clip also capturing their use of racially and sexually abusive 
language.129  Two weeks later, MP Lars Isovaar reported his bag stolen by “two 
unknown people with immigrant backgrounds”; in fact, Isovaar had left his bag in a 
restaurant and police called to investigate the alleged robbery  reported the MP for his 
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racist abuse towards a Riksdag security guard.130  These scandals do not appear to 
have diminished the party’s appeal; polling released in December 2012 showed the 
SD as the fourth most popular party  in Sweden, with 7.9% support, with the party  at 
7.7% in June 2013.131
 The SD do have a political precedent: in 1991 the newly-formed Ny  
Demokrati (New Democracy, ND) achieved even greater success than the SD did in 
2010, gaining 30 seats in the Riksdag. They ran on a platform of reduced 
government, private enterprise, and immigration policies that bordered on outright 
xenophobia.132  The party’s instant success was based on the appeal of its leaders, 
aristocratic industrialist Ian Wachtmeister and record company owner Bert Karlsson, 
who used populist language and stunts, drastic rhetoric and humour to portray their 
distinctiveness from the established parties.133 The party’s time in the Riksdag was 
marked by internal divisions, scandals and discord between the two leaders, leading 
to Wachtmeister stepping down as chairman in 1994. By this point, ND had become 
the subject of ridicule,134  and any hope the party  had of presenting itself as an 
independent alternative was damaged by its cooperation with the non-socialist 
government.135 As a result, ND was eradicated at the elections in 1994.
 As well as providing an example of the potential for a populist party in 
Swedish politics, the activities of ND founder Bert Karlsson were hugely  significant 
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for the music scene of the extreme right in Sweden. Despite—or perhaps because of
—the lack of parliamentary opportunity  for the extreme right in Sweden, the country 
has supported a strong, often neo-Nazi, extreme-right community. This community 
has had strong associations with violence; the successes of ND and SD were both 
followed by “lone wolf” shootings targeting immigrants: John Ausonius was 
convicted of a string of shootings in Stockholm in 1991 and 1992 after taking direct 
inspiration from ND,136 while Peter Mangs was found guilty in 2012 for a number of 
shootings in Malmö. As well as attacks against immigrants, the movement’s enemies 
are also targeted; in 1999, two policemen were killed (the prosecutor referred to it as 
execution) by neo-Nazi bank robbers, while in a separate incident the trade union 
member Björn Söderberg was murdered for exposing the Nazi ideology of an elected 
representative. This was also the year that the journalist Peter Karlsson, who had 
highlighted the relationship between neo-Nazism and organised crime in a series of 
articles, and his son were seriously wounded by a car bomb.137
 According to statistics produced by The Skinhead International (which is 
unfortunately  unclear on its time-frame and research methods) Sweden in the early- 
to mid-1990s had a larger number of skinheads than countries many times its size.138 
Studies have noted the problem of xenophobic sentiments among adolescents,139 
while a 1997 study found that 12.2% of Swedish schoolchildren sometimes or often 
listened to racist music, with that figure rising to 17% for boys of Swedish origin.140 
The country has been a popular destination for touring bands from around the world 
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(particularly Skrewdriver), has produced many musicians, and has provided outlets 
for extreme-right bands through record labels.
 In the 1980s, Sweden followed the British example of Rock Against 
Communism, and there was much cooperation between the two countries in terms of 
publishing and the joint release of material. Particularly significant here was the 
Bevara Sverige Svenskt movement, which funded the release of music. However, the 
music scene was not a major source of income for extreme-right movements; until 
the early 1990s the extreme right was infamous for violent robberies of banks and 
munition stores. This approach changed around 1993 when music became the 
primary source of funding for extreme-right organisations,141 thanks to the example 
of Ultima Thule. Signed to Bert Karlsson’s Swedish label, Mariann Grammofon, and 
playing a form of music that came to be known as ‘Viking Rock’, Ultima Thule 
achieved immediate success, with three albums entering the chart that year and 
attaining gold and platinum status.142 Despite this success, Karlsson was pressured 
into breaking the contract  with Ultima Thule by the media controversy surrounding 
the band’s allegedly racist origins. 
 The career of Ultima Thule can be divided easily into two periods. The first 
incarnation of the band was between 1982 and 1986, and was the period of their most 
overt affiliation with neo-Nazi groups. Their first single was funded by Bevara 
Sverige Svenskt, and during this period their music also appeared on compilations 
alongside contemporary racist bands from Britain. After disbanding for four years, 
the band returned with a new singer and worked their way to the mainstream 
exposure afforded to them through a major label contract. Despite the apparent 
convergence of ideologies, Karlsson claimed not to know of the band’s past, 
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describing them as “really good kids” and “ordinary patriots and nationalists.”143 The 
band themselves reacted strongly, protesting their innocence:
We in Ultima Thule are not racist  or a Nazi band.… We have enough courage 
that we would admit  it  if we were.… We must question the mental health of our 
country when patriotic songs about Sweden, and the texts of our history, are 
equated with racism. This is only part of a witch hunt of anyone who dares to 
stand up for Sweden. This is as disgusting as when schoolchildren are forbidden 
from singing our national anthem because of fear of growing racism.… We 
recognise our right to be proud of our country and do not accept some obscure 
publication associating our music with racism and Nazism.144
It is difficult to describe Ultima Thule’s music as explicitly racist. They pioneered the 
form known as “Vikingarock” (“Viking Rock”), used to describe a genre of music 
which merged elements of folk music with rock and punk. Vikingarock has been said 
to occupy “the grey  area between extreme-right ideology and a naïve romantic 
patriotism,”145 and genre bands maintain that it is apolitical. However, Vikingarock is 
often seen as part of the extreme-right music scene, not only by  anti-fascists but also 
by those within the extreme-right music scene itself, with Ultima Thule featuring in 
the British version of Blood & Honour as an example of success. They frequently 
appear on extreme-right forums, and attract fans who make Nazi salutes during their 
performances, although the band have been known to refuse to play while this was 
occurring, attempting to dissociate themselves from such behaviour.146
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 Ultima Thule’s protestation of innocence was based on the difference 
between them and their contemporaries. Before 2000, the most significant extreme-
right musicians from Sweden other than Ultima Thule were probably Dirlewanger 
and Midgårds Söner. Although the latter emphasised their Swedishness, probably 
influenced by Ultima Thule, they revealed their ideology  through songs such as 
‘Fourth Reich.’ Dirlewanger, named after a German SS commander and his 
eponymous penal unit, released albums such as White Power Rock ’n’ Roll and 
Rocking For The Golden Race, used swastikas on their album covers and released 
songs such as ‘Nigger Season.’ The band did try to capitalise on Ultima Thule’s 
success by repackaging White Power Rock ’n’ Roll as Heroes in the Snow, renaming 
themselves the same before shortening it to Heroes.
 The success of Ultima Thule was a hugely significant event in the history  of 
the Swedish extreme-right music scene. Trading on the financial and marketing 
advantages their mainstream success had allowed them, Ultima Thule set up their 
own label and record store, releasing many  more albums (they played their final 
show in July  2012) and providing an outlet for other bands in the scene. While 
Ultima Thule could conceivably claim that their own music did not contain racist 
content, their association with the bands on their label seems to expose their 
ideology. Among the bands signed to Ultima Thule’s label were Midgårds Söner and 
Dirlewanger.
 Following Ultima Thule’s commercial success, the mid-1990s saw a surge in 
independent producers of extreme-right music in Sweden, such as Last Resort 
Records, Svea Music, Nordland and Ragnarock Records. While many Swedish bands 
had little international significance, the labels did, producing albums by bands from 
around the world, including Britain, the United States and Australia.147  In the late 
1990s the Swedish scene started to decline; this has been linked to a police 
crackdown on live gigs, which culminated in a raid of one concert and the arrest  of 
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297 people.148  This, alongside the increasing availability  of extreme-right music 
online, means that most labels have now folded or are trading at a drastically  reduced 
level.
 Since 2000, the most significant Swedish musician has undoubtedly been the 
female singer Saga. Although she has contributed to the releases of the band 
Symphony of Sorrow as well as the third Pro Patria album by Midgård, she is best 
known for her solo work. 2000 was the year she released the first  two volumes (of 
three) of My Tribute to Skrewdriver, which situated her firmly  in the extreme-right 
tradition, and an album of originals, On My Own, was released in 2008. Her style 
however is markedly different. As well as being a female musician in an 
overwhelmingly  masculine environment, Saga plays in “softer” styles and forms, and 
her lyrics are more ambiguous than most of her contemporaries (see Chapter Seven). 
In this way, Saga follows the ambiguous approach of Ultima Thule.
 While it  is difficult to estimate the popularity of any musician from the 
extreme right, Saga seems to be a relative superstar and hugely popular. Prussian 
Blue (see below) claimed to have listened to her music when they were young, which 
inspired them to create their own, and many  of her contemporaries refer to her in 
interviews (albeit often in terms of her sexual allure). Although Sweden is still 
producing a number of extreme-right bands in a variety  of genres, it is Saga who is 
most prominent in the contemporary scene.
 There is a parallel between the recent development of extreme-right music 
and of the political context  in Sweden. The success of Saga is a manifestation of 
image modernisation, with the extreme-right distancing themselves from skinhead 
culture and instead presenting themselves as the home of ordinary Swedish 
patriotism. This modernising process can clearly be traced to the work of Ultima 
Thule, but that band were an exception to the general tendency for explicitly  racist 
skinhead music. This type of music is still made in Sweden, but it has greatly 
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diminished in significance because it is no longer in harmony with the message of 
the political wing of the extreme right. This decline has been intensified by  the SD 
discarding extreme-right music from its strategy, instead attempting to adopt 
Swedish folk music. However, the SD’s folk campaign was largely ineffective, and it 
is possible that the party will attempt to re-establish its links with extreme-right 
music in the future, although such music would undoubtedly be “softer.”
United States
Certain features of the United States are particularly  distinctive among these four 
nations; its history as an immigrant nation means it is difficult to employ arguments 
of indigenous cultures and peoples, as has become common with extreme-right 
movements in Europe. It  also has a drastically different history of race relations; 
while European countries only experienced mass non-white immigration after World 
War Two,149 the immigrant nature of the US and its history of slavery means that race 
has for centuries been a much more visible concept. American extreme-right culture 
therefore has had a longer history and more to draw on than its European 
counterparts. Also of importance is that much of the population in modern America 
which is deemed “non-white” is native-born, as opposed to the first-generation 
immigrants who are often the object of the European extreme right’s hostility.
 In addition, the strong two-party political system in the US means that 
extreme-right groups have largely  worked outwith the democratic sphere, whereas in 
European countries there have usually been links with groups which are engaged 
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with the democratic process, even if only  superficially.150 Extreme-right figures have 
taken part in elections, standing as candidates for Democratic and Republican 
nomination, but this is relatively rare and has generally not been successful. The 
groups examined in this section are, therefore, not  political parties as such, and 
extreme-right ideology has little hope of democratic advancement, even in 
comparison with the relatively ineffectual political parties cited above. This 
undoubtedly contributes to the continuing prevalence of violent  rhetoric (explored in 
Chapter Five) amongst the American extreme-right—since violent revolution appears 
to be the only  conceivable route to establishing extreme-right power—and the 
preponderance for conspiracy theorising, since lack of enfranchisement is attributed 
to nefarious forces. The lack of any centralised focus for the extreme-right in the 
USA may also be a factor in the sheer diversity  of groups, encompassing the militia 
movement, neo-Nazis, motorcycle groups, skinheads, Christian fundamentalists, 
pagans, and more. These groups can and do work together, but also demonstrate the 
tendency for infighting and disagreement which characterises the extreme right.
 Probably the most notorious of these activist movements is the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK) which, with a history  stretching back over 140 years, “remains a symbol of 
perseverance … and continues to inspire Aryan vigilantism and devotion to white 
power.”151 This history is generally  divided into three stages. The Klan was founded 
by former Confederate soldiers in 1866 in the southern state of Tennessee, with the 
original intention of preventing newly emancipated black people from voting. 
Described as “America’s first  true terrorist group,”152  this first Klan conducted a 
reign of terror throughout the former Confederate states between 1867 and 1871, 
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targeting not only freed black slaves but whites sympathetic to Reconstruction 
policies. A Joint Congressional Committee found that in this four-year period “the 
Klan had been responsible for hundreds, possibly thousands, of black deaths.”153 
Legislation designed to curb Klan violence was passed in 1870 and 1871, and led to 
the decline of the Klan. However, the Klan’s influence set the foundation for white 
political monopoly in the South, while also creating a violent pattern for regulating 
race relations.154  This latter point is well demonstrated by  the fact that lynchings, 
rather than declining with the demise of the Klan, actually peaked during the 1890s.
 While the first Klan was intended to maintain the dominance of whites in the 
United States, the second was more diverse in its ideology. It was reestablished in 
1915 by William J. Simmons who had been inspired by film-maker D.W. Griffith’s 
glorification of the Klan in The Birth of a Nation, released in the same year; the 
second Klan even adopted the film’s uniforms and burning crosses.155  The second 
Klan was heavily driven by  Protestant interests, expanding its list  of targets beyond 
blacks and the government, and reaching truly national prominence:
Jews, Catholics, non-Aryan foreigners and socialists were now regarded as 
enemies by the Klan.… The Klan also attacked people considered immoral or 
traitors to the white race. Indeed, all those who deviated from a strict 
conservative norm were regarded as legitimate targets. Second, the new Klan 
managed to extend its influence outside the South—and by the mid-1920s had 
become a national organization, a reflection of the unsettled conditions in 
America following World War I, during which a conservative, xenophobic 
reaction swept the country. Although estimates vary, at  the peak of its power in 
1925, Klan membership may have reached as high as 5 million.156
Although the second Klan also engaged in violent activities—which, along with 
internal schisms, would eventually lead to its decline—they also used other means to 
advance their goals. These included political methods, with Klan members and 
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sympathisers elected to offices across the country, and also cultural practices, with 
the Klan encouraging a sense of community through, among other things, music (see 
below).
 The KKK was marginalised again during the Great Depression, re-emerging 
to a degree to oppose the Civil Rights Movement and, like the first, mainly based in 
the former Confederate states. Rather than entirely refounding the Klan, as Simmons 
had done, this third Klan involved the unification (to a degree) of independent 
“Klaverns” (local units) and the targeting of black families and Civil Rights activists 
through terrorism. The third Klan faced extreme hostility  from public opinion and the 
FBI, although some police departments such as in Birmingham, Alabama, cooperated 
with it. The Klan declined due to its failure to stop the Civil Rights Movement,157 
and splintered into isolated factions, continuing in this essentially  disunited form 
until the present day. Branches of the KKK became associated with neo-Nazi and 
white power movements, which led to the establishment of some KKK chapters 
outside the United States (Ian Stuart Donaldson formed a sideline band called The 
Klansmen, and joined an English chapter158). Today’s Klan is wedded to the white 
power scene, particularly through what Simi and Futrell call the “Nazification” of the 
KKK, with neo-Nazi symbolism, ideology and ritual integrated into Klan 
traditions.159  Other Klans have arisen that have associated with groups such as 
Christian Identity and Aryan Nations.160
 I have devoted this space to histories of the various Klans from a time before 
my main period of study  because they have had such an influence on extreme-right 
cultures which followed. Not only has the KKK been the foremost extreme-right 
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organisation in the USA throughout its history, but its iconography and symbolism 
have become embedded in the national consciousness. The Klan is also significant in 
that it  has provided one of the main inspirations for successive extreme-right groups, 
rather than the National Socialism to which most European groups can trace their 
history; National Socialist groups do exist in the United States, but  it is important  to 
recognise the singular influence of the Ku Klux Klan as well. Martin Durham’s 
summary  of the second Klan’s ideology demonstrates many features which are 
shared by the contemporary extreme right:
Shaped by wartime jingoism, it  called for opposition to “Foreign Labor 
Agitators.” It  was anti-Semitic too. Bolshevism, the Klan declared, was “a 
Jewish-controlled and Jewish-financed movement,” and Jewish international 
bankers were seeking to dominate the governments of the world.… The pope, it 
declared, was an alien despot, and his church hated America and sought to crush 
it. The Klan was fiercely opposed too to what it saw as a rising tide of 
immorality. The country, Klansmen claimed, had entered a “corrupt  and jazz-
made age,” and “degrading” films and “filthy fiction” were undermining 
America.161
This focus on degeneracy, anti-communism and anti-Semitism may be so close to 
Nazi ideology  as to brook no distinction, but  it allows the contemporary extreme 
right in the United States to trace its roots back to something American rather than 
foreign.162
 While the Klan’s history has mainly been associated with violence, the 
second manifestation established its own musical culture which indicates a unique 
history of extreme-right musical culture in the USA. The Klan used the leading 
medium of its time in order to disseminate its message, sheet music.163 The covers of 
these products have been catalogued by Danny O. Crew and analysed by Holly 
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Holmes,164 with Holmes arguing that economic benefits in their distribution were of 
secondary importance:
For the price of a dollar or two, the KKK sold the idea, or intellectual good, of 
inclusion in an organization whose service was to restore American values and 
ideals to society. Ideas included anti-miscegenation, anti-immigration and anti-
Catholicism, while services included the Klan’s own version of law 
enforcement to stop violators of prohibition, pressure on citizens to vote for 
particular Klan candidates for local government  and pressure on lawmakers to 
enact restrictions on immigration.165
As well as sheet music, the Klan of the 1920s sponsored fiddle contests, promoting 
ostensibly  “old-fashioned” music in order to establish music far removed from 
Jewish and black influence as “authentic American music.”166  Music was also an 
integral part of many Klan ceremonies, appropriating or adapting hymns and popular 
and patriotic tunes, and collecting the results in songbooks known as “Klorans.”167 
Martin Durham notes that the second Klan sought to root “itself in local 
communities” in addition to its acts of terrorism,168 and in this practice music seems 
to have played an important role in fostering a sense of community, as well as 
spreading the message of the Klan.
 The Klan’s particular association with the South, especially  in its first and 
third incarnations, was part of a political ideology which found expression in another 
bastion of Southern culture: country music. In their analysis of what they refer to as 
“country hate music,” Messner et al. see these products of the 1950s and 1960s as 
something distinct from the “hate rock” generally  associated with extreme-right 
musical cultures. Among the artists they analyse are the Sons of Mississippi, Happy 
Fats, the Klansman, Colonel Sharecropper, the Dixie Greys, Odis Cochran and the 
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Three Bigots, and Johnny Rebel.169 The figure behind much of this material was Jay 
Miller, founder of many labels, the most significant in this context being Reb Rebel 
Records. Miller’s association with black blues musicians suggests that he was 
motivated primarily by economics rather than ideology. While this music was 
distributed through “underground” rather than mainstream channels, it had 
significant commercial successes; for example, it is said that Happy Fats’ ‘Dear Mr. 
President’ sold over 200,000 copies.170
 Although less successful than Happy Fats, Johnny Rebel (real name Clifford 
Joseph Trahan) was the musician with the greatest legacy. Trahan only recorded 
around a dozen songs as Johnny Rebel in his career, but these were picked up by  the 
later extreme-right scene,171 and Rebel was acclaimed as a historical virtue. Indeed, 
Rebel has been held up as the inspiration for the entire extreme-right scene, with 
Michael Wade arguing that Rebel inspired Skrewdriver in the creation of their 
musical style.172 This seems, however, unlikely; while Ian Stuart Donaldson admired 
Rebel, there is no evidence as to when he became aware of his music. What seems 
more probable is that the contemporary extreme-right scene evolved on its own with 
origins in punk, before some in the scene became aware of Rebel’s work and cited 
him as a forerunner, albeit not a direct inspiration.
 Klan culture was an influential seam, but it had to coexist, and at times 
compete, with American National Socialism. While pro-Nazi figures such as William 
Dudley Pelley, Gerald Winrod and Charles Coughlin were vocal in the interwar 
period,173 it  was not until 1959 that  a prominent American National Socialist  party 
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was formed. Founded by George Lincoln Rockwell and initially called the World 
Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists, it was renamed in 1960 as the 
American Nazi Party, likely as part of Rockwell’s strategy of using propaganda to 
shock and gain attention.174 Attention-seeking also involved dressing party members 
in uniforms and holding confrontational demonstrations against Jews and civil rights. 
Rockwell went so far as to create a “Hate Bus” in 1961 in reaction to civil rights 
buses, daubing a Volkswagen van with the slogans “LINCOLN ROCKWELL’S 
HATE BUS,” “WE DO HATE RACE MIXING” and “WE HATE JEW-
COMMUNISM.”175  Although Rockwell and the American Nazi Party became 
notorious for acts such as these, the lack of progress led Rockwell to take the party 
down a more “professional” route. He changed the party’s name in January  1967 to 
the National Socialist White People’s Party and replaced the use of “Sieg Heil” with 
“White Power,” inspired by the call “Black Power.” In August that  year, Rockwell 
was assassinated by a former party member, John Patler, who had been expelled in 
April for his apparently “Bolshevik leanings.”176
 While Rockwell’s political ventures were in many ways a failure—
particularly in terms of supporter numbers—his legacy was hugely influential on 
future generations of the American extreme right. Simonelli considers three 
particular aspects to be central to this legacy.177  First, Rockwell’s replacement of 
Nazi slogans with the concept of “White Power” expanded the supremacist recruiting 
pool to include those thought of as non-Aryan. Second, Rockwell was one of the first 
in the American extreme right to advocate Holocaust denial, which was to become an 
important component in extreme-right ideology. Third, Rockwell linked together 
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Nazism with Christian Identity, the latter being the interpretation of the Bible which 
sees Jews as children of Satan. As well as these legacies identified by Simonelli, two 
more features of Rockwell’s life are significant. First, he recognised the potential of 
music, releasing songs such as ‘Ship Those Niggers Back’ by  Odis Cochran and the 
Three Bigots. Second, he heavily influenced the next generation of the American 
extreme right, such as William Luther Pierce.
 Pierce, a physicist who had spent three years teaching at Oregon State 
University, was employed by Rockwell in 1966 as editor of the journal National 
Socialist World, which “cultivated its image and status as the leading international 
Nazi periodical with long articles and book reviews written for an educated and 
literate readership, as well as high standards of production.”178  In 1970, with 
Rockwell’s successors taking different ideological directions, Pierce became leader 
of the National Youth Alliance, renaming it the National Alliance (NA) in 1974. The 
NA espoused revolutionary  ideology, and published monthly  instructional articles in 
the party magazine on weapon use and bomb building.179
 In 1975, the NA began the monthly serialisation of The Turner Diaries, a 
novel Pierce wrote under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald and which was 
published as a book in 1978. The book depicts a revolution in the United States 
leading to race war, and the extermination of non-white groups, as well as Jews and 
homosexuals. Pierce followed this with Hunter (also as Andrew Macdonald), 
published in 1989, which described the actions of an assassin targeting mixed-race 
couples, and journalists and politicians who were seen as promoting race-mixing. 
The Turner Diaries, and to a lesser extent Hunter, had a huge influence on the 
development of the extreme right. The Turner Diaries popularised the idea of 
leaderless resistance, distancing political movements from the often illegal activities 
of their adherents. Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh was an avid reader of the 
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book, and his attack has been compared to the bombing of the FBI headquarters in 
the novel.180 
 The Order, a terrorist group which committed a series of murders, robberies 
and a bombing in the early 1980s, took its name from the organisation in The Turner 
Diaries, itself a reference to the SS. The leader of The Order, Robert  Jay Mathews, 
was killed by FBI agents during a gun-fight in 1984 while his colleagues were 
arrested and imprisoned. Of the other members, the most influential was undoubtedly 
David Lane, who died in 2007 while serving a 190-year prison sentence. During his 
time in prison, Lane became one of the leading writers and thinkers of the extreme-
right movement. Lane coined the 14 words which have permeated the extreme right, 
the number 14 making many appearances in signatures, manifestos, propaganda, etc. 
The 14 words are: “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for 
White children,” and at times are accompanied by Lane’s continuance: “because the 
beauty of the White Aryan woman must not perish from this earth.” Lane’s interest in 
Wotanism also popularised this religion within the extreme right.
 While Pierce’s novels had inspired activists to commit terrorist acts, Pierce 
himself decided that a long-term approach was needed. According to Durham:
[W]hat most  marked the Alliance was Pierce’s argument that in the period 
ahead, it  should aim to recruit from ‘an elite minority carefully sifted out of the 
overall White population’. The resulting organization would ‘elaborate and 
elucidate the truth’ and when mass mobilization at last  became possible, it 
would be ready.181
To achieve this end, the NA produced a wide variety  of propaganda materials 
including novels, radio broadcasts, comic books182 and video games.183 Of these, it 
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was music that was most successful, and Pierce harnessed its potential through his 
label, Resistance Records.
 The first person on the extreme right to popularise the use of skinhead music 
in the US was Tom Metzger, leader of White Aryan Resistance (WAR). The 
American skinhead subculture was imported from Britain in the early 1980s and, as 
in Britain, incorporated both racist and anti-racist skins. Early  on, Skrewdriver 
records were the main touchstone of the racist American skinheads due to a lack of 
local bands and venues.184 Stores sprang up  selling records by  Skrewdriver and other 
British bands like No Remorse and Brutal Attack, while American bands such as 
Final Solution, were forming.185 Metzger helped shape the scene by pioneering the 
use of computer bulletin boards, recorded message telephone lines and public access 
television, and Metzger’s appearances on mainstream talk-shows, despite their 
unsympathetic portrayal and treatment of him, afforded him enormous publicity. 
Perhaps his most telling contribution, however, was his establishment of “Aryan 
Fest” in 1988, involving speeches and music. Metzger’s success was observed by 
other organisations such as Aryan Nations, who went on to create their own festivals 
to attract skinhead recruits.186
 These opportunities encouraged the development of domestic bands and 
diminished the reliance on British imports. Bands such as Bound For Glory, formed 
in 1989, were successful enough to embark on tours in Europe. While skinheads 
provided a recruiting pool for extreme-right organisations, their violent tendencies 
caused problems. In 1988, skinhead members of WAR murdered an Ethiopian 
student, Metzger saying the perpetrators had done their “civic duty.” The Southern 
Poverty Law Center and Anti-Defamation League brought a civil lawsuit against 
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Metzger and WAR, asserting the latter’s responsibility, and in 1990 Metzger was 
found liable for $12.5 million.187  This judgement crippled Metzger and WAR, 
ensuring their relative impotence, with Metzger’s contribution to the extreme right 
since then essentially reduced to making speeches at rallies and hosting an online 
radio show.
 Metzger’s influence over the music scene was vastly reduced, and the 
establishment of Resistance Records created a new focal point for it. George Burdi 
had founded the band RaHoWa (an abbreviation of “Racial Holy  War”) in 1989, and 
they  became one of the most successful bands of the 1990s, with songs such as ‘Ode 
to a Dying People’ frequently covered in the scene. Burdi founded Resistance— 
encompassing a magazine and production company—in 1993. Not just a distributor 
but a major producer of music, Resistance became the central point of skinhead 
culture, selling up  to 50,000 CDs a year in a variety  of genres.188  Burdi’s control 
ended with his imprisonment on assault charges in 1997 (he later renounced his racist 
ideology altogether), and William Pierce bought the company on behalf of the 
National Alliance for $100,000.189 Under Pierce’s control, Resistance recovered from 
a year-long low following Burdi’s imprisonment, with sales in 2000 reportedly 
generating more than $1 million.190  Pierce had extended his commercial reach in 
1999 with the purchase of the Swedish label Nordland Records, also the name of one 
of the more significant Swedish extreme-right magazines, in the same year, 
reportedly doubling his inventory to 80,000 CDs.191 This allowed Pierce not only  to 
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take control of contracts for some of Europe’s more significant bands, but also to 
provide an avenue of distribution for his own label.192
 Resistance’s success, as well as the National Alliance’s, ended with Pierce’s 
death in 2002. Erich Gliebe, who had been running Resistance Records, became NA 
leader but presided over the descent of the organisation into acrimony. Gliebe 
temporarily left the party and was replaced by his associate Shaun Walker. Walker’s 
imprisonment a year later—on charges related to the beating of Mexican American 
and Native American people—led to Gliebe’s return. During this period, NA 
membership and Resistance sales declined dramatically.193  According to the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL), the NA “has been barely functioning since the spring of 
2005,”194  with at least three new groups being formed by purged members. 
Resistance maintained a large catalogue and online presence for a number of years, 
but has not produced a magazine since spring 2007, with its website pages apparently 
not updated since 2008,195 and the website has been inoperative since at least July 
2013.196
 During the time between Burdi’s imprisonment and the National Alliance 
reestablishing Resistance, a number of other companies were founded to fill the gap 
in the market. Distributors were set up to serve particular locations: Tri-State Terror 
in the Northeast, Panzerfaust Records in the Midwest, and Imperium Records in the 
Northwest.197 The most successful of these was Panzerfaust, becoming Resistance’s 
biggest competitor. In 2004 Panzerfaust  gained notoriety with its “Project 
Schoolyard” (similar to the NPD’s “Projekt Schulhof) which attempted to distribute 
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100,000 copies of a 20-track sampler to teenagers.198 The label collapsed when label 
co-founder Anthony  Pierpont was “exposed” as mixed-race,199 but  was reborn under 
different management as Free Your Mind Productions in 2005. Free Your Mind now 
competes with a number of similarly-sized distributors, such as Micetrap 
Distribution, ISD Records (originally  based in Britain but relocated to the USA), 
Condemned Records, Elegy Records and MSR Productions. This competitiveness 
has undermined the use of music by  any one organisation to gain dominance; this is 
exacerbated by the tendency of distributors to negotiate non-exclusive rights with 
musicians,200 diffusing revenue between various distributors.
 The music scene in the United States is still highly significant, with the 
country  commonly  cited as producing the greatest number of extreme-right bands. 
The collapse of Resistance and Panzerfaust has meant that  this music is not 
harnessed by one organisation in particular, but this has not reduced the circulation 
and significance of this music. Indeed, the lack of central organisation has frequently 
been advocated, with many figures—including Pierce and Metzger—instead 
advocating “lone wolf” structures. Music plays a crucial role in providing a sense of 
community  between individual activists,201 which can manifest as a community of 
brutality. The American skinhead scene has been described by  the Anti-Defamation 
League as even more violent than its international counterparts,202 and the music has 
been cited as contributing to violence committed before, during, and after gigs. Most 
recently, this was manifested in the revelation that the gunman who killed six and 
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himself in a Wisconsin Sikh temple in 2012 was a member of a number of white-
power bands.203
Contending with Censorship
While the analyses above demonstrate the variation of political and musical contexts 
across these four countries, external factors can also lead to significant national 
variations. Censorship is one of the most important of these factors, often targeting 
some of the more explicit content of extreme-right music, but applied differently 
according to national laws. In the United States, policy deviates significantly from 
international consensus over the prohibition of hate speech, as summarised by 
Frederick Schauer:
[T]here appears to be a strong international consensus that  the principles of 
freedom of expression are either overridden or irrelevant when what is being 
expressed is racial, ethnic or religious hatred.… [T]he incitement to racial 
hatred and other verbal manifestations of race-based animosity are widely 
accepted as lying outside the boundaries of what  a properly conceived freedom 
of expression encompasses.… In contrast  to this international consensus that 
various forms of hate speech need to be prohibited by law and that such 
prohibition creates no or few free speech issues, the United States remains 
steadfastly committed to the opposite view.204
In the United States, the First Amendment205  essentially grants the extreme-right 
music scene complete freedom to produce and distribute its material and, 
consequently, the music—and particularly the lyrics—coming from the United States 
has not altered much over the past twenty years. In Germany, Great Britain and 
Sweden there is a general legislative consensus that hate speech consists of any 
communication which is threatening or abusive towards a person or persons on 
account of their race, ethnicity  or religion. Extreme-right music has therefore been 
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targeted in each of these countries, but the extent of the law, and its application, 
differs. This is further complicated by the fact that  some of the most pertinent 
legislation has come into effect relatively recently, forcing the extreme right to adapt 
or face criminal proceedings.
 Where censorship  has affected the ability of bands to operate, they have often 
come up with methods to overcome it. Skrewdriver could never tour the United 
States because their frontman, Ian Stuart Donaldson, had a criminal record in the UK 
for assault, but the band did carry  out relatively  successful tours of Germany and 
Sweden. A performance by Skrewdriver of their song White Power in Germany in 
1993 demonstrates some of the ambiguities encountered in dealing with this 
music.206  During the video taken by a member of the crowd, Nazi/Roman salutes 
made by the backing vocalists on stage and by some members of the audience are 
clearly visible.
I stand and watch my country;
Going down the drain;
We are all at fault now;
We are all to blame;
We’re letting them take over;
We just let them come;
Once we had an Empire;
And now we’ve got a slum.
[chorus]
White Power! For Britain;
White Power! Today;
White Power! For Europe;
Before it gets too late.207
Whether the song itself would violate German law is debatable; the lyrics’ 
implication of white supremacism arguably falls foul of Germany’s Volksverhetzung 
law, which forbids the incitement of hatred against a segment of the population. 
Certainly  illegal, now at least, are the Roman/Nazi salutes made by those on stage 
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and in the crowd. These salutes, along with much Nazi symbolism and vocabulary, 
are prohibited and punishable by a custodial sentence. Confronted with such 
situations, extreme-right activists have attempted to circumvent the law. For a salute, 
they  adopted the “Kühnengruß,” a three-fingered salute using the thumb, index and 
middle fingers—although this is now illegal in Germany, it is still a legal alternative 
in Austria and Switzerland. While symbols such as the swastika are also prohibited, 
emblems such as the Odal Rune have been adopted to serve the same purpose. 
Another common tactic is to use numbers to represent acronyms; for instance the 18 
in the name of the organisation Combat 18 refers to the letters AH, Adolf Hitler. 88 
designates Heil Hitler, and 28 refers to Blood & Honour.
 As outlined in the above section on Germany, the Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution has targeted extreme-right music, bringing 
prosecutions against musicians, producers and labels, as well as raiding premises and 
seizing illegal material, including music. While methods such as those listed above 
have been devised to circumvent legislation, some bands have simply ignored the 
legal restrictions, continuing to produce illegal music and risk prosecution. As a 
result, many prominent German extreme-right musicians have criminal records, 
although others have adopted the softer strategies outlined in Chapter Seven.
 Although Swedish law has similar legislative proscriptions as Germany in 
terms of Nazi symbolism, these have often remained unenforced due to concerns 
over their constitutional validity. Anders Widfelt notes that in 1996 and 1997 
Swedish courts ruled that the law against  political uniforms (with particular reference 
to swastika armbands)
could not  be applied, as it  ‘manifestly’ (i.e. obviously) conflicts with the 
Instrument  of Government’s protection of freedom of expression. The law 
against political uniforms still exists, but  is to all intents and purposes 
impractical.
Conversely, the Swedish Supreme Court ruled in 1996 that emblems and symbols 
(including clothes) connected to the extreme right can be regarded as persecution of 
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population groups.208  These legislative inconsistencies have made prosecution 
difficult, and the authorities are further hampered by the tactics of musicians and 
distributors (see below). However, since the Supreme Court ruling of 1996, the use 
of explicitly Nazi symbolism has declined. It is difficult  to find anything as blatant as 
Dirlewanger’s use of the swastika for the album cover of Rocking for the Golden 
Race (Rebelles Européens, 1989), for example. 
 Swedish law is strict when it comes to inciteful lyrics, although this does not 
seem to have always been the case. The song ‘Nigger Season’ (Single, 1989) by 
Dirlewanger—one of the most popular bands of the Swedish scene—obviously 
constitutes hate speech:
It’s time to grab your gun;
It’s time to have some fun;
Nigger nigger nigger hunt;
Hunt hunt tonight.
It is notable that when this song was released as a single, the band themselves 
censored the racial slur in the song title (rendered ‘N_____ Season’), but not 
elsewhere on the cover, which carries the statement “Watch out nigger!” The menace 
of the song is heightened by the cover photograph, which shows the band wielding 
various firearms and posing by a pickup truck. This song is an obvious candidate for 
censorship, being both threatening and abusive on racial grounds, but as far as I am 
aware no charges have ever been brought against Dirlewanger during their long 
career.
 Prosecution is not always a simple matter. By 2003, only one extreme-right 
band had been prosecuted under Swedish law. The extreme-right music scene has 
employed a number of tactics to avoid prosecution, the most obvious of which is the 
printing of innocent words on record sleeves while the songs themselves contain hate 
lyrics. Typical examples include replacing “Jew” with “you,” “White power” with 
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“Viking power,” “White pride” with “pure pride.”209 In addition, albums are released 
without identifying markers on the sleeve, making it difficult to trace them back to 
their producers.210  The scene has used smaller, and perhaps less scrupulous, 
manufacturers ever since its links to more well-known businesses were exposed in 
the 1990s.211 Prosecution is complicated further by the statute of limitations, which 
requires charges to be brought against music within a year of its manufacture and 
distribution.
 Perhaps the most prominent censorship of any Swedish band in the scene was 
not on legal grounds. As outlined above, Bert Karlsson signed the band Ultima Thule 
to his label in 1993, and they achieved instant Swedish chart success with their 
albums and singles. Although Ultima Thule employed the Swedish flag rather than 
the swastika, and although their lyrics emphasised faux-Romantic themes of tradition 
and heritage rather than racial supremacy, the band’s past association with 
organisations such as Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep  Sweden Swedish) led to a huge 
amount of media pressure, and eventually Karlsson was forced to drop the band from 
his label. Although Ultima Thule had essentially been banned from taking part in the 
mainstream music industry, the exposure and royalties they received allowed them to 
set up their own independent record store and label, releasing a considerable amount 
of music over the years and providing a base for other bands—such as Dirlewanger 
(at this point renamed Heroes)—to operate from.
 While Ultima Thule’s parting from Karlsson’s label was essentially due to 
media pressure, the most  dogged opponents of Swedish extreme-right music have 
tended to be anti-fascist activists. Stieg Larsson, the author of the Lisbeth Salander 
novels, was primarily known in his lifetime as the co-founder and editor-in-chief of 
the anti-fascist  magazine Expo. Along with its British associate publication 
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Searchlight, Expo worked to publicise and oppose the activities of the extreme right, 
although the effectiveness of their opposition is variable. In 1989, for example, 
Skrewdriver were due to play a concert  in Eskilstuna; anti-Fascist journalists 
managed to convince the Swedish police to close the venue, but Skrewdriver had 
another venue on standby and, unbeknownst to the police and protestors, proceeded 
to play their concert.212
 The disruption of concerts has also been the typical approach in Britain. In 
the 1970s, the punk subculture associated with the extreme right gained such a 
reputation for the violence of its fans that venue owners, local authorities and the 
police refused many bands permission to perform. This meant that potential venues 
were reduced to a handful owned by sympathetic people, some of which were rather 
unconventional; for instance, future British National Party leader Nick Griffin used 
to organise concerts on his family farm. The typical way to avoid the restrictions was 
to book venues under assumed names, but even then the concerts faced disruption by 
anti-fascist protestors. Attempting to overcome this, venues would often be kept 
secret, with ticket-holders directed to a meeting point, from which they would be 
redirected to the venue. This did not deter protesters, however, often leading to 
violent confrontations; the most famous example of this is probably  the London 
concert known as the “Main Event” in 1989, at which frequent violent clashes 
between protesters and concert-goers led to around two-thirds missing the concert 
altogether. In the aftermath, most extreme-right musicians were forced out of 
London, and Britain became less significant as a place for live extreme-right music.
 Even the BNP, who take great care to ensure their music does not contain any 
overt hate speech, have found their activities effectively  censored: the party’s annual 
Red White and Blue Festival was denied an entertainment licence in 2009 by the 
local council in Derbyshire, ruling out musical performances. The party  abandoned 
future festivals in the face of similar difficulties, and frequent protests by  anti-fascist 
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campaigners. This continuing dedication by anti-fascists to sabotaging extreme-right 
performances has mostly been directed at live performances and associated 
gatherings; there are no examples of extreme-right music being banned in Britain.
Conclusion
As this summary has shown, it is difficult  to generalise the extreme-right music 
scene across national boundaries, or even to assert with confidence what “extreme-
right” means. However, there are a number of similarities worth highlighting. Later 
chapters explore the wide variety  of genres employed by  the extreme right, but each 
of the more successful musical cultures in these nations stems from the Oi! scene of 
Britain. Even in the USA, where an independent music culture associated with the 
KKK already existed, it was the spur of the British skinhead subculture which led to 
the proliferation of extreme-right bands there. In this context, it is easy to see why 
Britain is viewed as a “Fatherland” within the extreme right where music is 
concerned.
 Unsurprisingly, extreme-right  musical culture has often been inextricably 
linked to extreme-right  political movements, with the differing nature of these 
movements having a significant influence on the music itself. Oi! in Britain had 
acquired extreme-right associations, but it was the agency of the NF which 
coordinated musicians and gave them a common platform. However, the inadequacy 
of NF organisation led to the establishment of Blood & Honour, which made the 
extreme-right music scene autonomous. Similarly, in Sweden the early scene was 
coordinated around Bevara Sverige Svenskt, and it was Bert Karlsson of Ny 
Demokrati who gave Ultima Thule their opportunity. Again, circumstances led to 
musicians taking on the primary role, in this case with Ultima Thule’s record label 
being a main outlet for their contemporaries.
 More successful use of music by  political movements has occurred in 
Germany and the United States. In Germany, the use of music by  the 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands is a crucial component in their 
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recruitment and retention of supporters. In the USA, the significance of the National 
Alliance was greatly  increased by the revenue and publicity  it  received from its 
music operations. However, this latter example shows the precariousness of many 
extreme-right endeavours: in a similar manner to the collapse of Blood & Honour in 
Britain following the death of Ian Stuart Donaldson, the death of William Pierce led 
to the collapse of Resistance. These examples illustrate the difficulty faced in re-
establishing centralised control over extreme-right music once it is lost.
 Perhaps the most significant  common feature of these scenes is their 
evolutionary  nature. Much scholarly  literature on extreme-right music focuses on its 
historical roots in the skinhead subculture, or on the musical styles associated with 
this subculture. Such an approach implies that  extreme-right music has remained 
relatively static in its output  and ideology. As the following chapters illustrate, the 
extreme-right scene is in fact more diverse in genre, lyrical themes and ideology. As 




The Paranoid Style and Popular Music:
Extreme-Right Narratives of Conspiracy and Mass Media
“We need the people to awake and fight for us right now;
‘Cause we will never be enslaved by the Zionist masterplan.” 
Skrewdriver, ‘Tomorrow is Always Too Late’, Blood & Honour, Rock-O-Rama, 
1985
“I am well aware that the orthodox opinion is that 6 million Jews 
were gassed and cremated and turned into lampshades. Orthodox 
opinion also once held that the Earth was flat… I have reached the 
conclusion that the ‘extermination’ tale is a mixture of Allied wartime 
propaganda, extremely profitable lie, and latter [sic] witch-hysteria.” 
Nick Griffin, 1998.
“If you haven’t looked recently at what MTV is offering to our teenagers, make a 
point to survey their programmes. They are pushing as hard as they can the idea 
that miscegenation—that sex between Whites and Blacks—is a natural and good 
thing, a fashionable thing. They are deliberately and blatantly encouraging 
teenaged White girls to have sexual relations with Blacks.”
William Pierce, ‘Skating on Thin Ice’, American Dissident Voices, 2011, p.185.
“A nation under the power of an alien and destructive mass media is equally 
oppressed as one under the power of a foreign, occupying government.”
David Duke, Jewish Supremacism, 2007, p.31.
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Extreme-right politics is often bound up with conspiratorial thinking. Conspiracy 
theories are used to attract and mobilise support, to justify prejudice and to place 
blame upon identifiable enemies. Perhaps most  crucial concerning conspiracy 
theories, however, is their ability to provide an explanation for the marginal status of 
extreme-right supporters: in what is often an ideology  of racial supremacy, the 
apparent marginal status of an elite racial group presents a potentially contradictory 
predicament. Such marginalisation can be explained by the nefarious conspiracies of 
enemies of the white race, and the passive nature of the majority that accept this 
unnatural condition.
 This chapter examines the use of conspiracy theories to create a shared sense 
of identity amongst extreme-right supporters. This includes not only  the 
dissemination of conspiracy belief through various media including songs, but also 
the discourse surrounding reception of mainstream music and the broader beliefs 
about the conspiratorial nature of mass media. This in turn leads to a belief in the 
superior nature of extreme-right supporters due to their ability to perceive and resist 
this manipulation. Within this model, the subversive design of the mainstream music 
industry is contrasted with the honesty and integrity of the extreme right’s own music 
scene. Furthermore, conspiracy theories serve to foster, confirm and justify 
prejudices, while providing believers with a sense of group solidarity.
Theorising Conspiracies
The term “conspiracy” has roots in legal parlance, being defined in English law as a 
crime which “consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an illegal act, 
or to do a lawful act by  unlawful means.”1  In becoming part of popular language, 
“conspiracy” is no longer confined to the illegal, but also to the immoral, the 
reprehensible: “a combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose.”2  While 
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“conspiracy” is therefore fairly clearly defined, the compound term “conspiracy 
theory” is much more contested. It was originally a neutral descriptor for any claim 
of civil, criminal or political conspiracy, but its popular meaning has evolved into 
something substantially more complex. 
 Peter Knight states that
At the most basic level, a conspiracy theory blames the current, undesirable 
state of affairs on a concerted conspiracy by a secret group.… However, the 
label “conspiracy theory” usually suggests that the interpretation offered is 
wrong.3
Knight’s mention of secrecy  is a crucial component of conspiracy  theories, although 
the group in itself need not be secret (with a plethora of supposedly  public bodies 
such as the United Nations, European Union and the World Bank frequently 
featuring in conspiracy  theories) so long as some of their activities or motives are 
assumed to be concealed from public view. The notion of concertedness is also 
crucial, with conspiracy theories suggesting a view of the world as governable and 
controllable, a perspective often contrasted with the view of history as “the fairly 
random and unpredictable interaction of countless individuals, or the predictable 
interplay of vast, impersonal structural forces.”4
 Another important aspect of conspiracy  theorising is the attitude towards 
evidence. Evidence which supports a theory  is embraced, but a lack of evidence is 
not considered damaging; such a lack is simply taken to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the conspirators in concealing their activity. This belief in the reach 
and power of conspirators means that “the very same thing that critics argue makes 
conspiracy theories unbelievable is, for conspiracy theorists, the strongest  evidence 
in favour of their claims.”5 This attitude allows the theorist to dismiss any evidence 
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that would seem to invalidate a theory as proof of the meticulous detail constructed 
by the conspirator(s) to cover their tracks.
 The apparent irrationality of ignoring disproving evidence is in part the 
reason that “conspiracy theory” is generally  considered a pejorative term, 
demonstrated particularly by the popular culture stereotype of a “conspiracy nut” 
wearing a tin foil hat to avoid having their thoughts read or their mind controlled.6 
The notion of conspiracism as the domain of the mentally  imbalanced has even been 
the starting-point of some academic analyses; in his book on the subject Daniel Pipes 
observed that while “political paranoids need not suffer from personal paranoia … 
often the two go together.”7  While such attitudes build on Richard Hofstadter’s 
introduction of the paranoid into the discourse of conspiracism in his highly 
influential essay  The Paranoid Style in American Politics—and he is also blamed for 
equating a conspiracist mindset with deficient  mental health—Hofstadter was clear 
that this was not a parallel he wished to make, saying:
the idea of a paranoid style would have little contemporary relevance or 
historical value if it  were applied only to people with profoundly disturbed 
minds. It  is the use of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal 
people that makes the phenomenon significant.8
 The difficulties in equating conspiracism with paranoia are demonstrated by  
an analysis of conspiracy belief in the United States.9 A 1994 survey  found that 69% 
of respondents believed John F. Kennedy had been killed by a conspiracy, while 
finding considerable agreement levels between 41% and 55% for conspiracies 
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9 The United States is a hub of conspiracy theories and belief, to the extent that Goldberg refers to it as 
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regarding the concealment of evidence of flying saucers; FBI involvement in the 
assassination of Martin Luther King; a (modern) Japanese conspiracy to destroy the 
American economy; and the collusion of Ronald Reagan and George Bush with 
Iranian hostage-takers not to release the American hostages until after the 1980 US 
Presidential election.10  More recent studies have found that nearly half of African 
Americans believe AIDS is a man-made virus;11 a third of Americans believe the US 
government actively took part in or allowed the 9/11 terrorist attacks to justify war in 
the Middle East;12 while a quarter of Americans doubt President Barack Obama was 
born in the United States and a fifth believe he is a Muslim.13 Clearly, when such 
significant proportions of the population identify with conspiracy theories, it 
becomes difficult to attribute conspiracism to paranoid tendencies within the 
individual or to marginal groups.
 Conspiracism as paranoia also does not allow for the fact that conspiracy 
theories can at  times be grounded in justifiable doubts. While Knight suggests that 
proven conspiracies are often called something else, such as “investigative 
journalism, or just well-researched historical analysis,”14  it is difficult to theorise a 
distinction between conspiracy  theories which have no rational basis and those which 
merely remain unproven. One methodology which can help  to distinguish the belief 
in conspiracies from the sociological phenomenon of conspiracy theories has been 
forwarded by Jovan Byford, who considers “conspiracy theories as a tradition of 
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explanation, characterised by a particular rhetorical style.”15  Byford considers the 
publication in 1797 of two accounts, by Augustin Barruel and John Robison,16  of 
conspiratorial causes of the French Revolution—particularly the involvement of 
Freemasons and the Illuminati—to be particularly important to the current 
phenomenon of conspiracy theories. Citing Geoffrey Cubitt,17 Byford notes certain 
features which particularly distinguished these writings: prior to the Revolution, 
theories restricted themselves to fairly  specific events with tangible rewards for the 
conspirators; Revolutionary theories centred the plot on secretive societies whose 
goal was “the implementation of an evil and subversive plan,” namely the 
destruction of Christianity and the established social order.18
 The work of Barruel and Robison has been recycled and recontextualised on 
numerous occasions, thus contributing to what Byford perceives as “a distinct 
narrative structure, thematic configuration and explanatory logic.”19  In this view of 
conspiracy theories as a tradition, conspiracies are seen as the stimulating force in 
history: diverse global events and time periods are integrated into a grand arching 
conspiracy theory driven by a particular nefarious group. The characteristics of the 
conspirators can easily adapt to the context and politics of the time, as can the stated 
goals, with the result that conspiracy theorising is an adaptable and multifunctional 
process.
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The Place of Conspiracies
Along with this classification of the theories themselves, Benjamin McArthur has 
categorised ‘conspiracy-mindedness’ in four categories, with different functions 
ascribed to each20: First, there is the “casual embrace” of conspiracy theories, a 
desire “to find purposefulness where others might only see coincidence, to prefer the 
clarity  of simple explanations to the ambiguity of contradictory facts, to see personal 
motivation at work rather than impersonal forces.”21  McArthur sees this attitude as 
one we all indulge in occasionally, and as relatively unthreatening. Indeed, an 
absolute disinclination to believe in the existence of conspiracies could be seen as a 
naïve position, given the many proven instances of conspiracies taking place.
 The second form of conspiracy-mindedness is possibly an exploitation of the 
first, namely  the use of “intrigue as a form of entertainment.”22 The prime example 
of this is probably  Hollywood, with a tradition of conspiratorial plotting from 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers, through to Oliver Stone’s JFK, while the theme of 
secretive interests at the heart of corporations and governments are crucial to the 
plots of films such as the Bourne trilogy  and The Constant Gardener. McArthur 
notes that his students largely derive their opinion on historical conspiracies from 
film.
 The third mindset of conspiracism is “the conviction of socially oppressed or 
disadvantaged groups that they are the victims of an organised effort.”23 Such a tactic 
can function as a coping mechanism, allowing someone to give a name or face to 
impersonal forces. For example, in their discussion of American rap music, 
Christopher Holmes Smith and John Fiske suggest  that the use of the Illuminati and 
the New World Order “are not so much signs of the ‘inner workings of a paranoid 
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imagination’ as of a tactical naming of the unspeakable, and of a deep-rooted 
distrust-verging-on-hatred of powerful elites.” The frequent use of the Illuminati in 
rap music is an attempt to give corporeality to a system which favours whites over 
blacks, a tool to reveal the true nature of power which is bound in secrecy.24
 McArthur’s fourth category, stemming from the third, is the “use of 
conspiracy as a political weapon.” This is frequently represented by an individual 
who claims to speak on behalf of a threatened majority.25  As McArthur notes, 
“Resentment remolds reality,”26  and it is the resentment directed toward certain 
groups that has been the most prominent feature of conspiracy  theorising as a 
political weapon. The most obvious victims have been the Jews, the victims of the 
defamatory  Protocols of the Elders of Zion, of the bona fide conspiracy of the 
Holocaust,27 and recent concerted attempts all the way up to academia28 designed to 
undermine the significance of the Holocaust, even to deny its very existence.
 Although conspiracy theories can be found across the political spectrum, it is 
no surprise that those espoused by the extreme right often have undertones of racism 
and xenophobia in their targeting of ethnic and religious minorities. This conspiracy 
theorising generally falls into McArthur’s third and fourth categories: this is no 
casual embrace of conspiracies, nor a means of entertainment, but rather a means of 
explaining the perceived marginalisation of the white race, and an exploitation of the 
rhetoric of conspiracies to vilify political enemies.
 Related to these functions, conspiracy theorising plays a fundamental role, as 
with many other of the means of constructing identity through extreme-right music, 
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in clearly  delineating the lines of “us” and “them,” and furthermore ascribing 
absolute moral characteristics to both: the “we” of “us” are generally  moral, virtuous 
and noble; “they,” meanwhile, are frequently degenerate, under-handed, and even 
demonic. The naming of “them” provides a target group on whom any number of 
problems can be blamed, with the implication that, if they can be removed, the 
conspiracy will be broken and life will improve for those who were conspired 
against.
 It should be noted that those on the extreme right do not identify themselves 
as conspiracy theorists; there is an evaluative, frequently pejorative, association with 
the term in colloquial language which does not flatter the theorist.29 However, within 
the narrative structure of conspiracism, those who do not believe in conspiracy are 
themselves subject to scorn and ridicule by  the theorists, with inclusion in the latter 
group therefore bestowing its own kind of internal privileged position.
 In addition to being a marker of belonging, conspiracy  theories can serve a 
motivational function, with Ramet arguing, in her discussion of Eastern European 
anti-Semitic groups, that “Conspiracy  theories serve as the fastest  mechanism for 
energizing hatred.”30 Linked to this energisation of hatred is the use of conspiracies 
to justify (or foster) prejudices, perhaps most evident in the frequent portrayal of 
Jews as manipulative, controlling and immoral. Furthermore, research has suggested 
that exposure to conspiracy theories can lead to political disillusionment,31 
suggesting that conspiracy theories may serve a purpose for those who are already 
disillusioned, particularly politically.
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Common Conspiracy Theories of the Extreme Right
While conspiracism is a significant component of the contemporary extreme right, 
belief in conspiracy theories does not necessarily indicate extreme-right political 
belief, just  as disbelief does not negate such politics. However, there are a number of 
conspiracy theories which are recurrent within extreme-right movements, either 
persisting unchanged or evolving to suit  contemporary and local needs. The most 
common target of extreme-right conspiracies have been Jews, a common target of 
conspiracy theorising in general.32  This is nothing new; allegations concerning 
Jewish conspiracies date to at least the Middle Ages—particularly  the blood libel and 
host desecration accusations33—and theories surrounding the French Revolution are 
known to have incorporated claims of Jewish involvement. However, perhaps the 
most influential articulation of the theory of Jewish control is The Protocols of the 
Learned Elders of Zion, which originated in Russia around 1903, and was first 
published in English in 1919.
 The Protocols purports to be the secret minutes of a meeting of unspecified 
Jewish leaders, who discuss their plan of attaining world domination through global 
control of the press, political parties and economies. It is a well-known forgery with 
probable links to the Russian Tsarist  secret police,34 but evidence of forgery  has been 
dismissed in the typical manner of the conspiratorial mindset, which sees such 
contradictory evidence as proof of the conspirators’ power: for example, the 
translator of an early English edition writes that “The claim of the Jews that the 
Protocols are forgeries is in itself an admission of their genuineness.”35 The reach of 
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the Protocols was immense; Norman Cohn, who argues that the Protocols was the 
“warrant for genocide” that culminated in the Holocaust, claims that its circulation 
was second only to the Bible until 1945.36
 While the Protocols fell from prominence after the Holocaust, it is still 
capable of finding a receptive audience, particularly in the contemporary extreme 
right and anti-Semitic elements in the Arab world.37  The Protocols are still 
disseminated by extreme-right publishers and websites, but the Jewish domination 
theory  has also evolved, most notably with the emergence of the theory of ZOG, 
which stands for Zionist  Occupation(al) Government. Coined in 1976 by American 
neo-Nazi Eric Thomson, ZOG covers much of the same ground as the Protocols; 
governments are under Jewish control, thus “occupational” as they have no 
democratic legitimacy  or mandate. Unlike the Protocols, ZOG thus legitimises 
resistance to supposedly puppet regimes, since it asserts that Jews have already 
established political control—leading to phrases such as “Jewnited Kingdom”38—
although the stage of the conspiracy can vary across different articulations.
 The Protocols and ZOG are the fullest articulations of Jewish control, which 
demonstrates the persistence of anti-Semitism in extreme-right movements even as 
Jews are substituted for different Others, particularly Muslims. Billig suggests that, 
in this case, conspiracy theorising becomes self-perpetuating, for it is easier to adapt 
old arguments involving Jews to new contexts than to proclaim that decades of anti-
Semitic conspiracism was in error—and, therefore, that extreme-right movements 
were also wrong.39  So while extreme-right movements substitute the threatening 
Other to reflect tensions of the time—as in Britain, where pre-war anti-Semitism was 
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replaced with fear of Afro-Caribbean immigration, in turn replaced by hostility 
towards Asian immigrants from former British colonies in the 1970s, and the current 
climate of Islamophobia—anti-Semitism persists as an overarching explanatory 
component of conspiracy theorising.
 It should be noted that even in organisations which forward conspiracy 
theories, particularly anti-Semitic ones, these theories may not be an integral part of 
their platform, especially  in material aimed at outsiders. Some conspiracy theories 
are utilised specifically to appeal to the disillusioned, but there is a self-awareness in 
some quarters of the way that conspiracism can alienate potential supporters. 
Recognising this, the pre-modernised British National Front had a two-tier 
propaganda process, in which “[m]essages designed for mass appeal concentrated 
upon West Indian and Asian targets, whilst the ‘serious’ party magazines, to be read 
by the inner core of members, were fundamentally anti-Semitic.”40 Similar wariness 
of engaging outsiders with extreme-right conspiratorial beliefs is evident on 
Stormfront, for example:
I have tried to lay out  the full conspiracy to people and they blow me off every 
time. Where I have been successful is narrowing my focus to a single issue, 
such as this latest  gaff [sic] with the banks, by pointing out that  all of the 
Federal Reserve board Governors happen to be Jewish, and that the massive 
mortguage [sic] defaults were cause [sic] by affirmative action lending. People 
are smart enough to draw their own conclusions, all you need to do is point 
them in the right direction.41
And advice on appealing to a contributor’s brother:
Don't  approach him with the jewish thing, this will only make you look nuts, 
and further entrench him into his beliefs.42
This holding back of conspiracy theories suggests that they  can function on a similar 
level to “softer” extreme-right music, with softer material gradually introducing 
potential supporters to more extreme theories.
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 Jews are not the only ones designated as puppet-masters (although they  are by 
far the most common), with other conspiracy theory staples such as the Illuminati, 
Freemasons and the New World Order also referred to. Of these, all of which are at 
times conflated with Judaism, the New World Order is of most concern to the 
extreme right, similar to ZOG in its portrayal of a global elite seeking to establish 
global authoritarian rule. Subscribers to this theory, particularly in the United States, 
believe they are under surveillance from mysterious black helicopters, that road signs 
contain encoded messages to guide an impending invasion by the United Nations, 
and that in the new regime a whole class of people will be dedicated to providing 
organ replacements for the wealthy.43
 However, these other conspiracy  theories can also be made to conform to a 
larger anti-Semitic theory, in the same way that more focused conspiracy theories can 
be accommodated within a larger anti-Semitic framework. One of the most pervasive 
theories among the extreme right is the belief that the Holocaust, frequently referred 
to as the Holyhoax or Holohoax, did not occur but was a fabrication designed to 
elicit  sympathy for Jews and thus lead to the establishment of Israel. Holocaust 
denial can vary in scale from outright  denial to questioning the numbers of Jews 
killed, the cause of their death and denying that the Nazis had any official policy for 
Jewish extermination. Particularly important  figures in Holocaust denial, which is 
generally  referred to positively as “revisionism,” include “historians” David Irving, 
Arthur Butz (author of The Hoax of the Twentieth Century), Robert Faurisson and 
Richard Verrall (author, as Richard Harwood, of Did Six Million Really Die?). The 
Institute for Historical Review—co-founded by  Willis Carto, who was co-owner of 
Resistance Records for a short period in 1998—presents itself as a scholarly body, 
having circulated the Journal of Historical Review until 2002, and now disseminates 
its material online. Bradley Smith, founder of the website Committee for Open 
Debate on the Holocaust (http://codoh.com/) and its associated forum, has targeted 
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his adverts at campuses through newspapers and online advertisements, justifying his 
claims in the terms of open debate and informing students that established professors 
refuse to engage with his arguments.44 The use of pseudo-academics and journals to 
question the Holocaust is an example of the extreme right using the tools of 
academia in an attempt to lend a veneer of respectability  to their views. The narrative 
of Holocaust  denial has been adopted by many  across the extreme right, with even 
leaders of ostensibly “modernised” parties forwarding such theories; BNP leader 
Nick Griffin and former FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen have both been prosecuted 
regarding comments they have made disputing the Holocaust.
 It could be argued that Holocaust  denial is intended to absolve the most 
notorious adherents of extreme-right politics, the Nazis, from any wrongdoing, and 
thus “cleanse” extreme-right politics of its negative connotations. While such 
motivation—conscious or unconscious—may play a part, it  seems more likely that 
Holocaust denial sits alongside theories of Jewish control of media, economies and 
governments as the reason that more people cannot see the “truth” offered by 
extreme-right politics. As extreme-right ideology frequently embraces notions of 
supremacy and elitism, the lack of progress for extreme-right ideology is explained 
away as the result of an unlevel playing field, due to Jewish/Zionist  control, 
particularly of media platforms, and subsequent tarnishing of extreme-right politics. 
Such control is also perceived in what might be called “lesser” conspiracy theories, 
which, although they  can be detached from theories of Jewish control, are often seen 
as a component within the Zionist programme. Such conspiracies include the pushing 
of false climate change theories or even government control of the weather,45 that 
terrorist attacks are in fact conducted by ruling elites in order to further their 
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agendas,46 and, in America, that proposed gun control is a precursor to martial law 
and suspension of the constitution.47 
 Constituting such a significant space within extreme-right ideology, it is no 
surprise to find conspiracy  theories, particularly anti-Semitic ones, providing the 
subject matter in much extreme-right music. Anti-Semitic conspiracies have been 
part of the extreme-right music scene from essentially its beginnings; Skrewdriver’s 
first “political” album, Hail the New Dawn (Rock-O-Rama, 1984), included a pledge 
to “never submit to a six point master plan” in the title song, an apparent reference to 
the Star of David.48 Anti-Semitic conspiracies and references to ZOG have remained 
popular throughout the years, with examples from the biggest extreme-right bands 
right through to relative unknowns. Among these are suggestions that the power of 
ZOG could be negated through the bombing of Israel (Angry Aryans, ‘The Bombing 
of Israel’, Too White For You, Resistance Records, 2002), that the media is in service 
to Jewish interests (Dirlewanger, ‘Judiska Lögner’, Rocking for the Golden Race, 
Rebelles Européens, 1989), and that the “lies” of the Holocaust will become reality 
(Der Stürmer, ‘Marked for Genocide’, Bloodsworn: The First Decade, Deathsquad 
Rex, 2008).
 As the latter example suggests, Holocaust denial also constitutes an important 
narrative in extreme-right music, even as hatred of Jews, and fantasies about their 
destruction, are proclaimed. This is seen not only in lyrical content, with Prussian 
Blue—one of the few bands to receive any mainstream attention—claiming that their 
name derives from the apparent lack of colouring in gas chambers,49  a popular 
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argument among Holocaust  deniers. Plentiful examples could be cited which 
conform to similar traits of extreme-right conspiratorial thinking, but another 
important aspect  of conspiracism in extreme-right music is the portrayal of itself as a 
“pure” form. This is forwarded in part  through the portrayal of the mainstream music 
industry as degenerate, but also as playing an active role in conspiracies.
Hidden Meanings and Feelings of Superiority
As alluded to throughout this chapter, the extreme-right belief in conspiracy theories 
encourages a view of the world in which the majority of the population is a passive 
mass, potentially brainwashed, with extreme-right movements the sole hope of 
preventing a society of automatons. According to this perspective, the struggle is 
made harder by the pervasiveness of anti-extreme-right material, and the implied 
intellectual deficiencies of those who have not joined the cause.
 Such an attitude is evident in the explanation of the galleries of Mourning the 
Ancient:
I think a lot  of viewers understand the basics of it. But  on an average much 
more do not I'm sure. Its irrelevant  to us though really. One cannot  expect the 
average drone to understand something deeper than his television. Which in a 
way motivated us to make the hidden galleries, to separate those who support 
and understand MTA from the others. It  is those brave spirits whom Mourning 
the Ancient spills her blood for... and symbolically fights beside ‘til the last.50
Here, hidden meaning is not a sign of a malignant conspiracy, but a tool for 
separating or recognising the elite, and marking it  out as superior through its insight 
and insider knowledge. Clearly, this quote refers to a specifically visual medium, but 
Mourning the Ancient also works extensively with music (its own and that of other 
bands).
 Such insight can be used to justify a liking for ideologically inappropriate 
material; this is particularly  the case in justifying appreciation of bands and 
musicians of the mainstream music industry, who would generally be considered to 
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be in the service of ZOG or similar. For instance, one Stormfront contributor argues 
that the lyrics of Iron Maiden have “camouflaged visions” of white nationalism, but 
“Only 0,000001% of listeners like myself can discuss his [sic] lyrics in political-
racial means.”51 It should be noted that opinion is split  in responses to this theory, 
with some responders sympathetic and others dismissive, but  the attitude of being 
able to see what the majority cannot is pervasive.
 As well as marking themselves out through their insight and resistance to the 
conspiracies of the mainstream media, extreme-right supporters often contrast their 
own characters with those of the supposedly “degenerate” mainstream. The term 
“sheeple” is in common usage to refer to the “herd” who do not engage with 
extreme-right political ideas; one Stormfront contributor attempts to quantify the 
distinction, with no mention of sources or justification for his statistics:
I think the people most likely to join the WN [white nationalist] movement are 
intelligent  and freethinking people, such as those with the INTJ personality type 
[introversion, intuition, thinking and judgement, as defined by the Myers-Briggs 
personality types]. That’s why 40% of the people on this forum are INTJ’s, even 
though INTJs are only about  1 percent of the general population. INTJ can see 
into the heart  of matters, i.e. we don't  just  think superficially. Also INTJ are the 
ones who least follow tradition and beliefs handed down from authorities and 
institutions. INTJ’s think for themselves. The most  common personality group 
are the SJ guardians, and these are the most traditional people. They generally 
believe what their churches, schools, and other authorities and institutions tell 
them.52
As many on the extreme-right, certainly  among the contributors to web forums, often 
appear to rely on assumptions more on evidence, musical preference is seen as one 
way of determining intelligence. A thread discussing the popularity  of Nicki Minaj 
contains one such sweeping statement about relative intelligence and musical 
preference:
I don't know what  we as civilized citizens can do. It's like going to the zoo and 
seeing apes throw **** [sic]. Even if you were to advise them of how 
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disgusting the behavior was, it probably wouldn't  register with their small 
brains.53
Obviously such an opinion carries racial connotations, but the judgements commonly 
passed on white fans of “black” music, particularly hostility to “whiggers,” shows 
that musical preference is seen as indicative of intelligence. So, while extreme-right 
music remains utterly marginal in comparison with mainstream music—which 
supporters find so distasteful—they  can console themselves with the knowledge that 
this is due to their own high standing, taste and discernment.
Constructing Conspiracies from Musical Moral Panics
The term “moral panic” is credited to the British sociologist Stanley Cohen, and his 
1972 book Folk Devils and Moral Panics. In Cohen’s definition a moral panic occurs 
when a “condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined 
as a threat to societal values and interests.” Such panics can be inconsequential, but 
can also lead to changes in “legal and social policy or even in the way society 
conceives itself.”54 This point should be emphasised; the use of the word “panic”—
with its implications of uncontrollable anxiety and accompanying irrational 
behaviour—does not necessarily mean that the basis for a moral panic is 
unwarranted.
 Generally speaking, there are two main fears which drive moral panics: that 
of the encroachment of decadence upon the dominant classes which threatens their 
position; and a fear that perceived immorality spreading through the lower classes is 
endangering dominant classes. In other words, moral panics are usually seen to 
threaten the very structure of society  itself. Often these fears are predicated upon the 
behaviour of youth. Jon Savage’s book Teenage, a history of youth culture between 
1875 and 1945, can be read as a history of moral panics and the efforts to protect 
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youth from immorality,55 while Johan Fornäs writes that youth’s association with the 
future is frequently  coupled with fear and “a culturally  pessimistic diagnosis of 
degeneration.”56
 The generation gap integral to many  moral panics is also integral to many of 
the youth-driven popular music scenes, themselves the frequent source of moral 
panics over the years, as Martin and Segrave portray in their description of rock’s 
early days:
Rock music was the universal language of youth cutting across culture, race, 
religion, and politics. Islamic fundamentalists, liberal democracies, fascist 
dictatorships, or totalitarian communist governments had at least  one thing in 
common—they believed rock was somehow subversive. This perhaps reinforces 
the idea that rock and roll is a generational conflict. It represents the idealistic, 
spontaneous, and nihilistic tendencies of youth versus the hypocritical, 
repressive, and traditional tendencies of adult society.57
While Martin and Segrave’s assessment is a little black and white—regarding rock as 
a universal language of youth and as a somewhat utopian force—moral panics are 
often framed in such black and white declarations.
 The emergence of rock ’n’ roll in the 1950s was the source of a moral panic in 
certain circles, often involving prominent individuals. In 1956, the Bishop  of 
Woolwich asserted that “the hypnotic rhythm and wild gestures [have] a maddening 
effect on a rhythm-loving age group,” while the conductor Sir Malcolm Sargent 
claimed that the “primitive tom-tom thumping … is capable of inciting youngsters to 
riot and fight.”58 Much of the criticism in the 1950s contained implicit racism with 
frequent references to “jungle” or “primitive” rhythms, a typical comment coming 
again from Sir Malcolm Sargent, who claimed that rock ’n’ roll was not  new as it 
“has been played in the jungle for centuries.”59  Indeed, the musical and lyrical 
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features of rock ’n’ roll which attracted such moralist ire were not entirely new, 
having widely  circulated for a time in black music, but what triggered the outrage 
was that this music was now available to—and popular among—white teenagers.
 While the critics of the 1950s often justified their attacks with recourse to the 
perceived moral and musical deficiencies of rock ’n’ roll, the executive secretary of 
the segregationist North Alabama White Citizens Council was of a more 
conspiratorial persuasion. He claimed that rock ’n’ roll was a plot by  the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People to bring the white man “down to 
the level of the Negro,” and to serve the “cause of integration.”60
 Similar narratives claiming that  music is explicitly designed to forward 
multiculturalism, and that it has a debilitating and degenerative effect on whites, are 
evident in a series of articles that appeared in Spearhead magazine in the mid-1990s, 
under the editorship of then-leader of the British National Party, John Tyndall. Until 
his death in 2005 (just  before he was due to face charges of incitement to racial 
hatred) Tyndall and other contributors articulated their hardline ideology through 
Spearhead, even as the BNP was being taken over by a new, modernising generation. 
The content  of Spearhead should therefore not be seen as representative of the 
extreme right as a whole, but of one strand of thought which was particularly 
significant for being held by senior figures within the BNP at one time.
 Musically speaking, Spearhead ideology consisted of a conservative taste for 
classical music, particularly German canonic composers and supposedly nationalist 
composers.61 When popular music was addressed it was treated as a sign of cultural 
degeneracy; an article arguing for a firm adoption of eugenics policies posited that 
the average IQ in Britain had decreased since the war, as demonstrated by “Teenage 
morons, high on drugs, flocking to Bacchanal ‘raves’ [and] addiction to jungle-beat 
rap ‘music,’ which appeals to the very lowest instincts of human beings.”62
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 Such sentiments signal the belief that popular music is very much a primitive 
commodity, popular merely for its ability to appeal to the low and base instincts in 
the listener, and used by  elites as part of a conspiracy to keep people docile. Colin 
Jordan, a long-time colleague of Tyndall and even more open about his National 
Socialist ideology, took this one step further in the article ‘Subversion Through 
Music.’ Jordan wrote:
There is a rhythm natural to Aryan men and women indicated by their breathing 
rate and heartbeat. Where the beat of “music” is speeded up much above the 
normal pulse rate per minute, tension is built  up in the emotional system of the 
person participating to the deletrious [sic] point of what amounts to a hypnotic 
seizure of the mind. In this condition the critical faculties are overcome and 
suspended by the convulsions of the senses; reason collapses; and in this 
“hypnoid” state there is a greatly increased suggestibility. The implantation of 
words sung (or shouted or screeched) or indirectly by behaviour and display is 
greatly facilitated.… This amounts to a mugging of the mind. The purpose of 
the muggers is to break down barriers in the brain, and brainwash away 
distinctions of race and sex in youth to whom the future belongs, thus capturing 
that future … [for] the revolutionary advance of multiracialism, Democracy’s 
zenith. Skinheads, while they may radiate and ingest  a somewhat different 
message from that  conveyed by … minstrels of degeneration, nevertheless 
practise the same back-to-the-jungle method of mind-bending by primitive 
“music” plus primitive physical contortion as is used … to promote [the] 
revolution of multiracialism. Whatever the difference of content, the mode of 
conveyance is virtually the same, the damage to personality just  as bad, so that 
the skinheads, while fondly seeing themselves as rebels, are to be seen on this 
assessment as relatives of all the rest of the jungle “music” tribe.63
Jordan—who offers no evidence to substantiate his claims, and does not clarify the 
significant difference between rhythm in popular music and rhythm in, say, folk and 
classical music—offers no suggestions to combat this manipulation. It  seems, rather, 
that this article is intended as a confirmation of the superior character of those who 
are resistant to this brainwashing, superior in particular to their ideological comrades, 
skinheads.
 A follow-up article echoed a belief in the manipulative use of music by 
political elites: “One of the most pernicious forms of mind-numbing prole-feed used 
by our present political masters is the ugly  cacophony  known as ‘rock’ music.”64 
Another writer summed up the party line:
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Rock, rap and rave cannot appeal to any rational or cultivated sensibility and are 
intended simply to excite. “Raving” is indeed a definition of a response 
expected of fans who are incited into making displays of collective hysteria and 
reduced to a condition of mindlessness in which they may be easily conditioned 
by the moguls of the media into believing that  black is beautiful, white is racist, 
the third world is virtuous, and such like nonsense. It  is for this reason amongst 
others that pop “culture” is not  merely a worthless manifestation of decadence 
in society: it is also dangerous.65
This extract  demonstrates the belief that popular music is capable of delivering 
highly  specific messages, which are antagonistic towards the truths offered by the 
extreme right.
 While the writers in Spearhead attacked all forms of popular music, their 
arguments are still apparent in discussions of more specific genres generally 
characterised as black. The characterisation of black people as innately primitive is 
very common, and their music—and black interaction with it—is seen as an obvious 
demonstration of this.66 The popularity of this supposedly primitive and degenerate 
“black” music among white listeners, especially young ones, is viewed as evidence 
of a concerted conspiracy to indoctrinate them with certain political opinions. This 
belief relies on the notion that music has the ability to enact physical and mental 
changes within the listener in line with a political ideology, often on a subconscious 
level. In order for this brainwashing to take place, it is commonly  assumed that 
music is part of a media hegemony controlled by  elites, manipulated for their 
purposes and, most importantly, hostile to the extreme right and their cause.
Music as Part of the Partisan Media
When Nick Griffin deposed Tyndall as BNP leader, part of his modernising agenda 
was to disavow the conservative elitism displayed by Tyndall and his colleagues, in 
an attempt to appeal to a populist  base. The party’s own record label and festival 
used forms of popular music which were presented as family-friendly—to tie in with 
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the presentation of a modern BNP—and not at all the threat that Tyndall and his 
colleagues were so quick to identify. While popular music as a genre was no longer 
under attack, much of popular music was. The explanation for this is expressed by a 
lone dissenting voice in the Spearhead series of articles mentioned above, who 
wrote:
We stumble here of course into that old favourite of the BNP’s enemies, the 
mass media. Just  as this entity attempts to ensure that  the party is, as far as 
possible, condemned to obscurity or trampled underneath a deluge of public 
hate, so it  also suppresses news of rock music that  could be construed, as 
worthy of some respect. Not only this, but  it also promotes and nurtures all the 
worst trash in the field of rock and “pop” music.67
Since the BNP were releasing music stylistically similar to the mainstream (notably 
folk, pop and country), in this doctrine musical style is not at issue, but the 
subversive intention of producers, distributors and broadcasters is. Griffin, who 
acknowledges the need for the BNP to branch into popular music to gain wider 
appeal, wrote an article calling the media the number one enemy, for which reason he 
deems it essential to create a nationalist  “counter-media and … counter culture.”68 
The typical extreme-right mistrust of the media is largely  based on a belief that 
media hostility is part of an “Establishment consensus,” and if extreme-right parties 
or movements were given a fair platform they would be able to convince the 
population of the worthiness of their cause. In essence, this conspiracy  theory 
identifies the same goal as that diagnosed by Tyndall et. al—the spread of 
multiculturalism—but through a different manifestation of the cloaked conspiracy 
project: mainstream culture, rather than all popular music.
 Of course, media coverage of the extreme right can be extensive, especially 
when parties are gaining support, but the parties themselves often complain of media 
bias in such reporting. One article previously  published by  the BNP claims that 
guidance given by the National Union of Journalists regarding reporting on race 
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means that the BNP is always going to be portrayed in a negative light;69 the party 
included policies designed to stop the BNP being “the victim of media lies and 
smears” in its 2005 manifesto.70  While the BNP generally avoid citing conspiracy 
theories about media coverage, others are not so hesitant, pointing to the control of 
ZOG and the like.71  Indeed, a significant part of the origin myth of Skrewdriver 
holds that “Marxist” media pressure, was the reason for their lack of success in the 
mainstream music industry,72  while often the “black” music seen as detrimental to 
whiteness is claimed to be under Jewish control.73
 The music industry is therefore, in the conspiratorial mindset, seen as 
promoting the agenda of interests opposed to extreme-right ideology. Pop music in 
particular is seen as promoting miscegenation, homosexuality and liberalism. This 
viewpoint is essentially  the same as the “brainwashing” view of popular music, with 
media saturation achieving the same goal. Indeed, extreme-right discussions of the 
music industry, and other media, often do not make clear whether their subversive 
effect is due to psychological targeting designed to keep people in bondage or merely 
effective propaganda, although explanations seem to tend to the former.74
 One important factor is the significant presence of non-whites in visible and 
successful roles in the music industry; given the belief in the inferiority of non-
whites these positions are deemed to be unmerited and part of the programme to push 
a multi-racial agenda. For instance, one commenter suggests that the change of 
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content on MTV is not a matter of changing taste, but part of an agenda on the part of 
the network:
MTV is much more destructive now than it  was in the late 80s when [Allan] 
Bloom was writing, with Negro rappers having largely displaced White 
rockstars, and it  is unquestionable that  MTV, not  incidentally but deliberately 
and openly, promotes ruinous choices for young White people.75
As such, successful non-white musicians are seen as the beneficiaries of promotion 
rather than rewarded for their talent or hard work, as in this comment about Rihanna:
It’s obvious she is being promoted because she is a racial mix, there can’t  be 
any other reason for her celebrity.76
The instigation behind this promotion is assumed to be part of a Jewish conspiracy, 
with evidence apparently provided by the numerous Jewish and part-Jewish people 
in positions of prominence in the music industry.77
 Thus, the mainstream music industry is seen, as with other media, as Jewish-
controlled and operated to further a Zionist agenda. The promotion of non-white 
musicians is seen as part of this programme: since the quality of the musicians’ work 
is perceived to be low, to say nothing of degenerate, it  is asserted that they have been 
given prominence in order to serve a purpose. Similarly, the white musicians who are 
part of the music industry are assumed to be traitors through selling themselves to an 
anti-white business. As such, the extreme right are largely distrustful of the products 
of the mainstream music industry, as they are of mainstream media outlets in general. 
In order to promote their own “truth,” therefore, the extreme right must disseminate 
their message through their own media outlets.
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Establishing an Alternative Media and Music
In an attempt to convey their own side of the story to the world, the extreme right 
have expended much effort in establishing their own media. The distrust of news 
media is countered by the dissemination of extreme-right perspectives in newsletters, 
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and books; the information age has led to an 
explosion of such sources online, particularly through blogs and forums. As well as 
websites solely  dedicated to reporting news from an extreme-right perspective, sites 
such as Stormfront and Vanguard News Network not only provide a source for the 
dissemination of links, stories and opinions, they provide a social space in which 
extreme-right politics is privileged and encouraged.
 The value of social media is evident from the various groups created on sites 
like Facebook to promote aspects of the extreme-right cause, while alternatives to the 
“Jewish” Facebook, such as AWS Network (“A White Networking and Dating 
Community”) and NewSaxon (“A Social Networking Site for People of European 
Descent”) are also available.78 Similarly, Metapedia (http://en.metapedia.org) acts as 
a substitute for Wikipedia (the latter often referred to as “Jewipedia”), while Trutube 
(http://trutube.tv) is a video-hosting site designed to offer an alternative to YouTube 
or “JewTube.” The extreme right have even attempted to counter supposed Jewish 
influence in video games79 through games such as Aryan 3, Shoot the Black, White 
Power Doom, ZOG’s Nightmare 2, and Ethnic Cleansing, which “draw both novice 
and longtime racists to interactive versions of Aryan racial extermination and white 
domination fantasies.”80  Indeed, of the media commonly cited as under Jewish 
control, it seems only  pornography has not been emulated by extreme-right activists, 
no doubt because it  is generally perceived to be degenerate and immoral, although 
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even here the photo galleries of the website Mourning the Ancient could be seen to 
be fulfilling a similar function.81
 The extreme-right music industry is a central part of the alternative media that 
the extreme right has sought to establish. Clearly, the music scene is intended to aid 
in the recruitment and mobilisation of support, the dissemination of extreme-right 
ideology and financial sustainability, but it is also intended as a bulwark against the 
mainstream industry, which is seen as actively working against extreme-right 
interests. Such a portrayal is evident in Final Truth’s ‘We Speak the Truth’ (We Speak 
the Truth, Panzerfaust, 2004), which combines accusations of brainwashing—with 
the music industry reduced to MTV—with a messianic role on the part of the band, 
imparting truth and deliverance to the “brainwashed”:
It’s thought control, imprisonment of the mind;
Force-fed bullshit facts and lies;
“Free your mind” you hear on MTV;
And expand your thoughts with diversity;
But your mind is not free if you’re told what to think;
Rather than expanding your mind starts to shrink;
Mainstream or not my voice will be heard;
And open up the eyes of the brainwashed blur.
Similarly, Bound For Glory’s ‘Musical Terrorists’ (Glory Awaits, BFG Productions, 
1997) conflates the mainstream industry with MTV: 
We’re rocking against the industry;
You can kiss our ass MTV;
…
Turn off your radio, come and open your ears;
Don’t listen to that garbage that promotes hippies and queers.
The imperative to “come and open your ears” is indicative of the extreme-right belief 
in political “awakenings,” and the belief that they  can engender such awakenings 
through the dissemination of their “truth” through their various media.
123
81 Mourning the Ancient,  http://www.mourningtheancient.com/index1.htm, accessed 16 Jan 2013. On 
this website, see Andrew Fergus Wilson, ‘From Apocalyptic Paranoia to the Mythic Nation: Political 
extremity and myths of origin in the neo-fascist milieu’, in Marion Gibson,  Shelley Trower and Garry 
Tregidga (eds.), Mysticism, Myth and Celtic Identity, London: Routledge, 2012, pp.199-215.
Conclusion
The portrayal of the extreme right as conspiracy theorists by their enemies feeds into 
a portrayal of them as unhinged, unbalanced or delusional. However, the belief in 
conspiracies, especially  on the part of political elites, is, according to statistics 
gathered on conspiracy  belief (see above), actually in line with significant swathes of 
the population. While it is difficult to generalise given the proliferation of conspiracy 
theories on various different  topics, they can act as a coping mechanism, portraying 
the world as controllable and providing justification for individual marginalisation. 
In the case of the extreme right, Billig refers to “defensive attribution,” which:
occurs when people make attributions to protect their own sense of self-esteem 
and to justify their own apparent failings. Thus, instead of blaming themselves, 
people seek explanations which blame others for anything that has gone wrong. 
Firmly believing in the superiority of their own race or nation, conspiracy 
theorists are explaining why that  nation or race is not behaving in a superior 
way.… [I]n the post-war years fascist ideologists explain away the minority 
status of their beliefs by claiming that people have turned against fascism 
because their minds have been subverted: they have been blinded by the “myth” 
of the Holocaust and other cunning devices.82
Not only does the conspiracist mindset justify the supposed marginalisation of 
extreme-right supporters—who can only conceive of their oppression as unnatural—
but it complements wider distrust of elites. 
 Conspiracy  theories allow complex issues and problems to be simplified 
down to a root cause, often a cause with malice aforethought, and consequently 
provides an enemy which if removed, removes the problem. For example, the 
commonly stated belief on the extreme right  that immigration is intended—often by 
Jewish conspirators—to be a deliberate attempt to subjugate “indigenous” white 
populations not only provides a justification for perceived white marginalisation, but 
also a solution: removing the elites which allow uncontrolled immigration will allow 
the white race to rise again, while the removal of immigrant populations will lead to 
economic prosperity (and, implicitly, sexual purity).
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 Conspiracy  theorising thus constructs a dichotomy of “us” and “them,” with 
mainstream music perceived in a similar manner, due to its promotion of liberal 
ideals at odds with extreme-right ideology. Furthermore, this notion of us and them is 
justified not only  by the assertion that this mainstream music is objectively inferior, 
but also that it is deliberately constructed in this way for nefarious ends. So, popular 
music uses “primitive” beats and rhythms as well as repetition and motifs to better 
condition its listeners, to make them more receptive to brainwashing messages in 
support of multiculturalism in particular, and liberal ideas in general. 
 The identification of this supposed conspiracy  behind popular music is 
significant; as with many conspiracy theories, it can provide the theorist with a sense 
of insight and superiority. By identifying the conspiracy, the theorist can feel superior 
to those who continue to be duped by  it. Such a feeling is enhanced when theorists 
perceive themselves to be unaffected by the conspiracy, and therefore in possession 
of greater intellectual strength and capacity.
 While conspiracy theories are important in constructing a sense of community  
among those who identify with them, conspiracy  theories surrounding various media 
institutions are particularly important to the extreme right. Not only are media 
portrayed as politically partisan, they  are claimed to be controlled by people who are 
actively working against the interests of the extreme right. Such opinions can 
function as mitigation for the lack of a wider appeal for extreme-right politics; rather 
than an fundamental failures in the ideology itself, blame is placed at the feet of the 
wider public, and the methods by  which they  are conditioned against extreme-right 
politics.
 The prevalence of conspiracy theorising in extreme-right movements is a 
significant factor in the existence and justification of the extreme-right music scene, 
along with various other facets of extreme-right media. While extreme-right music 
provides a means of financing movements, propagandising and establishing a sense 
of community, it is also contrasted with the mainstream industry, a source of truth to 
counter subversive conspiracies. In this narrative, extreme-right music is an urgent 
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enterprise, since the conspiracies directed at the white race must be halted before the 
situation becomes irretrievable.
 This use of conspiracy theories imbues extreme-right music with a moral 
character, working outside and against the subversive mainstream music industry, 
and untainted by its degeneracy. Liking for extreme-right music constructs an “in-
group” which marks itself apart from the ordinary “sheeple,”with the music and its 
listeners portrayed as inherently superior. As with so many other aspects of extreme-
right ideology and culture, therefore, conspiracist thinking provides those who might 
otherwise feel marginalised and isolated with a sense of superiority.
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Chapter Three:
Genre and the Construction of Whiteness
“Come on boys, hear the white noise;
Come on boys, hear the white noise;
What you gonna do when it's too late?
Let the stranger control your fate?
Let all our music be taken away?”
Skrewdriver, ‘White Noise’, Hail Victory, Rock-O-Rama, 1994.
“We rock for white power, for a white society;
And we don’t care about their rules;
…
We will keep on playing white race music;
Until the final day;
We will rock for white survival;
For the survival of our race.”
Dirlewanger, ‘Rocking for the Golden Race’, 
Rocking for the Golden Race, Rebelles Européens, 1989.
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In his analysis of the Greek myth of Europe’s origin, Johan Fornäs notes the 
whiteness of the bull whose form Zeus takes in his “relations” with Europa, 
providing “a mythical explanation to the fair skin colour of Europeans.”1 Despite this 
foundational myth of Europe linking its inhabitants with particular pigmentation, the 
racialisation—and, consequently, the “whiteness”—of Europeans is a more modern 
phenomenon. Alastair Bonnett contends that white racial identities are an essential 
part of modernity, and that modernity  itself is racialised, particularly associated with 
European whites.2
 While whiteness is an established feature of the modern world, white 
identities have not always been the sole preserve of those who are now described as 
white. Bonnett cites the socially contingent white identity in China: 
[A]lthough there were no white racial identities in pre-modern China, there 
were white identities. In other words, certain Chinese people employed the 
category ‘white’ to help define which social collectivity they belonged to.… 
Whiteness was associated with purity, sensitivity and beauty.… Early 
encounters with Europeans do not appear to have disturbed Chinese white 
identities. Westerners were not  interpreted as more authentically white than 
Chinese people. Indeed, many accounts emphasise the peculiar, ash-like, quality 
of the former’s skins.3
Michael Keevak notes that early explorers rarely mentioned skin colour in their 
accounts of East Asia, and when they  did they referred to them as white.4 By the end 
of the seventeenth century, whiteness was reserved for Europeans, and the later 
designation of East Asians as “yellow” was in part  used to characterise a potential 
threat—the “yellow peril”—and to explain the assumed lesser-evolved nature of the 
newly categorised “Mongoloid” race. By the nineteenth century  those with 
Mongolism (or Down syndrome) were equated with the “Mongolian” race, which 
was cast as a previous evolutionary stage; white people could therefore be “afflicted” 
128
1 Johan Förnas, Signifying Europe, Bristol: Intellect Books, 2011, p.10.
2 Alastair Bonnett, White Identities: Historical and international perspectives. Harlow, Essex: Prentice 
Hall, 2000, p.2.
3 Bonnett, White Identities, pp.9-11
4  Michael Keevak, Becoming Yellow: A Short History of Racial Thinking, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2011, p.1.
with Mongolian traits because of ill-health or birth defects, but the yellow race was 
frozen in a permanent state of underdevelopment.5
 Similarly, early  contact between Europeans and Middle Eastern peoples “did 
not destabilise Middle Eastern peoples’ white identities. Indeed, a range of colours 
was applied to ‘Europeans’, including white but also yellow, red and pale blue.”6 
These examples clearly demonstrate that white racial identity  is not innate, and is the 
result of historical processes. However, today whiteness is primarily, perhaps solely, 
associated with European heritage.
 Bonnett argues that the racialising project was a result of colonialism, a 
distinction made between the dominant and the subjugated, and was a blend of 
moral, cultural and territorial components.7  This project  was aided by  the 
development of Darwinism, which had a profound effect on the understanding of the 
human race and on the development of extreme-right ideology. The practice of 
racism had sat uncomfortably within ideals of Christian brotherhood,8 but Darwinism
—particularly Social Darwinism—was interpreted to claim the existence of different 
races within humanity, with the white race claimed as the pinnacle of evolution. 
Darwinism was also used to argue that the white race was threatened by the prospect 
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of interbreeding and multiculturalism, and to claim that the oppression of other races 
by whites was simply part of the struggle of life under natural selection.
 Extreme-right politics has generally been a politics of overt white 
supremacism based on this particular interpretation of Darwinism, often drawing 
heavily on Nazi theories of Aryanism. Although the modernised extreme right has 
attempted to distance itself from white supremacism, its rhetoric of cultural 
distinctiveness often draws on notions of whiteness as objective and under threat; 
despite this, the extreme right has had to contend with the relative status of whiteness 
as invisible. This chapter assesses the ways in which the extreme right—in both 
supremacist and distinctiveness rhetorics—has constructed whiteness as tangible, 
particularly through the various genres in which extreme-right musicians perform.
 The chapter explores the meanings, significance and unmarked nature of 
whiteness, the way that popular music has been “raced” in mainstream discourses, 
before going on to analyse the extreme right’s own discourses and ideologies 
surrounding the “whiteness” or otherwise of various music genres. This approach 
demonstrates that extreme-right ideologies of race and racial identities in music are, 
while extreme, based on assumptions that are common in mainstream culture. Even 
so, the following examples reveal that, in dealing with the inherent contradictions 
and disagreements of race in music, the extreme right will always have difficulty  in 
asserting particular genres as objectively “white.”
Whiteness and Race
While academic scholarship has emerged undermining the idea of an objective 
measure of race9—and some scholars argued against race even before it became 
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scientifically questionable10—it would be foolish to assume that this has undermined 
the concept of race in everyday life. While scholarship argues that race is a socially 
constructed category, it is a significant and influential component within the societies 
that construct it, similar to the “imagined” communities of Benedict Anderson.11 
However, while race has generally  been a crucial component in the portrayal of 
“non-white” peoples, it has generally been considered irrelevant—or at  least 
subservient to categories of gender, class, sexuality and nation—in the construction 
of white identities.
 The main goal of what has been called “White(ness) Studies” has been to 
draw attention to whiteness and its privileges, and to make clear its socially-
constructed nature. Perhaps the most famous exegesis of white privilege is Peggy 
McIntosh’s ‘White Privilege,’ which methodically lists a number of unspoken 
benefits accrued by whites which cannot be taken for granted by other ethnicities.12 
Similar perspectives have drawn attention to the unspoken position of power held by 
whiteness, whether in fields such as literature and film or in political parties.
 Another goal of whiteness studies has been to draw attention to the way in 
which whiteness masks itself as normal, and therefore unworthy of consideration:
Whiteness colonizes the definition of the normal and subsequently achieves a 
complete disavowal of ethnic categorization. Thus Brief Encounters is never 
studied as a film about white people, but  rather as a film about English middle-
class people; similarly, The Godfather is mostly studied as a film about  Italian 
American people. By contrast, The Color Purple is not  studied as a film about 
poor southern U.S. people but about black people.13
In a similar vein, musical genres are often described as “black” in a way which 
essentialises them as an expression of a whole ethnicity, rather than dependent on 
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factors such as economics, place, time and cultural exchange. In contrast, genres that 
could as easily be described as “white” as some are called “black” are usually 
defined by  other characteristics, such as class, geography, economics, or sexuality. 
So punk is often studied (particularly  in a British context) in terms of class and 
politics, metal in its portrayal of masculinity, country  in terms of the socioeconomic 
status of its fans and musicians.
 The concept of “white” music is relatively  foreign; for instance, 
“w(h)igger” (an alteration of “nigger”) refers to white emulation of black fashions 
and language, particularly hip-hop, while “blue-eyed soul” makes an indirect 
reference to whiteness in a supposedly black medium. However, while white music is 
something of a misnomer, there is certainly a conception of whiteness in music, 
albeit generally  in the context of blackness. This is shown by  genre labels such as 
“blue-eyed soul,” but also from stereotypes of black and white responses to music.
 The embedded nature of these stereotypes is shown by an anecdote in which 
film scholar Richard Dyer most strongly  experiences his whiteness, significantly  in a 
musical environment:
Living in New York at  the time (1980), I went out dancing a lot  with black 
friends to black venues; I had a black music radio station on all the time; I could 
not have been more into it. At one mixed-race social event, we all started 
dancing in a formation copied from the TV series Soul Train, two lines facing 
each other, which we took it in turns to dance down between. For all my love of 
dancing and funk, I have never felt  more white than when I danced down 
between those lines. I know it  was stereotypes in my head; I know plenty of 
black people who can’t dance; I know perceptions of looseness and tightness of 
the body are dubious. All I can say is that  at  that moment, the black guys all 
looked loose and I felt tight.… I felt it, I hated it, dancing between the lines—
and hated it not for itself, but  because it brought home to me that, in my very 
limbs, I had not the kinship with black people that I wanted to have.14
The association of black music with the body  has a long history, and is often 
conflated with primitivism connected to a focus on rhythm. Black music is situated 
as the opposite of white values of music, which are asserted as more cerebral and 
considered. The contingent nature of these racialized identities is underlined by Ruth 
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Iana Gustafson, who suggests that “musical values associated with whiteness took 
their social heft from comparisons to abject blackness.”15
 Such attitudes have become embedded throughout the 20th century in the 
marketing and perception of popular music. A particularly  common argument has 
been that black culture has historically been innovative in popular music and that 
whites appropriate and exploit. According to one writer: “Blacks create then move 
on. Whites document and then recycle. In the history of popular music, these truths 
are self-evident.”16  Such an argument could be justified by pointing to black 
originators in various diverse and influential styles and genres, such as jazz, rock and 
hip-hop. However, examples such as this often make these claims in racial rather 
than cultural terms, implying or underlining a belief in innate racial differences 
which, as well as sustaining essentialist ideology, provides mainstream confirmation 
of the extreme-right belief in fundamental racial difference.
 Of course, even if racial essentialism ought to be denied, it should not be 
forgotten that racial segregation, profiling and pride will play a part in the 
development of musical communities and culture.17 Race is, after all, the tying of 
meaning to particular skin tones, face shapes etc.; the very existence of such 
meanings can have an enormous effect on social interactions and hierarchies. 
However, all too often the language of race oversimplifies the complexities of 
popular music, and often reduces complex histories to simple binaries, as 
persuasively argued by Les Back and Vron Ware:
Critics and writers seem obsessed with reducing white involvement  in black 
music to a very limited range of archetypal possibilities. This relationship is 
characterized variously as the return of the black-faced minstrel, jazz-obsessed 
hipsters and white Negroes who want  “to be black,” or latter-day hip-hopping 
Wiggers (i.e., “white niggers”) who dream of the Hood from the safety of the 
vanilla suburbs. Another archetype … is the conniving and parasitic whites, 
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record producers and company executives, who cream off the profits and exploit 
black creativity.… [S]uch prototypical images of love and theft conceal the 
diversity of white involvement in black music. It has been all too easy to 
characterize the encounters and dialogues involving white musicians in such 
terms. Distinctions among musicians, studio owners, producers, and songwriters 
are elided within the language of appropriation.18
So, while there are many examples which, even in a seemingly racialised world, 
dispute the pervasiveness and significance of race in, in this case, the creation of 
popular music, the way that the language of race has become embedded in the 
discourses surrounding popular music allows ethnic groups to be characterised as 
homogeneous in their relation and contribution to popular music and to each other.
 A further embedding of a black and white divide in popular music is evident 
in its marketing. Karl Hagstrom Miller has described how music of the southern 
USA during racial segregation was not unique to any ethnic or cultural group, but 
rather became isolated along race lines during the late nineteenth and early  twentieth 
centuries. Miller shows how a variety of forces—including scholars, musicians, 
producers, consumers, and particularly the marketing of music by record labels—
played a role in compartmentalising popular music according to race.19  Broadly 
speaking, the blues became the genre of African Americans, while country music was 
associated with whites. However, the labels originally  used for describing this 
distinction reveal much of the way race is conceived in music; blues was called 
“race” music, and country “hillbilly” music. 
 The depiction of hillbilly  music portrayed its musicians as poor, white, and 
happy in their exclusion from urban culture. Race music, meanwhile, while arguably 
specifically referring to southern black music, is a description which presumes the 
presence of race is description enough, simultaneously associating the characteristics 
of a regionally and socio-economically specific music with an entire ethnicity. It is 
also notable that the term “race” was used, rather than, say, “black,” indicating 
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another example in which whiteness is unsaid and unmarked. Such a distinction may 
also have contributed to a notion that black music is fundamentally different, 
fundamentally the Other, to white culture, a notion certainly espoused by the extreme 
right.
 It is because of the particular significance of imagined blackness in the 
construction of musical white identities, as well as the preoccupations of extreme-
right musicians and supporters, that this chapter will assess whiteness in the context 
of blackness. Certainly, there are musics associated with Asians, Arabs, and 
insufficiently  white Europeans,20  but these are nowhere near as important to the 
construction of whiteness as blackness is, both in and outwith extreme-right 
ideologies. For this reason, I do not consider it necessary  to use the umbrella term 
“non-white” in this chapter.21
 It is not my intention here to assert some genres as white in a similar way to 
genres that are commonly understood as black. In my opinion, labelling genres in 
this way is a form of essentialism which ignores the lack of scientific basis for racial 
categorisation, as well neglecting the cultural cooperation often involved in the 
origin of genres. In other words, calling a genre black or white implies, for better or 
worse, that it “belongs” to a group of certain pigmentation, that it is defined by the 
group and that  the group can be defined by it.22 In addition, even if genres can be 
traced back to what we commonly understand as black or white origins, all genres—
particularly popular—involve a blend of influences that cannot be distilled into a 
single characteristic, be it class, ethnicity, nationality, or colour. So while this chapter 
examines the way that extreme-right groups perceive certain genres to be white or 
135
20 Insufficiently white generally encompasses Mediterraneans, Hispanics and Eastern Europeans. See 
Chapter One’s discussion of Nordicism.
21 For a discussion of the problematic but necessary use of the term “non-white,” see Dyer, White,  p.
11 and Ruth Frankenberg, ‘Introduction: Local Whitenesses, Localizing Whiteness’, Displacing 
Whiteness: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism, Durham, NC: Duke University Press,  1997, pp.
1-33.
22  For example, the alleged degeneracy of hip-hop is seen by white supremacists as evidence of the 
inferiority of the entire black race.
black, this is not to argue that certain genres are white or black; it is to examine the 
varied ways in which the extreme right construct whiteness, and how different 
musics are accommodated into their ideologies.
 The “invisible” or “unmarked” nature of whiteness has proved problematic 
for white supremacists, or those who wish to assert white culture and tradition as 
independent and demonstrable. In presenting whiteness as under threat, the extreme 
right must first assert or prove the existence of a unified white race. As the following 
examples show, this has been a problematic process with mixed results.
Classical Music and Elite Culture
There is a particular strand of extreme-right ideology that is purely interested in 
classical music, seeing it as a pinnacle of white achievement, while deriding popular 
music as base and degenerate. This belief appears to draw heavily on the cultural 
ideology of Nazism and the Nietzschean idea of the gifted individual transcending 
the masses. Given its elitist nature, it is no surprise that this particular musical 
ideology is mostly found in pre-modernised movements; while modernised 
movements do still promote classical music, they are careful to avoid presenting it in 
such an obviously elitist manner.
 Perhaps the most comprehensive examples of constructing classical music as 
white are found in the magazine Spearhead, edited by John Tyndall, then leader of 
the BNP. The articles on classical music seem to be intended dually as educational 
and improving material for readers, and an assertion of the particular achievements 
of the white race. The educational approach is particularly evident in this excerpt, 
which urges readers to “discover” classical music:
Your classical voyage will open up a thousand years of European genius. 
Together with your imagination, it will give you the gift of seeing, perhaps for 
the first  time, a race-greatness that will offer sanctuary from decadence. It  will 
also remind you that  this generation faces the greatest responsibility of all. The 
Armageddon is already being fought. The battle for white survival will be won 
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or lost during the next  fifty years. This music, our music, your music, is just 
another expression of white achievement which is worth fighting for.23
The implication here is clearly that familiarity  with classical music will improve and 
refine the individual. It is unsurprising that Tyndall and his circle were hostile to 
successful extreme-right popular musics, and hoped to improve the image of their 
movement by teaching skinheads the pleasures of the classical canon. But the 
primary function here is music as motivator; the argument moves quickly  from 
classical music as a work of genius to a heritage which must be fought for. In other 
passages, the role of classical music as incitement to action is the sole emphasis:
Anyone whoever doubts the fundamental destiny of the white race should listen 
to the fourth movement  of Beethoven’s ninth (choral) symphony, Wagner’s 
Siegried Idyll or Verdi’s Requiem. Then let them say whether the white race is 
worth fighting for!24
The language of these examples makes clear that classical music is not seen as the 
preserve of a privileged elite; rather it is seen as belonging to the white race. This 
belonging proves the superiority  of whiteness, and simultaneously demonstrates the 
reason why the race must be fought for.
 Although the first writer plainly states that a “classical voyage will open up a 
thousand years of European genius,” in practice the time period is not as broad as 
that. In Spearhead, the focus is on Romantic composers, particularly  Wagner and 
Verdi, as well as English composers such as John Ireland who are viewed by 
contributors as being unfairly neglected due to their “nationalist” outlook.25  The 
Resistance Records website, in its use of composers to provide inspirational quotes, 
restricts itself to the giants of the Germanic canon: Beethoven, Wagner, Mozart and 
Bach. The quotes—on the Featured Artists page alongside adverts for bands such as 
Angry  Aryans, Kremator and Definite Hate—imply the necessity  that activists 
familiarise themselves with the classical canon in order to better themselves and their 
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understanding of the white cause. Beethoven addresses the function of music as 
inspirer (“Music should strike fire from the heart of man, and bring tears from the 
eyes of woman.”), Mozart emphasises the importance of being true to oneself (“I pay 
no attention whatever to anybody’s praise or blame. I simply  follow my own 
feelings.”) while Bach underlines the importance of work ethic and application (“I 
worked hard. Anyone who works as hard as I did can achieve the same results.”). 
The influence of Nazism in this choice is clear in the quote on Wagner, which is 
actually from Adolf Hitler: “Whoever wants to understand National Socialist 
Germany must know Wagner.”26 This last quote emphasises that Resistance’s origins 
lie with Nazism and that  the essence of Nazism is found in Wagner; hence supporters 
will appreciate the nature of white supremacism all the more through their 
engagement with classical music.
The High/Low Divide
Classical music is of course notorious for being a canon of works by  dead white 
males. One can point  to a handful of female or non-white figures but, particularly 
before the 20th century, it is a canon which has strong resonances with extreme-right 
ideals of patriarchy and ethnicity. Within this context, it becomes crucial to construct 
this music as white, rather than as a product of particular societies or privileged 
individuals. Occasionally, this is framed in the context of a historical comparison of 
the cultural products of non-white societies with Western Europe, the Other then 
138
26 ‘Featured Artists’, Resistance Records, http://resistance.com/featured/, accessed 1 June 2012.
being dismissed as backward or primitive.27 The most common approach, however, 
is to posit classical music as “white” and in opposition to the “black,” “negroid” or 
“jungle” nature of popular music.
 The rhetoric of race has largely informed much of the distinction between 
“high” and “low” culture in the 20th century. While the high/low distinction has been 
traced to at least mediaeval times28—as a differentiation between elite and popular 
tastes—the increasing influence of black culture on popular music in the 20th 
century led to racial flavouring of the argument. Rhythmic emphasis, and its 
associations with sexuality and base human instincts, was contrasted with the more 
cerebral appreciation and introspection of the concert hall. Simon Frith—who has 
argued that bodily response to rhythm is anything but “brainless”—traces these 
prejudices to the Romantic history of defining African culture as “the body, the other 
of the bourgeois mind”.29  “[H]ow rhythms are read,” Frith asserts, “is a matter of 
cultural, not musical politics.”30  In this context, it  becomes clear that  the attack on 
emergent popular musics was a reaction to the transgression of a black aesthetic upon 
white cultural dominance.
 The terms used by BNP writers in the mid-1990s (quoted in full in the 
previous chapter) indicate a racialised perception of popular music: “jungle 
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‘music,’”31 “mind-numbing prole-feed,”32 “monotonous monophonic drivel.”33 These 
attacks from conservatives dismiss popular music entirely, making no distinction 
between black and white within it. American terrorist David Lane, who does make a 
distinction between white and black practices, still sees classical music as the salve 
for the problems facing the white race:
[W]hen we had our own nations, our dance was stately and orderly. The 
Virginia reel, waltz and square dance are examples. Dancing was a kind of 
refined courtship. The Negroidal frenzy dancing of this age is simulated 
copulation, not  courtship. This simulated copulation is usually accompanied by 
some cacophony, wrongfully called music, which invariably is played at  a 
decibel level designed to attract  the attention of aliens on some distant  planet. 
The thumping of synthesized instrumentation drowns out any vocal lyrics, 
which indeed have no redeeming value anyway.… How I wish young White 
people would or could, hear or see productions by Tchaikovsky, Wagner, 
Strauss, Beethoven, Rossini, Verdi and the other great  Aryan composers. The 
1812 Overture, the William Tell Overture and the Tannhauser Overture are 
Aryan culture at  their finest. And 99% of today’s youth haven’t  a clue. It is not 
their fault and it  is oh-so-sad. But the alien destroyer knows that the further a 
generation is removed form its own culture, the less it cares about the 
preservation of the race from which it sprang.34
For these ideologues, contemporary popular music does not constitute part of the 
heritage of the white race. However, attempts to make the extreme-right a haven of 
classical music have largely failed, and even those who espouse this ideology have 
come to accept the economic realities of the extreme-right music scene. In its later 
years, Spearhead began to carry adverts for CDs and BNP benefit concerts 
performed by  extreme-right bands,35  while David Lane said this on the subject of 
extreme-right rock:
I am overjoyed at  the success we are seeing with the White Power bands. I must 
confess that  I don’t  understand the phenomenon, since my preference runs to 
Wagner and Tchaikovsky, but the music enjoyment  of us dinosaurs is of no 
importance. White Rock seems to reach and unify our young folk, and that is 
the first good news in decades.36
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Given the success of extreme-right music—both financially and in terms of its 
popularity in the movement—some have seen it necessary to justify  the presence of 
particular genres within extreme-right ideology. This has proven difficult, not only 
because of the multicultural origins of most popular music genres, but because 
ideological adaptation tends to occur after the event, and there is a lack of consensus 
within the extreme right as to what are appropriate genres.
What’s white?
The desire to capitalise on the economic potential of music has frequently appealed 
to extreme-right groups, who see it not only  as a source of possible income, but as an 
opportunity to assert and disseminate their ideology. The reasoning behind this is 
well demonstrated in the following letter to the BNP magazine Identity, regarding the 
establishment of Great White Records:
At the BNP leadership conference held at  the start of July, the party’s National 
Cultural Officer, Jonathan Bowden, gave an inspirational talk on the importance 
of our working to revitalise areas of traditional and Politically Incorrect British 
culture, and co-opt  them to our political and ideological war against  the liberal-
left  drive to deculturalise and destroy our nation. This is the theoretical side of a 
project which Nick Griffin and a small team of musicians have been developing 
behind the scenes in recent months: To create a nationalist recording label to 
produce musical and other CDs promoting in a sensible way our political 
message and/or traditional British and Western culture.… Everything from folk 
music to rock and classical piano is on the agenda. Quite simply, if it  springs 
from British and Western roots, if we can find the artists, and if some of our 
people want to listen to it, we intend to produce and sell it.37
However, it is not a straightforward process to designate particular genres as 
ideologically  sound; some of the complexities involved in this are outlined in this 
passage, again from Identity:
the would-be cultural wing of a nationalist revival was largely centred on a 
musical form and arrangement  of musical instruments that  was a product of 
mid-to-late-twentieth century America—the greatest  influence in the destruction 
of popular traditional white culture from Dixie to the Ural Mountains. Classical 
music buffs who derided it as ‘black jungle noise’ were well wide of the mark, 
but so were those who tried to claim the music as ‘white.’ The truth is that  most 
of the pop music of the second half of the last  century had a mixture of black 
and white origins. And, wherever it  came from, its total rejection of so many of 
the instruments, melodies and influences of traditional (i.e. pre-approximately 
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1940) European music made it a potent  factor in the deculturalisation and 
psychological uprooting of generations of young whites. So what  was to be 
done? The prescription of the elderly purists—to write-off a whole lifetime’s 
worth of music and get  everyone listening to classical waltzes, Wagner or 
original recordings of long-dead folk singings—was an obvious non-starter.38
This article, published in 2001, outlines the imagined development of nationalist 
music and describes this narrative as if from the future. In this article, the music 
scene has overcome its problems and ideological contradictions and emerged as 
something truly white (described throughout as “White Roots Music”). The article 
claims this has been achieved through the revival of “songs that were sung in pubs or 
on army route marches or on sailing ships for generations,” as well as through the 
use of:
long-neglected traditional instruments. Electric guitars and rock drum kits 
remained at  the centre of the music, but  tin whistles, bagpipes, fiddles and 
related instruments, bodran and even Ulster’s huge lambeg war drums all began 
to feature as well. Some bands experimented with the enormous potential of 
modern electronic synthesiser keyboards to produce contemporary sound 
versions of everything from accordions to church organs.39
Despite outlining the ways in which an apparently authentically  white musical 
culture can be created, the hopes of the manifesto have not been realised. The vast 
majority  of extreme-right musicians still play in the genres that were popular in the 
mid-1990s, although there is certainly  more variety than there was then, even if not 
to the extent of incorporating the bodran or lambeg.
 A simple way of accommodating popular music within white supremacist 
ideology is to claim white origins for genres commonly thought of as non-white. 
This is the approach of a contributor to Stormfront, under the alias “Fight the 
Racists,” in a thread which, like the poster’s alias, is based on the assumption that the 
most widespread victims of racism are white people:
White people are responsible for the creation of many of the most  popular forms 
of music. White people created the blues, jazz, rock and roll and rap music. 
White liberals and blacks often falsely credit blacks with the accomplishments 
of white people. For example, they claim blacks invented the traffic light, the 
blood bank and air conditioning when these things were invented by whites. 
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They do the same thing with music. They claim blacks created the blues, jazz, 
rock and roll and rap and that  white people “stole” this music from blacks. If 
there was any stealing done it was done by blacks from whites. The blues came 
from the British Isles. An early blues song is Greensleeves. Greensleeves is a 
song about a man who was taken advantage of by a woman and then rejected. It 
dates from the late 1500s. The first recorded jazz song was Livery Stable Blues 
by the Dixieland Jass Band, recorded in 1917. Band member Nick Larocca 
claimed to have invented jazz and his music is the first known examples of it. 
Rock and roll is often claimed to be speeded up blues. This claim ignores the 
influence of white country music in rock and roll. Either way rock and roll 
developed from white music. The first known recorded example of a rock and 
roll song is Move It  On Over, recorded by Hank Williams in 1947. It was the 
template for songs such as Rock Around the Clock and Roll Over Beethoven. 
Oh, and the term “rock and roll” was used by whites in the 1800s. For example, 
it  was mentioned in one of the Little House On the Prairie books, set  around 
1880. It  probably refers to the motion of trains. Black supremacists try to credit 
blacks with inventing the term, using a preposterous explanation. Rap was being 
done by whites in the 1920s. The first  recorded rap song was recorded in 1927 
by Swedish artist Evert  Taube. It  was called Kinesiska Muren. Don't believe 
what I say? Listen to the songs yourself. Are you going to believe black 
supremacist, anti-white propagandists or your own ears?40
It is not difficult to dispute the examples cited by “Fight  the Racists,” and this is one 
of the criticisms from his fellow Stormfront posters, such as “Trenchcoater”: “It’s all 
hearsay. I can say my grandfather was rapping in the 1800’s [sic]. Doesnt [sic] mean 
it’s true or he was the first. Move on, there [are] non-whites who have accomplished 
things like rap, obviously mediocre, but still we dont [sic] need credit for 
everything.” While some respondents are receptive, even pointing to an American 
academic’s claim that rap battles are based on an old Scottish tradition of “flyting,”41 
others do not want whites to claim credit for what they see as inferior practices. For 
instance, “Let them keep the garbage called rap” and “Blacks can have the blues if 
they  want, it’s no good. It was made 100 times better by bands like the Rolling 
Stones.”
 As these latter posts suggest, there is a desire to maintain the “inferior” status 
of some genres in order to demonstrate the inherent superiority of the white race; in 
order to consolidate the sense of community  in “us,” there must be an easily 
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identifiable “them,” and a fundamental component in the construction of this binary 
is the belief in genres as identifiably, and authentically, “white” or “black.” However, 
the ambiguities of racial origins, as well as differing tastes and aesthetics within the 
extreme right, mean that this has been a difficult and often contradictory process. 
What is dismissed as “black” or “jungle music” by  some will be held up as a shining 
example of white supremacy by others. These contradictions highlight the 
constructed nature of whiteness, and the difficulties the extreme right face in 
attempting to ascribe objective qualities to it.
Punk and Oi!
As outlined in Chapter One, the extreme-right music scene emerged from British 
punk. Punk has been cited as “Year Zero” for a number of cultural developments:
Punk briefly united a motley array of malcontents as a force against. But when 
the question shifted to “What are we for?,” the moment/movement  disintegrated 
and dispersed, each strand nurturing its own creation-myth of what punk meant 
and its own vision of where to go next.42
These various strands are generally  grouped under the umbrella term “post-punk”, 
but of particular relevance here is Oi!, the foundational genre of extreme-right music, 
which was proclaimed as the authentic version of punk. There were a number of 
factors which facilitated the appropriation of punk by the extreme right. Punk’s 
rhetoric of anti-elitism, as well as the presentation of Oi! as the authentic culture of 
the street in opposition to “art school” mainstream punk, was well suited to the 
rhetoric of the National Front as representatives of the working class. Punk 
provocatively appropriated Nazi symbolism as well; the swastika became something 
of a fashion accessory, while wartime imagery  was often referenced. Sid Vicious 
famously  wore a T-shirt with a swastika on it, while Joy Division’s name referred to 
prostitutes in concentration camps. Nazi symbolism was also used in song names, 
such as The Residents’ ‘Third Reich ’n’ Roll,’ Luxus’ ‘Auschwitz’, and The Cretins’ 
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‘Dachau Disco.’43 Siouxsie Sioux from Siouxsie and the Banshees excused her own 
use of the swastika as “high camp,” while the band encountered controversy  for the 
line “Too many Jews for my liking” in the song ‘Love in a Void,’ which was 
explained as shorthand for “too many businessmen.” 
 Dick Hebdige has addressed the use of the swastika by punks directly:
Conventionally, as far as the British were concerned, the swastika signified 
“enemy.” None the less, in punk usage, the symbol lost its “natural” meaning—
fascism. The punks were not  generally sympathetic to the parties of the extreme 
right.… We must resort, then, to the most obvious of explanations—that the 
swastika was worn because it was guaranteed to shock.… The signifier 
(swastika) had been willfully detached from the concept  (Nazism) it 
conventionally signified, and … its primary value and appeal derived precisely 
from its potential for deceit. It was exploited as an empty effect.44
While this is probably true for some, perhaps the majority, of those punks who 
appropriated Nazi symbolism, there were certainly those who used and understood 
these activities unironically. Admittedly, even Skrewdriver’s early use of the 
swastika has been interpreted as conforming to Hebdige’s interpretation,45 but punk’s 
process of making Nazism “fashionable” may have contributed to the confidence the 
developing extreme right  felt  in openly displaying their extremist views through such 
symbolism.
 Although the extreme-right brand of Oi! quickly became associated with the 
white supremacist ideology of its practitioners, it was drawing on the particular 
association punk had established with whiteness. Through the activities of Rock 
Against Racism (RAR), punk became invested with a liberal/left-leaning ideology, as 
well as anti-racism. However, RAR concerts were generally segregated, with blacks 
represented by reggae bands, whites by punks. This segregation was not absolute, 
with RAR particularly influential in the development of 2-Tone (see below). At the 
same time, Asians—who were the main victims of racism in Britain, particularly  the 
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skinhead practice of “Paki bashing”—were almost ignored, particularly at a national 
level; one Asian band, Alien Kulture played at a RAR event, also releasing a single 
and album to little mainstream attention. Not only did this leave many Asian fans 
feeling that the movement was ignoring their concerns,46 but hostility towards them 
was not limited to those musicians explicitly identifying with extreme-right politics; 
for instance Bernie Rhodes, manager of the Clash, said in an interview that “There’s 
a lot of Pakis that deserve it” when the subject of anti-Asian violence came up.47
 As well as the ethnicity of its practitioners, it has been suggested that the 
sound of punk reflects whiteness. Writing on American punk pioneers the New York 
Dolls, Robert Christgau makes a link between the style of their drummer and the 
colour of their skin: “although drawn to the backbeat, he [Jerry Nolan] submerged it, 
never funking around.… This was essential discipline in what was supposed to be a 
definitively white style.”48  Dave Laing, in his analysis of punk, quotes Christgau in 
his assessment of punk’s attitude to rhythm, also drawing on the stereotypes of race 
and rhythm:
More crucial to punk’s sense of difference from other musics is its attitude to 
rhythm. It is here that the apparent paradox of a music both more ‘primitive’ 
and ‘revisionist’ finds its most appropriate application. Perhaps the most 
characteristic rhythmic feature of music containing Afro-American elements is 
syncopation.… The presence of recognizable syncopation in the music is a 
precondition for all dancing in the rock-based popular music sphere. The main 
reason for the ‘undanceability’ of much punk rock (and for its adoption of the 
‘pogo’ as a suitable dance form) is that, to quote Christgau, it  tends to 
‘submerge’ syncopation in its rhythmic patterns.49
Laing also points to the “monadic” style of punk rhythm (1-1-1-1), as opposed to the 
dyad of conventional rock (1-2-1-2), emphasising particularly the monadic style of 
punk bass lines. Simon Reynolds makes a similar point: “Pursuing a militant and 
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aggressively monolithic sound, punk had mostly purged ‘blackness’ from rock, 
severing the music’s links to R&B while simultaneously  rejecting disco as escapist 
and vapid.”50  These assertions all draw on a similar set of assumptions. Rhythmic 
variations, particularly  syncopation, are proclaimed to be entirely “black” in nature. 
In addition, the references to “discipline” (Christgau) and the use of adjectives such 
as “militant” (Reynolds) as opposite to rhythmic variation implies these 
characteristics as white; it follows that characteristics of wildness, primitivism, and 
indiscipline are ascribed to non-whites. Consider the David Lane quote (above); 
Lane sees white dancing traditions as “refined courtship,” disciplined and orderly. In 
contrast, black (or “Negroidal frenzy”) dancing is “simulated copulation.”
 Punk’s value of discipline was also perceived in its generic “purity”:
Along with dance music’s sensuality and swing, punk had also rejected all those 
hyphenated compound sounds (jazz-rock, country-rock, folk-rock, classical-
rock, etc.) that  proliferated in the early seventies. To punks, this kind of thing 
smacked of virtuoso showing off…. Defining itself against this limp, ‘all gates 
open’ eclecticism, punk proposed a strident purism.51
Punk was valued for its lack of artifice, for its DIY, back-to-basics aesthetics, for its 
accessibility. It threatened the distinction between audience and performer, 
particularly with its philosophy  of “learn three chords and start a band.” These values 
appealed to the sensibility  of the extreme right; the lack of artifice portrayed a raw, 
unrefined sort of authenticity, an authenticity of the man in the street, stripped of the 
decadence of mainstream rock. These values were particularly  significant to the punk 
subgenre Oi!.
 Oi! is perhaps the genre with the most association with racism in Britain. It 
was not born out of racist ideology, however, but like the racialisation of genres it 
acquired it  in a gradual process. In terms of genre style, it was based on simplicity, 
both musically—in harmony and melody—and in structure. Oi! is therefore the punk 
ethos of “purity” taken to the extreme, completely rejecting artifice. The emphasis on 
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purity  in music was analogous to race; in extreme-right ideology, whiteness is seen 
as pure, while other races are threatening because of their capacity  to “dilute” white 
purity.52
 While Oi! was the most significant subgenre of punk for the extreme right, 
other genres associated with punk also proved popular, even if their “purity” is even 
less obvious. 2-tone was in many  ways a riposte to the racial segregation of popular 
music: white musicians became very open to what was previously perceived as being 
black music, influenced by a number of genres and working with black musicians, 
seeking “to produce a fusion of white (punk) and black (reggae) British musical 
traditions by developing a contemporary version of 1960s Jamaican ska.”53 However, 
the multiracial makeup of this genre didn’t put off a racist following. Just as the 
skinheads of the 1960s had modelled their style on black culture and listened to 
reggae while simultaneously engaging in racist practices such as “Paki bashing,” the 
skinhead fans of 2-tone bands saw no problem in their appreciation of this music, 
although they did take steps to “sanitise” the musicians to align them with their 
ideology. For instance, the skinhead fans of the Specials, who had two black 
members, referred to the band as “the Specials plus two,” making clear that in their 
eyes the Specials consisted of its white members.54 The only all-white 2-tone band, 
Madness, had frequent problems at their gigs from racist skinheads,55 while Madness 
frontman Suggs had been a roadie for (pre-racist) Skrewdriver,56  giving the band 
something of a cult following on the extreme right. 2-tone was not to become a genre 
of great significance to the extreme right, but it  demonstrates the way in which the 
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apparent cognitive dissonance of racists listening and dancing to multiracial bands or 
musics is not necessarily considered to be dissonant at all.
 Oi! did not last  as the dominant genre of extreme-right music, with more 
general rock and metal styles becoming prominent, but many aspects of Oi! ideology 
were maintained. Vocal delivery is more mixed, but still has a notable trace of Oi!’s 
influence; while there are some bands and singers who sing in a conventional 
manner, there are many others who deliver their lyrics predominantly  through 
shouting. Instrumental ability is still varied, but this often seems to be the result of 
capability rather than aesthetic; there are many extreme-right bands—particularly 
playing metal, but also some more general rock bands—which make no attempt to 
conceal their virtuosity. The very letters of Oi! also became something of a 
trademark of band names, which were misspelled to include them, particularly in 
Germany to replace “eu,” as with the bands Proissenheads, Doitsche Patrioten, Noie 
Werte and Oithansie. Above all, extreme-right rock music continues to present itself 
as the authentic expression of white working-class culture.
Rock
While punk and Oi! were the catalysts for the creation of an extreme-right music 
culture, these genres became less significant throughout the 1980s, with most bands 
employing a more generic rock sound. While punk ideals were still influential, they 
were no longer essential. For example, some bands still maintained a certain 
incompetence in their instrumental skills, but others demonstrated their proficiency. 
This was evident particularly in the growing influence and use of metal, particularly 
in central and eastern Europe.
 Using the umbrella term “rock,” while vague, can be problematic. While 
rock’s origins—from rock ’n’ roll—are usually cited as a mix of African-American 
blues and predominantly white country music, the influence of black music, and 
particularly of black rock ’n’ roll pioneers, is emphasised. Either way is problematic 
from an extreme-right perspective; if seen as a product of black culture or as the 
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result of cultural miscegenation, then it is hardly an example of white supremacy. 
Therefore, extreme-right advocates of rock emphasise its white roots or point  to its 
development by white musicians. The former approach is shown by some of the 
respondents to the Stormfront forum post quoted above on the white origins of music
—they  emphasise the role of Hank Williams in the birth of rock ’n’ roll, particularly 
his 1947 song ‘Move It On Over.’57 
 The role of white performers is also crucial to the account in an anonymous 
editorial of a South Carolina skinhead fanzine Skinned Alive in 1987. The editorial 
begins by  challenging the attitude displayed by ideologues such as those found in the 
pages of Spearhead:
This claim [the African origins of popular music] is also used by boring old 
Losers among Whites who are responsible for letting “Jews” and Third 
Worlders take over in the first place. These old farts claim rock music hurts their 
ears or they say it is just  “nigger music.” Well, we say, the music of warriors 
ought to hurt your ears: The sounds of the march into battle were not meant to 
evoke the charms of a swank drawing room in Mayfair or Beverly Hills. We’re 
in a rage: You’re damn right  we’ve gone Berserk—just like our Viking 
ancestors. Unlike our critics, we simply can’t  sit  still and watch apes steal our 
women, rape our old women, take our jobs and turn our nations into the same 
black pits of filth and ugliness as the lands the minorities are descended from. 
The music which reflects our rage and which empowers us to unite and repel the 
alien invasion is rough, rocky, gut-wrenching and we make no apologies to 
anyone for it.58
This narrative not only places skinheads in the same historical continuum as Vikings 
(see Chapter Six), but also argues that their music is an aural manifestation of an 
aspect of whiteness, in this case white rage.
 This revisionism dismisses black influences by crediting the particular genius 
of whites for the evolution of rock. As well as white musicians, it cites the 
technological basis of rock ’n’ roll:
The roots of rock and roll are electrical. Without electricity and the electrical 
guitar there would be no rock and roll. And as White Power Rock Music 
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pioneers [sic] Ian Stuart  told us in a recent  interview, “Who invented the electric 
guitar? It wasn’t a nigger.”59
As well as the technological basis of rock, the influence of white practitioners is 
emphasised, particularly Jerry Lee Lewis and Elvis Presley:
The two undisputed, towering geniuses of that sound [White rock] are JERRY 
LEE LEWIS (the Killer) and the King himself, ELVIS PRESLEY. No other 
White artists, to say nothing of some black, can hold a candle to these two.… 
PRESLEY and LEWIS got  their sound, their genius and their power from the 
heritage of Scottish and Anglo-Saxon folk and church music traditions out of 
which they were sprung.… White folk musical genius is too overwhelming to 
be resisted and that is the root of the appeal of modern Rock.… [Presley and 
Lewis] would shake the world to its core with their unique White sound.… Our 
music is overwhelmingly White in origin, style and evolution. 50s Rock was 
White. Rockabilly was White. Punk’s a White invention. Heavy-metal is White. 
The original Stones and Who sounds were White.60
This quote’s attempt to associate “white” genres with the supposed genius of 
individual practitioners is mirrored in a passage from a biography  of Donaldson: “In 
the 1950’s [sic] the DJ Alan Freed coined the phrase Rock and Roll. In the 1980’s Ian 
Stuart pioneered the term White Rock.”61  As well as giving Alan Freed the main 
credit for rock ’n’ roll, implying the efforts of early  black musicians only had 
significance due to the ingenuity of Freed, this quote attempts to establish “White 
Rock” as distinct, as a new phenomenon, and therefore sidesteps the issue of 
multicultural origins of white supremacist music.
Metal
One of the most significant subgenres of rock within extreme-right music is metal, 
which, as perhaps the dominant genre of the 1980s—the time when the extreme-right 
music scene was developing—was always likely to affect extreme-right bands. Metal 
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asserting that the band progressed from Oi! to metal,62  even if it might be more 
accurate to say that they  incorporated metal influences into their rock aesthetic. In 
addition, an extreme-right metal subgenre, National Socialist Black Metal, has 
emerged, while ostensibly non-political metal, particularly “black” and “pagan” 
metal, has come to be viewed as a “white” genre, with mainstream bands perceived 
as embodying extreme-right ideals.
 The extreme-right belief in the “whiteness” of metal is perfectly consistent 
with the typical characterisations of the genre’s mainstream identity. Robert Walser 
notes that while heavy  metal can trace its origins to African-American blues, “the 
histories of musical genres such as rock and heavy metal commonly begin at the 
point of white dominance,” thus emphasising the contribution of, for example, Black 
Sabbath at  the expense of precursors such as Robert Johnson and Howlin’ Wolf.63 
From this perspective, metal has been highly effective in “whitewashing” the 
diversity of its roots, while effectively providing a homogeneous racial space, with 
the genre remaining essentially white-dominated. Walser argues that white 
appropriation of black forms and styles, and the purging of these influences from the 
genre’s self-identity, is probably one reason why the genre has failed to attract black 
fans and musicians in any  large numbers. It is interesting that part of Walser’s 
discussion is centred on the body, as he argues that  metal’s “relatively rigid sense of 
the body and concern with dominance reflect European-American transformation of 
African-American musical materials and cultural values.”64
 While mainstream metal can be interpreted as being compatible with 
extreme-right ideology, there are sub-genres which lend themselves even more 
strongly. Keith Kahn-Harris’s book on “extreme” metal analyses many  of these sub-
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genres, including thrash, death, doom, and black metals, as well as grindcore.65 
Kahn-Harris notes that, similar to mainstream metal, extreme forms also purge black 
elements:
The extent to which extreme metal has excluded the African American musical 
influences of metal is striking. Not only is there virtually no detectable blues 
element  in the music, there is a near-total absence of syncopation and other 
rhythms common in forms of funk, soul and other African American influenced 
dance music.66
So even though metal in general is strongly associated with whiteness and the 
forgetting of black musical influences, there are sub-genres such as extreme metal 
which take this “whitening” even further. The tendency for rhythmic uniformity in 
metal, despite the fact that metal drummers are capable of and often play exceedingly 
complex and unusual parts, is reminiscent  of Christgau’s assertion that punk 
similarly “submerged” rhythmic syncopation to create a “white” sound.
 Many of the themes of extreme metal sub-genres are similar to those adopted 
by factions of the extreme right, particularly  an interest in Vikings and paganism, but 
it is extreme metal’s ambiguous relationship with racism, anti-Semitism and fascism 
that is most striking. Kahn-Harris cites the case of Darkthrone’s Transilvanian 
Hunger (Peaceville Records, 1994) which was originally going to include a reference 
criticising “Jewish behaviour” before media pressure intervened; however, the album 
was still released with the phrase “Norsk Arisk Black Metal” (Norwegian Aryan 
Black Metal) on the sleeve.67
 It is conceivable that examples such as this are merely  part of black metal’s 
rejection of mainstream culture, rather than a declaration of political affiliation just 
as black metal bands are also known to refer to rape and murder. Indeed, Kahn-
Harris argues that any explicit political stance would be undesirable to many 
musicians and fans, as the scene “upholds an ‘autonomous’ view of music, which 
sees it as ideally removed from social forces.… For extreme metal scene members, 
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music connotes the scene and politics connotes that which is outside the scene.”68 
Just as with punk’s use of the swastika, then, the flirtation of some metal bands with 
the language and symbolism of racism and fascism can be understood as a 
transgressive act.
 However, just as punk’s use of the swastika could be perceived as supporting 
extreme-right politics, so bands such as Darkthrone are liked by  extreme-right metal 
fans, with that band particularly  popular.69  What this also means—despite Kahn-
Harris’s claim that “overt Nazi bands tend to be confined to their own, largely 
autonomous scenes”70—is that messages aligned with extreme-right ideology can 
circulate in this genre relatively unproblematically. Even explicitly racist bands are 
not necessarily  ostracised. The following is a quote from an extreme-right fan of 
black metal, which refers to Burzum, the one-man band of Varg Vikernes, a neo-Nazi 
imprisoned for the murder of a black metal guitarist and arson of churches. It is 
unlikely that such a notorious figure’s politics would be unknown to listeners:
I’ve got friends with varying musical tastes and stances on race issues. But  all 
of my fellow Metal heads (wether [sic] they agree with his or my racial stances 
or not) love Burzum every bit as much as Dark Funeral, Bathory, Venom, 
Mayhem, Impaled Nazarene, and Enslaved, despite Vaarg’s [sic] highly 
publicised stance on race issues.71
In truth, given that the lyrics of black metal are almost indistinguishable because of 
the genre’s singing stylistic conventions, and given that even examples of racism are 
heavily outweighed by anti-Christianity, it is unreasonable to connect the majority of 
black metal groups explicitly to the extreme-right music scene. There are, however, 
bands which assert this affiliation themselves.
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 National Socialist Black Metal (NSBM) is a label for black metal bands with 
National Socialist influence; while it can be used to refer to transgressive 
appropriation, it more often implies political conviction behind National Socialist 
influence. Band names—such as Greece’s Der Stürmer, named after a Nazi 
newspaper, and the French band Kristallnacht—reflect the influence of extreme-right 
politics in general and National Socialism in particular;. The ideology draws on 
social Darwinism, with one introductory  website stating: “We support natural 
selection, and ethnic nationalism, which means that each state supports an organic 
population defined by language, culture, values and genetics.”72 
 According to this website, NSBM  is a “distributed movement” with no 
l e a d e r s h i p , a l t h o u g h g r o u p s s u c h a s t h e P a g a n F r o n t ( h t t p : / /
www.thepaganfront.com/) do act as umbrella organisations for the genre. Unlike the 
rest of the extreme-right music scene, NSBM  “does not try to evangelize; instead 
they  wait for new adherents to burrow their way into the scene.”73 This may in part 
be because of NSBM’s elitist intellectualism, with Vikernes writing that “We seek 
the elite.”74 This elitism can be off-putting to outsiders, as the following quotes from 
Stormfront indicate: “I can't stand the wankers in the scene that take it way too 
seriously for my liking,”75  and “I think the majority of metal musicians portray an 
elitist attitude.”76 In addition, NSBM’s image is somewhat at odds with most other 
extreme-right styles. A Resistance article on whether black metal is white music cites 
an argument that
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many Death/Black Bands cannot be treated as WP [White Power] Bands, 
because who would take seriously such “faggots” with long hair and make-up? 
This is no surprise at  all, given the ridiculous show put on by self-declared 
Black Metal bands such as Britain’s Cradle of Filth, one of the most  popular 
Metal bands these days. One can hardly find anything white about them except 
their make-up.77
The article emphasises this distinction between what the writer sees as the 
inauthentic mainstream in contrast to the “militant underground” which is working 
for the extreme-right cause, but it is clear that black metal has not been fully 
accepted by  some in the extreme-right movement. Even so, it achieved significant 
popularity in the early  2000s, with Resistance Records owner William Pierce 
investing in the black metal label Cymophane Records c.2000.78  While this is 
unsurprising given metal’s potential profitability  and appeal to young listeners, it 
should be remembered that metal as a genre strove to create a self-identity as white, 
and in doing so embodies certain aspects of extreme-right ideology.
Folk
Folk music is a genre of contradiction. It is often defined as a “tradition evolved 
through the process of oral transmission,”79 but much folk music has only survived 
because of the activities of folk collectors, who notated and recorded folk music 
according to their own tastes and preferences. It has been appropriated by Fascist and 
Communist governments to legitimise their regimes, and Harker argues that the 
concept of folksong has helped “to mystify workers’ culture in the interests of 
bourgeois ideology  and therefore of capitalism, east and west.”80  Folk has been 
commonly associated with left-wing ideology since the second folk revival, in line 
with the beliefs of prominent collectors and artists, but  the sense of longing for a 
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romanticised pre-industrial golden age which drove many folk collectors 
demonstrates the reactionary potential of the genre. Folk’s position as a “national” 
music—even if folk nationalism has been used for projects on left and right—means 
it can be just as easily  used as a tool for bigotry, xenophobia and cultural exclusivism 
as for an idealised expression of a utopian community. 
 In a genre of such contradiction, it is unsurprising that the extreme right have 
seen folk music as in line with their ideology. Indeed, the concept of the “Volk”—
representing the national character to which a nation’s people belong—was a crucial 
component of Nazi ideology. Although folk has always been advocated to a degree 
by some on the extreme right, it came into particular favour with the two 
collaborations of Ian Stuart Donaldson with Stigger (a pseudonym short for “stupid 
nigger” used by the guitarist Steve Calladine), Patriotic Ballads (Rock-O-Rama, 
1991) and Patriotic Ballads II – Our Time Will Come (Rock-O-Rama, 1992). On 
these albums, folk is understood aesthetically, the songs being originals, reworked 
versions of Skrewdriver songs and a couple of covers of Lynyrd Skynyrd and Guns 
N’ Roses songs. “Folk music” is evoked merely through the use of acoustic guitars, 
with typical themes—particularly  vehement anti-Communism—appearing. While 
this suggests business as usual, the sleeve notes of the first album suggest that 
Donaldson is playing the role of a balladeer highlighting injustice:
Everyday in the media we are bombarded with stories of injustice against 
minorities. What  we never hear about  are the many cases of oppression and 
discrimination by the state against  us, the white majority. Ian Stuart and Stigger 
of SKREWDRIVER have therefore put together some acoustic ballads to 
highlight  this injustice, and to offer some hope to a much maligned people. 
Listen and learn.81
These albums are often cited in internal histories of the extreme right as hugely 
influential, introducing a generation of listeners to folk. It is also claimed that these 
albums appealed to a new set of listeners, as in a Spearhead obituary of Donaldson, 
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in which the writer claims that  my “own father, on hearing some of his songs, 
believed he was listening to folk music.”82
 At around the same time, the German singer Frank Rennicke was establishing 
himself as a “Nationale Bard,” gaining inter-generational popularity among 
traditionalists and neo-Nazis alike.83  Like Donaldson, Rennicke sings mainly 
originals, focusing particularly on (at times vague) themes such as “blood and soil,” 
Germany, resistance, racism and martyrdom.84  Such is the cult of Donaldson in 
Britain that in an interview with Blood & Honour it is assumed that Rennicke was 
inspired by Donaldson, which Rennicke denies.85 In fact, Rennicke’s ballad releases
—themselves drawing on a long German folk tradition—have proved so popular that 
it has become a fairly established style on the German extreme right, with musicians 
such as Annett Moeck releasing music in a similar vein.
  One concerted attempt to embrace folk as understood in terms of a song 
tradition was undertaken by  the BNP. The BNP has engaged with folk music in a 
number of ways. Firstly, and probably most publicly, it has attempted to identify with 
mainstream folk artists. Nick Griffin has made no secret  of his preference for folk, 
and sees artists such as Kate Rusby as “a welcome contrast to the multi-cult junk 
played incessantly on Radio One.”86  In making this distinction, Griffin is making 
clear that folk as he understands it necessarily entails racial, or at least cultural, 
purity. While this assertion has been contested—particularly by Folk Against 
Fascism—folk music was perhaps the pre-eminent style promoted by the modernised 
BNP, suggesting a market that agrees with Griffin’s interpretation of the genre.
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 The BNP also actively encourages members to become involved with local 
events that can be grouped under the folk banner, with an activist  handbook outlining 
this idea:
Ideally our activists will lead their communities in organising, or at least 
supporting cultural events such as St  George’s Day celebrations (April 23rd). 
Most  regions of the country have cultural events which are unique to that  area, 
or country. For example, the Padstow Hobby Horse in Cornwall, Arbor Tree 
Day in Shropshire, Garland King Day and The Well Dressing in Derbyshire, the 
Marshfield Mummers in Wiltshire, the Haxey Hood in Humberside and 
countless others. Some such celebrations, now very popular, have only been 
revived in recent  years – the Hastings Jack in the Green and Whittlesey Straw 
Bear festivals show just how big such things can get. Why not  do some research 
to see if there’s a lost  local tradition that you can inspire a team of enthusiasts to 
revive? Our ancient national festivals, such as May Day, Guy Fawkes Night  and 
Christmas, should also be staunchly supported – lest  the PC lunatic health and 
safety police and the Islamists manage to ban them all.87
In laying claim to the cultural events and attempting to re-establish them, the BNP is 
seeking to take on the role of gatekeeper. The call to act before Islamist intervention 
also suggests that  there are criteria which can lead to exclusion from the folk, in this 
case religion, but a religion which the extreme right predominantly  conceives of in 
ethnic terms. Similarly, Nick Griffin challenged singer Billy Bragg, well known for 
his left-wing associations, to sing a “proper folk song, like the Blackleg Miner,” 
thereby questioning the legitimacy of Bragg’s folk associations.88  Through these 
tactics, the BNP has attempted to establish itself as the authentic voice of British folk 
culture and, indeed, as the “folk” itself.
 This attempt by the BNP to associate its ideology with folk culture, and its 
practice of selling the work of folk artists without permission to raise funds, inspired 
the creation of Folk Against Fascism, an organisation which worked against  the BNP. 
Folk Against Facsism’s success in mobilising mainstream folk culture against the 
BNP may have hindered the latter’s attempts to appropriate the genre, but it  has not 
ended the popularity of folk within the extreme right. The BNP’s albums of adapted 
traditional tunes and newly-composed “folk” material are not unique, with many 
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others having covered ideologically suitable folk songs and written their own music 
in a similar style; folk artists and traditions are popular topics on forums, while 
various outlets sell folk releases alongside Oi! bands.
 This continuing popularity  is unsurprising, particularly since folk is generally  
regarded as a medium through which resistance is well expressed. Just as musicians 
might use native music as a symbol of opposition to colonial or Western dominance, 
folk is employed as a rejection of the mainstream music which is seen as promoting 
multiculturalism or degenerate values. Added to this, folk’s reputation for articulating 
“communal values [and commenting] on shared social problems”89 chimes well with 
the extreme right’s political motivations.
 While folk has proved relatively popular in these instances, there has been 
little attempt to theorise it to any extent. It is presumed by extreme-right proponents 
that folk is representative of a nation, and as the extreme-right conception of nation 
is bound up with race, that folk represents whiteness. In addition, there is little 
argument over folk authenticity, with original compositions labelled as folk 
apparently  because they sound like it. Folk music, understood as traditional music, is 
appreciated by some on the extreme right, with various dedicated forums on 
Stormfront.90  This often ignores intriguing ambiguities, such as the influence of 
Jewish and Romany peoples—two traditional enemies of the extreme right—on 
various folk musics of the world, particularly  in Eastern Europe. The “multicultural” 
nature of this music and its associated traditions are seemingly unknown to those 
who advocate it, and who apparently see it as a pure expression of nationhood. This 
serves as yet another example of how extreme-right portrayals of musics as racially 
pure must involve the reduction of complex processes and ideologies into simple 
binaries.
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Country
Folk collectors such as Cecil Sharp did tour the United States, but they were seeking 
music from groups that could trace their origins elsewhere, such as seeking 
“English” folk music in the Appalachian mountains. With the shorter history of the 
United States and its “melting-pot” history, it is difficult to proclaim one overarching 
authentic folk culture. However, country music has taken on some of the 
characteristics projected on to folk in other countries; it is seen as a music of 
authenticity, a music with working-class values, and a music with a distinctive 
history. As with folk, the extreme right have latched on to one significant  feature of 
country music, namely its characterisation as a white genre.
 In this regard, country is often portrayed as the contrast to rock music, 
stemming back to the record company distinction between hillbilly  music and race 
music. Hillbilly music was characterised as the music of poor southern whites, 
despite the diversity of country’s origins:
[C]ountry music derives from a diversity of European, African, Mexican, and 
First Nation musical sources. Nevertheless, country music is known as the 
outgrowth of the vernacular music of white Americans, just  as rock music is 
considered to be the developed form of decades of vernacular music-making by 
black Americans.91
This “whitening” of country  has somewhat tarnished its image, with it being 
associated with a history  of a particular sort of segregationist politics: “the specific 
white supremacist, antimodern, and antiurban politics and culture of the 
Confederacy.”92  In this conception, country is “understood to signify an explicit 
claim to whiteness … a marked, foregrounded claim of cultural identity—a bad 
whiteness.”93
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 It is not my intention here to argue whether or not this reputation is deserved, 
but this perception of country makes it a genre ripe for appropriation by the extreme 
right, even outwith the United States. In the early 1980s, for example, the 
traditionalist faction within the NF was, in contrast to the youth faction’s embrace of 
Oi!, largely  dismissive of popular music. The only  genre deemed to be ideologically 
suitable was country music, which
was acceptable because it was said (inaccurately) to derive from “the rich 
heritage of the White peoples” and to originate in British folk songs of the 
Elizabethan era. Only in country music could they find, the racists said, the 
values and the community which accorded with their politics. The music was 
seen, again mistakenly, to embody their racist populism.94
Such an interpretation was predicated on the mistaken belief in a musical racial 
divide, and the equally  mistaken belief in the isolation of “folk”-like musics from the 
mainstream popular culture of the time.95  Although country  music derived from a 
mixture of European, African and American (including Mexican) sources, it  came to 
be seen as “white” in contrast to “black” rock music, a relationship that became so 
embedded that, according to Peter Doggett, “Suspicion, bordering on hatred, has 
shadowed every encounter between country and rock since the 1950s.”96
 Country music is very much perceived as a place of conservative values, and 
thus in opposition to various other musical subcultures, making it possible for 
listening to country music to be an explicit statement of political belief and not just 
an aesthetic choice.97 Aaron Fox argues that the right-wing sentiments of songs such 
as Haggard’s ‘Okie from Muskogee’ are not necessarily  sincere or unironic,98  but 
any subversive intent on the part of the musicians would arguably  be irrelevant. 
Often, extreme-right adoption of songs and bands whitewashes any ambiguities in 
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order to make the material conform to the narrow ideology of the extreme right. 
Thus, Skrewdriver’s cover99  of ‘Tomorrow Belongs to Me’ (Hail the New Dawn, 
Rock-O-Rama, 1984) from the musical Cabaret turns a song indicating the horrific 
potential of Nazism into a straightforward anthem of white nationalism, and the 
adoption of Lynyrd Skynyrd portrays the American South in terms of racist 
confederacy, neglecting the band’s associations with black culture and its problems 
with the connotations of the confederate flag.100  As such, material which is 
ambiguous will generally  be interpreted in a way favourable to and harmonious with 
extreme-right ideology.
 Country music, therefore, has been interpreted as a straightforward 
representation of extreme-right values and ideology, despite its historical association 
with black music and arguably ambiguous politics. The genre’s conservative nature 
was recognised long ago; Malone quotes the folk collector Alan Lomax’s writings of 
1959, and his argument that:
the southern white rural style is the product  of the “security patterns” of the 
white community. In reference to its social function, “the primary effect of 
music is to give the listener a feeling of security, for it symbolizes the place 
where he was born, his earliest  childhood satisfactions, his religious experience, 
his pleasure in community doings, his courtship and his work—any or all of 
these personality-shaping experiences.” A musical style, then, is ‘one of the 
most conservative of culture traits,’ because it  is so deeply interwoven in the 
security framework of the community.101
As such, almost all white country musicians are generally  well-liked by extreme-
right country fans. Some artists and songs—particularly  David Allen Coe, although 
he is occasionally confused with Johnny Rebel—are particularly  popular because 
they are perceived to be in line with extreme-right ideology.
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 Even musicians who seem explicitly opposed to extreme-right ideology still 
have fans and defenders. For example, the all-female group  Dixie Chicks caused 
controversy  with their public stance against then-president of the USA George Bush 
and the invasion of Iraq, and to some conservative country  fans through posing nude 
on a magazine cover. This led to a hostile reaction on some Stormfront forums:
I personally think they are acting like sluts and should have their Texas 
citizenship revoked! They in no way represent  good ole [sic] Texan values 
whatsoever.102
Upon seeing the Dixie Chick's latest videos, I have all but concluded that  the 
two sisters are Jews.103
The Dixie Pricks can go to hell with all the other liberal babykillers as far as I 
am concerned.104
It would be nice if they would die in a firey [sic] bus crash.105
However, even if the balance of opinion on Stormfront is against  the band, there are 
still those who defend them, particularly for their resistance:
I like their music even though I don't agree with their views… To their respect 
they do not put political ideas in their songs (at least as far as I have heard).106
Personally I respect them for voicing their own opinion in the face of the Jew-
backed media...107
Despite the Dixie Chicks’ espousal of liberal values and refusal to conform to the 
gender roles that some on the extreme right demand, they are still acceptable to 
others. Given that such leniency  is unlikely to be granted to musicians of other 
genres, it seems that this is in no small part thanks to the cultural values and ideology 
the Dixie Chicks are ascribed through their mere association with country music.
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 Probably the most prominent country musician explicitly  associated with the 
extreme-right is Johnny  Rebel, part of a wave of music released on Reb Rebel 
Records in the 1960s by musicians such as the Klansman, Odis Cochran and the 
Three Bigots, and Colonel Sharecropper.108 This music was released in the context of 
the civil rights movement in the 1960s, and was deliberately confrontational, with 
Rebel’s songs ‘Nigger Hatin’ Me,’ ‘Move Them Niggers North’ and ‘Kajun Ku Klux 
Klan’ representative of the material released. Such songs, as well as acting to 
dehumanise African-Americans, were intended to mobilise whites in support of 
maintaining segregation.109  While Rebel achieved a modicum of popularity,110  his 
career did not  last beyond the 1960s, and it  was not until he was rediscovered after 
the establishment of the extreme-right music scene that he was to become an 
important figure in the scene’s self-identity.
 One of the clearest influences Rebel has had is on the band Racist Redneck 
Rebels, whose album Keep the Hate Alive! (Micetrap Records, 2003) contains a 
number of song titles reminiscent  of Rebel’s, such as ‘Niggers, Niggers, Niggers,’ 
‘The Nigger Crematory’ and ‘Whatever Happened to That Dear Ol’ Klan of Mine?’ 
The approach of Racist Redneck Rebels is hugely  dependent on their political 
incorrectness, not only  through their use of culturally insensitive and inappropriate 
language, but also in their characterisation of race. One of their more popular songs, 
‘Droppin’ the Kids off in Harlem,’ concerns a father’s attempt to cure his children of 
their appreciation of rap music:
Hey honey I’m dropping the kids off in Harlem;
I’ll pick ‘em up when they’ve had enough of that nigger shit;
Hey honey I’m dropping the kids off in Harlem;
And we’ll see how quick they come home when they’ve had enough of it;
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Well the kids came home right quick talking about going to college;
Wanna be doctors and lawyers, anything but that Harlem stuff;
Started doing homework and listening to country music;
And in the garbage went all that Tommy Hilfiger crap;
Don’t those niggers know Tommy Hilfiger’s a faggot?
While this song’s appeal is based on its provocative nature, it is interesting to note 
that one of the ways the children attempt to avoid black culture, alongside education, 
is through country music, a pairing somewhat surprising given that country music 
generally  positions itself at the opposite end of the social hierarchy from higher 
learning institutions.
 Other country  musicians have tended to use a “softer” approach to lyrics and 
subject matter, avoiding racial stereotypes and racist language. The work of Carl 
Klang is based partly  on Christian values and “patriotism,” but mostly consists of 
attacks on federal government and the socialist nature of taxes (see particularly 
Extremist, self-released, 1999). Klang’s music generally  consists solely  of these 
attacks, not outlining a positive position or alternative. While such an approach is not 
automatically an indication of extreme-right belief, Klang has ties to the movement; 
his CDs are sold by extreme-right outlets, and he has been approvingly  referenced in, 
among other places, the BNP’s Identity.111
 The BNP has also been active in the promotion of Traven Tucker, a country  
singer who has released two albums on Raventone Records (Traven Tucker & the 
Nameless Faith, 2002; ’Til the Day I Die, 2006) which were also distributed by the 
BNP’s Great White Records. Tucker also appeared at the party’s Red White & Blue 
Festivals of 2007 and 2008. Tucker’s albums, which have an electrified country 
sound, mourn the deterioration of traditional southern life and values, as in ‘My 
Hometown’ (’Til the Day I Die, Raventone Records, 2006):
Yesterday the flag did wave, and we could stand proud;
You could speak the truth and you could speak it out loud;
Now I don’t understand every word I hear, from a sea of foreign sounds;
Today this place don’t look much like my hometown.
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The tone of these songs is in keeping with the “new racism,” with implied arguments 
for segregation and cultural preservation of whites, while maintaining that such 
views are not based on prejudice and unfairly classed as hate, an argument made in 
‘Ain’t No Shame (Bein’ a White Man)’ (’Til the Day I Die, Raventone Records, 
2006):
Just for the record man, let’s get one thing straight;
Ain’t got nothing against no one, you can’t call it hate;
But speaking for my brother, and speaking for my kin;
My heritage and way of life, and this mess we’re in;
Don’t try and make me pay, for sins of a few;
’Cause there ain’t no shame in being a white man through and through.
Tucker’s shamelessness in his whiteness is presented through its equation with the 
southern way of life and its values. The references to heritage and family, as well as 
to the sins of the few (a group which does not include the narrator), present southern 
life, and, by extension, whiteness as inherently decent.
 Such examples of country musicians explicitly aligning themselves with the 
extreme-right cause are relatively  few. But  what is significant about country  music is 
not that  it is a particularly popular genre for musicians, but that it represents a set of 
values and a way of life which, through its association with the American South and 
that region’s racialised history, is taken to represent white culture. With this in mind, 
in an extreme-right context, country music constitutes an aural signifier of whiteness, 
a musical code which has race as an integral component of its aesthetic.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the commonly conceived racialised nature of certain 
genres is the result of historical processes rather than objective historical fact or 
expressive of essential qualities of racial difference. The desire to understand these 
genres as raced suggests a desire for authenticity, but a desire that does not  wish to 
acknowledge the complicated and ambiguous origins of musical styles:
We—particularly the Americans among us—seem to have been born with a 
desire to categorize all cultural products as either authentically black or 
authentically white. We remain confused by those that are authentically mixed, 
as if that  were some kind of logical impossibility.… There are those we 
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recognize as masters of racial mixing—Elvis Presley, Jimi Hendrix, and 
Eminem being the most  obvious—but  instead of accepting them as integrated 
Americans and therefore heroic figures, Hendrix gets accused of Uncle 
Tomming and Elvis and Eminem of “appropriation.” Even scholars, who should 
know better, almost  always consider “black music” a field of study entirely 
separate from the rest of American music.112
The desire to diversify  the scope of cultural and scholarly attention beyond white 
subjects through publications such as the Black Music Research Journal has drawn 
attention to the way in which society  has acted to demonstrate the unspoken nature of 
white privilege, but it has also served to reify  the notion of essential racial difference, 
and the idea that such difference is expressed in music.
 The notion that race is a characteristic of music is problematic given the 
multiracial origins of many genres, as well as the scientific dismantling of the very 
concept of race. This contradiction is demonstrated by  the extreme right’s difficulty 
in firmly establishing genres as white. It is a commonplace assertion that music is 
raced, most notably  with the rhetoric of “black” music. From an extreme-right 
perspective, in a world of raced music genres, some music must therefore be white; 
in this regard, the racing of genres by the extreme right is clearly  an extreme 
manifestation of a mainstream commonplace. Furthermore, the ascription of racial 
characteristics based on music—such as the extreme-right interpretation of hip-hop 
as representing the criminality and degeneracy of black people—is mirrored by the 
mainstream tendency to describe black musicians and people as inherently  rhythmic 
or soulful.
 Nevertheless, when ideologues set out to establish the racial nature of genres, 
they  must contend with contradictions, ambiguities and disagreements. Indeed, 
within the extreme-right movement there is disagreement as to whether “white” 
refers to appearance, bloodline or character. Given this non-specificity of whiteness, 
as well as the mixed cultural origins and histories of most music genres, any 
arguments over “white” genres have to rely on selective histories and simplification 
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to conform to the binary nature that the extreme right seek. However, while 
diversifying genres has been problematic in terms of ideology, it is an understandable 
component of the extreme right’s desire to maximise their economic potential and to 
satisfy the interests of as many potential supporters as possible. From this 
perspective, it  is possible that the extreme right are less concerned with establishing 
what “whiteness” is, and rather hope to appeal to as broad a base of “whites” as 




Populist Music: Genre, Lyrics and the Construction of Class
“White, White, White working class;
Working class patriot;
White, White, White working class;
Working class way of life.”
Arresting Officers, ‘Working Class Patriot’, Land and Heritage, Rock-O-Rama, 
1990.
“The British National Party is the voice of ordinary people 
who fear for their future and those of their children under the 
present government and the ‘established’ political parties.”
‘The Voice of Ordinary People’, BNP Scotland General Election Manifesto 2011, 
p.4.
“Crooked politicians and their media lies;
A race of dignity is what they despise;
They're raping our nation that was proud and free;
Now like vultures they are coming for me.”
Bound For Glory, ‘America, America’, Warriors Glory, Rock-O-Rama, 1990.
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The extreme right has an ambiguous relationship  with social class. The extreme-right 
factions of the first half of the 20th century incorporated aspects of socialism into 
their ideology, but simultaneously  demanded that loyalty  to the nation take absolute 
priority, as opposed to communism’s advocacy  of loyalty on class lines (a distinction 
further muddied by Stalin’s adoption of nationalist communism). The different 
manifestations of extreme-right ideology have also had to deal with a tension in 
advocating elite or popular culture. However, even with such contradictions, it is 
possible to discern certain tendencies—particularly  over the last thirty  or so years—
in extreme-right narratives of class, as well as their expression in music.
 The contemporary extreme right actively  embraces genres and styles which 
are associated with working-class values. While genres such as folk carry 
respectability, the championing of styles such as Oi! and country involves the 
adoption of something which is deemed culturally base by the mainstream; therefore, 
the deliberate embracing of such genres implies a rejection of supposed elite culture. 
It is also worth pointing out that, a few negligible forays into pop music 
notwithstanding, populist music is not the same thing as mass or mainstream music, 
which is often perceived as decadent, degenerate and racially impure.
 This chapter is not intended to ascribe or justify the class identities of 
particular genres of popular music; rather, it investigates how these associations are 
adopted, adapted and rejected in the music of the extreme right, particularly in the 
ideology surrounding this music. It should also be noted that mere association is not 
necessarily the sole component of populist music. Class belonging is emphasised 
through attacks on outsiders, with hostility  particularly directed towards elite groups 
and the middle class. 
 While populist rhetoric and language have been cited in analyses of political 
manifestations of the extreme right, it is not a concept that  has been explored with 
regard to music (although the association of extreme-right music with particular 
class-based values has been recognised to an extent). This is in spite of the 
significance that class narratives have to the understanding and justification of much 
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of the material of the extreme-right music scene, and furthermore to that material 
which it  seeks to adopt. This chapter examines extreme-right music subcultures 
through the lens of populism, noting the various ways in which class is performed, 
particularly the almost ubiquitous presence of working-class values.
Populism and the Extreme Right
At various times since the 1970s, and particularly after the electoral breakthrough of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National in France in 1984, extreme-right parties in 
Western Europe have adopted a populist  approach.1 This tendency reflects the latest 
manifestation of extreme-right preoccupation, albeit varied, with class. Extreme-right 
narratives of class can generally be delineated into two varieties: a more traditional 
belief in an elite class (not necessarily corresponding with the perceived elite within 
a society) comparable to interpretations of Nietzsche’s Übermensch; and a veneration 
of the perceived values and morals of the working class, generally contrasted with 
decadence and degeneracy elsewhere in society. These need not be mutually 
exclusive, particularly given that the elevation of the working class carries with it  an 
implication of elitism—as do beliefs in racial superiority—but the ascendancy  of 
populism reflects and demonstrates a shift of emphasis from elites towards masses.
 Populism often takes the form of depicting a struggle between the common 
population and elites, and as such is used to attack the political classes as being out 
of touch. While it has strong connections with right-wing rhetoric, it is just as likely 
to be found on the far left, and even mainstream political parties use populist 
language when it suits their purpose. Indeed, John Lukacs argues that for a 
significant period, a general right-wing fear of popular sovereignty meant that 
populism was essentially a left-wing phenomenon, although no longer.2  But while 
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populism as a style is therefore not confined to any one political persuasion, it is a 
core tool of huge significance to most contemporary extreme-right movements.
 Political scientist Roger Eatwell considers four features to be central to 
populism:
First, populists claim to represent  the true will of the people, which is failing to 
be heard.… Second, populists are anti-Establishment, portraying parties and 
especially elite politicians as distant and often corrupt.… [A] linked third trait 
[is] the tendency to use “low” rather than “high” concepts, language and style. 
Fourth, populist  movements tend to produce charismatic leaders, who portray 
themselves as the embodiment of what people really think.3
Clearly, each of these features has a musical parallel. The true will of the people 
might represent the true musical “character” of the people, which extreme-right 
supporters often claim is suppressed in favour of multiculturalist  propaganda. The 
anti-elitism of populism is certainly mirrored in the hostility towards the mainstream 
“establishment” of the music industry, although it is interesting to note the narratives 
of elitism which surround much of the discussion of racialised music. The 
charismatic leaders of populism could have their equals in the relative musical 
celebrities of extreme-right music, particularly Ian Stuart Donaldson. Perhaps most 
evident, however, is the tendency to use “low” language and style, particularly in the 
espousing of genres and lyrics which are considered crude and base by  the 
mainstream. These features will recur throughout the following discussion of class 
and music, but it  is worth taking a moment to articulate the significance of class in 
extreme-right ideologies.
Economic and Cultural Class in Extreme-Right Ideology
Extreme-right class rhetoric can be delineated into economic and cultural ideologies. 
The economic rendering of class is used to appeal to the economic insecurity  of 
active and potential supporters, being offered as evidence of the active oppression of 
the white race by conspiratorial Others. The conspiracy has a number of 
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manifestations, such as the supremacist notion of ZOG keeping the innate greatness 
of the white race down, or the belief that political elites allowed mass immigration 
for their own ends, and in so doing decreased the employment prospects of the 
“indigenous” population. This rhetoric of class is an appeal to people’s pockets, with 
the suggestion that the adoption of extreme-right policies will lead to increased 
prosperity.
 While economic class acts as evidence to support extreme-right conspiracies, 
the use of class identities by  the extreme right does not necessarily reflect strict 
demographics within the movement. Economically speaking, the success of some 
extreme-right musical ventures has relatively enriched those behind them, while 
others have supported the movement with wealth earned elsewhere.4  Culturally 
speaking, some prominent figures in the extreme right have graduated from—and 
even been employed by—universities, despite these institutions being generally cast 
as strongholds of elitism and Marxist  thought. Indeed, extreme-right movements 
have attempted to enter into campuses and university  life by actively  courting the 
student population: in Britain, the National Culturists plan to target students 
specifically,5 while there is a history of white student unions in the United States 
linked to extreme-right movements, most recently at Towson University in Maryland 
in 2012.6  So while research shows that, broadly speaking, extreme-right supporters 
come from positions of economic insecurity, it is clear that not all extreme-right 
supporters fit easily into particular socioeconomic categories.
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 As well as an indication of economic status, class also acts as a cultural 
marker, a shorthand for a particular set of values and a particular code of morality. 
The hierarchical arrangement of “high” and “low” culture is the most obvious 
ascription of value to taste, but it is not a straightforward division:
For its proponents, the origins of this division lie in the religious ideas of the 
spiritual ascent  from the earthly to the heavenly. In this model, the low is 
confined to the physical and material conditions of our animal existence, 
whereas the high is concerned with the spiritual. The low is mortal and 
ephemeral, whereas the high is immortal and eternal. For its opponents, on the 
other hand, the metaphor maps directly onto class divisions that  embody 
hierarchies of social power. Low culture is that  of the oppressed, and high 
culture that of the oppressors.7
The latter equation of cultural hierarchy with class division is fundamental to Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital, for which he argues that culture plays a 
significant part in the ordering of class relationships, and in the reproduction of these 
relationships over time.8  This approach allows for an understanding of class more 
focused on value and culture than economic wealth and status, but there are problems 
with Bourdieu’s analysis; perhaps most relevant from a musical perspective is that 
while research has shown that education and social status can be broadly  related to 
taste, there is also evidence that musical listeners are becoming more “omnivorous”9 
and therefore more likely to have a wide variety of listening tastes.
 Nevertheless, while it is problematic to make class categorisations on the 
basis of taste, the “high/low” distinctions made between certain genres reveal the 
significance of notions of class that are tied to the genres themselves. In other words, 
class identities in music may not reveal anything definite about the listener (or the 
musician), but they do say  something important about the genre. In this regard, the 
deliberate adoption and espousal of genres characterised as “lowbrow” or “base,” 
alongside the general rejection of the traditionalist wing’s high culture or elitist 
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focus, demonstrates the extreme-right preoccupation with identifying with the 
“ordinary” people and their “lowbrow” culture. Even so, the narratives of populism 
can also carry strong connotations of elitism within their espousal of the lowbrow.
Making Elitism Racial
The ideology  of white supremacism clearly constructs a racial hierarchy  which is 
deemed to be more relevant than intra-racial class divides. At times, such white 
supremacism is justified through equation with highbrow forms. One of the “sticky 
threads”10 on Stormfront is a plea for others to listen to more classical music, which 
is viewed as proof of white supremacy:
I want  to challenge everyone to listen to more classical music. It is the best 
music ever made by the most  talented musicians ever to walk the earth. The 
more you listen to it, the more you understand that such beauty, such majesty, 
can only be the work of white [sic] FOR WHITES. The masters, Mozart, Bach, 
Beethoven, Tchaikovsky, Wagner, Vivaldi (to name but  a few). These men were 
on a level of godlike inspiration that no other race has ever produced an equal. 
This music is so timeless, breathtaking, and spiritual, that it will live on forever 
as the theme, the anthem, of the white race. Only if we fail to insure [sic] the 
survival of our white race will the beauty of classical music disappear from the 
universe. We need to make “being white” not  only popular and cool again, but 
we need to make “being white” POWERFUL again. Listening to the classics 
FORCES you to be white. It promotes cultivation, wisdom, civilization, honor, 
nobility, tranquility, refinement, manners, pride, struggle, peace, and glory. No 
other music can do this. When you listen to the classics, you are taking part  in a 
honorable and noble tradition of being white.… Remember the Third Riech 
[sic] and Richard Wagner. This is OUR MUSIC and we can build an empire 
with it.11
Here, the highbrow nature of classical music—as well as its promotion of civilisation 
and refinement—is equated with race, rather than with a particular economic 
stratum.
 The racial application of elite taste is not an innovation; the terms “highbrow” 
and “lowbrow” were derived from the skull-measuring practice of phrenology, and in 
particular the distinction of “Anglo-Saxon” superiority over other whites and non-
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whites.12 Karl Hagstrom Miller’s description of the use of classical music in a similar 
supremacist manner in the USA a century  ago mirrors the intentions of the 
contemporary extreme right:
Opera and orchestral music may have epitomized upper-class refinement, but 
they also came to signify white cultural supremacy in an era characterized by 
the racial violence of lynching and Jim Crow segregation, as well as by the 
growing fear that white children were, in the words of an influential editorial in 
1913, “falling prey to the collective soul of the negro through the influence of 
what is popularly known as ‘rag time’ music.”13
This long history of regarding classical music as “white” is reproduced in extreme-
right ideology, conflating a number of assumptions about race and class.
 Similar narratives of elitism surround folk music, narratives which are 
embedded in the history  of the genre. As Matthew Gelbart has shown, the concept of 
folk music arose around the same time as that of classical or art music in the 
eighteenth century (marking a shift from the categorisation of music by social 
function), and was driven by the nationalist and Romantic projects of the nineteenth 
century.14 The concept of “the folk” was flavoured by  Herder’s argument that it was 
from the common people that the character of a nation could be divined, and an 
interpretation of Rousseau which led to the concept of the “noble savage,” the idea 
that mankind was at  its purest and best in the state closest to nature. Both of these 
ideas looked to the rural “folk” as the last remnants of a purer state of humanity, 
before the advancement of societal hierarchies and industrialisation.
 Even though many followers of these thinkers recognised folk as a legitimate 
art form in its own right, there were some who attempted to reconcile the idealised 
ideology of folk with its position in the lower strata of society. Even some who 
recognised artistic qualities in folk music sought to dissociate it from its working-
class origins. At the beginning of the 20th-century  there was a school of thought 
178
12  Lawrence Levine, Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988, pp.221-222.
13 Karl Hagstrom Miller, Segregating Sound: Inventing Folk and Pop Music in the Age of Jim Crow, 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2010, pp.163-164.
14  Matthew Gelbart, The Invention of “Folk Music” and “Art Music”: Emerging Categories from 
Ossian to Wagner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.6-9.
typified by  John Robert Moore, who believed that the folk “are unable to create 
anything equal to the songs which they have received,”15  essentially casting the 
“folk” as vessels, incapable of the creativity  demonstrated in the material they 
possessed. In a similar vein, the influential American folklorist William Wells Newell 
argued that  the folk preserved rather than created, and that  existing music was the 
result of a previous era in which the “best minds” concerned themselves with their 
composition.16
 This elitist doctrine achieved its fullest  expression in the work of Hans 
Naumann, who in 1922 proposed the concept of gesunkenes Kulturgut, literally 
sunken cultural materials. Naumann believed that  folklore originated among the 
Oberschicht or upper stratum of society, and was then imitated and corrupted by  the 
unsophisticated Unterschicht or lower class. The reproductions of the Unterschicht 
were degenerate imitations, representing the ignorant and debased nature of the 
lower classes.17  The ideas of Naumann and his contemporaries were later 
incorporated into the Nazi ideology of the master race, with Naumann himself a 
member of the party.
 Similar ideology was evident in Britain. Cecil Sharp, the figurehead of the 
first folk revival, saw folk song as “the heritage … of the Arian [sic] race” and in 
opposition to “our system of education [which] is, at present, too cosmopolitan.”18 
Sharp has been accused of taking a similar view to Naumann, wishing to preserve 
folk culture for middle-class edification, while salvaging it from the perceived 
brutalities of its working-class practitioners. The attitudes of collectors towards their 
musical informers were also less than enlightened; Sharp, for instance, thought he 
179
15 Georgina Boyes, ‘New Directions—Old Destinations: A Consideration of the Role of the Tradition-
Bearer in Folksong Research,’ in Ian Russell (ed.), Singer, Song and Scholar, Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press,1986, p.10.
16 Karl Hagstrom Miller, Segregating Sound: Inventing Folk and Pop Music in the Age of Jim Crow, 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2010, p.92.
17  Hasan El-Shamy, ‘Gesunkenes Kulturgut’, in Thomas Green (ed.), Folklore: An Encyclopedia of 
Beliefs, Customs, Tales, Music and Art (Vol.1), Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1997, pp.419-422.
18 Michael Brocken, The British Folk Revival: 1944-2002. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p.9.
was saving folksongs not only for posterity, but from the barbarities and incivilities 
of those who performed them.
 As Sharp’s integration of Aryanism and anti-cosmopolitanism into his 
argument demonstrates, the rhetoric of folk “purity” had racial implications, and 
members of Sharp’s circle were associated with Rolf Gardiner, a prominent  British 
fascist.19  Even the way the history of the Folk Revival is told has hints of the 
authoritarian principles behind fascism: the activities of a few collectors are 
privileged over the activities of the many thousands involved in the movement.20 The 
elevation of these chosen few—practically all men—above the masses from which 
they  draw their esteem has echoes of Nietzsche’s idea of the Übermensch or 
Superman, who would rise above the herd of ordinary  men, overcoming nihilism to 
re-establish a more spiritual community (ideas which were famously  influential on 
Nazi ideology). While it  is overly  simplistic to suggest that folk music in general, or 
the original Folk Revival in particular, is Fascist or extreme-right in nature, both 
certainly had the potential to be interpreted in such a way by inclined individuals.
 It is difficult to know how significant these elitist narratives surrounding folk 
music have been in influencing extreme-right appropriation, particularly  since folk 
music is also associated with working-class values (see below). What is certain is 
that folk music has taken on a significant role in the cultural activity of the extreme 
right, and that aspects of the cultural elitism that have characterised some ideologies 
of folk are mirrored by racial elitism in folk’s use by the extreme right.
 The elitist narratives surrounding certain musics often coincide with a low 
opinion of other musical styles and genres, and many on the extreme right view 
highbrow and lowbrow genres as working in opposition, as appealing to distinct 
audiences. Take, for example, the plan for a Europe-wide radio network outlined by 
Nick Griffin to an undercover journalist:
180
19  Georgina Boyes, The Imagined Village: Culture,  ideology and the English Folk Revival. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, pp.154-164.
20 Boyes, The Imagined Village, xii.
The aim should be something like three one-hour evening slots. One would be 
aimed at  a more cultural audience—folk music with a few classical pieces, 
poetry and some politically incorrect literature readings. The second would be 
based on more mainstream, commercial sounding, melodic rock. The third 
would play the kind of music still more popular among the independent base of 
the whole White Power music scene—skinhead Oi! music and heavy metal.21
Griffin is clearly hoping to reach out to all classes, but in explicitly targeting a “more 
cultural audience” he regards certain musical tastes as being segregated along class 
lines.
 Griffin hoped to harness the economic and political support of skinheads 
partly through this radio network, but his opinion of them was that they were 
“scum.”22  William Pierce revealed a similarly low opinion while justifying the 
National Alliance moving into popular music, implying that current members belong 
on a higher plane than the “millions of White Americans” who are used to such 
music.23  Pierce’s position is reminiscent  of David Lane’s statement expressing 
bemused joy  at  the success of “White Power” bands, since his own taste is for 
classical music; both seem keen to point out that while such music can serve a useful 
purpose for the political cause, they are above such things themselves. Clearly then 
there is still some tension between different factions of the extreme right along class 
lines,24  but as the following discussion shows, the musical culture of the extreme 
right is overwhelmingly of a populist nature.
Representing the “Ordinary”
Many of the genres which are particularly  significant within extreme-right  music 
have strong class connotations, and the majority  of these associations are with 
particular aspects of working-class culture. Oi!, the foundational genre of the current 
extreme-right music scene, stemmed from punk, which is itself generally 
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characterised as a reaction against  the elaborate and pretentious musical styles of the 
time, particularly prog rock, as well as the commercial nature of the music industry. 
Immediately, this origin story sets up a class conflict, or at least an aesthetic one, 
between the simplistic and apparently democratic DIY (do-it-yourself) of punk and 
the established, hierarchical, elite music industry.
 While punk has been described as a youth cult, it has also been characterised 
as having a class dimension, particularly in its supposed expression of street  culture. 
For sympathetic left-wing ideologues, punk was a youth- and class-based political 
expression on left-wing lines, an interpretation predicated on the music being an 
accurate reflection of young working-class life, as Simon Frith has explained.25 As 
Frith suggests, there was a significant element of opportunism in this position, 
especially since exceptions, such as racist skinhead fans or bands, were either 
ignored or dismissed as not in keeping with the true spirit of punk. This opportunism 
is reflected by the extreme-right appropriation of Oi!. Just as left-wing organisations, 
particularly Rock Against Racism, were somewhat successful in associating punk in 
general with left-wing politics, the extreme right was successful in appropriating Oi! 
for its own cause. Because of the class associations the genre already  had, this 
appropriation necessarily entailed a class dimension.
 Although folk music has elitist connotations, as explored above, it also has 
historical associations with the idea of “ordinary” people and everyday  life. While 
the first  Folk Revival contained elements of politics, often conservative, the second 
Revival was much more obvious in its political aspirations, which were 
overwhelmingly  of the left.26  The extent to which this is so is demonstrated by  a 
distinction within the NF in the 1980s, in which “Traditional folk was acceptable 
because of its origins in some (mythical) British past; modern folk was unacceptable 
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because it purveyed ‘boring neo-marxist ideas.’”27  During this period, folk was 
frequently and loudly proclaimed by the left to be the domain of the working class, 
setting up an ideology of authenticity in which the music belongs to the working 
class, clearly in contrast to the idea that folk music needs to be saved from them.
 Country music has been said to embrace “a key Romantic mythology  of the 
sacredness of the folkloric ordinary,”28 in a way that sees it serve as an American folk 
music. Some histories would mistakenly have country as an authentically white 
music evolving outside of mainstream popular culture, while even those who 
acknowledge outside influences still emphasise the folk origins of the music:
Commercial country music developed out of the folk culture of the rural South. 
Although it has absorbed styles, songs, instruments, and influences from a 
multitude of nonwhite and noncountry sources, the music has been created and 
disseminated largely by rural dwellers within the mainstream of the white 
Protestant Anglo-Celtic tradition.29
As well as this association with folk purity, country music is strongly  associated with 
the working class, both in its demographics and in its values.
 As the examples of Oi!, country and folk demonstrate, many of the genres 
found in extreme-right  music have pre-existing associations with working-class 
culture. Indeed, the growing popularity  of metal—which has its origins in working-
class Birmingham, as well as an audience that was, at least in its early days, white, 
male and working class30—provides another example of this association, although 
arguably the class identity is less significant to the conception of metal as a genre. It 
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is not my intention to analyse the class association of these genres here,31 but it is 
worth pointing out that the use of these genres is combined, albeit to a limited extent, 
with hostility towards the middle class and the bourgeoisie.
Hostility to the Class Outsider
Part of the construction of the working-class identity of these genres involved 
articulating the inauthentic nature of other genres. This was a particularly important 
component of Oi!, which was in large part considered to be in opposition to the 
middle class punk mainstream:
[P]unk was never any spontaneous street rebellion made good, as the myths 
would have it. More like a weekend exercise in shock, courtesy of the oh so 
trendy fashion and art  colleges. And all this a million miles away from the 
snotty nosed kids in their snorkel coats, too busy booting a ball around a 
sprawling council estate to lead the charge of the punk brigade.32
The view that punk in general is not properly  working class is probably  predicated on 
the term’s nebulous nature, being applied to a variety of disparate bands. Some 
musicians did have links to art schools and hippy culture, while Joe Strummer of The 
Clash was revealed to be a public-school-educated son of a diplomat.33  Such 
examples were at odds with punk’s rhetoric of representing the sound of working-
class street culture, and left it open to accusations of being merely an art-school pose.
 Being working class was, apparently in contrast, an integral aspect of 
skinhead culture and identity. One of the most bellicose expressions of this class 
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identity  was through hostility towards those perceived as middle-class; the early 
skinhead subculture was particularly belligerent towards hippy culture, a hostility 
which Murray Healy argues is partially motivated by gender ideology and the 
valuing of the protestant work ethic:
In the late nineteenth century, effeminacy was associated with the idle 
aristocracy, objectionable on the grounds that  it was a symptom of excessive 
cross-gender attachment which resulted in the disorder of men’s “natural” 
mastery over women.… This utilitarian gendering of class is still evident  in the 
skinheads’ puritan endorsement  of the work ethic and repudiation of lazy 
middle-class hippies.34
While hippies, whose perceived laziness was contrasted with the virtuous work ethic 
of the working class, were significant early enemies for the skinheads, the same 
arguments could be made against various other subcultures, including, eventually, 
“art-school” punks.
 Skinhead distaste for punk seemingly also had a political aspect, particularly 
from the skinheads aligned with extreme-right ideology. Extreme-right biographies 
of Ian Stuart Donaldson claim that Skrewdriver, who had started as a punk band, 
became alienated from it not only  because of its “hijacking” by the middle class, but 
also because it was perceived as becoming more and more left-wing, in no small part 
thanks to the pressure of the “Marxist” music press.35  Oi! was thus asserted as a 
symbol of authentic working-class culture, while rival claims to represent the 
working class musically  were dismissed as middle-class falsehoods. Conveniently, 
Oi!’s representation of the working class—at least that which was “authentic” Oi!—
also corresponded with extreme-right ideology.
 Brutal Attack’s ‘Middle Class Fools’ (Stronger Than Before, Rock-O-Rama, 
1986) is based on the undermining role the middle class plays, while partly outlining 
a revenge fantasy over a repetitive three-chord backing:
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Middle class fool, I judge you;
And as the boot comes down what you gonna do?
You’d better run and hide, and stay away;
To see you in a cell would really make my day.
[chorus]
So tell me how can I win?
Show me where I should begin;
Can’t take no more of their rules;
Can’t listen to these middle class fools.
One other remarkable instance of class politics is found in Ian Stuart Donaldson’s 
cover of Elvis Presley’s ‘In the Ghetto’ (No Turning Back, Rock-O-Rama, 1989), in 
which each occurrence of the chorus line “In the Ghetto” is followed by “White 
Ghettos.” Less flattering lyrics are also changed; “he learns to steal” becomes “he 
learns white pride,” “he steals a car” becomes “he drives his car” and “he tries to 
run” is changed to “he orders his life.” An outro is also added:
And his mother cries;
White pride;
And his mother cries;
White Pride.
The song is not discussed in the biographies of Donaldson, nor seemingly on 
messageboards, perhaps because the point of the cover is hard to discern. It is 
possible that Donaldson is insisting that the poverty  of the ghettos is also felt  by 
whites, while the elimination of the lyrics regarding stealing suggests that whites 
deal with the circumstances of poverty  in a virtuous way. The insertion of white pride 
is ambiguous, since it seems to offer no redemption for the song’s subject.
 Overwhelmingly, class hostility  is aimed towards “elites,” generally 
characterised as rich capitalists or corrupt politicians. Both of these groups can take 
on supposedly racial characteristics, particularly in their conflation with Judaism, but 
this is not absolute; for example, Blue Eyed Devils’ ‘Total War’ (Holocaust 2000, 
Tri-State Terror, 1998):
Take the so-called lawmakers and put them against the wall;
No mercy for the enemy, I don’t care if they are white;
Because they have my skin colour doesn’t make their actions right;
…
Class war, total fucking war.
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Bound For Glory’s ‘Fall of the Tyrants’ (Over the Top, Rock-O-Rama, 1992) 
combines hostility towards capitalism with a promise of revolution:
Living for pleasure whatever the measure, only caring about your own wealth;
Enslaving the people to support your own evil, you don't care about your nation’s health;
But now the people have risen, they’ve made a decision, revolution it will start tonight;
To take back the gold that they once had stole and return it to the people’s right.
This hostility  towards organised capital must still reconcile with extreme hostility 
towards Marxist ideals, something which is confusingly conflated in Skrewdriver’s 
‘Blood and Honour’ (Blood & Honour, Rock-O-Rama, 1985):
Marxists’ greedy hands around our throats;
Bankers buying up your lives and sitting back to gloat.
Frequently, Marxism is dismissed as a deceptive plot designed to keep the white 
working class down, and thus it is a deceptive and inauthentic representation of 
working-class values. In contrast, the extreme right sets itself up as the true 
embodiment of the working class, so long as it is white.
 Hostility towards elites is therefore frequently contrasted with valourisation 
of the working class, expressed here in Bound For Glory’s ‘Eternal Flame’ (When the 
Hammer Falls, Rock-O-Rama, 1991):
The poor get poorer and the rich get richer, while sitting on their ass;
It wasn't them who built this country, it was the White working class.
Final War’s ‘Pride and Tradition’ (Glory Unending, Panzerfaust, 2002), meanwhile, 
asserts that, although the white working class is defamed, it is still strong:
Respected members of the working class;
Paying our taxes and busting our ass;
We’re the ones who always get the blame;
But we stand proud and we have no shame.
Hostility towards political elites, particularly because of their perceived betrayal of 
their people, is a significant presence in softer material as well, such as in ‘Nothing 
Bloody Works’ (West Wind, Great White Records, 2007), which emphasises the 
BNP’s claim to represent “decent” society  in a country that has lost its integrity  and 
values because of corrupt politicians:
I went looking for a phonebox to try and call a friend;
And one that wasn’t vandalised, I found one in the end;
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192 had been abolished so I tried elsewhere instead;
But I couldn’t understand a word the man from Delhi said.
[chorus]
It’s Blair’s new Britain and nothing bloody works;
It’s Blair’s new Britain and his wife grabs all the perks;
It’s Blair’s new Britain moving jobs across the sea;
Nothing left behind for you and me.
Despite the presence of class rhetoric, class is not as significant a subject of extreme-
right music as race and culture. However, while class may  appear to be of secondary 
importance in the lyrical content of extreme-right material, it is possible that the very 
sound of extreme-right music transmits a message about class and lifestyle.
The Sound of the Street
The vocal style of Oi! is often compared to football chanting, with football fans 
strongly associated with casual violence and racism at the time of the genre’s rise. As 
John Clarke notes:
Football, and especially the violence articulated around it … provided one arena 
for the expression of the Skinheads’ concern with a particular, collective, 
masculine self conception, involving an identification of masculinity with 
physical toughness, and an unwillingness to back down in the face of “trouble.” 
The violence also involved the Mobs’ stress on collective solidarity and mutual 
support in times of “need.”36
In a sense this made the extreme right  the perfect  home for the skinheads, with the 
British National Front having visible support within football “casual” groups. The 
association was strong enough for a regular column on football hooliganism to be 
included in the British version of Blood & Honour, with the singer of Rage & Fury 
asserting that “football is all about the white working class.”37
 Two further points about the vocal delivery  of Oi! seem pertinent here. First, 
the intensity and anger with which the vocals are delivered, often bordering on an 
amelodic shout, suggest that the white working class is not otherwise being heard. 
Secondly, this vocal style carries the potential for mass participation, requiring 
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minimal vocal range or musical skill. This means not only that audiences can easily 
join in, but also that vocal ability—other than perhaps volume—is not necessarily  a 
prerequisite for becoming a singer in a band.
 A similar musical simplicity 38 is evident in the lineup of Oi! bands, which 
were linked together by instrumentation—a ‘traditional’ guitar, bass, drums and 
vocalist setup—with musical skill not held in high regard. Harmonically, songs often 
stuck to the three chord formula associated with punk, while structurally  there was 
little deviation from the verse-chorus form. The basic nature of Oi!’s sound was in 
keeping with the genre’s ideological hostility  towards artifice, pretension and 
virtuosity, while presenting its simplicity as authenticity.
 Similar ideologies of authenticity  permeate other genres, and are particularly 
significant to country music. Consider the following description of the characteristics 
of country music songs:
(1) they are sung by artists without  formal musical training, who claim to come 
from working-class, southern roots; (2) they are sung in a southern, ‘twangy’ 
accent, using a nasal tone (as opposed to the cultivated bel canto sound taught in 
conservatories in Europe and North America); (3) they are accompanied by 
string instruments, especially the fiddle and/or steel guitar; (4) they are sung in 
verse-chorus-bridge form; (5) they feature lyrics that tell stories about  ordinary 
life which are often funny or tragic; (6) they use regular meter and simple tonal 
harmonies (often just I-IV-V); (7) they are marked by a transparent  texture, in 
order to ensure that words can be clearly understood at all times; and (8) they 
celebrate rural life and document the difficulties faced by working-class 
people.39
Clearly, each of these features emphasises country values of simplicity and 
authenticity; cultivated singing, formal training, complex arrangements and harmonic 
structures, lyrical subjects beyond the everyday, and layered arrangements are all 
rejected. Indeed, not only are they  rejected, but the opposites are embraced, with 
country music setting itself up as the opposite of elite culture.
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 Country music is notable in that the themes expressed in its lyrics often 
address the “ordinary” lives of its (predominantly white) working-class audience. 
Alongside hip-hop, country  is therefore one of the most prominent genres which “is 
significantly defined by the thematization of a class experience as well as the 
associative sounding of it,”40 even if the realities of commercial radio play  suggest 
that the genre is much more apolitical than its reputation suggests.41 It is not only the 
words themselves, however, that  transmit political and class ideologies; the sound of 
the music itself makes a significant statement.
Voice, accent and lyrics
A major component of the communicative potential in popular music is in the voice 
of the singer, but not only in terms of the lyrics that are sung. At a fundamental level, 
the voice conveys certain characteristics of the singer, such as gender—although 
these cannot necessarily be inferred with absolute certainty. Frith writes that the 
“pop” voice is heard as “personally expressive … in a way that a classical singer, 
even a dramatic and ‘tragic’ star like Maria Callas, is not.” The “pop” singer’s 
singing is heard to convey  their inner self, in contrast to the classical singer whose 
expression is generally thought to be determined by the score.42
 An important component of the singer’s perceived personality is the accent, 
which, although accents can be imitated, flattened and adopted, is seen as an 
indicator of social class. Given the dominant nature of American singers in popular 
music, particularly  in its early development, the American accent became pervasive, 
even among non-American musicians. In this context, Dave Laing writes that punk’s 
rejection of Americanisation was very much influenced by:
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[David Bowie’s] example of a vocal accent that  had not been imported from 
America. This was an essential element for that strand in punk rock that leant 
towards the autobiographical rather than dramatized: “We sing in English, not 
mimicking some American rock singer’s accent. That’s just pretending to be 
something you ain’t,” said Joe Strummer of The Clash.43
In non-American countries,44 the use of the American accent generally signifies one 
of two things: either the singer is an American, and therefore active in the 
suppression of “indigenous” talent; or the accent has been adopted, representing not 
only the singer’s rejection of their heritage but an artifice, in contrast to the extreme-
right’s stated valuing of plain-speaking and authenticity.45
 Rosenthal and Flacks make a similar argument about the non-literal 
communicative properties of the singing voice:
The form of the lyrics may also make a statement beyond anything those lyrics 
say. This is perhaps most obvious when singers speak in a language or accent 
that has traditionally been devalued, as when artists in colonized countries begin 
writing in their own languages instead of the mother country’s tongue, or punks 
sing in working-class accents. Here an artist  could write “nonsense” lyrics and 
still project a clear meaning: I am not ashamed of this language, this accent.46
As Rosenthal and Flacks point out, the language used can convey something in a 
similar manner to accent. In the extreme-right music scene, there are varying 
approaches to language, suggesting alternative significances of language itself. 
English is obviously the language used in the United Kingdom and the United States, 
and an integral characteristic of the identification of the “native” populace. In 
Germany, the overwhelming majority of bands sing in their native language; even 
when popular bands such as Landser release English-language albums to improve 
their standing in the international market, these are translations of music originally in 
German, with the Germanic releases their prime focus. 
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 However, in Sweden, musicians are much more split in their use of Swedish 
and English, to the extent that individual bands and musicians will include both 
English- and Swedish-language songs on the same release. Particular approaches can 
be a case of conforming to a particular ideology, can evolve over time or be adapted 
for particular circumstances. For instance, Saga’s vocals for Midgård’s Pro Patria III 
(Midgård Records, 2003) were entirely in Swedish which is clearly in keeping with 
the album’s intention to convey and appeal to a particular notion of Swedishness (the 
album cover uses the colours of the flag—as well as images of the flag itself—
alongside other visual tropes of Sweden); Saga’s other work, clearly  intended for a 
more international audience, is exclusively in English. Ultima Thule’s almost 
exclusive use of Swedish fits with their self-identification as a patriotic, nationalist 
band, rather than a racist (or racialist) one. Elsewhere, bands switch between English 
and Swedish with no particular consistency; Dirlewanger are a prominent example of 
a band which splits between English and Swedish.
 It seems, therefore, that Swedish musicians are generally less concerned with 
speaking to their own populace; this may be because they conceive of extreme-right 
politics as an international phenomenon, or merely  a reflection of the economic 
reality  of making music in a relatively  small country like Sweden, and it is 
undoubtedly helped by the advanced proficiency of English amongst the Swedish 
population.47  However, it is also a fair reflection of practice in other countries, 
particularly from the emerging scene in the former USSR, where bands are more 
likely to include at least some English-language material.
 In terms of the lyrics themselves, there are linguistic tendencies that 
emphasise the personal and collective nature of extreme-right ideology. Rosenthal 
and Flacks write that:
In any language, use of the first person plural (‘we’) includes listeners in a way 
that using the first person singular (‘I’) or addressing a particular person by 
using the second person (‘you’) does not.48
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Of course, extreme-right music has no monopoly on first- and second-person 
personal pronouns, but the way they are employed is obviously influenced by the 
political motivations of the extreme right. Often, this entails the description of a 
community  which will bring about political change, although at times it can take the 
form of chastisement. The latter is demonstrated by Skrewdriver’s ‘White 
Power’ (Single, 1983, White Noise quoted in Chapter One, p.90), which describes 
the responsibility this community  holds for the degradation of its country, while 
distinguishing between the “them” who are sending the country down the drain, and 
the “we” who let it happen. However, while some songs portray  a sense of collective 
responsibility such as this, often those held responsible for the oppression or 
degradation of the white race are not regarded as part of the collective; rather, the 
collective has been betrayed by  race traitors, as in Angry Aryans’ ‘Joe 6-
Pack’ (Racially Motivated Violence, Resistance Records, 2002):
Self-centred whitey, all you care for is you;
Six pack in your grip, by-product of the Jew;
…
Sold out your pride for a six pack;
…
Lazy whites, self destruction;
Lazy whites, liberal corruption;
Lazy whites, drug addiction;
Lazy whites, fatal condition.
And similarly in Aggressive Force’s ‘Closet Coward’ (Aggressive Force, Panzerfaust, 
2000):
I try to talk to you, but you’re ignorant still;
You live your life with your head in the sand;
You can’t stand up, you’re not a man;
…
You’re a closet coward, you’re one of a kind;
You don’t speak your views, you don’t speak your mind;
You sit and let the world pass by;
Never say a word, you’re living a lie.
And again in Saga’s ‘Hypocrite’ (On My Own, Midgård Records, 2007):
You complain about immigration, you really make me sick;
It was your vote that opened the border you filthy hypocrite;
You say one thing but do another, just how weak can one man be?
You’re the reason for our misery, so blame yourself and don’t blame me.
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[chorus]
You’re the one, the one to blame;
People like you cause us pain;
You’re the one, the one to blame;
Start to act, but use your brain.
These examples demonstrate the common, albeit not universal, difference in the 
usage of “we” and “you,” with the latter being accusatory and castigating. The 
collective is more often portrayed as the body with the potential of effecting real and 
positive change, as in Bound for Glory’s ‘Never Again!’ (Never Again, Thor 
Records, 1997) (which also places the blame on others as “you”):
Truth is our weapon, faith is our defence;
Let the cry of freedom ring as we climb over the fence;
Remember the fallen, and the lives they had gave;
Standing against your tanks vowing never to be slaves.
[chorus]
Never again will your tanks roll through;
Never again, to be sold out by a chosen few;
Never again will you rape the motherland;
Never again, your demise lies in our hands.
Unsurprisingly, this collective will use its strength to bring about a new age, as in 
Landser’s ‘Das Reich kommt wieder’ (Das Reich kommt wieder, Wotan Records, 
1992):
We know we shall win;
All others will fly out of here;
You see our flags, you hear our songs;
This state is going under and the Reich will rise again.49
As well as imagining a community through the frequent use of “we” and “us,” 
singers also emphasise their own involvement and investment in extreme-right 
politics. Rahowa’s ‘Ode to a Dying People’ (Cult of the Holy War, 1995, Resistance 
Records), offering a very pessimistic perspective, indicates the narrator’s pain at the 
apparent fall of his race:
Disease encroaching on all I hold dear;
Somehow I got to get my soul out of here;
Heart of agony, faint burning hope;
I'm finding it hard to try to cope.
[chorus]
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49 Wir wissen wir werden siegen; Ganz andere werden hier raus fliegen; Seht ihr uns're Fahnen, hört 
ihr uns're Lieder; Dieser Staat geht unter und das Reich kommt wieder.
If this is the way it ends, if this is the way my race ends;
If this is the way it ends, I can't bear to witness.
Kara’s ‘Here and Now’ (Under a Fading Moon, Brotherhood Records, 2007), 
meanwhile, is an offer of salvation, which notably accommodates “you” into “we”:
The anger, it swells deep in my gut;
As they chop and change and cut;
I want so much to open your eyes;
I need you to see their lies;
…
Take my hand, knot your fingers through mine;
Walk with me, leave the darkness behind;
Every minute from this minute now;
We’ll do what we like anyhow.
Singers therefore position themselves as part of the collective by emphasising their 
investment and involvement in the extreme-right cause, but they also cast themselves 
as selfless and inspirational, capable of guiding others onto the right path.
 One other notable aspect of extreme-right lyrics is the frequency with which 
explicit  and racist language is employed. The use of such language by  the broader 
extreme right is more variable, with websites such as Stormfront banning racial 
epithets and political parties seeking to avoid damaging controversy, but a selection 
of song titles demonstrate their prevalence in music: consider Dirlewanger’s ‘Nigger 
Season’ (Single, Rebelles Européens 1990), Midtown Bootboy’s ‘Coon 
Hunt’ (Unfinished Business, Stormfront Records, 1996), Jew Slaughter’s ‘Jew 
Slaughter Whore’ (Alcoholocaust, Micetrap Records, 2002) Racist Redneck Rebels’ 
‘Jungle Bunny’ (Keep the Hate Alive!, Micetrap  Records, 2003), Evil Incarnate’s 
‘Killer of Faggots’ (Smashing Rainbows, Fetch the Rope Records, 2007), and 
Brassic’s ‘Benders’ (Voice of Freedom, Hostile Class Productions, 2010). The chorus 
of Landser’s ‘Afrika Lied’ (Republik der Strolche, NS Records, 1995) is 
representative of the simplistic rhetoric which runs through much of this material:
Africa for apes, Europe for whites.50
Such language clearly has a vicarious nature, but it  is also in keeping with the 
extreme right’s general disdain for political correctness, and thus in line with the 
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populist ideal of embodying what the people really think—but mostly  do not dare to 
say—and the linked populist tendency to use “low” language. It  is notable that 
hostility towards florid and pretentious language, and the valuing of plain-speaking 
and “telling it like it is,” are prominent features of the genres discussed in this 
chapter.
Conclusion
The extent to which extreme-right portrayals of class identities in music reflect some 
deeper reality  of the music itself is questionable. The perceived authenticity  of 
country  music, with its apparent sincerity  and realism, ignores the importance of 
commercialism in the genre’s development.51  The particularly masculine class 
identities associated with Oi! were derived from a black subculture and musical 
styles. Narratives of folk authenticity and purity ignore the class contradictions 
within its history, as well as the influence of popular music on much of its repertoire. 
And of course, even within extreme-right narratives of particular musics there are 
class contradictions, particularly  in the use of supposedly “low” music to assert racial 
superiority.
 In addition, the preoccupation of identifying with the “ordinary” people does 
not necessarily extend to identifying with quantitively popular music. Commercially 
successful genres such as rap, dance and pop, particularly  those associated with black 
culture, are as a rule avoided by extreme-right musicians and disdained by 
supporters. Such forms are regarded as inauthentic in terms of portraying class 
culture; in extreme-right populist ideology, such mass-musical forms do not 
accurately mirror the virtues of class culture. Clearly, this is in part because the 
extreme right understands the working class in terms of its whiteness, and each of 
these genres—Oi!, country, folk—is in part valued for supposedly expressing this 
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whiteness. But while race is integral, such a class-based rhetoric, particularly  with a 
populist tendency, must be dependent on class identity.
 The populist depiction of class can be distilled to a binary creation of “us” 
and “them,” a distinction that is flexible enough to encompass, among other things, 
racial, gender, religious and class differences. Extreme-right lyrics commonly 
literally incorporate the language of “us” and “them,” of “we” and “you.” 
Furthermore, Oi!, folk and country music all have as part of their identity, or at least 
in some interpretations of their identity, a character of anti-elitism, which in turn is 
predicated on identifying with the “common man.”
 Such an attitude is a crucial component of populism, which is based on an 
anti-elitist and anti-establishment perspective. The association of these genres with 
“lowbrow” culture—even if folk arguably has a simultaneous identity  as art music—
conforms to the populist tendency to embrace “low” rather than “high” styles, just as 
the rejection of political correctness and use of explicit language represents the use 
of “low” language. This, along with the use of genres which reflect the extreme-right 
view of class cultural values rather than dominant taste, all suggest that extreme-right 
music might be referred to more accurately as “populist” rather than “popular.”
 The populist nature of extreme-right music can seem inharmonious with the 
strand of extreme-right ideology which values “high” art, particularly classical 
music, but the elitism associated with such forms is interpreted as a reflection of 
racial supremacy rather than as signifying social divisions. Thus, there is no 
ideological dissonance in embracing populist music and high art music; the former 
becomes a statement of values and a repudiation of the degenerate elements within 





Violence is in Style: Music, Masculinity and Violence
“Musical revolution spreading through the land;
Big city white boys, ready to make a stand;
Angry, tattooed, and scarred;
We're really a nasty bunch;
Stand in the way of our pride;
We'll give you the knockout punch.”
Bound For Glory, ‘Musical Terrorists’, Glory Awaits, BFG Productions, 1997.
“If you’ve read the Turner Diaries, you know the year 2000 there’ll be the 
uprising and all that, racial violence on the streets. My aim was political.
 It was to cause a racial war in this country. There’d be a backlash from the 
ethnic minorities, then all the white people will go out and vote BNP.”
David Copeland, London Nailbomber, Panorama, BBC, 30 June 2000.
“[A] great part of the present pathology of our society can be ascribed 
properly to its feminization over the past century or two, 
to its loss of its former masculine spirit and masculine character.”
William Pierce, ‘The Feminization of America’, American Dissident Voices, 2011, 
p.320.
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Typically, extreme-right movements have been dominated by  men, and particularly 
concerned with cultivating an outlook which appeals to them. Women have risen to 
positions of authority  in some extreme-right movements—most notably  Marine Le 
Pen, leader of the French Front National—but these are exceptions in an ideology 
which broadly concerns itself with the promotion of masculine interests. Each of the 
main subgroupings of the extreme right demonstrates this masculine primacy. Ferber 
argues that “[t]he central project of the contemporary white supremacist  movement is 
the articulation of a white, male identity.”1 Similarly, the composition of the militia 
movement is primarily  male, with the few women tending to be wives of male 
members.2  Even after modernisation, voting data show that extreme-right  political 
parties still appeal predominately to male voters.3
 Alongside its maleness, the extreme right is renowned for its association with 
violence. This reputation is typically associated with the men of the movement, with 
women expected to be submissive. Such gender roles are not restricted to the 
extreme right, with Spierenburg noting:
[I]n societies with pronounced notions of honor and shame, a person’s 
reputation often depends on physical bravery and a forceful response to insults.
… In almost every society, male honor is considered to be quite different from 
female honor. Men may take pride in attacking fellow men, whether they use 
this force to protect women or for other reasons. Passivity, in violent  and 
peaceful situations, is a cardinal feminine virtue.4
These ideals are, in the context  of the extreme right, a reaction to contemporary 
politics of gender equality, with the emphasis on violence to empower men who 
otherwise feel emasculated by society. There is a strong link between various 
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extreme-right groups and violence;5 this chapter explores the specific significance of 
music to this violence.
 It is beyond the scope of this research to determine whether extreme-right 
music plays a role in instigating and influencing violence, or whether pre-existing 
violent intention is merely  reflected by the music produced, but it is relevant to 
examine the various ways that music is used to create spaces in which violence can 
be imagined, valourised and enacted. This chapter demonstrates various ways in 
which music and violence interact, showing: that  violence is a core component of 
idealised masculinity  portrayed in much extreme-right music, particularly through 
the warrior image; that violence is part of musical subcultural ritual (particularly  the 
violence of skinhead gigs); that music is used to articulate hostility  towards enemies; 
that lyrics frequently  assert that violence will lead to a new dawn through an 
imagined revolution. The chapter concludes by examining some specific acts of 
violence and the extreme-right music associated with them.
Masculinity, Music and Violence
Images of warriors are central to the extreme right; not only are archetypes such as 
Vikings and Crusaders lionised, but analogies are drawn between historical struggles 
and the contemporary extreme-right movement (see Chapter Six). With this 
centrality of warrior imagery, it is not surprising that the main genres and styles 
associated with extreme-right  music cater to a sense of aggression and violence. 
These genres are essentially policed to maintain their masculinity, emphasising the 
centrality of violence in the extreme-right conception of masculine values.
 Female musicians are generally excluded from the genres associated with this 
notion of masculinity, finding success instead in genres more “appropriate” to their 
femininity, particularly  folk and more mainstream rock. This exclusion may in part 
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particularly the Anti-Defamation League (www.adl.org) and the Southern Poverty Law Center 
(www.splcenter.org) in the USA, Searchlight magazine in Great Britain, Expo magazine in Sweden 
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be predicated on the style and excessively physical nature of singing, particularly the 
“shout-along” style adopted by many Oi! and rock bands; however, it is undoubtedly 
also a result of prejudice, with the few women who have attempted to make music in 
“masculine” styles meeting with little success.
*
While concerns about music’s ability to challenge established order have been voiced 
from at least Classical antiquity,6  the academic study of the relationship  between 
music and violence has been a neglected area, although some notable work has 
emerged in recent years. Studies have previously tended to examine the amount of 
violent content in music lyrics and videos,7 and the relationship between this content 
and the attitudes towards violence of listeners,8 as well as looking broadly at claims 
that particular genres incite violence more readily than others.9 There has also been 
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some recent work examining the role of music as a weapon in itself,10  alongside 
work which considers the relationship between music and violent acts.11  As this 
study of the relationship between music and violence has increased, some broader 
theories on the subject have emerged.
 In her own proposal of a social musicology of war, Morag Grant cites the 
work of Svanibor Pettan, and his suggestion of the basic functions of music in 
wartime, comprising of:
encouragement—of those fighting on the front lines and those hiding in shelters 
alike; provocation and sometimes humiliation directed towards those seen as 
enemies; and call[s] for the involvement of those not directly endangered—
including fellow citizens, the Diaspora and the political and military decision-
makers abroad.… Music was also considered a medium in which individuals 
and groups could express their perceptions of the war—on the one hand to spark 
the zeal for military commitment and to incite support  for war efforts […] 
through glorifying patriotism, heroic individuals, battles and military units; on 
the other to mourn over the victims and devastation.12
Grant’s own model proposes three levels for analysing music in war: music at the 
moment of violence, music in the preparation of violence, and music in the reporting 
of violence. Music at the moment of violence is itself divided into three categories: 
music at the moment of violence (incorporating musical signals used on the 
battlefield), music accompanying the inflicting of violence, and music as an 
instrument of violence. Music in preparation of violence covers rituals and practices 
carried out in the run-up  to battle, and can also be extended to cover ways of coping 
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with violence’s aftermath. Music and the reporting of violence is a much broader 
category, and can involve combatants and non-combatants alike, using music in a 
variety of ways to transmit and create knowledge of violent events, and, 
significantly, distanced from the moment of violence, either temporally  or 
geographically.13  Clearly, Pettan’s and Grant’s models have something to offer in 
understanding the relationship between music and violence, although their specific 
focus on war does not incorporate the full extent of the significance of violence in 
extreme-right music. 
 In a more general discussion of the relationship between popular music and 
violence, Johnson and Cloonan propose four categories in the central chapters of 
their discussion of the topic: (1) music accompanying violence; (2) music and 
incitement to violence; (3) music and arousal to violence; and (4) music as 
violence.14 The second and third categories are distinct as:
incitement is in the music, and arousal is in the listener…. In a way that  the 
varieties of musical taste make obvious, music may incite, but fail to arouse a 
particular audience. It may also not seek to arouse violence, yet  become 
complicit in it.15
The way Johnson and Cloonan consider music as violence—as a tool to cause 
disorientation, humiliation and pain—is not generally  applicable to the use of music 
by the extreme right, being generally  restricted to states and factions engaged in 
outright hostilities,16 and is not considered further here. Otherwise, this chapter will 
demonstrate the relationship  between music and violence in the ways these scholars 
have suggested, particularly as a mode to glorify  and encourage sacrifice, to incite 
and accompany violence, and as a tool in the preparation of violence.
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Surrey: Ashgate, 2009.
15 Ibid., p.94.
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Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, and the use of music for torture in camps run by the United 
States army (Cusick, ‘“You are in a place that is out of this world…”’.)
 While I am drawing on these models in the following discussion, they  have 
primarily  been concerned with instances of music’s association with actual acts of 
violence and conflicts, therefore neglecting an important aspect of music’s 
relationship  with violence: the significance of music in violent rhetoric, in which no 
act of violence is committed.17 Clearly, threats of violence without fulfilment can be 
incorporated within “music and incitement to violence,” but this inclusion does not 
account for a topic discussed in some detail below: revenge fantasies. Extreme-right 
revenge fantasies typically describe a time to come when enemies and Others will 
face reprisal from the white population, after which a pure state can exist. These 
revenge fantasies do not necessarily incite violence (although some clearly have that 
intention); rather, they use violence as a purging framework, after which a better 
world will be established. Therefore, I propose an additional category to the models 
above: Music to imagine violence.
 The rest of this chapter explores the various ways in which music and 
violence intertwine in the extreme right and the associated music scene, and the 
specific construction of masculine identity which results. It begins with an 
examination of the importance of violence to extreme-right masculine identity—
particularly the portrayal of supporters as warriors—and the way in which this 
identity  is maintained and privileged, before turning to the extreme-right archetype, 
the skinhead, and its reputation for violence. Also crucial here is the rejection, or at 
least the underplaying, of sexual activity, with sex rarely mentioned from a positive 
perspective. This contrasts greatly  with an obsession with perceived sexual 
perversion or deviance; partly  this is predicated upon policing group  identity and 
maintaining heterosexuality (explored below in the context of the skinhead), and on 
providing a target group upon which to focus hostilities.
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Masculinity and Violence: White Warriors
Overwhelmingly, extreme-right  portrayals of masculinity emphasise militancy and 
physical capability. Political activism is constantly  characterised as a “fight” and 
supporters as warriors, in both metaphorical and literal senses. These warriors are 
seen as crucial in safeguarding the future of the race and cause, both aggressively, in 
taking the fight to enemies and Others, and protectively, in guarding against attacks. 
The centrality  of the warrior reveals much about the ideal of extreme-right 
masculinity and its component characteristics, most obviously the conflation of 
masculinity with violence and power.
 Importantly, the appetite for the image of the warrior serves to proclaim 
extreme-right rejection of what it sees as the feminising of society,18  a connection 
made explicitly  in Rebel Hell’s ‘Violence is in Style’ (Thirst For Conquest, 
Panzerfaust, 2003):
We’re tired of all the weaklings and the move to feminise;
We size them up with a rifle butt right between the eyes;
We learned our conflict resolution the old fashioned way;
Step out back, we’ll show you how just like the olden days;
[chorus]
Violence is in style, violence;
Violence is in style, violence;
Violence is in style, violence;
Violence, it’s a way of life.
We have no time for weak sisters with their limping wrists;
We’re walking tall, swaggering and standing when we piss;
We take the measure of a man by how he shoots, fights or fucks;
Not by how many deals he made at his fucking power lunch.
Rebel Hell not only reject the perceived feminisation of society (characteristically, 
this is a violent rejection), but also assert a number of qualities they hold to constitute 
masculinity. This includes some rather surprising examples, such as the notion that 
standing to urinate is a core component of masculinity, or that there is something 
essentially  different about the way  a “real” man operates a firearm. However, 
amongst these—and the rejection of feminisation—there are other recurring tropes, 
206
18  Feminisation of white men is often depicted as the result of Jewish influence; cf. Jessie Daniels, 
White Lies: Race, Class, Gender and Sexuality in White Supremacist Discourse, New York & London: 
Routledge, 1997, pp.112-113.
particularly homophobia and nostalgia for a mythic golden past. There is also, in the 
judgement of masculinity as contingent on the type of work a man does, a rejection 
of financial success as a measure of masculinity. This belief is crucial in justifying 
economic insecurity to supporters of the extreme right, an ideology which so often 
attracts those from the socioeconomic margins.19
 Interestingly, despite all the attacks on homosexuality, there is very little 
reference in extreme-right music to heterosexuality. This may be due to an unspoken 
understanding of the appropriate form of sexual desire, a belief in gentlemanly 
restraint, or the widespread opinion that  extreme-right music should not address 
themes and subjects which are generally the domain of degenerate mainstream 
popular music (in this case love and sex).
 But while extreme-right  music does not address heterosexual sex in a 
significant way, the belief in the beauty of white women is a core tenet. While this 
beauty is obviously politicised, it is also generally  subject to appreciation rather than 
the stimulation of sexual desire. For instance, in Skrewdriver’s ‘The Warrior’s 
Song’ (Warlord, Rock-O-Rama, 1989), women’s beauty is toasted in the context of 
what men are fighting for, simultaneously  emphasising the warrior characteristics 
that define the extreme-right male:
Let's drink to our mighty warriors;
Let's drink to the northern winds;
Let's drink to our women's beauty;
Let's drink before the war begins.
The invocation to drink to worthy  subjects highlights the importance of alcohol to 
extreme-right culture. For instance, a former British neo-Nazi recounts in detail his 
recollections of involvement in the “permanently pissed”20  British extreme right. 
Even professionalised branches of the extreme right have to contend with the 
inebriation of their colleagues; for example, a meeting organised by the highly 
professional Swedish extreme right was marred by  the drunken state of their 
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Norwegian counterparts.21 But while alcohol is one of the few luxuries permitted by 
the extreme-right conception of masculinity, as an identity  it is dominated by fixation 
on violence and hostility towards perceived sexual deviance.
 Violence is not only  employed in reaction to homosexuality (see below), but 
permeates extreme-right attitudes to sex in general. Indeed, violence can act as a 
surrogate for sex: one skinhead is quoted in Moore’s Skinheads Shaved for Battle, 
“the violence is better than sex.”22 Moore, not a model of objectivity, also states that, 
for skinheads, “Bludgeoning inferiors and competitive predators is their main 
business, quick, uninvolved sex a momentary leisure to chuckle over with the other 
Neanderthals about the fire.”23  This appraisal is mirrored by a summary, in a 
biography  of Ian Stuart Donaldson, of the skinhead protagonist  of James Moffatt’s 
novels (written under the pseudonym Richard Allen):
He went to Brighton and kicked in some hippies with his boots. Then he fucked 
some bird and got dressed again: clip-on braces, new Doc Martens and skintight 
Levi's so that his boots could be seen in all their savage glory. In Joe Hawkin’s 
[sic.] world, women existed only for their tits (which usually jiggled). Men 
existed only to have their heads crushed in (by boots, with aggro) or to do the 
crushing.24
Allen’s books, which also contain scenes of rape, are said (by another extreme-right 
source) to have sold thousands and played a huge part in promoting the skinhead cult 
by providing a “youth-bible.”25  Homophobia may not play  a pivotal role in these 
works, but they  emphasise a skinhead masculinity predicated upon violence and 
abuse of female characters who are reduced to sexual objects.
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 The lack of sexual content in extreme-right music—from a positive 
perspective, at least—is in part because of a belief that it is of secondary importance 
to other themes. Mark Hamm states that “white power” rock bands “transmit only 
images of masculinity, neo-Nazism, and violence. White power rock is a music of 
carnal morality—without sex and without other pleasures of the human condition.”26 
This perspective means that asserting one’s masculinity is not achieved through 
sexual means, but rather through asserting one’s physical strength. This identity 
construction is mostly  found in genres associated with “white power” and neo-Nazi 
music, which construct a particular form of masculine identity through warrior 
archetypes. However, masculinity is not constructed solely through ideologies of 
maleness, with the stipulation of specific feminine roles also significant.
Maintaining the Masculine Norms of the Extreme-Right
Sexuality and gender27 are key  issues for extreme-right movements, which generally 
see themselves as standing up to what they consider to be sexual deviancy, and as 
representatives of a more moral outlook than the rest of society. Unsurprisingly, the 
strong views on sexuality  lead to consequent expectations of the roles that the 
genders are expected to conform to, with particularly  strict expectations placed upon 
women. The following examples make clear that these constructions are designed to 
appeal to the frustrations of white men, and to explain their marginalisation in a way 
that does not undermine their masculinity.
 It is unsurprising that the extreme right is so male-focused. While there is 
significant female support for extreme-right groups, there is no doubt that it is still an 
ideology characterised by patriarchy and masculinity, something which is reflected in 
membership demographics; a number of studies (cited above) have noted the 
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consistency of extreme-right supporters across nations being predominantly male. 
This imbalance is mirrored in gender representation in extreme-right music; female 
musicians remain an absolute minority, and despite the various constructions of 
female gender and sexuality, the appearance of women in song lyrics and subject 
matter is relatively rare. It  is far more common to find songs from a first-person 
perspective (with the overwhelming majority of singers being male), addressed in the 
second-person (usually  clearly intended as men singing to men), or about a third-
person “he.”
 The gender imbalance of extreme-right music is reflected in the reception of 
feminism, which is seen as the gender equivalent of anti-racism, in that it is thought 
to be forcing equality  on unequal relationships—in this case between men and 
women—and in so doing discriminating against the inherent superiority of the white 
male. Feminists are thus cast as “Feminazis” whose campaigning for equal rights 
must result in the oppression of white men.28 There is also a sense that feminism, as 
well as corrupting gender roles that are deemed to be natural, places the loyalty  of 
women to their gender, rather than to their race.29 Feminism is therefore deemed to 
be a significant contributory factor to the decline of whiteness.
 The way that feminism is perceived to have altered courtship  is outlined by  
David Lane: “The male is meant to capture females, not beg for their favor like some 
whipped spaniel. In our now alien-occupied countries a man ‘woos’ a woman with 
promises of material goods, with $60 or $100 bouquets of flowers; he is an 
emasculated idiot.”30  While this situation would seem to favour the female, Lane 
asserts that women are disadvantaged by this state of affairs as well:
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By conditioning and false intellectualization the modern woman convinces 
herself she should “own” one man, rather than be the possession of a superior 
man. But  the fire fades. The spark dies. Her orgasms are weak and faked. 
Because once a man is “tamed,” the natural attraction is gone. He is now her 
working drone, she no longer needs to compete with other women. In her heart 
of hearts she despises “her man,” while her innermost  being longs to be taken 
by a dominant male.… Her instincts are denied.31
In another essay, Lane returns to the theme of sexual relations as sexual subjugation:
Females in nature do not have a choice. They are programmed by nature to 
accept the conquering male and thus the superior genes are passed along, 
ensuring the strength and survival of the specie. The superior male takes all the 
females he can capture and defend. Among humans, the superior males take also 
the most attractive females, and thus their beauty unites with virility for higher 
life.32
This tacit endorsement of rape is not exceptional, but seen as a natural consequence 
of natural power relations between the genders. A notorious example of this surfaced 
when a BNP candidate for the London Assembly wrote about the “myth” of rape on 
his blog:
Rape is simply sex. Women enjoy sex, so rape cannot be such a terrible physical 
ordeal. To suggest  that rape, when conducted without  violence, is a serious 
crime is like suggesting that  forcefeeding a woman chocolate cake is a heinous 
offence. A woman would be more inconvenienced by having her handbag 
snatched. The demonisation of rape is all part  of the feminazi desire to obtain 
power and mastery over men. Men who go along with the rape myth are either 
morons or traitors.33
It would be wrong to suggest that approval of rape is uniform across the extreme 
right—this candidate was removed by the BNP when his comments were revealed in 
the press—but clearly the belief in a natural inequality between the sexes, and the 
belief in the subjugation of men by feminism, is seen to be detracting from the 
natural order of sexual conduct, specifically the mastery of men.
 It should be emphasised that women who are part of groups with strong views 
on gender and sexuality  do not necessarily subscribe wholeheartedly to this ideology. 
For instance, Kathleen Blee’s interviews with women members of extreme right 
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groups reveal opinions at odds with seemingly  central tenets of extreme-right  belief, 
such as a Klanswoman, a member of a group with a strong anti-abortion stance,34 
who confessed: “Oh, Lord. I have to tell you, I had one [an abortion] myself. I think 
it’s a perfectly private thing.… It  should never be part of a political platform. Not an 
issue out in public.”35  Women are far from unthinking members of extreme-right 
groups, and are actively striving to have their voice heard and to improve the status 
of women within the movement, thereby hoping to appeal to more potential female 
recruits. That said, Kathleen Blee argues that while men and women are to an extent 
remade in a “racist mould” when they join extreme-right groups, the self-interest  of 
men is much closer to the goals of the groups in question than the self-interest of 
women, thereby necessitating the greater sacrifice of women’s interests in order to 
conform to the group ideology.36
 The roles to which women are expected to conform are clearly  evident in the 
depiction and reception of women in extreme-right music. A primary  portrayal of 
women is as sexual objects, rather at odds with the lack of sex from extreme-right 
discourse. For instance, when Resistance used women on its covers (see Fig. 1), they 
were generally presented in sexually  provocative poses. Occasionally  they were 
models with no connection to the issues content; female musicians were presented in 
similar poses. One issue featured the bassist of Blood Eagle in various poses, without 
her bandmates.37  Also notable in this regard are the central pages of each issue of 
Resistance; the magazine usually  had a few colour pages per issue, some of which 
were always reserved for a spread of ‘Proud Aryan Women,’ images apparently 
submitted by readers. While these photographs were not always sexually  suggestive, 
212
34  Extreme-right groups are commonly against abortion in the case of white children, with some 
advocating the sterilisation of other ethnic groups, viewing reproduction as a crucial battleground in 
their racial struggle.
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occasionally featuring children and older women, it  was clearly intended to present 
images of the beauty and desirability of the white race—symbolised by these women
—in order to motivate for the cause. Two reasons for this sexual depiction of women 
are frequently cited by  the extreme right: first, that it is a result of the superior 
physical attractiveness of white women; and second, that sexual imagery  is a useful 
propagandistic tool to attract men to the cause.
 Saga, perhaps the most popular female extreme-right musician, is often 
represented and discussed in sexual terms. Chapter Seven shows how Saga 
represents a “softer” image, but this “sexiness” is also very much valued, as the 
following selection of fan posts demonstrates:
Maybe it seems like a real weard [sic] thing to say, but saga is jus’t [sic] a real beautifull 
[sic] MILF.38
[A female poster writes] I love her. Some of my friends hate her voice, but I think that is 
because their husbands LOVE her.… My gawd she's prettier than the pics of her on his [sic] 
C.D.'s, sexie [sic] lady with a smooth voice.39
Fig. 1: Women on the cover of Resistance Magazine, Issues 17 (Winter 
2002), 25 (Winter 2005/6) and 26 (Summer 2006).
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Saga is a goddess and the best argument yet for cloning!40
What a beautiful woman and songs.… She’s so beautiful even live!41
Saga is aware of, and caters to, this fanbase; her album On My Own (Midgård 
Records, 2007) included a glossy pullout poster of Saga in various poses, with the 
accompanying message: “With love, Saga xxx.” It is hard to disentangle appreciation 
of Saga’s music from appreciation of her as a woman (fans often mention both 
factors), but there can be little doubt that  Saga’s success has been helped by her 
image and marketing strategy.
 The rarity of female musicians in the extreme-right scene, however, means 
that female representations are just  as often created by men. The female version of 
the skinhead, the skingirl, de-emphasises conventional femininity: hairstyles, such as 
the so-called “Chelsea cut,” incorporate shaved sections with longer hair; clothing 
fashion is mostly the same as for men; while skingirl culture also allows women to 
participate alongside men in the violent rituals of the mosh-pit.42 The representation 
of skingirls includes these aspects, but  also emphasises the female status as sexual 
object. Project Vandal’s Our Cult (TB Records, 2007) does this through an 
illustration of a skingirl with large breasts in tight clothing.43 Ortel’s Pro Vás A Vaše 
Ženy! (“For You And Your Wife!”, Iron Sword Records, 2006) is even less subtle; it 
shows a skingirl with the appropriate uniform of partially shaven head, braces and 
tattoos, and also armed with both a knife and a gun (see Fig. 2). However, the 
woman, apart from the braces passing over her exaggerated breasts, is topless, 
therefore embodying a strange combination of the threat of violence and sexual 
allure.
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 It should be noted that  some of these covers, and many others, also show men 
with prominent and exaggerated musculature, and therefore similarly  objectified. 
However, there is evidence that the “ideal type” represented in these illustrations 
places more pressure on women than on men; there is no shortage of men featured on 
album covers and other media who do not look anything like this ideal type.44 It also 
appears that—other than in cases such as Saga’s where the musician’s sexuality  and 
appearance are greatly valued by fans—other women are reluctant to appear on 
covers, unless they are representing another facet of womanhood, such as innocence 
or motherhood: for example the covers of Kara’s Under a Fading Moon 
(Brotherhood Records, 2007) and Froidenspender’s self-titled album (self-released, 
1999) use illustrations rather than pictures of the musicians themselves. However, 
these illustrations may be intended to allow the musician anonymity,45  or, in the 
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Fig. 2: Cover of Ortel’s 
album Pro Vás A Vaše 
Ženy!, Iron Sword 
Records, 2006.
cases where musicians are pictured elsewhere in album or promotional material, to 
allow them to assert ideological principle and to distance themselves from any notion 
of self-promotion.
 As well as being sexually objectified, women are valued for their role as 
mothers, seen not only as responsible for bearing the next generation of white 
children, but also responsible for ensuring that they are raised in an appropriate and 
racially-aware manner. The extreme-right conception of motherhood is hierarchical, 
with women designated a role in the home as part  of a family unit, but it  also reveals 
hostility towards miscegenation through its assertion of the racially pure family unit.
 Musical examples of positive mothering role-models are relatively  rare; one 
musician who has cultivated an image of a good wife and mother is the German 
balladeer Annett Müller, née Moeck, known commonly by her first name. Annett 
herself avows this when considering the question of female musicians in the 
extreme-right scene: “Whether male or female, is not  really  all that important, but 
rather what he or she want to express… [which] in my writing [is] maternal care and 
sensitivity toward the children.”46
 At times, Annett’s music focuses on the everyday workings of the home and a 
mother’s life, as in ‘Alltagsleben einer Mutter’ (Eine Mutter klagt an, Pühses Liste, 
2000):
At half five the alarm clock startles you, and a new day unfolds;
Prepare the coffee, and there is no bread, quickly run to the baker;
Cook the eggs, butter the sandwiches, and check the homework of the boys;
…
Being mummy is difficult, on some days very much so.47
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Annett’s work has seen her become a relative star of the extreme-right  scene in 
Germany, and it  is likely that this is in part  due to her portrayal of another facet of 
white life which, in its purity and innocence, requires protection.
 On the other side of the coin from the approval of the traditional family unit 
is hostility  towards procreation outside of one’s own people, with miscegenation 
(almost always concerning white women and non-white men) a common theme of 
revenge fantasies (see below). The theme is common for many extreme-right bands, 
but is a particular concern for Angry Aryans, as in ‘Race Mixing is 
Treason’ (Racially Motivated Violence, Tri-State Terror, 1999):
I walk down the street, I see them hand in hand;
This stupid white bitch, with a colored man;
Their repulsive act of nature really makes me sick;
How these white bimbos get off sucking nigger dick;
Race mixing is treason.
Omnipresent is the threat—often promise—of punishment and revenge for this 
betrayal. It is interesting to note that during my research I have found no examples of 
women singing about miscegenation, and no songs addressing any  betrayal on the 
part of men. This might be due to the relative lack of women in the extreme-right 
music scene (although there are enough to form a sample) and the fact that white 
male miscegenation is seen as insignificant in comparison to that of white females. 
This suggests that in matters of gender and sexuality, the extreme right is particularly 
geared towards the interests of men and a particular sort of masculinity. Through the 
reduction of women to specific roles—that  of sexual objects, passive idealised 
mothers or race traitors—the extreme right, and particularly  the music scene, creates 
a space which privileges a specific notion of masculinity, a space in which violence 
plays a variety of significant roles.
Masculine Identity: The skinhead
The archetypal image of the post-1980s extreme-right supporter has almost always 
been the skinhead. Skinheads were described by Dave Mazzella (a senior figure in 
White Aryan Resistance in the late 1980s) as “our front line warriors… [who] roam 
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the streets and do what’s necessary to protect the race.”48 This role is physical, with 
skinheads notorious in many countries for their association with violent hate crimes, 
but also highly symbolic. As discussed in the next chapter, the skinhead image takes 
on the role of the modern incarnation of the warrior throughout history, the latest in a 
line including Viking warriors, crusaders, and Waffen-SS soldiers. This warrior status 
is not automatic, but is rather something which has been cultivated and maintained.
 According to George Marshall, “by the close of ’69 a definite [skinhead] 
uniform had developed.… The idea was to look hard and smart.”49  The language 
used here is not an accident; the idea of “uniform” recurs throughout descriptions of 
the skinhead subculture, as does violence: 
Skinhead gear represented the ultimate gang uniform. It was stylised hardness 
and blatantly working class. Being part of a gang gave a tremendous feeling of 
belonging and from it  stemmed the pride, respect and loyalty you had for your 
mates and our gang’s reputation.… The gang’s hardcore was always made up of 
those who were always looking for a fight and those who were good at  it. A 
boot squad who went in first and came out best.50
This uniform was not  merely imposing, but practical; indeed, due to the prevalence 
of skinhead violence at football matches, the police banned steel-toe-capped boots 
from football grounds as an offensive weapon, leading to the rise in popularity  in 
Doc Martens, which were also employed as an effective weapon.
 This image was matched by the skinheads’ reputation, garnered at gigs, 
football matches and beaches on bank holidays. While the original skinheads were 
notorious for “Paki-bashing,” there were many other targets for skinhead aggression, 
particularly other style subcultures such as hippies, teds, mods and greasers, Marshall 
revealing that: “Queers and anyone who looked remotely like one were usually easy 
and regular targets in most  areas, especially  when there was one of them and ten little 
aggro merchants eager to wade in.”51  Clearly, skinhead life—with its emphasis on 
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masculinity and the homogenisation of boys and men into gangs—was homosocial, 
with “queer-bashing” employed to disavow any association with homosexuality. That 
said, this targeting may have been based on looks alone: Murray Healy’s 
interviewees suggest that homosexuals were accepted into the first skinhead gangs of 
the 1960s,52 although these examples may be exceptional rather than typical.
 Healy  also suggests that the practice of “Paki-bashing” itself is based on 
gender rather than racial lines. Certainly, there are those who deny the racial aspect, 
such as the observer in 1970 who rather simplistically claimed that one gang had 
some “coloured people, giving lie to the suggestion that their paki-bashing [was] 
sparked purely  by racial hatred.”53 Healy suggests that the targeting of Asians was a 
result of the gendering of race. White youths, whose whiteness was the norm and 
therefore unmarked, looked to the black culture of Rude Boys as an example of 
hypermasculinity; in contrast, Asian focus on study and family was regarded as 
feminine.54 Therefore, black culture was respected and emulated (although clashes 
did occur), while Asians were targeted, and seen as easy targets at that, particularly 
due to their perceived lack of masculinity. Of course, the judgement of a person’s 
gender qualities based on their race is still racism, but it does suggest that 
masculinity was the prime concern of the first wave of skinheads.
 Often, the depiction of the warrior not only asserts the most valued aspects of 
masculinity, but simultaneously reveals the frustrations which drive many on the 
extreme right. The skinhead revival of the late 1970s, and the annexation of the 
subculture by the National Front, saw racism and homophobia becoming core 
components of skinhead ideology. In part, this was based on the increasing visibility 
of ethnic minorities and gay-rights activists in society; similarly, the assertion of 
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women having a natural place in the home was a reaction to feminism and the 
increased competition in the job market. The very characteristics valued as central to 
masculinity—particularly physical strength—were no longer as important, leading to 
a sense of oppression and marginalisation on the part of white working-class men.
Keeping the Skinhead Straight
The second-wave of skinhead subculture—roughly coinciding with the introduction 
of punk in the late 1970s—altered the original style in some ways, but the most 
significant change—particularly in the context of this thesis—was the integration and 
association of the skinheads with organised extreme-right politics. It was at this time 
that homophobia became a militant  and active component of skinhead life, in 
contrast to earlier ambivalence and even acceptance; indeed, it has been said that the 
period between the decline of the first skinhead cult and its revival “was a great time 
when virtually all the skinheads you used to see were gay.”55  The ultra-masculine 
reputation of the skinhead had proved exceptionally  popular with gay men, 
particularly in Britain, where “the skinhead represented the most potent 
representation of real masculinity available.”56  Not only did the skinhead style 
become popular among gay men, it  was adopted as an object of gay desire, 
particularly through its employment in pornography.
 This association of the skinhead style with homosexuality not only troubled 
the extreme right, but perplexed mainstream perceptions and stereotypes. Healy cites 
the difficulty  many people have in reconciling the image of the skinhead—the ultra-
masculine, working class “real man”—with the stereotype of gay men as effeminate, 
middle class weaklings; in this view, “gay” and “skinhead” ought to constitute 
opposite ends of the masculine scale.57  Similarly, homosexuality  is generally 
associated with liberal politics, and therefore removed from extreme-right ideology. 
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But, as Healy shows, gay men fetishised masculinity, while the following examples 
demonstrate that homosexuality is by no means in automatic contradiction with 
extreme-right politics.
 The most famous “outing” of a prominent figure associated with the extreme-
right music scene was that of Nicky Crane. Crane was a prominent member of the 
British Movement and had served as a roadie for Skrewdriver, also contributing 
lyrics and cover illustrations for the band.58  He was the face of the influential 
Strength Thru Oi! album (Decca, 1981, Fig. 3), an ostensibly non-racist mainstream 
release which garnered controversy  with its Nazi-referencing title and the image of 
Crane, albeit with his nationalist tattoos airbrushed out.59  Crane would, with Ian 
Stuart Donaldson, act as co-founder of Blood & Honour in 1987, also taking on the 
role of head of security. 
 Throughout this period, Crane effectively led a double life, being a familiar 
face on the gay skin scene and even starring in some gay porn videos in the 
mid-1980s.60 Crane’s politics were common knowledge on the gay scene, but it was 
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Fig. 3: Strength Thru Oi!
album cover, Decca, 1981.
on the Channel 4 documentary Out in 1992 that Crane outed himself. The reaction of 
Ian Stuart Donaldson reveals the shock and disgust this revelation provoked on the 
extreme right:
I feel more betrayed by him than probably anybody else, because he was the 
head of our security. I actually used to stick up for him when people used to say 
that he was queer, because he convinced me that he wasn’t. I always used to ask 
him why he worked at  these gay clubs, telling him that he'd get  a bad name. He 
used to say that it was the security firm that he used to work with, that  they used 
to give him the job there. I accepted him at face value, as he was a Nationalist. I 
was fooled the same as everybody else. Perhaps more than everybody else. I felt 
I was betrayed by him and I want nothing to do with him whatsoever. He’s dug 
his own grave as far as I’m concerned.61
Nicky Crane subsequently left the British Movement, unable to reconcile his 
sexuality with his politics, before dying of AIDS in 1993, but there are examples of 
those who have attempted to have their sexuality recognised and accepted by the 
extreme right.
 As early  as 1974, a group in California, the National Socialist League, was 
formed specifically  to accommodate gay  neo-Nazis. The group argued against the 
splits within the white race while “racial enemies advance on all sides,” and declared 
it would fight separately until sexual preference was accepted.62 The League lasted 
until the mid-1980s before ceasing operations. More recently, the Internet has 
allowed a number of extreme-right gay-oriented websites to reach an audience, such 
as the Gay Racialist Network and Gays Against Semitism, while chatrooms cater to 
such diverse topics as “Gay Nazi Sex,” “Nazi Muscle,” “Gay Nazi White Power 
Fetishists” and “Gay Aryan Neo-Nazi Skinheads.”63
 These groups have done little to temper the extreme homophobia of the 
mainstream extreme right, as shown by a recent forum on Stormfront initiated by a 
poster who argued: “A homosexual isn’t less white than anyone else here. They  did 
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not choose to be that way, yet you guys hate them.” This view was supported by 
another contributor, who states that “as a gay White man, I find this disappointing. I 
want to support the White race just  like any  other White individual.” Despite this 
eagerness to contribute, the response was overwhelmingly hostile, with responses 
including “Homosexuality is a defect and a mental illness and should be treated as 
such,” “it is unnatural, I hunted many years and never saw a male try to **** [sic] a 
male. it  is sickening and only  exists because some humans are perverse” and “A 
homosexual is a person with a dangerous mental illness. They molest children at a 
truly  alarming rate—thirty  times the rate of heterosexuals according to one of the 
studies. Their lifespans are shortened by decades due to their behaviors. They spread 
deadly diseases. They side with the enemies of our race on virtually every  issue. 
Shall I continue?”64  It is clear that homophobia remains deeply rooted in extreme-
right ideology, and therefore no surprise that homosexuals are a particular target for 
hostility in music.
Music to Imagine Violence: Revenge Fantasies
Overwhelmingly, homophobic hostility is directed towards gay  men, since 
homosexuality  is thought of almost exclusively in terms of male sexuality.65 The use 
of homophobic language is complicated by the fact that it is commonly used to slur 
enemies and, perhaps more importantly, to justify schisms between groups which 
share the same broad ideology. A prominent example of this occurred after the split 
which saw the founding of Blood & Honour in the UK in 1987; this organisation’s 
members, having broken away from the control of the National Front, began 
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referring to the party  as the “Nutty Fairy  Party.”66 The extent to which this was mere 
name-calling varied, with those using the phrase sporadically  justifying it with 
accusations of homosexuality  against  NF leaders, including, at this point, Nick 
Griffin. This approach seems predicated on the notion that in white supremacist 
belief, belonging to the white elite is not solely based on skin colour and can be 
denied to those who fail to meet white moral standards, as in Bound For Glory’s 
‘White Country’ (Under the Gods, Nordland, 1994), which asserts that drug-users 
and homosexuals are categories which, along with immigrants, do not belong in the 
“white population”:
Look at the state of our land today;
The white population has no say;
Too many immigrants, junkies and queers;
The rot is increasing every year;
You’ve got to fight;
For a white country.
At times, it is difficult to tell if language such as this is used to attack homosexuals 
(as in this instance) or whether all those seen to be standing in the way of a pure 
society are placed in a hated category. But while it can occasionally  be difficult to 
distinguish between homophobic language used merely  to express hostility  or hatred 
and actual accusations and disapproval of homosexuality, there is an overwhelming 
amount of material overtly expressing the homophobic ideology of the extreme right.
 As with much extreme-right music addressing core ideological subjects, 
hostility towards perceived sexual deviance is expressed through revenge fantasies. 
Grinded Nig’s ‘Torture and Humiliation’ (Racial Mutilation, Panzerfaust, 2004), is 
an extreme articulation of this hatred, albeit displaying a preoccupation with 
penetration and penile discharge:
Our minds set for violent intent;
The goal to find a mutilation victim;
See some guys leave a queer bar;
We follow them to their fucking home;
Two white guys and a nigger faggot;
They watch gay porn and have some drinks;
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Torture and Humiliation;
We break down the door armed with knives;
They are beaten down, tied and gagged;
Smash the nigger’s head through the TV set;
Pull down his pants and ram a knife up his ass;
The white queer cries from what he sees;
I smash his jaw, then piss on his face;
…
Make the buttslammers suffer;
Drag them out to my back yard;
Force them to eat fresh dog shit;
Then slice their throats, they will bleed to death;
As the blood flows, they cry for forgiveness;
Now this is done, dispose of the bodies;
Go out and repeat it all again.
It is notable that Grinded Nig are the cause of some controversy, with the band 
considered too extreme in some quarters. For instance, one poster on the Vanguard 
News Network forum writes:
Their lyrics are fucking disgusting and they use Nazi imagery just  to be as 
shocking as possible. People like this are setting our entire movement  way 
back!… We just  can’t  afford to be associated with these guys. We are supposed 
to be the superior Aryans, right?67
The source of this objection is not Grinded Nig’s subject matter, but the graphic way 
in which it is presented; the problem is with the detailed graphic imagery of the 
band’s lyrics, with violence against homosexuals—prevalent in song lyrics elsewhere
—not something to be reproached.
 In their ‘United, White & Proud’ (Born to Hate, Resistance Records, 1993), 
American band Nordic Thunder suggest that “smashing local homos” is just as 
important to collective group identity as “Paki-bashing” was to the original 
skinheads:
United, white and proud, on the attack;
United, white and proud, gonna take our nation back;
East coast crews are bashing the fags;
Smashing local homos dressed up in drag;
Northern skins getting stronger everyday;
United, white and Proud, leading the way.
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Similarly, Before God’s ‘Minneapolis Burns’ (Wolves Amongst the Sheep, Subzero, 
1998) has attacks on homosexuals as a crucial component in its imagination of the 
battle for Minneapolis:
Homo-bars packed with gays;
Scream with anguish as they go up in flames.
While some of these revenge fantasies categorise homosexuals as merely one group 
among many  which face extreme-right violence, homosexuals are ascribed particular 
defining features, seen as ridden with disease, particularly AIDS. Sometimes, this 
characterisation is gleeful, as in Bound For Glory’s ‘Freddies [sic] Dead’ (Never 
Again!, Thor Records, 1997), which uses the music of Queen’s ‘We Will Rock 
You’—adapting the chorus to “AIDS will AIDS will kill you”—to mark the death of 
Freddie Mercury:
Freddie was an odd man, gay man;
Sleeping with the guys;
Knowing that he'd be doomed one day;
He got blood on his face;
Big disgrace;
This dirty little faggot's been put into his place.
AIDS is also, however, perceived as a threat to the stability of whiteness; despite the 
widespread assertion that AIDS is a gay  disease, its spread is feared and taken as 
justification for violent action, for example in Arresting Officers ‘Defend Us In 
Battle’ (Land and Heritage, Rock-O-Rama, 1990):
The spread of AIDS that’s caused by gays, in the closet they should stay;
…
Defend us in battle from the evils that we face;
Defend us in battle for the future of our race.
Similarly, homosexuality itself is seen as a disease, “infecting” the white race, as in 
Before God’s ‘Wretched’ (Under the Blood Banner, B.F.G. Productions, 2000):
Wretched filth you plague these streets;
You’ll never compare to natures elite;
A disease that has spread far too long;
Soon you’ll be gone;
…
Wretched queer you think your disease is natural;
I’ll never accept you as a homosexual;
…
You are a mistake and there’s only one solution;
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Help nature eradicate you through assisted evolution;
A deviation not meant for human creation;
A genetic aberration;
…
Your life is a cesspool filled with only waste;
AIDS will erase.
As in this example, theories of Social Darwinism, evolutionary theory and eugenics 
frequently arise in references to homosexuality. AIDS is seen as an act of nature, 
eradicating the unnatural presence of homosexuals.
 Homosexuality is also equated with other forms of sexual deviance, 
particularly paedophilia; this can be seen in Before God’s ‘Wretched’. A contributing 
factor to the extent to which paedophilia is equated with homosexuality  is evident in 
the frequency with which NAMBLA68  is referenced in discussions. This is most 
prevalent in written material, but a musical example can be found in Plunder & 
Pillage’s ‘Back in the Closet,’ which also fulfills other extreme-right tropes of nature, 
disease and violence:
I hate you and what you stand for;
You call yourself normal;
Yet you take it in the backdoor;
…
You broke the laws of nature;
And now you’re diseased;
…
I’m the hunter, you’re the hunted;
Run as fast as you can;
…
San Fran., Minneapolis and every major city;
NAMBLA and their cohorts march for your pity.
 Inevitably, homosexuals are not the only enemy who are the subjects of 
revenge fantasies. A host  of examples exist which demonstrate other targets of 
revenge fantasies, particularly Jews and immigrants, as in People Hater’s ‘Hate 
Crimes’ (Love to Hate, ISD Records, 1996):
Smash a nigger in the head, it’s fun to watch him bleed;
Throw a gook on the ground, kick ‘em in the teeth;
Torch a few synagogues, it’s fun to watch them burn;
Don’t you worry, the corner store camel always gets a turn.
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Similar phrases and sentiment can be found in RaHoWa’s popular ‘Third 
Reich’ (Declaration of War, Resistance Records, 1993):
You kill all the niggers and you gas all the jews;
Kill a gypsy and a commie too;
You just killed a kike;
Don’t it feel right?
Goodness gracious, Third Reich!
Revenge fantasies are thus used to put  enemies in easily-identifiable groups. The 
particular hostility  towards homosexuals allows extreme-right supporters to feel 
more certain in their sense of “us,” while also providing categories of perceived race 
traitors without detracting from the overall high opinion of the white race.
Music to Imagine Violence: The Coming Revolution
While revenge fantasies indulge in visions of violence directed against enemies, they 
also overlap with more focused prophecies of violence which foretell a coming 
revolution. The specifics of this revolution can vary, but  it generally takes the form 
of a race war started by  an attack on or by  the white population. This war is 
envisaged as being total, leading either to the destruction of the white race, which is 
rarely acknowledged as a possibility, or the total annihilation of its enemies. This 
vision of the ultimate conflict is commonly referred to as “The Day of the Rope,” or, 
to a lesser extent, “The Day of Reckoning.”
 The etymology of “Day of the Rope” appears to be drawn from William 
Pierce’s The Turner Diaries. The novel depicts a violent conflict initiated by 
extreme-right revolutionaries in the United States which eventually leads to global 
genocide, leaving the white race in possession of the planet. The novel’s narrator 
makes clear that violent struggle is the only way to create the desired new world:
[I]t  is because our new civilization will be based on an entirely different world 
view than the present one that  it  can only replace the other in a revolutionary 
manner. There is no way a society based on Aryan values and an Aryan outlook 
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can evolve peacefully from a society, which has succumbed to Jewish spiritual 
corruption.69
The “Day of the Rope” itself refers to the description of events following the 
revolutionary capture of Los Angeles:
August  1, 1993. Today has been the Day of the Rope—a grim and bloody day, 
but an unavoidable one.… [T]he night is filled with silent horrors; from tens of 
thousands of lampposts, power poles, and trees throughout this vast 
metropolitan area the grisly forms hang. In the lighted areas one sees them 
everywhere. Even the street  signs at  intersections have been pressed into 
service, and at  practically every street corner I passed this evening on my way 
to HQ there was a dangling corpse, four at  every intersection. Hanging from a 
single overpass only about a mile from here is a group of about 30, each with an 
identical placard around its neck bearing the printed legend, “I betrayed my 
race.” Two or three of that group had been decked out in academic robes before 
they were strung up, and the whole batch are apparently faculty members from 
the nearby UCLA campus.… The first thing I saw in the moonlight  was the 
placard with its legend in large, block letters: “I defiled my race.” Above the 
placard leered the horribly bloated, purplish face of a young woman, her eyes 
wide open and bulging, her mouth agape.… There are many thousands of 
hanging female corpses like that  in this city tonight, all wearing identical 
placards around their necks. They are the White women who were married to or 
living with Blacks, with Jews, or with other non-White males. There are also a 
number of men wearing the I-defiled-my-race placard, but the women easily 
outnumber them seven or eight to one.… [A]bout ninety per cent of the corpses 
with the I-betrayed-my-race placards are men… [and] are the politicians, the 
lawyers, the businessmen, the TV newscasters, the newspaper reporters and 
editors, the judges, the teachers, the school officials, the “civic leaders,” the 
bureaucrats, the preachers, and all the others who, for reasons of career or status 
or votes or whatever, helped promote or implement  the System’s racial program. 
The System had already paid them their 30 pieces of silver. Today we paid 
them.70
The Day  of the Rope is thus a revenge fantasy  writ large, where the enemies of the 
white race, including white race traitors, are purged for their crimes. One extreme-
right forum contributor compares this mythology to the Judgement Day of 
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Christianity  and Götterdämmerung in Odinism, clearly  noting the struggle between 
the just and the unjust, and the eventual triumph of the righteous.71
 The phrase and idea of the Day  of the Rope has since become a trope for 
many on the extreme right, used both as a goal invoked to maintain motivation, and 
as a reaction to the perceived immoral acts of non-whites and “race traitors.” 
Comments such as “Yet one more that will dangle from the end of a rope,”72  “The 
Day of the Rope will, indeed, be a long one”73 and “She will have one rope reserved 
for her on the day of the rope”74 are typical of many found on postings on forums 
such as Stormfront, demonstrating the linking of individual revenge fantasies to a 
racial revolution which is perceived as inevitable.
 The ubiquity  of the Day of the Rope has manifested in extreme-right music, 
although not  to the extent that might be expected. The phrase itself has been used as 
an album title by bands such as Ukraine’s Lut and the American Organized 
Resistance, and perhaps most notably by the Polish record label Strong Survive, 
which released at least five volumes of compilations using the phrase. One of the 
fullest explorations of the coming revolution can be found in People Hater’s ‘Day of 
the Rope’ (Love to Hate, ISD Records, 1996): 
Day of the rope is coming soon;
We’ll hang you by the neck you fucking coon;
Day of the rope is coming for you;
Especially if you're a greedy fucking Jew;
…
Day of the rope for the queers;
When we watch you choke you’ll hear us cheer;
Day of the rope is for the gooks;
You'll hang right along with all the filthy fucking spooks;
…
We’re looking to that glorious day;
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For generations you’ll hear ’em say;
They did a job that had to be done;
To free our land from all the filthy scum.
The target groups of the “Day  of the Rope” are essentially the same as those 
commonly employed in revenge fantasies, but here the use of violence is seen as a 
necessary  step to correct racial integration and to set up a purer society. Violence 
here becomes a purging and purifying mechanism, not only an assertion of individual 
superiority, but of racial superiority.
 Elsewhere, examples such as Aggravated Assault’s ‘Fetch the Rope’ (It Could 
Happen to You, Resistance Records, 1993) could refer to the Day of the Rope, 
particularly with its call for “White future, white nation, we need it now,” but it  also 
uses rope as a reference to the Ku Klux Klan practice of lynching. More generalised 
predictions of race war can be found in songs such as Sniper’s ‘War is Coming’ (War 
is Coming!, Rampage Productions, 2011) but, in music lyrics at least, there is a 
tendency to delineate acts of violence outside of any grand project in which they 
might function. Whether this is a conscious decision or not, revenge fantasies are 
much more common than predictions of total revolution.
Music to accompany violence: Gigs
Violence is not only aimed outwards by the extreme right, but also inward; one of the 
most obvious examples of this is the anarchic and ritualistic violence which 
accompanies live music.75 Here, violence functions not as an expression of hostility, 
but as a means of establishing a masculine camaraderie. That  said, gigs have also 
become a common site for extreme-right aggression to be loosed on opponents, not 
only because it  gathers together willing participants in violence, but also because 
such gigs often attract protestors, leading to confrontation.
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 Violence at gigs is most prominently associated with the skinhead subculture, 
and can be traced to the skinhead revival of the 1970s. This revival was tied to the 
wider rise of punk, which itself has associations with violence (although the link with 
violence has been characterised as unfair, many punks played up to it).76  The 
bonding of ideologies of violence and masculinity  was even manifested in the dance 
which arose out of punk, the pogo (which would remain a fixture in Oi! and skinhead 
gigs), with its physicality “locked into the wider masculine manual working-class 
ethos with which the later strands of ‘Oi’ music would more clearly identify.”77
 George Marshall’s Skinhead Nation, an insider’s account of the skinhead cult 
which views it as broadly apolitical78 ties the violent character of skinheads to the 
“golden age” of football hooliganism in the late 1960s and 1970s, and its resurgence 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, periods coinciding with the rise of the skinhead 
subculture and its later revival.79 According to Marshall:
Violence, whether it’s Rambo doing the business with a sub-machine gun on the 
big screen, or football fans ambushing rival fans at  a train station, is all about 
entertainment. Violence is exciting, dangerous, frightening, exhilarating, 
hilarious at times—in fact  everything good entertainment  should be. It’s not 
everybody’s idea of a good night  out, but neither is the opera, dog racing or 
bingo. It’s horses for courses, and there’s no doubting that a lot of young males 
get a buzz, get an adrenaline rush, get their kicks out of organised violence and 
the bravado and excitement that accompanies it—even if nothing happens. 
None of this is meant as an excuse, just some sort of explanation.80
Marshall’s linking of violence to young men looking for amusement asserts a natural 
link between aggression and male adolescence, and while he claims he is not trying 
to excuse it, his discussion of it gives the impression that it is glamorous. Even so, 
Marshall acknowledges the potential for skinhead violence to result in collateral 
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damage, as in this description of the violence at a Madness gig in Edinburgh, as late 
as 1993, which begins with a tone of awe:
At the Madness gig, the Capital City Service provided another awesome display 
of violence that has made Hibs casuals the most  feared crew in Scottish football, 
and one of the most notorious mobs in Britain. The fact that those involved 
were mainly from their younger ranks made it  all the more impressive.… After 
the gig though, I heard that  a pregnant  girl had been kicked to the ground and 
had lost her baby as a result  of the attack. Maybe violence isn’t always all it’s 
cracked up to be after all.81
 Fellow concert-goers are not the only ones endangered by skinhead violence, 
with bands themselves vulnerable. Oi! bands were contending with violent disruption 
of their gigs as early  as 197982—before the genre had even been named “Oi!”—and 
had to address the reputation of their fans for right-wing political extremism. Some 
bands, particularly Skrewdriver, would eventually embrace this politics, while Sham 
69 would take the different option of contributing to Rock Against Racism, with 
frontman Jimmy Pursey  also attempting to discourage fans on an individual level. 
While there is some anecdotal evidence that Pursey managed to convert some racist 
skinheads individually,83 overall, Sham 69 were dogged by a violent element in their 
fanbase associated with extreme-right politics. During their farewell tour concerts 
were frequently  disrupted—and cancelled—by the violent actions of skinhead fans. 
With the most prominent anti-racist Oi! band forced to break up, the genre, and its 
skinhead following, became firmly associated with extreme-right ideology.
 What particularly distinguished the violence of the skinheads from the wider 
aggression and violence of punk was that, with their politicisation and later 
absorption into the National Front, skinhead violence was given a political rationale, 
not only through its direction against minorities and enemies, but in its assertion of a 
particular type of working-class masculinity. Violence was therefore integrated into a 
particular strand of extreme-right ideology.
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 The predilection for violence among the skinhead subculture of the extreme 
right has been sustained; a sociological exploration of the American skinhead scene 
outlines how ritualised the practices of the skinhead subculture are:
Group dance rituals raise the communitarian spirit of the events. Skinheads 
perform a semi-choreographed, ritual boot-stomping dance that evokes power, 
violence, and militarism. The dance usually involves ten to twenty people 
stomping and rotating in a circular formation. Sometimes, one person moves to 
the center, crouching and stomping, circling in the opposite direction, and 
growling or shouting at the other skinheads. Often, the center skinhead will then 
run into the circled Aryans in a feigned but  very physical attempt  to break free. 
After several minutes a new skinhead moves to the center and the ritual repeats. 
Slam dancing in front of the stage is less choreographed, but no less ritualistic. 
The slam dance involves aggressive pushing and crashing and acting out  moves 
of a mock fight  as part of a violent  stylistic performance. Slam dancing 
sometimes escalates into actual brawls between two or more Aryans, which the 
other dancers usually break up after a minute or two. Less frequently, the brawls 
spread to the larger group of dancers and can escalate out of control. To an 
outsider, the fights can seem like a sign of discord among Aryans, but in most 
instances the fighting is just another part  of the ritual experience that  Aryans use 
to distinguish themselves as violent warriors.84
I have quoted this passage at length in order to demonstrate the generally  ritualistic 
nature of skinhead dancing, and the very  fine line there is between these rituals and 
the outright chaos of brawling. Even when violence strays beyond the relative 
confines of the ritual, however, it  is still an expression of group solidarity and 
camaraderie.
 George Burdi speaks of similar violent camaraderie at concerts for his band, 
RaHoWa:
The concerts were crazy. Friends would beat  each other up and then laugh about 
it afterwards, with their eyes swollen shut  and their noses broken and picking 
their teeth up off the ground.85
The violent camaraderie of gigs among skinheads is in contrast to the intense 
violence which can take place between extreme-right fans and their enemies. Gigs 
become a natural setting for such conflicts, as they are one of the few occasions for 
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which large numbers of extreme-right supporters congregate in the same physical 
space, and are also sites for protest by local people and anti-fascist groups.
 Although there are numerous examples of such violence (and its 
implementation by all grades of the extreme-right hierarchy), there are some which 
show the extent to which it can affect the movement. George Burdi, then-leader of 
RaHoWa and in control of Resistance Records, was imprisoned for causing actual 
bodily  harm to a female anti-fascist protestor while leading a charge of white 
supremacists against protestors in 1993. Not only  did this result in control of 
Resistance passing eventually to William Pierce, Burdi emerged from prison as an 
avowed anti-racist, a significant departure for the extreme-right music scene. On the 
other hand, violence also carries with it the threat of loss, and the extreme right are 
not always victorious. Prominent defeats include the “Main Event” in England in 
1989, a defeat which led to infightings and schisms that would contribute to the 
decline of the extreme right in the UK.86  However, even defeats can provide 
opportunities: the killing of Nordic Thunder singer Joe Rowan after a concert in 1994
—by black youths when he clashed with them in a convenience store—established 
him as a ready-made martyr, an example to be commemorated and remembered in 
glowing terms.87
 As well as clashes between extreme-right supporters and anti-fascists at 
extreme-right assemblies, there are examples of the extreme right seeking out such 
confrontation on other ground. InSanitee, an American band from the late 1990s, 
concealed the racist content of their music from promoters, leading to bookings at 
various non-racist events; this led to clashes and violence, resulting in seven 
skinhead arrests in one case. Insanitee also promoted themselves as a “high school 
dance band,” leading to at least  one teenage riot  in 1999.88  Such antagonism and 
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provocation can be seen in other examples where extreme-right activists seek out 
anti-fascist events in order to disrupt them violently. Such tactics, which are at least 
as old as Rock Against Racism, are still in use, as in the recent example of Russian 
skinheads violently disrupting an anti-fascist festival in Miass, central Russia, an 
action which drew approving comments from supporters of the western extreme 
right.89
*
Not all extreme-right gigs are accompanied by violence. This is especially the case 
with “softer” genres, with folk concerts, for example, very unlikely  to attract 
violence. Indeed, extreme-right supporters often point  out the relative peacefulness 
of their events compared to the reaction to them; this was the case with the BNP’s 
Red White and Blue Festival in 2008, which passed off peaceably, but which saw 
mass protests by anti-fascist groups. The BNP was then able to characterise the anti-
fascist groups as fascist because of their wish to deny the BNP freedom of 
expression. Indeed, the violence that occurred was instigated by the protestors, with 
four anti-fascists breaking into the compound in an attempt to provoke a 
confrontation, and ending up fighting the police.90  This determination to remain 
peaceful and passive in the face of extreme hostility allows the BNP to present itself 
as persecuted and to accuse the protestors of abusing democracy.91 Clearly, there are 
some who wish to move away from the hedonistic violence prevalent at many 
extreme-right gatherings.
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Music to accompany violence: 
Acts of violence associated with extreme-right music
On 5th August 2012, Wade Michael Page opened fire at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, 
Wisconsin, killing six people before turning the gun on himself. Page, a member of 
the Hammerskins white supremacist group, was also a long-time participant in the 
white power music scene, particularly  the bands End Apathy  and Youngland, with 
links to Definite Hate, 13 Knots, Max Resist, Intimidation One, Aggresive Force, 
Blue Eyed Devils, Celtic Warrior and Radikahl.92  Page’s involvement with the 
extreme-right music scene was a prominent feature of media coverage of the event, 
and is said to have aroused the attention of many in the USA for the first time.93
 The temple shootings represent probably the most publicised association 
between extreme-right music and a particular act of violence. Page’s involvement 
with extreme-right music was a crucial indicator of his political convictions, but 
there is no evidence to suggest that music influenced his attack: violence could be a 
discrete expression of Page’s commitment to this ideology. Music may have played a 
role in shaping his political outlook and activism which would later find expression 
through violence, but  it might just as well have been an outlet for his already-formed 
ideology.
 A more definitive example of music used by a perpetrator of violence can be 
found with the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 77 people 
during his attacks in Oslo and Utøya. Breivik’s manifesto reveals particularly his use 
of music in preparation for violence:
I do a mental check almost  every day through meditation and philosophising. I 
simulate/meditate while I go for a walk, playing my Ipod [sic] in my 
neighbourhood. This consists of a daily 40 minute walk while at  the same time 
philosophising ideologically/performing self indoctrination and the mental 
simulation of the operation while listening to motivational and inspiring music. 
I simulate various future scenarios relating to resistance efforts, confrontations 
with police, future interrogation scenarios, future court  appearances, future 
media interviews etc. or I philosophise about  certain articles in the book. This 
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daily mental exercise or ritual keeps me fully motivated and charges my 
batteries. And I’m sure it can work for other people as well.94
Music clearly played a fundamental role in Breivik’s ritualistic preparation, in 
accompanying his “meditation,” and in helping him to visualise the attacks. The 
extent to which music played a role in his imagining of the attacks is shown by a 
passage in which he discusses the singing of Helene Bøksle on music from the 
soundtrack of the computer game Age of Conan:
Imagine the following; at the end of your mission, when you have completed 
your primary objectives—imagine fighting for your life against a pursuing pack 
of system protectors (or as I like to call them: armed defenders of the 
multiculturalist system, also referred to as the police). You try to avoid 
confrontation but they eventually manage to surround you. You hear this song 
as you push forward to annihilate one of their flanks, head shotting [sic] two of 
your foes in bloody fervor trying to survive. This angelic voice sings to you 
from the heavens, strengthening your resolve in a hopeless battle. Your last 
desperate thrust  kills another two of your enemies. But  it  isn’t enough as you 
are now completely surrounded; your time is now. This voice is all you hear as 
your light turns to darkness and you enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. This 
must surely be the most  glorious way to claim the honour of martyrdom in 
battle.95
As Breivik’s citing of Bøksle suggests, he is not immersed in the music of the 
extreme-right scene. He cites three musicians specifically in his manifesto: Clint 
Mansell, a film composer; Helene Bøksle, a singer on a video game soundtrack; and 
Saga. Saga’s racial politics were easily  adapted to Breivik’s Islamophobia, and it 
seems he found ideological confirmation in her work, while feeling part of the 
broader ideological community of her fan-base.
 As well as being significant to the preparation of his violence, Breivik 
envisaged using music during the attack itself:
I will put  my iPod on max volume as a tool to suppress fear if needed. I might 
just  put Lux Aeterna by Clint Mansell on repeat as it is an incredibly powerful 
song. The combination of these factors (when added on top of intense training, 
simulation, superior armour and weaponry) basically turns you into an 
extremely focused and deadly force, a one-man-army.96
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Through stimulating music such as Mansell’s “Lux Aeterna” he sought to imagine 
the detail of his attack and work on suppressing his fear, while through Bøksle and 
Saga’s work Breivik envisaged himself as a martyr and hero, sacrificing himself for 
the cause he had adopted.97
 While these examples have received extensive media attention, there is 
evidence of the role of music in “lower-level” violence as well. At its most basic, this 
is seen in Matthew Collins description of an attack by  BNP supporters on “little old 
ladies” holding a meeting in a library:
And down they went, trying to curl into defensive little balls, covering their 
tortured faces as we screamed “BNP! BNP,” stamping in time, stamping on 
them, kicking their heads, stamping on their bodies, dragging them off the walls 
and into the middle of the room so that  every one of our number could feed on 
them.98
This use of “music” is basic: the chant provides a rhythmic pulse through which the 
identifying marker “BNP” is expressed, as well as directing the rhythm of the attack. 
The repetition of the letters “BNP” asserts a collective identity  for the attackers, 
allowing each individual to feel part of a greater whole, while also asserting that 
identity to the victims. Collins goes on to say:
This was our glorious victory, our chance to be heard, our chance to speak up 
for the poor old white working class, the warrior race of sturdy Anglo-Saxons. 
We were fighting back, this was our democratic right to be heard and these 
cowards, these little old ladies, had to learn that we were not  going to take their 
lies about us being brainless, racist thugs any more.99
The chant here functions as a primitive kind of battle song, coordinating the attack, 
asserting the identity of the attackers and engendering fear in the target.
 A link has been proposed between the violent nature of extreme-right music 
and the violent actions of its listeners. Probably the most prominent example of this 
came with the trial of three young German skinheads who murdered Marius Schöberl 
in 2002. The trial and its reporting focused in part on the fact that the perpetrators 
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had been listening to neo-Nazi music while drinking, before going to find their 
victim. Schöberl, a white German, was apparently chosen because he looked like a 
Jew, even though he was known to the attackers.100 Schöberl was tortured for hours 
in a “cycle of violence,” before being executed by  a “curb-kick” apparently  copied 
from the film American History X.101 The attackers apparently told the court that they 
felt  “any victim will do,”102  implying that the act was valued in itself, and also 
suggesting that listening to extreme-right music had instilled in the perpetrators a 
desire to do violence—although one could equally point to the alcohol they had 
consumed as an instigating factor, or challenge the relevance of both.
Conclusion
It ought to be emphasised that the examples cited in this chapter do not represent  an 
absolute consensus on the place of violence in extreme-right movements. The rise of 
modernised and democratic political parties has often entailed a desire for the 
extreme right to distance itself from its violent  reputation, even if the parties are still 
occasionally caught up in controversies involving violence. Because of this, extreme-
right supporters can react in different ways to violent incidents carried out  in the 
name of their ideology. On one forum on the shootings by Wade Michael Page 
comments do not explicitly express approval, but do blame non-whites for causing 
conflict by  their presence (for example, “All assorted nonwhites get the fuck out to 
your respective homelands and shit  like this will never happen; true peace on earth”; 
“Where is the crime in this act?”; as well as “Breivik had a better idea”103) with a 
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thread on Breivik’s attacks explicit in its praise (“He’s a hero that killed future Bill 
and Hilary Clinton’s [sic]”; “Breivik broke into the sick leftist orgy of Utoya [sic] 
island and started slaying the beasts, dishing out righteous justice left and right to the 
present and future destroyers of Norway”; “Anyone responsible for 75+ dead 
communists is a hero in my book”104). At the same time, others bemoan the way in 
which such actions make the task of advancing extreme-right ideology so much 
harder. A typical example is evident on the Stormfront forum regarding Deryl 
Dedmon, a white teen convicted for the murder of an African-American man:
It  is a damnable waste of this young man's life. If we had gotten to him first  and 
explained that ours is a protracted struggle and that misdirected violence will do 
nothing for the White man who uses it or for our race, he could be on his way to 
being a leader in the movement, instead of a prisoner.105
There is clearly  a split between those who see violence as a necessary step  given the 
inevitability of race war, and those who feel that the violent reputation of the extreme 
right is inhibiting its ability to attract supporters.
 While supporters of the same broad political ideology—and fans of the same 
music—can have directly contrasting views on the role of violence within that 
ideology, violence still has a dominant place in extreme-right culture, particularly the 
subject matter of much extreme-right music. Especially  important here is the 
propagandistic and indoctrinating role of music and the effect that the prevalence of 
violent subject matter might have, with many  writers citing specific examples where 
music is the first step in a radicalisation process which leads to violent actions.106 
Even so, such accounts also acknowledge that exposure to this music before or 
during acts of violence is not necessarily a causal factor in the violence itself:
[W]hite power music can play an indirect role in making violence—especially 
certain types of violence, such as hate crimes—more likely because it helps 
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make it more acceptable within the movement. However, one must always treat 
such an influence cautiously, because while white power music might possibly 
play a role in egging a listener to violence, it is obviously true that  many people 
will like white power music because they have already accepted the idea that 
racial violence is justified. In such cases, the music may not so much influence 
them as simply reflect back opinions that  they already share. Of course, even in 
such situations, the music can reinforce those opinions.107
It is clear that, even in cases where music and violence are associated, the 
relationship  between them is not necessarily the same across different incidents: what 
might incite one act might simply accompany  the other with no real effect. But the 
role of music in recruitment, a first  stage towards the potential enactment of 
violence, is obvious, even if this is also unlikely  to be an absolute function of the 
music:
[C]learly, it isn’t simply energy and emotion that drive a member of the White 
Aryan Resistance to attack a person of color, or that enable African American 
activists in Georgia in 1962 to stand up to institutionalized repression and 
vigilante violence. These various aspects of music and musicking, once again, 
interact, with each other and with nonmusical factors, to support  activism.… 
White power rock helps a young person identify his group; the words to the 
songs give him an analysis of where his problems come from, supplemented by 
the reading he’s done in the magazines his favorite bands have recommended. 
On a given night, singing along to Skrewdriver roaring in the background, he 
takes the step into action that his ideology, his identity, his peers, his group, all 
seem to suggest is necessary.108
Music, then, is not the sole driver towards ideological action—and its manifestation 
through violence—but it can be a powerful component. It is important  to note that 
while listening to extreme-right music will not inevitably provoke a violent reaction, 
violent incidents can still be contextualised, instigated and incited by music.
 Even if violence is not seen as an inevitability, it still holds a significant place 
in the extreme-right imagination. Music to imagine violence can remind listeners of 
the sacrifice they are expected to make for their cause, but also the rewards that will 
ensue from this sacrifice. It  can also allow the listener to indulge in fantasies in 
which enemies are punished for their degeneracy. Music to commemorate violence, 
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seen most  clearly  in the depiction of extreme-right supporters as warriors and their 
placing in a line of warrior archetypes such as the Vikings and Nazis (see Chapter 
Six), gives a context and legitimacy to struggle. Such functions are arguably as 
significant as the use of music to accompany and incite actual violence.
 Perhaps most importantly, the significance of violence places an emphasis on 
a specific notion of masculinity. The particular appeal of extreme-right politics to 
marginalised white men has seen it associated with the idea of a current “crisis” of 
masculinity. In this understanding, modern processes of deindustrialisation, and a 
resulting reduction of reliance on physical strength in the workplace, have challenged 
men’s privileged place in the employment market. Added to this, feminist successes 
in increasing the proportion of women in the workplace and, in the context of the 
extreme right, the ethnic diversification of labour forces, is said to have isolated and 
disorientated the modern man.109
 The extent to which this “crisis” exists is questionable. A focus on the 
changing nature of the job market, and a supposed subsequent loss of power for 
certain strata of the workforce, suggests that  this is a problem for the working-class, 
rather than a challenge to masculinity. It has also been argued that this “crisis” is 
merely a result of the “unmarked normativity” of white men being challenged;110 
while the extent to which this is a recent phenomenon has also been questioned.111 
Even so, this crisis is said to be a significant contributory factor for the existence of 
and recruitment to extreme-right movements.
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 The supposed obsolescence of masculine values is seen as a sign of the 
inherently  underachieving nature of extreme-right supporters, as in this assessment 
of skinheads:
Skin bravado was, in fact, loser nihilism; all they were good at was aggro and 
kicking people when they were down. Their power came from having nothing 
to lose. They knew where they were (lost) and what  they were (rubbish) in a 
world which didn’t even need their muscle power any more.112
However, others view a yearning for the reassertion of masculine dominance as a 
natural reaction to a changing world:
It  is hardly surprising, then, that  American men lacking confidence in the 
government and the economy, troubled by the changing relations between the 
sexes, uncertain of their identity or their future began to dream, to fantasize 
about the powers and features of another kind of man who could retake and 
reorder the world. And the hero of all these dreams was the para-military 
warrior.113
Kimmel and Ferber argue that  the militia man is the embodiment of these dreams, 
but the role could also be assumed by “warrior” figures such as skinheads. Often, 
these dreams of re-establishing white masculine dominance also entail the 
punishment of those responsible: someone will eventually pay for the perceived 
marginalisation of white men. Eventually, they will have an opportunity to 
demonstrate their physical superiority.
 Violence may be linked mostly with youth, with skinheads generally being 
seen as a youth cult, and most extreme-right music targeted at  a youth market. That is 
not to say  that violent acts are only  the work of adolescents, but that it is generally 
youths who are encouraged to do it; in the militia movements of the United States, 
the active terrorists tend to be in their twenties, while the typical member is likely to 
be in their late thirties to their fifties. Militias are regarded as a more focused form of 
extreme-right organisation, to which young men “graduate” following the hate 
crimes committed in their youth.114  With this in mind, extreme-right music might 
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encourage young men to “prove” their masculinity  in an approved way, although 




“Saga Music”: Paganism, Myth and Fantasy in the Extreme-Right 
Music Scene
“We shall remain forever loyal to our gods up high;
In Asgard they shall reign throughout the great Nordic skies;
We still fight on to this day to restore the great Norse way;
It will be hard but we won’t quit till we’ve removed this God of lies;
Let us not forget our past, and stories of long time told;
Remember the many fallen who died in the battles of old.”
Ásatrú, ‘Ásatrú Warriors’, 2249 RE—Demos, Blind Leper, 1999.
“Be a Berserker until the day you depart for Valhalla with a 
pound of the enemies [sic] lead in your still defiant body!!!”
David Lane, ‘Open Letter to a Dead Race’, 
Collection of Works of David Lane, n.d., p.193.
“I prophesise the coming era of the great rebirth of Paganism, the rebirth of the 
Aryan Pagan Empire, stronger because of the experiences of the last two thousand 
years. More than a thousand years of Christian rule that is strange to our true 
Pagan culture could not stand the test of time, as today Christianity collapses, and 
we find that true European Pagan traditions and belief survived.… The sounds of 
war horns will get us heated to fight. A lot of us will die, but we will die with joy, 
because we want to let our blood flow for the glory of the Pagan Aryan Empire.”
‘Interview with Graveland’, Resistance, Iss.7 1996, p.53.
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The use of mythic subjects is a common thread throughout the history of the 
extreme-right music scene, particularly  in lyrics, but also in band names, album 
artwork, and diverse merchandise. While the use of myth by the contemporary 
extreme right is undoubtedly  influenced by the ideology of Nazism, in many ways it 
is so markedly different that  it can be considered a distinct phenomenon. This 
chapter assesses the place of myth in the extreme-right music scene, in lyrics, album 
artwork, and also the “mythologising” of particular figures. The examples cited show 
that the appropriation of myth by the extreme right serves two broad functions: First, 
it attempts to establish contemporary extreme-right movements as the inheritors of 
shared cultural tradition, simultaneously  placing extreme-right policies as part of a 
shared national heritage; second, myth serves as a model for activism, with myth 
often serving as allegory  for how contemporary struggles can be won. A further 
function that myth can serve is aiding the imagining of a broader community;1 this is 
particularly evident in the use of less nationally-specific mythology (such as Viking 
mythology, explored below) to establish a sense of communality between the 
extreme-right movements in the Nordic European nations. This function can be 
especially useful given the lack of a shared religion across extreme-right movements.
 Fantasy is used in a similar manner to myth, although not on the same scale. 
By drawing on established literature, particularly J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, 
the extreme right draw analogies between struggles of good against evil and their 
own political movement. Such examples are often simple to appropriate; the light-
skinned races representing the forces of good in Tolkien’s work are easily contrasted 
with the dark-skinned evil races.
 Throughout its history, the extreme-right music scene has identified itself as a 
political cause rather than a commercial concern.2  This is reflected in the lyrical 
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themes that recur throughout the movement’s history: as a rule, the scene eschews 
the conventional subjects of popular music—love and sex. Instead, love for one’s 
country  and dismay  at its degeneration (usually blamed on non-“indigenous” ethnic 
groups) are the norm, although the expression varies; Skrewdriver and their 
contemporaries tended explicitly to demonise and attack perceived enemies 
(particularly communists, Jews and ethnic minorities), while “softer” recent releases 
have instead emphasised traditional values which are believed to represent the 
inherent character of the nation, albeit  at times focusing on the degenerate 
characteristics of immigrants. While extreme-right music addresses these concerns 
through music set in the present-day, there is also a tendency  to look to the past—
especially to myth—in order to articulate these ideologies.
Myth, past and present
The term “myth” has ambiguous and diverse meanings. “Myth” and “mythology” 
often refer to a story  or collection of stories, as in “Greek myth/ology,” concerning a 
hero, godlike being or event, that attempts to explain a certain phenomenon which 
human beings routinely  experience. This definition is probably most  clearly 
illustrated by the canon of origin myths, which seek to explain how the world came 
into being. Often, this use of myth is restricted to ancient cultures, although, as 
discussed below, some scholars have argued that  it  is applicable to modern societies. 
In this definition myth and mythology are usually interchangeable, and also have 
similarities with the term “legend.”3  Both myth and mythology can also be used to 
refer to scholarship (hereon referred to as “myth studies”) associated with these 
stories and canons. 
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 While this definition is ambiguous enough, the usage of “myth” in everyday  
language presents a further complication. At its simplest, “myth” is frequently  used 
to describe anything that is false, and to draw attention to the falsity  of the thing. 
Related to this is the definition of myth as a widely-held collective belief in 
something false. “Myth” has also been incorporated into semiotics, particularly 
influenced by Barthes’ analysis of “modern myths” and his contention that myth is a 
mode of speech, through which socially constructed notions and ideologies become 
naturalised in a society’s collective consciousness.4
 This chapter will consider and employ myth mainly in the sense of a canon of 
widely-known stories, but even this apparently narrower definition is fraught with 
difficulties and ambiguities. Flood notes that, despite “the apparent importance 
attached to myth in contemporary  societies,” the study of myth from a range of 
disciplinary  perspectives, rather than bringing “richness in diversity,” has in fact led 
to fragmentation and a lack of consensus over the phenomenon and the term.5 With 
such a proliferation of theories about myth, it is worth taking a moment to detail how 
this chapter understands the term.
 Many myth scholars have restricted the term’s application to “primitive” 
societies, precluding the formation of modern myths. This assertion is sometimes 
justified with the claim that myth is an attempt to understand and explain the world 
before the advent of conceptual reason, with the mythic mode of thought sometimes 
referred to as “prelogical.” Ernst Cassirer, in Language and Myth, argued that 
“before man thinks in terms of logical concepts, he holds his experiences by means 
of clear, separate, mythical images.”6  As Cassirer viewed language and myth as 
different stems of the same root, he believed that the process of abstracting language 
from its prehistoric, and mythic, origin and significance was part of the advance from 
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“‘momentary gods’… born from the need or the specific feeling of a critical 
moment” to the use of language in the service of logic.7 Despite noting the period of 
momentary  gods as the “lowest form,” and referring to a diverse assortment of non-
European cultures as “savages,” Cassirer was not necessarily arguing the inferiority 
of pre-Enlightenment humanity. Instead, he was articulating the relatively common 
view in myth studies that myth served the purpose of explaining the world until the 
intellectual tools of logic and science were of a sufficient standard to make myth’s 
function obsolete. The prevalence of irrationality, and hence myth, was in this model 
confined to the distant past or to distant cultures.
 Cassirer himself changed his position in The Myth of the State.8  Here the 
perceived irrationality  of myth was found in the rise of National Socialism, a 
decidedly  modern phenomenon. Flood, in his Political Myth, drew comparisons—as 
well as distinctions—between the “sacred myth” of ancient societies and the 
“political myth” of contemporary  ones (citing The Myth of the State specifically  as a 
“pioneering contribution to the study of political myth”9). Linking the definition of 
political myth to concepts of sacred myth and political ideology, Flood defines it as 
an ideologically marked account of past, present, or predicted political events. 
By ideologically marked, I mean that  the narrative discourse carries the imprint 
of the assumptions, values, and goals associated with a specific ideology or 
identifiable family of ideologies, and that  it  therefore conveys an explicit or 
implicit invitation to assent to a particular ideological standpoint.10
It is Flood’s concept of political myths which will mainly be employed in this 
chapter, since extreme-right use of myth is—clearly—ideologically  marked, but I do 
not draw as clear a distinction between “sacred” and “political” myths as Flood does, 
partly, as he argues, because they serve broadly similar purposes, and partly because 
the process by  which the extreme right creates political from sacred myths blurs any 
clear distinction between the two.
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 Some definitions of myth restrict themselves to narratives concerning the 
creation of the world and the human race, and to the affairs of the gods. Such 
restrictive definitions preclude the creation of modern myths based on the culture 
hero who, according to Flood, “is not normally portrayed as the creator of the world 
but is the one who completes the world by making it  habitable for man, thus bringing 
culture. Often the son of the creator-god, he embodies both the divine and the 
human.”11 One need only think of Arthurian legend to see an example of the apparent 
divinity of man, a divinity which elements of the extreme right have advocated for 
their own cultural heroes (see Contemporary mythologising, below).
 My definition of “myth” is deliberately broad, partly  in order to accommodate 
the diverse ways in which it is employed by the extreme right, and partly because 
this chapter is not intended to lead to a greater understanding of the concept of myth 
itself, but to achieve a greater understanding of the extreme right through its 
employment of myth. In his historical assessment of myth studies, Cassirer writes 
that “Every scholar still found in myth those objects with which he was most 
familiar. At bottom the different schools saw in the magic mirror of myth only their 
own faces.”12  Cassirer’s account certainly  lends weight  to his thesis, as he outlines 
the multitude of ways in which scholars have attempted to establish a single unifying 
theory  of myth, relating it to inherent human characteristics, whether to do with 
sexuality, linguistics etc. While no theory has established itself, Cassirer’s concept of 
the “magic mirror” is itself useful; just as theories of myth revealed the academic 
interests of scholars, so the use of myth by  the extreme right reveals ideological 
evolution and nuance. 
 Bronisław Malinowski, in his analysis of Melanesian societies, writes that 
myth fulfils “an indispensable function: it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it 
safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains 
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practical rules for the guidance of man.”13  Although Malinowski’s work was 
conducted on a society  in which myth was held to be literally  true—something which 
might not be said for all mythic appropriations by the extreme right—his thesis 
seems just as relevant to contemporary mythologising; in his analysis of Melanesian 
culture, Malinowski considers how historical accuracy is subordinate to the 
propagandistic needs of the tale-tellers:
The historical consideration of myth is interesting, therefore, in that it shows 
that myth, taken as a whole, cannot  be sober dispassionate history, since it  is 
always made ad hoc to fulfil a certain sociological function, to glorify a certain 
group, or to justify an anomalous status. These considerations show us also that 
to the native mind immediate history, semi-historic legend, and unmixed myth 
flow into one another, form a continuous sequence, and fulfil really the same 
sociological function. And this brings us once more to our original contention 
that the really important thing about  the myth is its character of a retrospective, 
ever-present, live actuality.14
This chapter explores similar cases of a more contemporary nature in which 
established myth is mixed together with historical and contemporary figures and 
events to fulfill the ideological needs of the extreme right. Within the vast canon of 
belligerent lyrics in extreme-right music, myth provides a context and a continuum 
for present-day activity. As well as providing subject  matter consistent with the 
scene’s narrative of being concerned with more weighty  matters than the commercial 
music industry, this use of myth perpetuates the notion of the chosen few, 
simultaneously  exhorting those few to overcome their difficulties and march on to 
greatness. This particular usage of myth also asserts a common bond between 
nationally and linguistically distinct peoples, arguing that they share a common 
heritage in particular historic and mythic tropes, particularly the Vikings.
The lure of the Vikings
In 2001 the BNP magazine Identity included an article purporting to be a “reprinting” 
from a 2005 Australian nationalist magazine (in fact written specifically for Identity), 
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discussing the rise of a new phenomenon: “White Roots Music.” Perhaps, through its 
format, betraying the influence of The Turner Diaries, the article touches on the 
imagined evolution of extreme-right musics, including the creation of “Saga Music”:
Still other bands, meanwhile, set about creating an alternative to commercial 
black rap by fusing modern dance, garage and industrial music with lyrics taken 
from the Western poetic tradition—a concept  initially dubbed “White Rap,” but 
later described by the more apt  term “Saga Music,” after the way in which the 
ancient  Viking tales were originally recited with musical accompaniment. 
Beowulf, Tennyson’s ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’ and extracts from accounts 
of the Battle of Rorke’s Drift were all brought to life for a fresh generation in 
this way (much to the horror of intellectual snobs who wanted to keep them 
untouched, particularly by “rough” working class kids).15
Here is an idealised example of the place of myth in the extreme-right music scene. 
The “saga” of the Vikings is unproblematically  cited as part of the heritage of 
Britain, perhaps through a conception of it as part of a pan-North European identity 
(examined in more detail below). The inclusion of accounts from Rorke’s Drift, 
where the imperial British army “heroically” fought off the hordes of “barbaric” 
native Zulus, is hardly subtle in its analogy.
 Remarkably, there have indeed been attempts to create Saga Music, or at least 
a nationalist alternative to rap.16 Evidence is reported in two conflicting sources—
BNP’s Identity and anti-fascist  magazine Searchlight—and their accounts of the 
entertainment at the 2002 Red White and Blue Festival. Identity makes reference to 
“an innovative setting of several Kipling poems to electronic dance music by “M.C. 
Kipling,”17 while a Searchlight infiltrator reports that: “One good laugh for all the 
wrong reasons was Wordsworth, who, the BNP claims, is the only white rap  artist. 
He gave up after a couple of attempts and told the audience he would change his 
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material for next year.”18  Whatever the reality, these experiments were never 
repeated and have no trace on BNP releases, so it seems safe to say  they did not meet 
with a positive reception from the Red White and Blue audience.
 While the prophecy of “Saga music” remains unfulfilled, the ideology  behind 
it is evident in much of the extreme-right music scene’s output.19 One particular issue 
that extreme-right ideology has been keen to address is the lack of a shared religion 
which can be held up as a unifying factor across disparate nations. The different 
denominations of Christianity, and the rivalries between them, have led some 
sections of the movement to identify forcefully  with one or another; for example, the 
British extreme right has generally  been strongly  anti-Papist, due to its Unionist 
stance.20
 There are also those who reject Christianity altogether, citing its roots in 
Judaism and suggesting it is another manifestation of Jewish global domination. 
Groups such as Christian Identity have reconciled their faith with anti-Semitism and 
racism through the belief that  white Europeans are the descendants of the Lost Tribes 
of Israel, that Jews are the children of Satan and that non-white “mud people” are 
inferior creatures with no soul, created before Adam and Eve. Christian Identity 
therefore interprets extreme-right ideology as compatible with Christian doctrine, but 
the movement is essentially restricted to the United States, and its adherents are 
estimated to be relatively  few, at around 25,000.21  While some extreme-right 
supporters are comfortable with Christianity, others view it as a Jewish construction 
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which is “alien” to the white race, or see it as too “soft,” looking instead to identify 
with something more European in heritage, and with more emphasis on strength and 
power.
 This has led to an increased interest in Paganism and its associated mythical 
canon, optimistically  identified as a true Nordic religion and a source of communal 
white identity, resulting in neo-Paganist movements drawing particularly on Viking 
culture, such as Odinism or Asatrú. Mattias Gardell asserts that in the United States 
racist paganism is surpassing “national socialist parties and the Ku Klux Klan(s), in 
terms of numbers and influence.”22
 Of course, Paganism is not restricted solely to the extreme right, and there are 
various branches of Paganism active in contemporary  society. In her introduction to a 
collection of essays considering the various denominations, Charlotte Hardman 
posits that “[t]he interest in Paganism today  in the UK and the USA may be 
interpreted as a response to an increasing dissatisfaction with the way the world is 
going ecologically, spiritually and materially; people are disillusioned by  mainstream 
religion and the realisation that materialism leaves an internal emptiness.”23 
Disillusion is often cited as a reason for the increasing electoral success of the 
extreme right;24 with minor alterations the preceding quote could well describe the 
attractions of the extreme right in the modern political environment.
 Viking paganism undoubtedly incorporates a racial element, even outwith 
those groups explicitly  identified with the extreme right, as detailed by Graham 
Harvey in his summary of one of the British sects:
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A major stress of this Odinic Rite is summed up in the words beneath their logo: 
“Faith, Folk, Family.” Along with other Heathen groups they are keen to stress 
that they are not racist  but do believe that  each “race” has a tradition which 
people would be more fulfilled following. They encourage the development  of 
the culture of each “race” believing that only confusion and stress can come 
from the mix of peoples and cultures. Odinism is considered to be the primary 
cultural tradition of the people of Britain descended from German and 
Scandinavian ancestry. Nonetheless… the Odinic Rite [do not] have much time 
for “political correctness,” and some members certainly hold views similar to 
those of right-wing political groups.25
This is certainly  not true of all Odinic sects (see particularly The Odinshof 26), but 
such groups must nevertheless be careful about the publicity of their activities, 
especially given the negative connotations of some Viking symbolism such as the 
swastika (the swastika, or fylfot, is found on numerous Viking artefacts). On the 
other hand, these religious groups do not associate themselves explicitly with 
extreme-right politics, and ethnocentric views are entirely compatible with, for 
example, Celtic paganism. However, the particular interest of the extreme right in 
Viking culture is something of an exception to the typical trends: “The main spiritual 
paths of Paganism to be found in the UK and the United States are Wicca, Druidry, 
Shamanism, Goddess Spirituality, Sacred Ecology, Heathenism and various Magical 
Groups….”27  Evidently, Viking paganism offers its own peculiar attractions, above 
and beyond popular pagan alternatives.
 One place where fascination with Vikings and extreme-right music is 
particularly significant is Sweden, one of the historical heartlands of the Viking 
diaspora. The term “Vikingarock” (“Viking Rock”) is used to describe a genre of 
music which merged elements of folk music with rock and punk, and came to 
prominence in the 1990s with the Swedish band Ultima Thule. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the association of Ultima Thule—the only extreme-right band ever 
signed to a major label—with organisations such as Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep 
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Sweden Swedish), and their links with more explicitly racist bands and labels, has 
resulted in the term’s interchangeability with other labels such as “white power 
music.”
 Unsurprisingly given the genre they operate in, the Viking theme recurs 
throughout Ultima Thule’s catalogue, most notably in album titles such as 
Vikingabalk  and Vikingablod. Old Norse imagery  is used to the utmost, as in the 
artwork of För Fäderneslandet, which shows a Viking, complete with mythic horned 
helmet, at the helm of a longship. The cover of Vikingabalk endeavours to naturalise 
the relationship between Vikings and modern Swedish identity, juxtaposing the 
Swedish flag with a warrior’s helmet. The link between Sweden’s past  and a present 
sense of belonging is evident in Ultima Thule’s lyrics, which often take a belligerent 
form. Viking symbolism and references thus become a shorthand for the notion that 
Swedishness is restricted to the “natives,” and must be fought for.
 Outside of Scandinavia, the preoccupation with the Vikings might seem 
strange, especially when a more apt heritage appears to be available (such as Anglo-
Saxons in England). There are three main functions that Viking mythology fulfills for 
the extreme-right. The first of these is intimated in Andrew Wawn’s description of 
the Viking vogue in the Victorian era, with the argument that “Anglo-Saxonism has 
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Fig. 4: Ultima Thule’s 
album För Fäderneslandet, 
Ultima Thule Records, 1992.
never found the right logo.”28 This was the period in which much of the iconography 
of Vikings (particularly  long-ships and horned helmets) was established, and Wawn’s 
analysis cuts to the heart  of the Viking appeal: their instant recognisability. Actually 
practising paganism might be rare, but their iconography is easily  recognised and 
reproduced. Many adherents to extreme-right ideology  esteem the Vikings, perhaps 
in part due to similar Nazi appropriation; the Scandinavian Odal rune was adopted by 
an SS division during the war and has since been revived and imitated by various 
extreme-right groups. 
 Alongside the PR success detailed by Wawn, Viking culture also represents a 
golden age, as articulated by Gardell:
Nationalists generally produce an imagined community by projecting the idea of 
a corporative nation back into legendary or mythological time, often presented 
as a “golden age,” a time untainted by the ills of the modern world and liberated 
from whomever is designated the national enemy. Frequently, the nationalist 
intends to revert to the ideals of the glorious high culture, albeit adopted to suit 
current conditions. Thus the importance of pre-Christian Norse culture to Aryan 
pagans….29
While Gardell’s work is primarily restricted to those who use Norse traditions to 
fulfill spiritual needs, such projections are not restricted to the religious. In 
appropriating these traditions and symbols, the contemporary extreme right presents 
itself as the authentic heir to North European tradition. This serves the additional 
function of asserting a homogeneous North European identity, which transcends 
national borders.
 Finally, the Vikings fulfill a particular standard as a warrior race. While 
mythic subjects are fairly common in extreme-right music, they are scarce in 
comparison to songs which speak in genericisms of soldiers, battles and martyrdom. 
While these are often vague, the Vikings provide a notable example of the warlike 
supremacy of the white race, despite the fact that they were mainly fighting other 
whites. The rhetoric of the extreme right is frequently couched in combative 
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language; this is especially true of Skrewdriver and their contemporaries, who lauded 
skinheads and street culture as the partisans of the modern-day battlefield. As shown 
below, this link is often made explicit; the warriors of the past share the spirit  of the 
warriors of today, and in turn, their battles are cast as glorious in an attempt to 
legitimise the violence carried out in the name of the extreme right.
 Towards the end of their career, references to myth began to appear frequently  
in Skrewdriver songs. This paralleled the growing number of extreme-right 
supporters paying homage to pagan gods—particularly from Norse mythology—
despite a professed goal of protecting White Protestants. While it was not until 
1989’s Warlord that Skrewdriver would include explicit references to mythology in 
their songs, they had been using its imagery since their return to music as a political 
band. The cover of Hail The New Dawn shows a Viking raiding party disembarking a 
longboat; Blood & Honour shows a muscular Viking with a bloodstained axe 
surveying a landscape; Warlord has a prominent spear-armed Viking in the 
background, while a tank makes its way over a road of skulls (Fig. 5); while The 
Strong Survive settles for the relative 
simplicity of a bare-chested Viking armed 
with an improbably large axe staring at the 
observer.30
 A popular lyrical theme is 
Valhalla, a symbol which fulfills two 
functions: it asserts the existence of a 
chosen few; and maps the obligations one 
must accomplish in order to take his31 
place among them, in this case fighting for 
the supremacy of the white race. The sense 
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Fig. 5: Skrewdriver, Warlord, Rock-O-
Rama, 1989.
of appointedness is also relevant to considerations of paganism in general, as Harvey 
states: “The attractions of quasi-secret society  membership, those special and 
different from the rest with additional magical powers to boot, supports the myth of 
the Chosen Few and segments within paganism exist to meet the needs of those 
seduced by such elitist conceptions.”32 In this context, Skrewdriver’s cover of White 
Lion’s ‘The Road to Valhalla’ (Freedom What Freedom, Rock-O-Rama, 1992) is 
made to conform to extreme-right ideology:
There is a road and it leads to Valhalla;
Where only the chosen are allowed.
References to Valhalla are not restricted to ideologically pliable covers; No Remorse, 
a band second only to Skrewdriver in their popularity in the extreme-right scene, 
espouse a similar ideology in their song ‘See You In Valhalla’ (See You In Valhalla, 
RAC Records, 1989):
Young warrior, with heart of pride;
Goddess of fate by his side;
Out to fight for kith and kin;
The rage of Odin to forge his wind;
He raised his sword and slayed his foe;
He was brought to the ground by an enemy bow;
I saw that great warrior fall;
And this is what I heard him call;
[chorus]
I stood by my people and my people’s needs;
And if a man is judged by his deeds;
Then I'll see you in Valhalla.
Valhalla serves a dual purpose, as both a spiritual and a material goal. While its 
spiritual origin is made clear in the context of No Remorse’s fallen warrior, it also 
serves as a promised land in conjunction with the myth of the chosen few. The 
implication is that the road to Valhalla, in the custody of Skrewdriver, consists of 
adherence to extreme-right ideology, which will itself result in the establishment of 
an earthly Utopia.
 References to Viking Gods are restricted to Odin and Thor, as in No 
Remorse’s ‘Son of Odin’ (See You In Valhalla, RAC Records, 1989):
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Cowards tremble, men stand tall;
The strong survive, the weak they fall;
The time has come for the giants of men;
With the smash of his hammer nothing can contend.
[chorus]
Son of Odin, God of war;
Mighty hammer in the name of Thor.
The attraction of these two particular gods from a vast canon is fairly plain; their 
martial associations and the undoubted power they wield are employed as an allegory 
for the struggles of the contemporary  extreme right. Thor’s Hammer (Mjölnir) has 
particular resonance—interpreted as representing the strength of the Aryan race—
and has been adopted by extreme-right supporters, particularly in tattoos and on 
clothing. As well as being cited in lyrics, Mjölnir was the name of a German band 
(operating in the 1990s before splitting up due to the attention of the authorities), and 
Thor’s Hammer was the name of a Polish band active between 1997 and 2003. The 
latter made clear their hostility towards Christianity, as well as their belief in the 
coming revival of the heathen past, in ‘May the Hammer Smash the Cross’ (May the 
Hammer Smash the Cross, Ancestral Research Records, 2000):
May the hammer smash the cross, turn to pieces Jesus’ corpse;
May the wrath of the folk drive the foreign prophets out;
What is alien, what is wrong shall be banished or destroyed;
From the mighty heathen past warriors’ spirits shall arise.
While some bands use Norse symbols as a means to attack Christianity, others see it 
as a means of cleansing, framing it in a similar way to the purging power of violence 
explored in Chapter Five, as in Skrewdriver’s ‘God of Thunder’ (Freedom What 
Freedom):
Panic spreads, misery;
Lot of people live in poverty;
Decline of Europe, decline of man;
Long time ago when the rot began;
We need a saviour, before long;
Must be soon before the chance is gone;
The great leader, from the north;
A true warrior to defend the cause;
[chorus]
God of Thunder, God of War;
Hail Europe! Hail Thor!
God of Thunder, God of War;
Hail Europe! Hail Thor!
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Here, Norse Gods are proclaimed as saviours, as true warriors and as indicative of 
European superiority, all important aspects of extreme-right rhetoric.
 In his assessment of the influence of James Macpherson’s Ossian on Scottish 
identity, Stefan Thomas Hall proposes the following as Macpherson’s motivation:
Fame is only won by doing something. Heroes are only celebrated as beams of 
light if they fight. Mourning fallen heroes is fine, but not grieving to the point of 
inaction. The point  of mourning and reflecting on one’s dead ancestors is to 
inspire action and to generate more fame for one’s self and one’s race. 
Macpherson’s scheme of presenting us with melancholic ancient  poetry is not 
simply to make us mourn these dead heroes but to inspire the race of 
Highlanders to more fame, a fame gained through remembering the past and 
acting on it, a fame derived from being able to say that the Highlanders have 
famous ancestors who “were renowned in their day, the terror of other times.”33
Clearly, the use of the Vikings is a similar call to action. The examples cited above 
make clear the combative rhetoric favoured by  the extreme right; the cause is a 
battle, and supporters are warriors. By using the imagery  and symbolism of the 
Vikings’ martial prowess and ferocity—to the exclusion of their achievements as 
immigrants, farmers and traders—the extreme right make clear that their 
interpretation is based on force and combat. This is reinforced by the references to 
Norse gods; of the vast canon available, only  Odin and Thor—God of War and 
hammer-wielding warrior respectively—are routinely referenced, making clear the 
one-dimensional interpretation of Viking culture by the extreme right.
 While the Vikings are thus interpreted to conform to certain facets of 
extreme-right ideology, they  also serve an important function as a lingua franca 
across various extreme-right movements. Viking iconography  is instantly 
recognisable, and is far less controversial than the use of Nazi symbolism. Norse 
religion also provides a supposedly  authentic Aryan religion which not only has the 
potential to override Christian factionalism, but is presented as a counter to the 
Jewish influence of Christianity. In this way, Viking myth and imagery have come to 
signify the internationalism of the extreme right.
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Arthurian Nationalism
Attempts have also been made to mine nation-specific mythologies; in a British 
context, the most conspicuous example is the use of Arthurian mythology. This 
association is at least as old as the National Front, which had its HQ at Excalibur 
House, while the splinter group National Front Constitutional Movement published a 
journal of the same name, with one issue including the “theme tune” of the 
movement, also called Excalibur.34  The BNP has carried on this tradition, with its 
merchandising arm also bearing the name Excalibur. It is significant that the most 
frequently cited aspect of Arthurian mythology is his sword; as in the case of the 
Vikings, myth seems to be particularly  valued for its militancy. Excalibur plays a 
further role in its association with the rightful rule of Britain; by staking claim to 
Excalibur, the extreme right cast themselves as speaking for the nation, as its rightful 
rulers.
 The myth of Arthur’s return at a time of great need tallies well with extreme-
right rhetoric about the apparently vulnerable position of the white race, while 
Excalibur itself provides a metaphor for the conflict that  this will engender, and the 
assuredness of victory:
Excalibur, it came to Arthur - Excalibur!
The sword that came from the lady of the lake - Excalibur!
And one day as the nation cries in agony - Excalibur!
The king will rise again for our people's sake.35
Even in the music of Great White Records, intended to be less confrontational than 
established extreme-right music, it is Excalibur which is cited. In Joey Smith’s 
‘English Pride’ (Not Just About the Music, Great White Records, 2008), one of the 
manifestations of this pride is “the sword Excalibur in King Arthur’s hand.” The 
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appeal of Arthurian legend has spread beyond Britain, with a popular Czech metal 
band choosing to name themselves Excalibur.
 While some songs make explicit reference to Arthurian legend, others are 
more ambiguous in their subject, as in the title track from Skrewdriver’s Warlord 
(Rock-O-Rama, 1989):
No one’s ever gonna take away his land;
Not whilst he has the power in his hands;
He appears when his nation is in danger;
To all our enemies he’s the slayer.
While the subject of this song could be interpreted to be King Arthur, given the 
prominence of the once and future king in the British national consciousness, this 
character is only  referred to ambiguously as “Warlord.” ‘Warlord’ is followed by 
‘One In A Million II’, a tribute to Hitler’s bodyguard. Hitler is not explicitly named, 
but the reference to 1933 as the “start” leaves no doubt about the subject:
Into battle, a fearless man;
Been around since the struggle began…;
He did it all for his people;
He stood and fought against the evil…;
’33 was the order’s start;
Ten thousand to begin the guard…;
They marched from tyranny to freedom;
The people with the hero there to lead them…;
Now they’re ready to give their all;
They can hear their forefathers’ call;
Death will march at their right hand;
Victory will be the black bands’;
Marching for a Europe of the people;
And at their head their gallant leader.
The “gallant leader” of the final line may not necessarily refer to the sleeping hero 
awakened, but  may simply refer to the figurehead being fought for. While numerous 
such figureheads have been used for other songs (including Arthur, Odin, Thor), it 
seems fairly plain here that the reference is to Hitler. The myth of King Arthur’s 
Messianic return is therefore appropriated for a newer cultural figure, part  of the 
process of contemporary mythologising.
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Mythologising Nazism
The religiosity surrounding Hitler during the Nazi era is striking; one need only think 
of the cult of personality which he cultivated, the quasi-religious nature of mass 
rallies—complete with congregations, preaching, and sacred iconography—and the 
almost biblical reverence accorded by supporters to Mein Kampf. It is no surprise 
that the British extreme right of the immediate post-war period was still infatuated 
with this state religion, and equally  unsurprising that, as a result, the movement was 
essentially  considered by voters and the media to be the preserve of the disturbed. 
This negative image was reinforced by the widely reported wedding ceremony in 
1963 of Françoise Dior, niece of fashion designer Christian, and Colin Jordan, one of 
the leading figures of the extreme right in post-war Britain (summarised here by 
Martin Walker):
For the occasion, she [Dior] wore a black and gold swastika necklace, encrusted 
with diamonds. They supped mead, toasted the British Nazi movement to the 
strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, and over a swastika-draped table, swore that 
they were of untainted Aryan blood, cut their fingers and let the mingled drop of 
blood fall on to an open page of a virgin copy of Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Within 
three months they were separated; they were briefly reconciled, but Jordan was 
granted a divorce in October 1967.36
The reverence for the Nazis is plain throughout the history of the music scene as 
well, from the swastikas adorning album covers (e.g. Dirlewanger’s Rocking for the 
Golden Race), to the Nazi salutes exchanged between musicians and audience at 
concerts; even the name Blood & Honour is taken from the motto of the Hitler 
Youth.
 Although admiration of the Nazis obviously found expression in idolatry  of 
Hitler, Rudolf Hess’s failed attempt to broker peace with the United Kingdom is seen 
as a heroic effort to end the “brother war,” an attempt they felt was undermined by 
the machinations of Communists or Jews. Skrewdriver’s ‘Prisoner of Peace’ (Blood 
& Honour, Rock-O-Rama, 1985) implies the influence of the latter:
He stuck up for his country, but he didn’t like the cost;
The European brother war, and lives were being lost;
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He saw the grieving mothers whose sons could not be found;
He wanted peace to stop the endless coffins in the ground…;
To sue for peace was his idea in 1941;
But the bankers’ grip was oh so tight, and the chance for peace was gone.
[chorus]
Free Rudolf Hess;
How long can they keep him there? We can only guess.
Two years later Hess committed suicide, and Skrewdriver released another tribute in 
‘Forty-Six Years’ (After the Fire, Rock-O-Rama, 1988):
They tried to break him with their corrupt ways;
Offered freedom until the end of his days;
Wanted him to denounce the Führer;





He stayed true to his faith.
Hess is thus held up as a kind of martyr, sacrificing himself and his career in an 
attempt to end a white “civil war,” and then staying true to his ideals despite 
supposedly unjust imprisonment. Hess is still held in high esteem by the extreme 
right; his remains had to be exhumed and cremated and his gravestone destroyed 
because his burial site had become a place of pilgrimage.37
 The reference to faith and devotion in ‘Forty-Six Years’ is significant; Nazism 
and racial pride are cast as a religion, the true faith. Those on the extreme right are 
the chosen few, persecuted on account of this faith. The chorus of No Remorse’s 
‘One Folk, One Faith’ (Blood Against Gold, Rock-O-Rama, 1991) makes the explicit 
connection between race and faith:
One Nation, One Race;
One Folk, One Faith.
“Faith” is thus explicitly tied to race, an innate quality  which has the potential to 
unite whites everywhere once and for all.
 The moral authority of Nazism is referenced in ‘The Snow Fell’ (White Rider, 
Rock-O-Rama, 1987), a very popular Skrewdriver song which is perhaps even more 
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popular in Saga’s cover version. It casts Stalin as “the beast” and the invading 
German army as “the forces of light”:
They took the old roads, that Napoleon had taken before;
They fought as the forces of light against the darkness in a holy war;
One day they were looking out in the sunshine on the cornflowers;
The next day they were freezing to death in the snow and the ice cold showers.
[chorus]
And the snow fell, covering the dreams and ideals;
And the snow fell, freezing the blood and the wheels;
And the snow fell, they had to keep warm for survival;
And the snow fell, and defeated the beast’s only rivals.
The mournful music of ‘The Snow Fell’ adds to the sense of tragedy, with the Nazi 
invasion of the Soviet Union proclaimed as a moral crusade defeated by unfortunate 
circumstances, with severe consequences for contemporary  society. ‘The Snow Fell’ 
depicts the defeat of the Nazis by  the Soviets as the low-point of the extreme-right 
struggle from which the white race must now rise. As such, it  is part of the mythic 
thread that the extreme right makes between past and contemporary figures and 
events.
Making a Mythic Thread
In September 1993, Skrewdriver frontman Ian Stuart Donaldson was killed in a car 
crash. Not only  did this rob the scene of its most significant band and solo artist, it 
ended the period of relative calm when Donaldson was in control of Blood & 
Honour. With his death, the extreme-right music scene collapsed into infighting and 
factionalism, with each camp attempting to lay claim to Donaldson’s legacy. The 
neo-Nazi organisation Combat 18 quickly set up ISD Records in order to stake its 
claim, although violent feuds soon destroyed any possibility of further unity. As of 
today, there are a number of websites trading on the Blood & Honour name and 
w h i c h d e n o u n c e o n e a n o t h e r a s t r a i t o r s ; f o r i n s t a n c e , h t t p : / /
www.bloodandhonour.com/ carries a statement calling itself the “legitimate Blood & 
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Honour Movement” while dismissing http://www.bloodandhonour.org/ as “wankers 
masquerading as Blood & Honour.”38
 The consistent lauding of Donaldson made him more significant in death than 
he was in life; he became the touchstone of the entire scene, and was viewed as a 
prophet on a par with the Nazis. No Remorse were quick to record their tribute, 
‘Farewell Ian Stuart’ (We Play For You, joint release with Svastika, Nordland 
Records, 1994):
So farewell to a comrade, and farewell to a friend;
You did your best, you shone above the rest, you were a white man until the end;
Farewell Ian Stuart, a man we held so high;
You will live forever, because heroes, heroes never die.
This hagiography is reminiscent of Skrewdriver’s own tribute to Rudolf Hess: both 
figures are lauded for staying true to the cause until the end and for leaving a legacy 
which will continue after their death.
 The elevation of Donaldson to heroic status was, before very long, inflected 
with martyrdom, an example of the conspiratorial predilection of the extreme right 
explored in Chapter Two. Most commonly, it is declared that Donaldson was 
murdered by the British Secret Service. Combat 18 distributed a leaflet claiming as 
much, while a biographer claimed that the evidence to support  this claim included, 
among other things, the fact that “the date of the ‘accident’ coincided precisely to the 
1939 Nazi law forbidding jews from owning a wireless and listening to music on the 
radio. Retorsion [sic] served ice cold by the Diaspora.”39
 The same source also stated that Donaldson once informed Combat  18 
members he believed he was going to be killed. This concern had evidently been on 
Donaldson’s mind for some years, given the contemplation of his mortality  on 1989’s 
‘Suddenly’ (Warlord, Rock-O-Rama):
One day if suddenly, I'm forced to take my leave;
Will you still carry on, with the things that we believe?
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One day if suddenly, they take my life away;
Will you still be fighting to win a bright new day?
Donaldson’s concerns seem quite reasonable given the dangers which surround the 
scene, but since his death this song has solidified his status as martyr and prophet, 
aware of his own coming death and concerned for the cause he would leave behind.
 If Donaldson’s death engendered a mythic figure from within the music scene 
itself, his music still provides the extreme-right  music industry with most of its 
momentum. Skrewdriver are even now the most popular, and prominent, band on a 
variety of websites, and the most widely  discussed on messageboards. As well as 
their own sales, Skrewdriver left a wealth of material which other musicians have 
covered extensively; one of the Blood & Honour websites includes a substantial list 
of these acts and the songs they chose.40  The most significant of these covers are 
those recorded by the Swedish singer Saga who—having started as the singer for the 
metal band Symphony of Sorrow—gained popularity  with her albums My Tribute to 
Skrewdriver (three volumes, Midgård Records, 2000, 2000 and 2002).
 The elevation of Donaldson is part of a process by which contemporary  
extreme-right activists are granted the same status as their forebears; set as the 
rightful heirs of the Vikings or Nazis, with the same moral justification. The above-
cited (in The lure of the Vikings) ‘See You In Valhalla’ by No Remorse also includes 
the Nazis:
Fresh faced man engaged in war;
With the fight and the courage, the fight of Thor;
Out to defend the Fatherland;
From those invading - alien man;
The time has come to leave this place;
He fought and died for the love of his race;
Gun in hand, the soldier fell.
As well as skinheads:
Fighting those with flag of red;
Among the crowd, a true skinhead;
Fists of steel, heart of gold;
A man so loyal and a man so bold.
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The association in this song 
is also evident in the album 
artwork of No Remorse’s 
T h i s Ti m e t h e Wo r l d 
(Rebelles Européens, 1988, 
Fig. 6), which shows three 
figures: a warrior (perhaps 
Viking), an SS soldier 
armed with a machine gun, 
and a skinhead wearing a 
No Remorse shirt. Each is 
imbued with the same 
integrity  and virtue through 
their common cause, each is 
presented as part of the same continuum in European history.
 As political parties of the extreme right have endeavoured to increase their 
electoral potential, they have sought to dissociate themselves from neo-Nazi 
stereotypes. Various measures have addressed this, including banning uniforms; 
revising manifestos; and attempting to create a viable replacement music culture. 
While the inspirations may not be the same (Hitler is hardly  an influence many 
contemporary  political parties would care to admit), the process is similar: placing 
current activists in a historical canon. BNP artist Joey Smith’s ‘English Pride’ (Not 
Just About the Music, Great White Records, 2008) links together Arthurian legend, 
Admiral Nelson and the two World Wars into an undying seam of patriotism:
I was there, when our land began;
I was the sword Excalibur held in King Arthur’s Hand;
Yes I was there, since St George was young;
I was the horse he rode on when he slayed the dragon.
…
In 1805 I was on Nelson’s boat;
…
In World War One I was in the trench with them;
…
271
Fig. 6: No Remorse’s This Time the World, Rebelles 
Européens, 1988.
In World War Two I kept our troops going;
I helped them every mile, ’til they reached Berlin;
Follow me, you know you should;
I’m the voice that burns inside you;
And I run through your blood;
You know it’s right, I can feel it inside;
I will never die because I am English pride!
Here, Arthurian myth is cited alongside historically verifiable—albeit romanticised
—events; myth is used to provide a context and a continuum for contemporary 
struggles, while typifying an everlasting innate Englishness. The use of myth and 
symbols by the BNP seeks to distance the party from the unappealing face of 
extreme-right politics, while simultaneously attempting to establish the BNP as the 
authentic inheritors of the nation’s history and mythic tradition.
Appropriating Fantasy
While the appropriation of myth serves the function of portraying the extreme right 
as the inheritors of national cultural heritage (as in the case of the BNP and Arthurian 
legend), or as a symbol of international unity (as in the case of the Vikings or Nazis), 
it also functions via analogy, something which can be seen from similar strategies of 
appropriation in works of fantasy. An encapsulation of this understanding can be 
found in a review published in Resistance magazine of the second of Peter Jackson’s 
film adaptations of The Lord of the Rings trilogy:
[T]his film has plenty to say to white racialists. Obviously, as a mainstream 
film, there are no overt racialist  themes, but  the film contains subtle morals—
the struggle between Good and Evil, the naturalness of a folk-centered 
community, among others—morals that we should be able to identify 
immediately and should recognize as being fundamental to all our activities, 
political or otherwise.41
The review goes on to claim that 
The most  prominent racial overtones of the film occur during the battle at 
Helms Deep. As the camera scanned the faces of the men and elves on the 
ramparts, I saw only White faces—and it  struck me that this is how all crowds 
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should look. Imagine a flat-faced oriental, a hook-nosed Jew, or a bubble-lipped 
African standing shoulder to shoulder in those ranks...it wouldn’t look right.42
This passage, along with other parts of the review, make clear the reviewer’s opinion 
that the white race represents that  which is true and beautiful in the world, contrasted 
with other races who are characterised by  physical defects. It is unclear whether the 
writer is stating that non-whites wouldn’t look right merely aesthetically or because 
of the faux-Middle Ages setting of the film, but there is also the possibility that the 
writer would view as fraudulent any race other than whites playing the role of proud, 
warrior people.
 Jackson’s later adaptations of Tolkien’s The Hobbit are much less favourably 
received, particularly for his inclusion of non-white extras as humans in crowd 
scenes, which one writer describes as “an insult  to the taste and intelligence of its 
[the film’s] audience.”43  A forum dedicated to this “controversy” on Stormfront 
reveals that many contributors view Tolkien’s work as part of white cultural heritage, 
a heritage which is being corrupted by Hollywood, with one comment blaming “Jews 
[who are] trying to erase white existence on earth by wiping us out and our 
history.”44 The casting of black British actor Idris Elba as the Norse God Heimdall in 
the Thor film franchise was met with similar disgust,45  indicating the sense of 
ownership the extreme right feel over myth and fantasy, and how racialised their 
conception of it is.
 Reviews of the other Lord of the Rings films appeared in Resistance, with one 
revealing the appeal of analogy:
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The characters in the film, though overshadowed by the magnitude of the story, 
make sense to White racialists. The bad guys—like those of today—seem to 
hold all the cards. The good guys—like those of today—persist against 
overwhelming odds. They exhibit  the traditional White virtues of honesty, 
loyalty, and bravery; they resist temptation, make the best of unfavourable 
conditions, and carry out their tasks despite fear.46
Not only are their heroes seen as embodying characteristics of the white race, these 
tales also demonstrate the triumph of virtue despite improbable odds, potentially 
providing solace to those who are disillusioned over the difficulty the extreme right 
often have in advancing their cause.
 Extreme-right interest in Tolkien did not begin with the success of Jackson’s 
adaptations. There is a whole section dedicated to fantasy on Stormfront, particularly 
Lord of the Rings,47 while the BNP have advocated the books to their members.48 
Significant figures in the extreme right have revealed their liking for Tolkien, such as 
in this interview with Ian Stuart Donaldson, in which he reveals not only his 
fondness for Tolkien, but also his own writing on a fantasy  theme, with a fairly 
obvious link to his own political beliefs:
[Donaldson:] I reckon that  my favourite author has got  to be Tolkien, The Lord 
Of The Rings is the best book I’ve ever read, I’ve read it over ten times.
[Interviewer:] What about the fantasy book that you once wrote?
[Donaldson:] I’ve lent it to so many different  people that I can’t  get it back, so I 
can’t  write it  out  again. Unless I re-wrote it  all, but  I can’t even remember most 
of it. It  was basically a fantasy story about a land that was being invaded, all of 
the tribes fought against  each other, but  in the end they all united to fight  the 
invaders. I was hoping to publish it  one day, but  I lent it  out to so many people 
that I’ve lost  track of where it is. We could even have done a concept LP to go 
with it. The book was called The New Dawn.49
It is difficult to gauge whether Donaldson’s interest in fantasy had any  notable 
influence on Skrewdriver’s music, but it did contribute to album titles; Hail the New 
Dawn (Rock-O-Rama, 1984) is self-referential, while it is suggested that  White Rider 
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(Rock-O-Rama, 1987) was taken from one of the names for the character Gandalf in 
Lord of the Rings.50
Conclusion
In the sphere of the extreme right, all myths are political. By contextualising old 
myths and creating new ones, the extreme right seek to insert their ideology into 
mainstream history, in order to influence a nation’s view of itself. In seeking to 
provide some precedence in cultural heritage, the use of myths tries to legitimise 
extreme-right ideology, while at the same time seeking to label those who oppose 
that ideology as enemies of the nation. This approach allows the extreme right to 
present their exclusionary principles in an ostensibly  non-racialised way, arguing that 
distinctive “indigenous” culture is threatened by multiculturalism.
 Beyond these national concerns, myth also serves an international function; 
by providing a projection of a golden age, and a heritage apparently shared by all 
Nordic Europeans, examples like the Vikings help  to overcome the lack of cultural 
unity  among Western European nations, particularly  in terms of religion and 
language. This lack of unity also might explain why it took so long for contemporary 
extreme-right political movements to distance themselves from the rhetoric of white 
supremacism, since race was one of the few things the peoples of these nations 
(thought they) had in common. As well as this cultural function, myth often serves as 
a model for activism, an activism very much associated with belligerence due to the 
canons that the extreme right draw on. The warriors of the past are presented as 
inspirational examples for the “warriors” of today; frequently, as in the case of No 
Remorse’s ‘See You In Valhalla’ and Joey  Smith’s ‘English Pride’, the warriors of the 
past are presented as the forebears of contemporary activists, fighting for a common 
cause.
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 At times, the willingness of the extreme right to claim—and mythologise—
any white, successful and romantic warrior for their cause borders on the comic. As 
Kirsten Dyck notes, the appropriation of William Wallace by the band Brutal Attack 
(‘In the Hearts of Highland Men’, When Odin Calls, Destiny Records, 1998) can 
seem jarring, given that No Remorse’s Englishness would conflict with Wallace’s 
brand of Scottish nationalism. Moreover, the band’s claim that “William Wallace, 
you did not die in vain” is intended to be understood as a reference to the white 
supremacist cause, a rather tenuous link given that Wallace was fighting other white 
people.51 Consider, for example, the following extract from a biography  of Wallace 
in Resistance, part of the series “White Men of Whom we are Proud”:
Scotland, which gave birth to the men of the Scottish Clans, who in the 
Declaration of Arbroath in 1320 gave expression to the uniqueness and grandeur 
of the Aryan soul—witnessed in so many episodes of our glorious Racial 
heritage—that  “It is not  for glory, nor riches, nor honor [sic] that we fight, but 
for freedom alone, which no man of worth yields up, but  with his life.” It  is also 
the country that  gave birth to a true son of the race, William Wallace, warrior, 
patriot, and guardian of Scotland, whose name and legend has been passed on 
down through the centuries, celebrated in song, poem, and story, and whose 
fame will endure as long as our race survives.52
Clearly, Wallace is being positioned as a White hero, rather than simply a Scottish 
one. Nothing in the accompanying biography—other than vague references to 
patriotism and foreign invaders—justifies this racial depiction of Wallace, 
particularly in light of the fact that he is fighting and being oppressed by  other 
“Aryans.”
 Wallace is, however, an appealing figure for many reasons, some of which are 
cited in the article:
For White Racialists today, in a world that  seeks the extinction of our kindred, it 
is easy to identify with the life story of William Wallace: the belief in an idea 
worth dying for; the division of our people; the traitors within our ranks; the 
hardship in trying to get  our race to fight  back when so many preach that  we 
must give into [sic] “the inevitable”; the powerful weaponry of our enemies that 
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use every medium possible to try to get our people to follow the path of Racial 
miscegenation and suicide.53
Most obviously, Wallace was a nationalist, a cause embedded within extreme-right 
thought, albeit  not  necessarily  equivalent to racial nationalism. Wallace fought a 
larger enemy, and thus great odds, with some success, serving as an inspirational 
model to extreme-right supporters facing similar odds. Wallace’s death, his 
martyrdom at the hands of the enemy, feeds into extreme-right appreciation of those 
who make deep personal sacrifices for their cause.54  Perhaps most importantly, 
Wallace’s use of violence to further his cause legitimises the extreme-right’s own 
preoccupation with violence and the warrior archetype. This depiction of Wallace 
reduces him to a force of good in the struggle against evil, a common dichotomy 
presented in extreme-right narratives of history and myth. The appropriation of 
fantasy  often entails a similar depiction of a Manichaean struggle between good and 
evil; the characteristics of perceived non-white races in fantasy stories—notably the 
Orcs in Lord of the Rings—are mapped on to the belief in differences between races 
in extreme-right ideology, just as historical events are depicted in terms of good and 
evil.
 The use of fantasy and myth—and the related appropriation and 
mythologisation of historical figures and events—serves a variety of functions. It 
provides a sense of continuity, in which extreme-right struggles are set in a historical 
context alongside mythic and historical narratives. The setting of this continuum also 
bestows a sense of legitimacy, casting the extreme right  as the successors of national 
heroes and symbols. Myth is often seen in the context of analogy, as providing an 
example of how to act  to contemporary supporters. This example is most  commonly 
depicted through violence and warrior status, not only feeding into the 
characterisation of extreme-right politics as a struggle, but complementing the voices 
which proclaim that actual conflict is an inevitability of ethnic mixing.
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 Even so, the mythic subjects drawn upon, and their interpretation, 
demonstrate a narrow perspective. The Vikings are favoured, but perceived in a 
narrow manner as a warrior race (with only the warrior gods Odin and Thor of 
interest), neglecting their nuances as immigrants, explorers, traders and farmers, as 
well as the fact that they mainly  engaged in conflict with other “white” peoples. This 
narrow focus, along with its homogeneous interpretation, make clear that the extreme 




“And for those of you who don’t like metal…”:
The softer side of extreme-right music
“Besides striving to create the best possible product we can, we 
also must work to improve the image of the resistance music 
scene, particularly in the eyes of young Whites. The time for us 
to be isolationists in society is over. We need to be inclusive rather 
than exclusive; the many genres of pro-White music now available 
allow us to reach out to a much wider demographic than just 
those Whites attracted to the skinhead subculture.”
Erich Gliebe, Editorial, Resistance, Iss.26 Summer 2006, p.2.
“We try to keep our lyrics fairly approachable for people that may 
not pay a lot of attention to racial issues in order to try and 
persuade them to think about things. Once they’re on side 
they can listen to groups with real hardcore lyrics.”
“Samuel,” White Power Musician,
quoted in Simi and Futrell, American Swastika, 2010, p.64.
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For much of its existence, extreme-right music has circulated in legally  questionable 
ways, facing difficulties not only  in avoiding anti-fascist opposition, but also at times 
having to contend with the law, particularly hate speech legislation. While some 
musicians, producers and distributors have developed various tactics to circumvent 
such legislation, others have turned to less explicit  and confrontational musical styles 
and lyrics. This “softer” side of extreme-right music is valued not only for its ability 
to circulate more freely, but also because its backers believe it will appeal to a 
broader audience, who may be alienated by more explicit ideological 
pronouncements early on in their process of radicalisation, or who feel hostility 
towards the more established extreme-right genres.
 As explored in Chapter One, legislation has at best succeeded in limiting the 
circulation of extreme-right music, rather than stopping it; those who are determined 
to break the law still do so, and distribution has become easier for illegal music 
thanks to the Internet  and peer-to-peer file sharing. Legislation is therefore not the 
only factor in the softening process: it is notable that in European countries, the 
extreme right have attempted to advance through political means; as discussed in 
Chapter One, the two-party system of the United States largely  precludes this. 
Therefore, the extreme right in the USA have largely  advocated revolution as the 
way to install the desired regime, while the softening of music in Europe reflects the 
modernising processes of the political parties. Softer music is therefore used by 
political parties and movements who do not wish to associate themselves with the 
negative reputation of violent neo-Nazism, but it  is also valued by more radical 
extreme-right movements, where it is intended to act as a “gateway” for new and 
potential recruits before they graduate on to more explicit material.
 This chapter looks at the various “softening” strategies that have been 
adopted. Two core issues lie at the heart of this softening: first, the extreme right are 
attempting to discard their reputation as a fringe group by proving their legitimacy 
and distancing themselves from illegal activities; second, there is a recognition that a 
broad range of tastes and ideologies are to be found under the extreme-right 
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umbrella, and that a monocultural extreme right will not satisfy everyone—in short, 
softening entails a pluralistic approach to extreme-right identity. As such, this chapter 
provides a counterpart to Chapter Five, which focuses mainly on explicit, “hardcore” 
material; the material here suggests a strand of extreme-right strategy which seeks to 
engage in democratic political processes, while projecting a more inclusive image in 
an attempt to appeal to a broader support base.
Softening Strategies
Lawrence Lessig uses the term “ambiguation” to refer to the blurring of meaning for 
a certain purpose, undermining the negative connotations of an act or symbol by 
giving it  a second, apparently more positive meaning. Lessig cites the example of 
citizens in occupied Denmark who took to wearing a yellow star, which the Nazi 
occupiers required to be worn by all Jews. This action ambiguated the meaning of the 
yellow star, which could now be seen as a symbol of Jewishness or Danish solidarity 
with them.1  I have drawn on Lessig’s concept here, but while there are many 
examples from the extreme right which could be described in terms of 
“ambiguation,” I will use the term “softening.” The main reason for this distinction is 
that softening does not necessarily entail ambiguation. For while softening can often 
take the form of subversion—such as the spread of extreme-right materials which are 
not necessarily easily identifiable as such—there are also instances of overt and 
unambiguous ideology being expressed in supposedly more mainstream material.
 From the various examples in this chapter, it is possible to identify  four 
particular softening strategies. The first strategy  is the softening of image. The 
extreme-right stereotype of a racist and violent skinhead wearing Doc Martens and a 
bomber jacket, perhaps with a swastika tattoo, is not one that is likely to appeal to 
voters. Instead, modernised parties and movements often portray  themselves as 
ordinary  folk who are just saying what everyone is thinking. In addition, extreme-
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right supporters “camouflage” themselves “to avoid confrontations they cannot win.
… In most everyday settings, Aryans are invisible.”2
 The second strategy is the softening of genre. Again, the stereotype of 
extreme-right music is Oi!, rock and metal, usually confrontational styles, which feed 
into the reputation for violence. The modernisers espouse more accessible genres, 
such as folk, country and pop, while there has always been a seam of extreme-right 
thought which advocates classical music as the highest expression of white culture. 
The use of more mainstream genres is often accompanied by the belief that this will 
result in extreme-right music reaching a wider audience.
 The third strategy is the softening of lyrics. Typical extreme-right lyrical 
tropes include violence, anti-Semitism, explicit racism, homophobia and sexism. The 
modernisers’ approach is to focus on ideals of heritage, tradition, cultural 
distinctiveness and national pride. Often, this entails a move away from racial 
ideology to a nationally-specific focus.
 The fourth strategy is the appropriation of cultural heritage and history, laying 
claim to significant symbolism and events in the national consciousness and claiming 
them as attuned to or endorsements of extreme-right policy. The BNP, examined in 
detail below, provide many examples of this, including selling music by Vera Lynn 
and the appropriation of the sense of Britishness associated with the wartime spirit. 
This was complemented by  the claim that if Winston Churchill were alive today he 
would vote BNP, as well as the use of British wartime imagery on campaign 
material. This claiming of established cultural symbols or works for racial ideology 
is also commonplace beyond the BNP; examples include the recasting of Lord of the 
Rings as a racial parable, and the availability  of the famous German singer Heino on 
the catalogue of Resistance Records.
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Softer Success: Ultima Thule
The softening strategies outlined above very rarely exist in isolation; the most 
successful extreme-right band—certainly  in terms of mainstream sales—combined 
each of these strategies in their music. Ultima Thule experienced mainstream success 
before media pressure compelled their label to rescind their contract; as the band’s 
response shows (see Chapter One), Ultima Thule rejected their characterisation as 
racist, despite their previous association with Bevara Sverige Svenskt. With this 
history of activity within racist circles, the tone of the band’s rejection shows an 
attempt to ambiguate the concept of patriotism: national pride becomes incompatible 
with multi-culturalism, while at the same time they ambiguate the concept of racism 
by implying that amongst racism’s victims are the indigenous Swedes.
 In regard to the lyrics themselves, Ultima Thule had some justification in 
complaining when their music was labelled racist. In comparison to the work of their 
contemporaries, which often contained references to Nazism as well as derogatory 
racial slurs, there is nothing specifically objectionable. Even on their first release, 
funded by Bevara Sverige Svenskt, the lyrics did nothing more than express a rather 
crude patriotism, referring to historical traits of the nation and the distinctive features 
of its landscape.3 This was the lyrical trend that continued in their mainstream works, 
historical references often focusing on the time of the Napoleonic campaigns, when 
Sweden was an influential power.4 
 While Ultima Thule were never guilty of lyrics that were likely to see them in 
court, theirs was a very specific form of patriotism. The narrative of their albums 
linked modern Swedes to historical struggles, and often emphasised the point  that the 
band were willing to “fight”, even to “take up arms”, for Sweden. The constant 
identification with the natural features of Sweden make this a very exclusionary form 
of patriotism; it  is implied that incomers will simply not have the same affinity  with 
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the country as the indigenous population. This process attempts to ambiguate 
patriotism, by implying that patriotism necessitates racism to preserve the true nature 
of national identity. It would seem that Ultima Thule have been partially successful 
in this regard, at  least in associating patriotism with racism. Among the national 
signifiers of Sweden, they frequently make use of the flag (cf. Vikingabalk, 1993) 
and Viking symbolism (cf. För Fäderneslandet, 1992) in their album art and 
promotional material. This itself is not without racist associations. For instance, Ben 
Marlene, a Swedish singer in the 1980s later to work in the music publishing 
industry, states that the Swedish flag is mainly carried by “skinheads and racists.”5 
The use of Viking culture and symbolism is also commonplace in the extreme-right, 
as Chapter Six shows; in the face of immigration, and principally the growth of 
Islam, the mythology surrounding the Vikings provides a model for the resistance, 
both in the assertion of cultural distinctiveness and in trying to justify the use of 
violence.
 The case of Ultima Thule demonstrates how softening can also involve 
ambiguation; by adopting national signifiers such as the Swedish flag, and rejecting 
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Fig. 7: Contrasting covers of Dirlewanger’s Rocking for the Golden Race (Rebelles 
Européens, 1989) and Ultima Thule’s Vikingabalk (Ultima Thule Records, 1993).
traditional symbols of the extreme right, Ultima Thule positioned themselves as 
legitimate custodians of national character rather than extremists. Even if this was 
not deemed credible by their critics, the uncertainty could potentially affect the 
appropriated material, altering its meaning and changing its use in other contexts. 
Ultima Thule therefore embody a hugely successful overlap between softening and 
ambiguation; the use of more mainstream genres, lyrics and symbols allowed the 
band to deny, and even turn back, accusations of racism, despite their history  of 
association with overtly racist causes and bands.
A History of Softening: The Case of the BNP
The BNP’s roots in the NF meant they advocated the same policies of ending 
immigration and forcing repatriation of foreigners already  in the UK, as well as using 
the same tactics of street marches as a show of strength. While senior figures in the 
NF did not always hold a high opinion of skinheads and the associated music scene, 
the party  had played a crucial role in the establishment of Rock Against Communism 
and extreme-right music in Britain more generally, so music was always likely to be 
an important component for the BNP as well. 
 Officially, the BNP looked down on popular music, instead advocating 
classical music and high culture in the party magazine. This generally  took the form 
of praising canonic composers such as Wagner and Verdi, or English composers—
such as John Ireland—who had apparently  been neglected because of their 
nationalism.6  As well as advocating classical music, the early BNP saw popular 
music as part of a conspiracy to destroy the white race (see Chapter Two). Despite 
this hostility, the BNP couldn’t ignore the economic benefits of Rock Against 
Communism. Although it didn’t have any official links with Blood & Honour, the 
party’s progress was regularly and favourably  featured in Blood & Honour magazine, 
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while bands played benefit concerts for the BNP. The products of skinhead bands 
were also advertised in the party magazine, Spearhead.
 This changed in 1999 when Nick Griffin took control of the BNP. Griffin 
engaged in the process of “modernising” the party, bringing it  into line with 
successful European parties like Le Pen’s Front  National. As well as softening party 
policies and distancing the BNP from violent strategies and tactics, this involved 
altering the party’s relationship with music.
 Before he became party leader, Griffin had revealed to undercover journalists 
in 1997 his grand plans for music within a broader strategy. He wanted to set up a 
British CD production company similar to Resistance in the United States and 
Nordland in Sweden. Griffin also hoped to establish ‘Radio White Europe’ to be 
broadcast from transmitters in Eastern Europe. He outlined the plans for this radio 
network with different broadcasts to appeal to distinct audiences. As well as hoping 
to appeal to a more “cultured” audience through different genres, Griffin saw his plan 
as a way of exploiting the financial potential of the skinhead market while distancing 
the party from them. He said:
I don’t know if your skinheads are scum, a lot  of ours are, they’re lower than 
low, they really are the pits.… The crucial thing is, if it can be done, it would 
create a large amount of money. It  would keep happy and involved and focused 
the group of people who we don’t want close to us for electoral reasons, 
skinheads with big boots.7
Despite their distaste for the skinheads and claims that they were not a neo-Nazi 
party, the BNP were still selling CDs with lyrics like “We’re national socialist 
skinheads and we hail to the Führer” in order to raise funds for their election 
campaigning.8 From this, and Griffin’s comments about keeping skinheads “happy,” 
it seems that skinheads were viewed as financially  indispensable, but their negative 
image was something the party did not want to be associated with.
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 One of Griffin’s first  actions as party leader was to establish an annual Red 
White and Blue festival, apparently based on a similar event held by the French 
Front National. This was advertised as a family occasion of wholesome activities, 
and one of its main features was music. The first festival in 2001 was described in 
the BNP magazine in very glowing terms: “Some will treasure most the way you 
could have heard a pin drop between the verses of the Welsh national anthem as sung 
by two little girls. Others will remember above all the warm comradeship when the 
whole audience joined in the singing of traditional British folk songs on the Saturday 
evening.”9  It was described a little differently by an undercover journalist, who 
reported that the event was headlined by Stigger, known for his Patriotic Ballads 
collaborations with Ian Stuart Donaldson and a former member of Oi! bands 
Skrewdriver and Warlord; and that at the end of the night, the crowd gathered in the 
beer tent and listened to SS marching songs.10
 By the 2003 festival, the attendance was over 1,000 and some of the audience 
were ejected for making Nazi salutes. It was described in the BNP magazine as 
follows: 
The numbers involved were not  large—not much more than a handful—have 
been identified and will not be attending again. The party intends that our 
family festival remains exactly that  and will be fixed for next year.… Nick 
Griffin ended his speech to a long standing ovation concluding with everyone 
singing Jerusalem.11
By this point the BNP were explicitly disassociating themselves from any neo-
Nazism, and encouraging the view that they were representing the ordinary, decent 
and hard-working people.
 In 2005 the party  record label released its first album, Time to Make a Stand 
(Great White Records), a mixture of folk song covers and new material, mainly  using 
acoustic guitars. Lyrics address themes such as white victims of murder, and the 
inevitable victory  of nationalism. While many of the songs are somewhat ambiguous 
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in their subject matter, there is still a fairly explicit example of xenophobia in ‘The 
Menace’—with lyrics and backing vocals by Nick Griffin—even if the “menace … 
can’t be named”:
You’ve heard about the Yardies;
Drugs and guns from overseas;
You’ve heard about the Triads;
And all their pimps and all their thieves;
But there’s another menace;
From far away it came;
You know exactly who I mean;
And why they can’t be named.
[chorus]
Strutting down our streets;
With baseball bats and clubs;
Beating up our old men;
And burning down our pubs;
A shower of foreign traitors;
Who want to take our land;
And if you want to stop them;
You must come and lend a hand.
Clearly, this song is hardly inoffensive; indeed, a BNP review of the album describes 
it as “a joy to listen to, simply for it  being SO politically-incorrect.”12 Even so, ‘The 
Menace’ is an example of a softer material, particularly in that it is about supposed 
cultural incompatibility rather than racial supremacy.
 As well as releasing their own material associated with folk culture, the BNP 
attempted to identify  the music of mainstream folk musicians with their ideology. As 
detailed in Chapter Three (pp.158-9), Nick Griffin has made no secret of his 
preference for folk, and the BNP actively  encourage members to become involved 
with local events that can be grouped under the folk banner. These activities actually 
led to the creation of Folk Against Fascism, an organisation which mobilised huge 
opposition to the BNP and their ideology. The musicians that Griffin cited also 
distanced themselves from the party.
 West Wind (Great White Records, 2007) still displays folk influences, but 
consists entirely of new compositions with lyrics by Nick Griffin. It is much more 
dependent on electric guitars than its predecessor, being more of a soft-rock album. 
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Again, the lyrics avoid outright racism or any of the features associated with most 
extreme-right music, instead focusing on apparent racism against whites and the 
betrayal of the indigenous population by elites (see Chapter Four).
 The last major release on Great White Records—before it  went bankrupt for 
the second time—was a pop album by Joey Smith, Not Just About the Music (2008). 
Smith wrote in the sleeve notes: “As far as I am aware this is the first  of its type. A 
nationalist pop  album! So I hope it reaches a new audience that conventional 
nationalist albums have not.” Nick Griffin also had high hopes for the release, 
writing:
Joe’s album will be a welcome departure for Great White, as it’s very much 
Britpop, a really “young” sound different to the folk/folk rock/country sound on 
the early CDs [on Great White Records]. Personally… I’m “into” traditional 
folk and country music in a big way. But  I’m also very well aware that 99.7% of 
youngsters are not, and that  it’s them that we need to reach out to with music 
more than anybody else.13
The lyrics hardly  reflect the content of conventional pop  music, addressing such 
issues as fighting American wars, race-mixing and freeing the land. In the song 
‘Never Wanna Leave’, Smith proclaims his national identity  and pride in belonging 
to the national community, while also asserting his ownership over what constitutes 
this identity:
I went to the beach, lazed on the sand, sun in my face;
I know I’m glad to be part of England, what a place!
[chorus]
It’s my home, don’t try to change it;
Leave it as it is, don’t rearrange it;
It is my right!
On my own there’s always friends here [sic.];
One’s that I love, people that I hold dear;
We’ll fight the good fight!
In this song, Smith declares that national identity is static and absolute, that it is 
under threat, and implies that the BNP are the true representatives of national identity 
and the only hope for its preservation.
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 These examples show a deliberate strategy  undertaken by  the BNP to 
associate themselves with an existing musical culture, folk, both in appropriating 
existing traditions and in using existing and newly  composed material in their 
albums. The release of a pop album, and the relative ambiguity of the lyrics, 
demonstrate a desire not only to appeal to new audiences, but to dissociate from what 
has been the financial foundation of the extreme-right music scene, the skinhead 
subculture. These musical examples are paralleled by  the “modernisation” process 
which has been undertaken by many extreme-right parties and movements, 
particularly in western Europe, which has seen a shift away from overt and explicit 
racism, towards a narrative of cultural distinctiveness and the oppression of the 
“indigenous” population.
The “Softer” Sex
One of the potential marketing techniques that is often described as untapped by the 
extreme right is the presence of women in the music scene. Extreme-right portrayals 
of women frequently present them as naturally docile and subservient (as well as 
hyper-sexualised), but a significant belief here is that  female musicians will naturally 
appeal to other women more than the men who dominate the scene. There is also a 
belief that women are less likely to engender hostility  from protestors and venues, as 
Cindy MacDonald, an American activist, writes:
The potential market for racist women music groups is larger than it  is for men. 
An all-female band would have far less trouble in terms of anti-racist  violence at 
gigs. All-male bands have problems. They are far more restricted in terms of 
clubs they can get into. That limits their audience. But with women artists, 
protestors would be a little less aggressive than they would be toward male 
musicians; also, concert  goers might be curious at why women would be 
singing racialist  songs. It’s a good selling point—women racialist  musicians. It 
allows more potential concert goers because some women music fans are turned 
off by ultra-aggressive testosterone-laced performers. A racialist woman singer 
would be an excellent role model which might attract women into our cause.14
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MacDonald’s theory that concert-goers would be curious about women singing this 
material raises another factor associated with women and extreme-right music: 
novelty. The overwhelmingly masculine nature of extreme-right music means most 
female musicians are treated as something of an oddity within the scene, a reaction 
which occasionally extends to the mainstream.
 Perhaps the most  famous example of extreme-right novelty—not only 
because of sex but also age—is the twin duo Prussian Blue, who played white 
nationalist pop music between 2003 and 2007, between the ages of around 11 and 15. 
The duo were so unusual that they were featured in two British documentaries, in 
2003 and 2007,15 and gained much media attention. In one of the documentaries, the 
presenter of a radio show who has just interviewed the girls talks about the confusion 
that results from hearing this ideology coming from such an unexpected source:
If they were ugly with gnarly teeth and warts on their faces, people would be 
going “You’re a racist!” But they’re beautiful as they’re saying these words, 
y’know, and they’re agreeable as they’re saying these words, and people go 
“What? Was that racist or not? I can’t tell!”16
The radio presenter is overstating somewhat; Prussian Blue gained such notoriety 
because of the explicitness of their message, disseminated through their lyrics, 
interviews and merchandise. Although their message was uncompromising, the style 
of Prussian Blue’s music was intended to appeal to a new audience. In an interview, 
the twins said that they listened to mostly white power music when they were young, 
but that they  were now listening to: “mainstream rock like Greenday [sic] and Avril 
Lavigne to get an idea about what kinds of sounds the kids like. If we get them to 
like our music and our sound we can then get them to listen to our message.”17
 As well as using different genres to spread their message, Prussian Blue 
promoted a different image for white nationalism, away from the stereotypical 
skinhead. Not only did the girls project an image of childhood innocence, but  they 
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were seen to hold sexual capital which could be exploited in the future to appeal to 
male desire; they are described as “fantasy sweethearts” by David Lane,18  and the 
girls’ mother recognised the sexual potential of the girls in appealing to white males:
What  young man, red-blooded American boy, isn’t  going to find two blonde 
twins, 16 years old, singing about  white pride, pride in your race, very few are 
not going to find that very appealing.19
 Like Prussian Blue, Saga is valued for the different image of the extreme 
right that she projects, and she is often represented and discussed in sexual terms. 
Saga was the singer in the band Symphony of Sorrow as well as a solo artist, and was 
featured on the cover of Issue 13 of Resistance magazine in 2000. One contributor to 
Resistance wrote that: “just having her in front of our camera helps our Cause. But, 
she is also quite good at  interviews. She comes across as the girl-next-door, who also 
understands the dynamics of racial conflict.”20 The novelty of Saga is suggested by 
her featuring in a 2005 documentary for the Discovery Channel called Hate Rock, 
with a quote from the programme reproduced approvingly in a Stormfront forum: 
What  makes me different  is I think I am a lot  more mainstream looking and that 
I am very much toned down compared to the other ones [musicians]. It’s not  in 
your clothes, it’s not in the way that  you dress, it’s not in your appearance, it’s 
what’s in your heart. It’s a lot  more easier for the mainstream public to see 
themselves in me than it is to see themselves in a skin-girl. Personal experiences 
have made me feel the way I do, and most  people do have the same beliefs that  I 
do. It’s a bad thing to be labelled a racist, these days, and it’s such a bad thing 
that people would rather shut  up than express what  they feel. I am just trying to 
say that, I don’t want people that are not like me around me.21
As well as her appealing—and more conventional—image, Saga’s music is generally 
mainstream rock and ballad, again offering an alternative to the hard rock and metal 
of most extreme-right music. A lot of Saga’s music consists of cover versions of 
extreme-right bands, and her first three releases were tributes to Skrewdriver, but she 
often performs them in a different way: one blogger writes that “Saga makes 
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Skrewdriver accessible.”22  Some of these covers retained the heavy guitar 
instrumentation of Skrewdriver but use significantly  less distortion, while Saga’s 
vocals are higher in the mix and are less aggressive—or, to put it another way, less 
“shouty”—than Donaldson’s originals. Saga also makes use of the piano on some of 
these covers, an instrument which is exceedingly rare in extreme-right music, and 
which would become dominant on her later solo releases. Saga’s music has turned 
her into a relative superstar on the extreme right, popular with both fans of 
established Oi!-influenced styles and those who dislike the dominant styles of 
extreme-right music.
 It is certainly  not the case that women in the extreme-right scene exclusively 
play  and sing softer styles and lyrics, just  as it is not the case that there are no men 
playing less confrontational material. There are examples of men having great 
success with softer styles of lyrics, such as the hugely popular German balladeer 
Frank Rennicke, or even Ian Stuart Donaldson’s folk albums. However, the few 
examples of women participating in the more confrontational styles of the extreme 
right, and their lack of success, may be indicative of barriers to the participation of 
women. Certainly, women can achieve success in extreme-right music—prominent 
examples being Saga and Prussian Blue—but generally only if they restrict 
themselves to “appropriate” genres.
 It is clearly no coincidence that the most successful female musicians, and 
even the moderately successful ones, release music that is significantly “softer” than 
the pervasive hard rock style of much extreme-right music. Women tend to be 
restricted to the specific genres of folk or pop-rock, with much less use of 
amplification and distortion. Admittedly, there is a role for female vocalists within 
all-male metal bands (this is how Saga’s career began, as part of the band Symphony 
of Sorrow), but otherwise opportunities for women seem limited. Kirsten Döhring 
and Renate Feldmann, for example, note the lack of success of four mixed-gender 
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bands playing music associated with the skinhead subculture, particularly in 
comparison with Annett Moeck, who has achieved great success in a more 
“appropriate” genre.23  These bands not only faced difficulties in releasing and 
generating interest in their music, but also had to contend with the attitudes of the 
extreme-right press characterising them as “Mädelband” (girlbands) and dismissing 
their music as proof that women “belong behind the stove and not behind the 
microphone.”24 Clearly, these sentiments speak to a broader misogyny (as discussed 
in Chapter Five), but this misogyny is much more likely to surface when women are 
seen to be deviating from their proper place. Given this pressure to release music of a 
“softer” sort, it  is little surprise that women form a significant component of the 
softer material produced by the extreme right.
The Softening Sell: Music for Youth
Young people are particular targets of extreme-right music, and of extreme-right 
propaganda in general. For example, German former neo-Nazi Ingo Hasselbach says:
I liked to approach 14- to 16-year-olds after school.… I’d act  a lot like an older 
brother; we’d go into the woods together and do things like Boy Scout 
exercises, building forts and making trails. I’d always slip in a bit of ideology 
against foreigners along the way, saying some racist things like how there are 
such big differences between the white and black races, for example. But only 
casually at first.25
Similarly, former white power skinhead T.J. Leyden said, “Our motto was: ‘You do 
not want the weekend patriot, you want his son.’”26
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 Perhaps the most concentrated application of the marketing of softer music is 
in the targeting of youth through music, a practice which often uses softer materials, 
designed to be the first  step on the road to radicalisation. Extreme-right music is seen 
as an excellent medium through which young people can be recruited to the cause, 
and this is often stated as a primary use of the music. Announcing the acquisition of 
Resistance Records for the National Alliance, William Pierce wrote to members:
As Resistance gains strength, that  acquisition should add an increasing number 
of younger members, in the 18-25 age range, to our ranks.… Some of the 
themes of this White resistance music will be offensive to some members. Aside 
from the lyrics, the music itself will not appeal to many members. It  is the type 
of music, however, which millions of White Americans are accustomed to.27
Similar sentiments are prominent in BNP leader Nick Griffin’s assessment of Joey 
Smith’s Not Just About the Music (see above). 
 As well as making music specifically intended for a youth audience, some 
extreme-right groups have created campaigns designed to disseminate it to them. In 
2004, German extreme-right groups distributed a compilation of extreme-right 
music, Anpassung ist Feigheit: Lieder aus dem Untergrund (Adjustment is 
Cowardice: Songs from the Underground) near schools and youth centres, with the 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution of North Rhine-Westphalia reporting 
that 50,000 of these CDs were distributed nationwide.28 This tactic was adopted by 
the NPD in the summer of that year, with the party  having released at least nine 
albums to 2013 under the banner of “Projekt Schulhof” (Project Schoolyard), or 
alternatively and less frequently “Aktion Schulhof” (Operation Schoolyard). In her 
assessment of these releases, Chiara Pierobon discerns some main themes which are 
common to many of the songs included on these compilations:
In the songs, the German past  is presented as a glorious time, characterised by 
peace, freedom, humanity, faithfulness and honour. Contrastingly, the present  is 
described in negative terms: the system is portrayed as sick and tyrannical; the 
world is represented in a state of war from which the mass media benefit; 
Germany is described as divided due to the action of its enemies; and German 
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values as perishing by drowning in their blood.… Capitalism and the 
Americanisation of society are addressed as alien forces that  have caused the 
current state of degeneration and corruption characterising the country.… 
According to the songs included in the NPD music initiative, it is time to rebel, 
to stand up and make a noise. By invoking themes such as comradeship and 
solidarity, the artists call for protest, rebellion, and revenge from below.29
The consistency  with which the NPD have produced and distributed these CDs 
implies their success as a venture, and this conclusion is lent  force from attempts by 
others to emulate them. The independent Bavarian group Kameradschaftsbund 
Hochfranken and the AG Wiking branch in Wilhelmshaven produced their own 
schoolyard CDs (in 2006 and 2009 respectively), while so-called “Autonome 
Nationalisten” (autonomous nationalists) produced a CD-ROM entitled “Jugend in 
Bewegung—Schüler CD des nationalen Widerstands” (Youth on the Move—Student 
CD of the national resistance, c.2010). The format of the latter release—which was 
much stronger in tone than the NPD releases—allowed for not only music (in mp3 
format) but also the inclusion of other media such as videos and images, also listing 
contact details for 126 extreme-right groups in Germany and a further 36 from the 
rest of Europe.30
 The Projekt Schulhof strategy has also been employed outside Germany, such 
as Perspektiven schaffen—Weg mit dem Alltagsgrau!, the product of the Partei 
National Orientierter Schweizer (Party of Nationally  Oriented Swiss).31 In the United 
States in 2004, Panzerfaust Records prepared 100,000 copies of a compilation called 
Project Schoolyard aimed at youths between 13 and 19 years old.32 However, it was 
around this time that Panzerfaust was deteriorating towards its eventual collapse, 
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undermining the project. Byron Calvert’s successor organisation to Panzerfaust, 
Tightrope Productions, revived the venture in early 2006 with Project Schoolyard II, 
which had a lesser run of 30,000 copies.33 Similarly, Resistance Records produced 
their own CD in 2006 based on the Schulhof idea:
Resistance Records has produced a dynamic sampler CD intended for mass 
distribution, in the hope of getting a copy into the hands of as many White 
youth as possible. It  is also our goal that  every White kid in America—and 
throughout the world—understands that  being racially aware and proud is an 
honorable thing. The songs on this disc offer a true alternative to the degenerate, 
anti-White music that floods mainstream radio today.… This CD is perfect  for 
distribution at mainstream concerts, schools, college campuses, athletic events, 
parks, gyms, etc. Anywhere White youth congregate would be suitable for 
handing out sampler CDs.34
Panzerfaust Records made clear the aims of their Project Schoolyard drive: “We 
don’t just entertain racist kids—we create them!”35  To this end, their Project 
Schoolyard was intended to be part of a “softer” strategy, with Panzerfaust stating 
that the album was “inconspicuous and not overtly racial … so that it will be able to 
fly below the radar screen of teachers and other people.”36 The extent to which this 
can be said to be true is debatable considering the album included songs such as 
‘Teutonic Uprising,’ ‘Hate Train Rolling,’ ‘White Kids’ and ‘Commie Scum,’ but the 
project was clearly  seen as introductory material for those who might be put off by 
more controversial material at an early stage.
 Similarly, the NPD have avoided more extreme lyrics on their Projekt 
Schulhof CDs, although this may be in part motivated by a desire to avoid the 
indexing and censorship of the albums. It has been noted that the NPD timed the 
distribution of the Schulhof CDs to coincide with Landtag elections,37  but it  is 
difficult to gauge the success of the ventures. While many  thousands of copies have 
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been distributed, the process is decentralised, with activists ordering copies with 
reductions in price for bulk orders. Therefore, CDs manufactured and sold does not 
necessarily equate with CDs distributed to young people; furthermore, there are no 
data available on the reception of this material by listeners and whether it succeeds in 
its radicalising intention. However, the energy with which these projects have been 
pursued by extreme-right  groups—and opposed by anti-fascist organisations—has 
made them a highly visible form of propaganda aimed at radicalising white youth.
 A different “stealth” approach targeting youth was adopted by  Kevin 
McGuire, an American neo-Nazi with ties to the National Alliance. McGuire placed 
adverts for free music downloads in school newspapers, ensuring at that time that the 
website was acceptable to the newspapers:
In an apparent attempt  to be misleading, the Victory Forever site initially 
displayed a page of music by independent  artists, including at  least  one African-
American artist. However, between the time when the ads were purchased and 
when they actually ran, the site was changed to its present, explicitly white 
supremacist form.38
As of at least June 2012, McGuire’s site (www.victoryforever.com) is no longer 
operating, but the scheme emphasises the importance that the extreme right place on 
targeting youth, and their confidence in using music to do so, particularly in the 
Internet age.
Broadening the Audience: Saga and Breivik
As stated in Chapter One (p.74), Saga is a relative superstar of extreme-right music. 
Her most notorious fan, however, is Anders Behring Breivik. In the section on music 
in his manifesto, Breivik devotes most of the space to Saga, including the following 
passage:
Saga is a courageous, Swedish, female nationalist-oriented musician who 
creates pop-music with patriotic texts. She is, as far as I know, the best and most 
talented patriotic musician in the English speaking world. And for those of you, 
like myself, who hates [sic] “metal”, Saga is one of the few sources available 
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that offers quality patriotic pop-music with brilliant  texts.… Marxist  and 
multiculturalist character-assassins will claim that Saga is an evil, national-
socialist  monsterband from hell, due to her success.… Saga has created several 
pop-tracks with nationalist-oriented texts that will appeal to all conservatives, 
and especially revolutionary conservatives of all conservative ideological 
denominations.39
Breivik seems to use “metal” as an umbrella term to describe the harder rock genres 
which make up most extreme-right music, with Saga therefore particularly valuable 
to Breivik as, out of all the music which might be considered politically sympathetic 
to his ideology, hers was the most accessible given his aesthetic preferences. This 
point is worth emphasising; there is a vast  amount of music—particularly from the 
extreme right—which Breivik could have used, but he had aesthetic preferences as 
well as ideological ones.
 After the publication of this manifesto, Saga released a statement on her 
website distancing herself from Breivik’s actions:
It  has come to my attention that  my music has been cited … as going some way 
to inspiring one of the most  vile and criminal acts in recent history. I cannot 
begin to describe how saddened I am to hear that  and wanted to inform you all 
of my shock and utter horror at such an atrocity. My music is conceived to be a 
positive step towards celebrating our identity and bringing about positive 
cultural and political change. Like a great many of artists and musicians, my 
music is designed to give hope to those who otherwise would have little. 
Change is brought  about through political and cultural means by like-minds 
working together for a greater cause not brought about by warped loners acting 
out their murderous intentions. I have never sought  to encourage or promote 
violence and I never shall.40
Saga’s statement is undermined by her position as a leading figure in the extreme-
right music scene, which has a history of association with violence and terrorism, but 
there are differences between Saga’s and Breivik’s ideologies. Saga is a traditional 
white power musician, focusing on anti-Semitism, while Breivik’s prime concern 
was with Muslim occupation of Europe. Breivik actually  called Nazism genocidal 
and imperialistic, comparing it to Islam, communism and multiculturalism as a “hate 
ideology.” Both Breivik and Saga are, however, concerned about the political 
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regimes in Western countries, which they  see as fostering multiculturalism and 
undermining the white race.
 Along with Saga, Breivik mentioned two other musicians in his manifesto 
who have no connection to extreme-right ideology, Clint Mansell and Helene Bøksle. 
Breivik saw music as a perfect  way of maintaining morale and motivation while 
preparing for what he called a “martyrdom” operation. As well as using music 
extensively  in the preparation for his attack, Breivik wrote that he would be listening 
to these musicians while carrying out his “operation.” The music of Mansell that 
Breivik refers to was originally recorded as the soundtrack for the film Requiem for a 
Dream, but it was its use in Lord of The Rings which he writes about in his 
manifesto:
I love this work. Lux Aeterna means “eternal light” and it  really is an 
appropriate title. I’ve listened to this track several hundred times and I never 
seem to get  tired of it. The track is very inspiring and invokes a type of 
passionate rage within you. In Lord of the Rings – a good version of this track 
(Requiem for a Tower version which I think is the best) is performed during the 
most intense fighting of one of the central battles. Since it  has worked for me, it 
is likely that it will work for you. An invigorating piece of art.
Breivik’s obsession with computer games has been well reported, and although he is 
said to have used games like Modern Warfare to prepare for his “operation”, he much 
preferred fantasy  games such as World of Warcraft, or Age of Conan. The music of 
Bøksle is from the soundtrack of Age of Conan, and Breivik cited it  as “worthy  of 
playing during a martyrdom operation.”41  The use of music such as this seems to 
have allowed Breivik to envisage himself as a knight or crusader, fighting off the 
enemies of Europe.
 The example of Breivik shows various processes of ambiguation and 
softening; the music of Saga provided him with ideological confirmation in an 
aesthetic framework to which he could relate. The music of Mansell and Bøksle 
allowed him to visualise himself in battle, an appropriation perhaps not intended by 
the creators, but not a great step from the music’s context. The association of 
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Mansell’s music with Lord of the Rings may have also added an analogous layer to 
his own crusade.
Conclusion
The process of softening in extreme-right music has undoubtedly been driven in part 
by the censorship outlined in Chapter One, but those producing censorable music do 
not automatically resort to softening strategies. Indeed, some in the movement, such 
as the singer of German band Blutrausch, argue that legal threats are useful in 
filtering out the uncommitted to leave only the strong:
[T]he anti-fascists are getting more active. For the movement it is an advantage 
because the stronger the pressure [the] stronger become the links of unity and 
the scum of the movement is filtered out. Only the strong survive. So we think 
the movement is only getting stronger and the resistance will never die as long 
as we are alive.42
This social Darwinist interpretation is embodied in a refusal to compromise 
expression, and therefore simply to contravene pertinent legislation. However, even 
those who do not adapt the music itself do take steps to avoid prosecution: names are 
withheld, printed lyrics are deliberately inaccurate, and music is smuggled or shared 
on the Internet.
 Beyond this hardcore attitude, there is a desire to diversify extreme-right 
music, particularly in terms of content and audiences (with the former seen as a way 
of reaching the latter). Often, this results in softening, a move away from the 
particularly  controversial and confrontational material which stereotypically 
characterises the extreme right, and which can be regarded as alienating. While the 
extreme right are apt to accuse others of using subversion and coercion to achieve 
their goals, they are just as likely to advocate such techniques for their own cause: 
“Conversion is a game; a game of manipulation, subversion, infiltration, coercion, 
and seduction.”43 “Soft” introductory material is particularly  evident in the Projekt 
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Schulhof releases, and its imitators. Softening in music can be seen as parallel to the 
modernisation processes of political parties, which seeks to establish their legitimacy 
and make them more electorally appealing. 
 Such softening is driven not only  by  a desire to reach new audiences, but to 
accommodate extreme-right supporters who do not fit the conventional skinhead 
mould. Breivik’s writing on Saga clearly  shows that  ideological support alone is not 
enough, and that aesthetic considerations do matter. The increase of releases across a 
range of genres reveals a recognition on the part of extreme-right musicians that 
shared political identity does not necessarily  entail a shared musical or cultural 
identity. However, the barriers to entry in some genres—particularly the lack of 
success of female musicians in the more traditional forms such as Oi!—shows that 
there is still an expectation of conformity within this diversity.
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Conclusion:
What Music is Doing
The establishment of extreme-right music, as well as its development and 
reinvention, is probably the most successful strand of extreme-right activity  in recent 
years. Although it  would be reductive to imagine that the extreme right  is uniform, 
the study of this music reveals much regarding the dominant characteristics of this 
ideology. Conspiracism acts as an explanatory tool for extreme-right supporters who 
perceive themselves to be marginalised while believing in their own superiority, and 
also provides the imperative for the establishment of an extreme-right media, in 
which music is focal, to offer “truths” and reassurances to counter the allegedly 
subversive content of the conspirators. The elements which constitute this music 
scene are extremely important: specific musics are declared purely and authentically 
white, contrasted with black music, and therefore argued to be proof of racial and 
cultural differences which must be fought for to be preserved. More extreme versions 
of this argument depict black music as degenerate, and white music as indicative of 
white racial supremacy.
 While this rationalisation positions white music as a polar opposite to black 
music, distinctions are made within the umbrella of white music, particularly  in 
terms of class. Elitist narratives are employed, but these are repositioned as 
representative of whiteness rather than of social hierarchies. Within this whiteness, 
working-class values are privileged in a way which lauds the socioeconomic position 
of supporters and repudiates elites, particularly politicians, as race traitors. Extreme-
right rhetoric is thus weighted along class lines, but perhaps more so on gender lines. 
Men are dominant, and a particular sort of militaristic masculinity is privileged. 
Placing contemporary extreme-right  activists in the context of myth, such as 
positioning the skinhead as the modern-day equivalent  of the Viking warrior or Nazi 
stormtrooper, creates a thread through which past and present figures are linked 
together in the context of racial supremacy and struggle. Myth also attempts to 
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overcome the lack of religious unity across extreme-right supporters while acting—
particularly alongside fantasy—as analogy, with simple interpretations of struggle 
between good and evil given a racial spin. The appropriation of myth provides a 
thread through which the extreme right attempt to legitimate their cause; by  laying 
claim to a nation’s or a people’s past, the extreme right claim to embody  its present. 
Women, meanwhile, are generally expected to conform to specific roles, as sexual 
objects, mothers and wives, while their very  presence is hoped to attract other 
women to the cause. For this reason, female musicians are held up as proof of the 
inclusive nature of extreme-right politics, while other softening strategies are 
adopted in order to appeal to a broader base of potential support and to project an 
image of extreme-right ideology as unthreatening.
 Each of these aspects says something about  the ideological motivation behind 
extreme-right politics, as well as the specific disillusionment and frustrations that 
they  seek to appeal to. But while study  of extreme-right music can lead to a greater 
understanding of the ideology  behind it, it is important to remember that this is not 
merely a political expression, but also a musical phenomenon. With this in mind, it is 
worth considering the various ways in which music functions.
International Generalities, National Specifics
Extreme-right music plays a significant role in creating an international extreme-
right community. Since extreme-right politics is frequently the politics of race, belief 
in the inherent characteristics of whiteness is seen as overriding national distinctions. 
Indeed, the extreme-right music scene has British roots and the British model has 
been transplanted to other countries, with Ian Stuart Donaldson taking on iconic 
status. More recently, Saga, a Swedish singer, has risen to international prominence 
thanks to distribution by major American labels and coverage in American music 
magazines. Individual musicians thus become international figures, while music 
produced in a given country is perceived as having relevance to the political situation
—and listeners—in others. This internationalism is as old as the scene itself—
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fostered by  the circulation of music and associated media, particularly magazines—
but has intensified with the rise of digital media and the Internet which have 
facilitated and eased the fostering of transnational communities.
 But while narratives of whiteness are understood as nullifying national 
differences, these differences are revealed by  the distinctive musical cultures of the 
countries in question. These differences can be conspicuous: compare, for example, 
the inward-facing emphasis of the German scene—where songs in German are 
obviously tailored for a domestic audience—with the more outward-facing Swedish 
scene, where the prevalence of songs in English indicates a globalised intention. 
More subtle distinctions are also evident; while national music scenes may have their 
roots in the British model, that  model has been tailored to suit national contexts. 
Chapter One explored the varying nature of these national contexts, and showed how 
nationally-specific legislation can influence the production, distribution and content 
of music. Political contexts can be particularly  significant: in the United States, for 
example, violent revolution is seen as the primary hope of bringing about extreme-
right change, and this is reflected in the combative and violent nature of much of the 
music. The populist approach of the British National Party, on the other hand, directs 
hostility towards political elites in order to complement party political activities. 
Thus, while it is important to recognise the international nature of extreme-right 
music, particularly given the importance of this aspect to musicians and supporters, 
national specifics are highly significant and should not be overlooked in any 
analysis.
Making money; a secondary concern
While the income stream that music can provide can and has sustained various 
extreme-right political parties and movements, constructing musical identities is 
arguably most important. This is, after all, primarily  a “message music,” and while 
there are those in the movement who campaign against piracy to try and keep  the 
industry profitable, others want  it freely available in order to increase its chances of 
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reaching new audiences, to promote and advance the extreme-right cause; it needs to 
be heard and disseminated as much as possible to get its message across to the 
desired audience. Indeed, when music is perceived to be produced primarily for 
financial reasons it has caused significant schism within the extreme right, most 
notably in the rift between British bands and the National Front which resulted in the 
establishment of Blood & Honour.
 Thus, while the financial potential of extreme-right music has certainly been 
the main motivating factor for certain individuals and organisations, this cannot be 
considered simply as an “industry” which directs its profits into a political cause. For 
one thing, much of this music is unlikely to yield a significant profit; most extreme-
right musicians are unlikely to be able to support themselves solely  through music, 
and are therefore motivated by political conviction and appreciation of the culture of 
extreme-right music. What little financial potential the music has is also undercut by 
those who freely distribute it, either online or with physical copies, indicating 
ideological motivation rather than business sense. The fact that this often loss-
making music is still produced in significant quantities indicates that the value of 
extreme-right music is not primarily financial.
Integration/indoctrination/recruitment into a community
One of the foremost reasons that the extreme right value music is the belief that it 
can recruit and indoctrinate people into extreme-right politics. It is this which drives 
projects of free distribution such as the Projekt Schulhof CDs or file-sharing on the 
Internet. While it  is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of such campaigns, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that  music was a fundamental factor in bringing many  activists 
into extreme-right movements.
 Such examples suggest  that extreme-right music can act as a gateway: a 
liking for a music genre can lead to a deeper immersion in the subculture that 
surrounds it; if politics is an important component of a music-based subculture, a 
liking for the music may entail a more sympathetic reception to associated political 
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ideology. Music might not  be able to entirely convince listeners, but it can certainly 
play  a role in introducing a political philosophy or worldview. Furthermore, the role 
of musicians as political figures tallies with the extreme right’s assertion of being 
fundamentally different to established political elites, which are portrayed as out of 
touch and untrustworthy. In this context, a political message expressed by a musician 
may have a different resonance than if heard from a politician. The very existence of 
a musical culture dedicated to extreme-right politics can also help to legitimise 
extreme-right views through the implication that they are shared by this music’s 
audience; this certainly seems to have been the belief of Anders Behring Breivik.
 Further, music affords possibilities of socialisation within a group. The 
marginal status of extreme-right music, its essential invisibility in terms of mass 
culture, means that contact with it frequently  involves a social aspect, at least  when it 
comes to the enthusiastic listener. While it is possible, particularly  through Internet 
sources, to become familiar with extreme-right music in isolation, most evidence 
suggests that contact with the music scene is the result of attending concerts, being 
recommended to bands by  acquaintances, and being handed sampler CDs. Web 
forums provide numerous examples of this social side of becoming familiar with the 
music, with the curious frequently requesting advice on music.
Connecting the Community
These networks of introduction and indoctrination function as a means of connecting 
a community of already  like-minded adherents, offering a space to meet and create 
networks through music. The community is consolidated through talking about music 
on websites, through subscribing to magazines which mainly focus on music, and 
through sharing files on particular websites. Music thus creates its own spaces to 
meet and socialise, providing an opportunity for shared experiences across 
geographically distinct places, particularly valuable to isolated extreme-right 
supporters who may be reticent in openly declaring their affiliation.
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 Extreme-right music can also create spaces, both real and imaginary, for the 
enactment of violence. Often, as in the ritualistic acts which marry music and 
violence in concert settings, these spaces involve a degree of group  participation and, 
by extension, a sense of community. In addition, those preparing to commit acts of 
violence in the name of their political cause can, while living in isolation, feel 
connected to a wider community through music; this is certainly  true in the case of 
Anders Behring Breivik, who cited the value of music in maintaining his morale 
during the preparation for his attacks, as well as the role he imagined it would play in 
accompanying his operation.
Defining the community
As well as constructing the spaces in which extreme-right communities can exist, 
music plays an important role in identifying the characteristics of those communities, 
and in articulating hostility towards those on the outside, by contrasting “us” with 
“them.” Such distinctions can be based on a number of characteristics such as 
gender, race, religion and class. The limits of this distinction vary, and it is evident 
that the modernised extreme right have a significantly broader conception of “us” 
than many traditionalists, something musically evident from the softening of genres 
and the attempt to appropriate other musics and traditions.
 The extent to which this mindset of “us” and “them” is embedded in extreme-
right culture is well demonstrated by the extensive use of such rhetoric in extreme-
right lyrics. Frequently, extreme-right communities are portrayed as facing 
overwhelming odds. The readiness of their supporters to believe in conspiracies is an 
indication of the difficulties the extreme right face in disseminating their message; 
they  believe that their music and their ideology  are wilfully  suppressed by nefarious 
forces. As they  assume that the mass media are compromised by  such conspiracies, 
they  value the extreme-right music industry  for providing a means of unfiltered and 
uncensored mass communication, albeit limited in its reach. Furthermore, the belief 
in a conspiracy  is in part  predicated on the theorists’ belief that they have the insight 
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to see what is not  evident to others, another aspect which can consolidate a sense of 
“us”—the insightful—as opposed to the brainwashed or conspiratorial “them.”
 Fundamentally, extreme-right music asserts that  it  is authentic, particularly  in 
contrast to the mainstream music industry. This is partly  achieved through criticising 
mainstream culture as degenerate and artificial, while presenting extreme-right music 
as moral and virtuous, as by the common people and for their benefit. As such, the 
aesthetics and ideology  of extreme-right music reveal much about the broader nature 
of extreme-right politics in general. Ideological positions are of course circulated 
through lyrics, which are arguably more significant to listeners than in many other 
genres, and are widely  circulated in physical and downloadable album artwork, as 
well as widely available online. But just  as significant are the musical qualities and 
choices.
 Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this is in the interpretation and 
presentation of genre. Certain genres are frequently branded not only as “white,” but 
as demonstrating white supremacy, particularly  over non-white music. So, classical 
music becomes conflated with race rather than class, and its elite and refined 
reputation is presented as evidence of white superiority over less civilised non-
whites. Similarly, the understanding of the white working class as inherently decent, 
moral and upstanding is reflected in the extreme-right understanding of class-
associated genres such as country and folk music.
 Thus, the music not only transmits a message through lyrics, but also through 
other musical components. Just as folk and country music transmit messages about 
class, so confrontational rock and metal music provide at least  in part an opportunity 
to assert a particular masculine identity. The favoured vocal style is more easily 
achieved by men, while the physical nature of concert rituals feeds into the 
imagining of a space for extreme-right “warriors,” a space which values those 
qualities of masculinity which are perceived to have been eroded by sexual equality 
and feminism. Lyrics often echo these sentiments, and women are typically 
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discouraged or prevented from participating, thus maintaining the extreme-right 
music scene as a predominantly masculine domain.
 The fact that it is used in this way, to create a space which values a specific 
type of supposedly  marginalised masculinity, highlights another significant function 
of extreme-right music: providing listeners and musicians with a sense of agency and 
power. Extreme-right music is, in essence, a music of frustration. It not only 
articulates this frustration, but acts as an avenue through which particular frustrations 
can be addressed. So, as well as indulging masculinity, much of this music also seeks 
to unashamedly celebrate and promote a broader, white identity which is felt to be 
neglected in favour of other cultures.
 The extreme-right’s appeal to a specifically white identity  is a reaction to the 
normativity and consequent invisibility of whiteness, and the resultant sense of a lack 
of white culture, particularly in contrast to a readily  identifiable and highly visible 
black culture. This invisibility of whiteness has two significant consequences for the 
extreme right. First, they  must aggressively assert that a white culture exists, even if 
the propounded qualities and features of this culture vary widely. Second, they must 
present non-white cultures—which are often portrayed as degenerate, though less so 
by the “modernised” extreme right—as a threat to the integrity of this white culture. 
Often, the latter argument appropriates the language of diversity and 
multiculturalism, particularly  in an appeal to cultural distinctiveness which insists 
that white culture is a tangible reality and needs to be protected. These processes are 
often facilitated through the use and interpretation of music.
*
In summary, then, extreme-right music can fulfill the following roles:
1) Music aids the recruitment and indoctrination of new supporters, particularly since 
it is one of the primary means of disseminating extreme-right ideology; at the very 
least it is one of the primary means of circulating extreme-right ideas.
2) Music can play a role in assisting socialisation within the larger group, as an entry 
point into extreme-right culture and a guide to its norms, expectations and rituals.
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3) The culture and media surrounding music provide a significant means of 
connecting extreme-right supporters, both remotely (particularly through 
magazines and the Internet) and physically, most prominently  through gigs and 
festivals.
4) Music provides a significant means through which to imagine the community; the 
very existence of the music implies an audience which in turn, given the content 
of the music, implies a political community.
5) Related to the above, the imagining of a community/audience for this music can 
help  to legitimise extreme-right beliefs through the suggestion that they are shared 
by others.
6) This music defines the characteristics of “us” and “them.” This is achieved not 
only through the content of the lyrics, but  also through the qualities and 
characteristics of the music itself and what this is perceived to signify, particularly 
in terms of gender, class and race.
7) The extreme-right music scene, alongside other extreme-right media, provides an 
alternative to mainstream media and culture, which is perceived as antagonistic 
and hostile towards extreme-right progress.
8) This music is proclaimed to represent an authentically  “white” culture, particularly 
in contrast with mainstream culture which is deemed to promote “black” culture 
and encourage the destruction of the white race.
9) This music provides an avenue to articulate frustration felt by many extreme-right 
supporters.
10) Extreme-right music promotes a space to privilege a particular sort of 
masculinity, felt to be under attack as a result of equal-rights legislation.
11) The masculinity promoted is imbued with defiant, martial characteristics, and 
extreme-right music complements both the imagining and enactment of violence.
While these qualities help  to explain the continuing success of extreme-right music, 
the continual difficulty the extreme right face in understanding music—and, more 
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generally, the world—is in their necessary  reduction of all topics into binaries. Such 
reductionism is essential in portraying circumstances in terms of “us” and “them,” 
good and evil, moral and degenerate, white and non-white, indigenous and foreign. 
While such judgements can readily be discredited (although not necessarily in the 
eyes of those who subscribe to them) with reference to their basis on flimsy 
reasoning or false evidence, they also rely on presenting various categories—such as 
the sexes, racial and class groups, and music genres—as absolute, unvarying and 
homogeneous. Not only are such judgements undermined by the diverse, ambiguous 
and potentially contradictory nature of things in the real world, the existence of such 
contradictions leads to differing interpretations by  individual supporters and factions 
of the extreme right, contributing to the fundamental disunity which has so often 
characterised extreme-right politics.
 Arguably, then, the most important function of extreme-right  music is its 
ability  to help resolve ideological contradictions. This music frequently  presents a 
perspective which is simplistic and straightforward; as such, it can often be agreed 
upon by  supporters, providing a common cause which otherwise might be hard to 
establish. Even so, as the analysis in this thesis suggests, the music often accentuates 
the very contradictions it seeks to harmonise, and exposes the challenges those 
contradictions present to extreme-right unity in the present day.
Taking Things Further
As outlined in the Introduction, much of the existing literature on extreme-right 
music has been produced by anti-Fascist organisations. While this literature is 
extremely useful, the vested interest  of these activist groups needs to be recognised 
as potentially dictating, or at least skewing, the emphasis of their work. Anti-Fascist 
organisations often need to attract outside support and funding; for this reason, there 
is a tendency to emphasise the threat and relevance of the extreme right, and to 
campaign for action against it. Much of the academic literature has taken a similar 
approach, emphasising the dangerous and violent side of extreme-right politics, and 
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in so doing raising awareness. There is nothing inherently  wrong with this approach, 
but I have sought to balance it  by  understanding what extreme-right music is doing, 
what needs and desires it is addressing, and in turn what lies behind its appeal. It  is 
not enough to consider how extreme-right music circulates and which figures are 
behind it; it is just as important to consider why.
 Another way of understanding this thesis is as an analysis of a political 
grouping which constitutes and expresses itself primarily  through music. In this way, 
it corroborates Street’s argument that  music can be a form of political experience.1 
Studies of the extreme right from political science have tended to focus on specific 
political parties, their manifestos and electoral performance; studies of extreme-right 
music have tended to neglect the significance of music as a means of political 
expression. In this work I have sought to unify  these two approaches, recognising the 
qualities particular to music and its importance as a means of cultural expression, 
while acknowledging that extreme-right music provides a site where politics can take 
place.
 While this dissertation has obvious resonances with the study and 
understanding of extreme-right politics, it has significance for work in other 
disciplines. General assessments of the relationship between music and politics have 
tended to fall into two broad categories: accounts and investigations of the 
relationship  between music and the state; and the use of music by social movements 
and campaigns independent of the state. This thesis belongs to the latter category, but 
is distinctive in its focus, since other works have tended to focus on left-wing 
movements and progressive initiatives.2  This is not to dismiss the content of this 
literature, but to point out that it creates a celebratory characterisation of music’s 
political potential due to a focus on particular political strands, and that incorporating 
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the use of music by other political affiliations will lead to a fuller understanding of 
the relationship between music and politics.
 Johnson and Cloonan point out that popular music studies tends to advocate 
the object of its study, to romanticise and valourise them and therefore to overlook 
“darker” aspects of popular music.3 The present study is not only relevant to Johnson 
and Cloonan’s point for demonstrating the ways in which music is used in a 
“negative” way by  the extreme right, but because many of the ways in which the 
extreme right understand music are extensions of commonplace narratives in 
mainstream culture. This is most evident with regard to the racialised understanding 
of genre, the notion that certain genres “belong” to specific racial groups and that 
there are innate musical qualities distinct to racial groups. This racial perspective on 
music is evident in academic literature: there is no shortage of work on “black” 
music, but comparatively  little on how “whiteness” in music is understood, 
particularly  outside the realms of explicitly racist music, highlighting the 
commonplace assumption that race is only significant in non-white contexts.
 I have picked out the example of race here, but similar analyses could be 
forwarded with reference to extreme-right  narratives of gender, class, religion and 
national identity. It is, therefore, not uncommon for conventions and commonplace 
assumptions in the mainstream to be put into the service of extremism. This is 
significant for a number of reasons. First, extremism does not exist in a vacuum, and 
it is important to consider not only those aspects which mark it as “extreme,” but also 
the commonalities it  holds with wider culture. Second, while the study of extremism 
is important in itself, it can also play an important role in elucidating common 
features of its host society, particularly  how unspoken, or at least  largely 
unrecognised, assumptions about identity permeate culture.
 More specifically, this thesis is intended as a contribution to the 
understanding of the relationship between cultural expression and violence. This is 
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something of a nascent field which has understandably focused on specific acts of 
violence and links to music. While extreme-right case studies can contribute to this 
approach—particularly of such major attacks as those perpetrated by  Anders Behring 
Breivik, but also acts of violence at a “lower” level—this musical culture 
demonstrates another significance of the music-violence relationship, specifically the 
value of music as symbolic violence. Violence here is not necessarily  enacted, but 
imagined, an everyday means of coping with frustration.
 Finally, the concept of softening introduced here can be a helpful concept for 
understanding the evolution of political parties and ideas. Many extreme-right 
movements are undergoing softening processes and it can therefore appear that 
extremism is on the wane; however, as I have sought to demonstrate, it has merely 
adapted to suit contemporary circumstances. While political parties of the extreme 
right can achieve successes in the democratic realm thanks to a softer approach, their 
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